Abstract

National security cognoscenti are busy sifting tea leaves trying to puzzle out the fate of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the new Administration. Of special concern to these policy gurus is the future of the semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's existence as a separate entity on the executive branch's organization chart is precarious. The agency has never functioned as intended since Congress created it in 1961. Its stock over the decades has ebbed and flowed, paralleling the prominence and clout of its director. And except for a few notable successes--the conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty being one--the agency's authority has plummeted in the past 14 years. Today, almost every interested party agrees that something has to be done, that the agency cannot continue as it now functions. Several recent studies have called for its rejuvenation. Still other studies have suggested that ACDA be dismantled, and those activities relevant to national security in a post-Cold War environment be shifted to and integrated into the State Department. Observers expect ACDA to evolve into an agency whose primary focus is on problems of proliferation. In a world in which tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, restraint on armsmore » transfers, and economic assistance conditional on a recipients's security behavior will be the norm for security and stability, a role for ACDA as the U.S.'s nonproliferation nanny is not a bad one.« less

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