Aristotle's Doctrine Research Articles

Human senses and sensors from Aristotle to the present.

This historical review on the semantic evolution of human senses and sensors revealed that Aristotle's list of the five senses sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell is still in use among non-scientific lay persons. It is no surprise that his classification in the work "De Anima" (On the Soul) from 350 BC confuses the sensor "touch" with the now more comprehensively defined somatosensory system and that senses are missing such as the later discovered vestibular system and the musculotendinous proprioception of the position of parts of the body in space. However, it is surprising that in the three most influential ancient cultures, Egypt, Greece, and China-which shaped the history of civilization-the concept prevailed that the heart rather than the brain processes perception, cognition, and emotions. This "cardiocentric view" can be traced back to the "Doctrine of Aristotle," the "Book of the Dead" in ancient Egypt, and the traditional Chinese medicine of correspondence documented in the book "Huang di Neijing." In Greek antiquity the philosophers Empedocles, Democritus and Aristotle were proponents of the allocation of the spirit and the soul to the heart connected to the body via the blood vessels. Opponents were the pre-Socratic mathematician Pythagoras, the philosopher Plato, and especially the Greek physician Hippocrates who regarded the brain as the most powerful organ in humans in his work "De Morbo Sacro." The Greek physician Galen of Pergamon further elaborated on the concept of the brain ("cephalocentric hypothesis") connected to the body by a network of nerves. The fundamental concepts for understanding functions and disorders of the vestibular system, the perception of self-motion, verticality and balance control were laid by a remarkable group of 19th century scientists including Purkynӗ, Mach, Breuer, Helmholtz, and Crum-Brown. It was also in the 19th century that Bell described a new sense of a reciprocal sensorimotor loop between the brain and the muscles which he called "muscular sense," later termed "kinaesthesia" by Bastian and defined in 1906 as "proprioception" by Sherrington as "the perception of joint and body movements as well as position of the body or body segments, in space." Both, the vestibular system and proprioception could be acknowledged as senses six or seven. However, we hesitate to recommend "pain"-which is variously assigned to the somatosensory system or extero-, intero-, visceroception-as a separate sensory system. Pain sensors are often not specific but have multisensory functions. Because of this inconsistent, partly contradictory classification even by experts in the current literature on senses and sensors we consider it justified to recommend a comprehensive reorganization of classification features according to the present state of knowledge with an expansion of the number of senses. Such a project has also to include the frequent task-dependent multisensory interactions for perceptual and sensorimotor achievements, and higher functions or disorders of the visual and vestibular systems as soon as cognition or emotions come into play. This requires a cooperation of sensory physiologists, neuroscientists and experienced physicians involved in the management of patients with sensory and multisensory disorders.

Средний термин, причина и суть бытия

The article deals with Aristotle's doctrine of syllogism as an elementary form of proof. According to Aristotle, of all fourteen valid syllogism forms, the first form of the first figure is best suited for this task, since its conclusion is "general and affirmative." But Aristotle also considers a special case of this syllogism form, when both terms of the first premise are equal, and its converse goes without restriction. Aristotle shows that in this case, on purely logical grounds, it is impossible to distinguish middle term from major, since they are interchangeable. Therefore, such syllogisms turn out to be ambiguous and do not prove anything. What is to be done? Aristotle turns to epistemological grounds to make the definition converse impossible and thus to get the ability to state it as the major syllogism premise. He claims that knowledge of the formal cause of a thing leads to the knowledge of a thing itself, but not vice versa. A determinable requires clarification with the help of the determinant, and not on the contrary. Therefore, the formal cause of a thing by Aristotle is always the cause, and not the thing itself, or the action. Therefore, if the definition serves as a major premise of the syllogism, then the formal cause of a thing always turns out to be a middle term, while for the major premise stands the thing itself. Thus, the interchangeability of terms is disestablished, since, as Aristotle says, the cause has the first place in comparison with its effect. As a result, a syllogism becomes complete, unambiguous, and quite “usable”.

MАRKАZIY OSIYО XALQLARI FALSAFASIDA NATURFALSAFIY G`OYALARNING ILGARI SURILISHI VA ASOSLANISHI

Today it is important to study the important ideas of Eastern philosophy in the field of natural science and important conceptual ideas in the teachings of thinkers on this subject. The need to study medieval Muslim philosophy In African countries, the question of the role of spiritual traditions, including traditions based on Beruni, in modern ideological life are of great importance.The concept of Eastern Aristotelianism was analyzed, representing not only the philosophical system or doctrine of Aristotle, but also rationalism, firmly associated with natural philosophy, and through it -medieval rationalistic philosophy. His relentless struggle for independence led to the spread of the achievements of Indian, Central Asian, Iranian and especially Greek scientific thought, which contributed to the development of secular science. In the 10th century, there were 17 madrasahs in Samarkand, in Samarkand alone, which during the Caliphate had a large library and an astronomical observatory, which are considered to have made a radical turn in cultural life

Aristotle and Newman on the Concreteness of Theoretical Knowing

Aristotle and Newman on the Concreteness of Theoretical Knowing Jonathan Buttaci* "Aristotle has been my master."1 In The Idea of a University John Henry Newman affirmed the inevitable influence—overt or covert—of Aristotle on our thinking. He wrote: While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it.2 This approach, in general, motivates the present article, reflecting on Aristotelian themes in Newman's thought and, in turn, exploring how he might aid the scholar of Aristotle. I argue that, at least in one crucial respect, Newman's thought is even more thoroughly Aristotelian than has been appreciated. [End Page 56] More specifically, this paper begins with an insight animating Newman's thought throughout his life and its potential tension with Aristotle. Newman wrote (and reiterated), "After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. He is influenced by what is direct and precise."3 This remark may be taken to be un-Aristotelian or even anti-Aristotelian in spirit, and on at least two counts. First, Aristotle and those working in the Aristotelian tradition commonly regard man as a rational and reasoning animal, indeed, defining him as such.4 Second, for Aristotle the characteristic human activity is theoretical or contemplative activity most of all. If that means trading in what is abstract and universal, as is commonly held, then by saying "[man] is influenced by what is direct and precise," Newman would have been proposing a substantial revision of Aristotelian views of theoretical knowledge, even while acknowledging an enormous debt to Aristotle's practical philosophy.5 So goes one interpretation of Newman's work based on a certain understanding of Aristotle's theory.6 According to this interpretation, in emphasizing concrete particulars and "what is direct and precise," Newman thereby thought "practice controls theory,"7 reversing the Aristotelian priority of theoretical knowing. If this were the right view, although Aristotle had been his master in general, Newman would have departed from Aristotle on this point by prioritizing the concrete, practical, and imaginative, and by subordinating the abstract, theoretical, and intellectual.8 [End Page 57] In this article I argue against that interpretation. Instead, Newman was more Aristotelian than it may seem, at least on this issue.9 Far from being un- or anti-Aristotelian, Newman's insistence that we are not merely syllogizing animals, and that even our theoretical knowledge is rooted in and directed toward concrete particulars, is thoroughly at home within Aristotle's thought. In fact, careful attention to Aristotle's scientific works shows the importance of familiarity with concrete particulars, as both the origin and the end of theoretical knowing. When these passages are read with Newman's chief philosophical insights in mind, they correct a common misreading of Aristotle, in fact, the very misreading that generates the alleged tension between Newman and Aristotle on this issue. As we shall see, Aristotle did not favor abstractions while rendering concrete experience superfluous or merely preparatory. On the contrary, even in Aristotle's account of theoretical knowing, the abstract is subordinated to the concrete. This way of reading Aristotle helps us to appreciate an even greater harmony between them.10 PRACTICAL LOGOS, INCARNATE AND EMPTY Before examining Newman's alleged departure from Aristotle when it comes to theoretical knowing, I begin with one strand of Newman's thinking that is uncontroversially Aristotelian. My eventual aim is to see how these uncontroversial Aristotelian debts in the practical case reveal deeper connections in their accounts of theoretical knowing. [End Page 58] Let us begin with a quote from Newman's sermon "On Holiness."11 Each of the following passages reveals the broadly Aristotelian view about human...

Marriage, Courtship and Aristotle's Spouidaia in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice

For Aristotle, seriousness is one of the loftiest qualities a human can acquire, requiring a level of refined practical judgment that rules an individual in private and public life. While Aristotle’s Politics is not known for its praise for the role of women’s rationality in society, he argues in this text that women can develop the sort of judgment to be serious, and that through this quality they play an important role in the regime, particularly through the experience of married life, for “it can be argued that even within her restricted domestic sphere the woman demonstrates considerably more virtue than Aristotle's official doctrine allows” . If romantic love is an important part of the human experience, and marriage is one manifestation of romantic love, understanding the ways that the human personality develops within the experiences of courtship and marriage is an important task. Moreover, understanding the ways that social structures can promote, or impede, the fostering of romantic love, is necessary to consider, especially if we take Aristotle’s insight into the importance of marriage to regimes seriously.

О ЦАРСТВЕ ЭЙДОСОВ

The article deals with the ontology of Plato, which contains three parts: pure being, complete non-being, and something in-between. Pure being is the kingdom of eidē: genera and species. Complete non-existence in itself does not exist and makes itself felt only in conjunction with being, forming what lies between it and pure being, i.e. the world of individuals. The main difference between eidē and individuals is that the former are eternal, and the latter are transient. The ontology of Plato is compared with the doctrine of Aristotle that every individual consists of material substance and form. Aristotle considers the primordial substance to be a solid formless substrate, which in itself does not exist, but manifests itself only when it gets a form. The forms for it are eidē, in particular lower species. When an individual arises, a certain part of material substance combines with a part of one or another lower species, thus acquiring a form corresponding to it. When an individual dies, his material part ceases to exist, dissolving in primary matter, and its form, being an eidos, retains its existence forever in the realm of eidē, as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus teach about this.

Interpretation of signs in the conception of Ch.S. Pierce via predicabilia and categories of Aristotle

The article is devoted to the hypothesis explaining the order of signs' classes presented in the manuscripts and articles of Ch.S.Pierce via the diagram of relations of Aristotle's categories which was described in the first translation of Aristotle into Latin conducted after Boethius by Julius Pacius.The hypothesis allows explaining not only the order of categories in the Ch.S.Pierces diagram but also interpreting them via ten categories of Aristotle on the background of scholastic tradition of depicting relations.The conclusion is drawn that the theory of Ch.S.Pierce seems to be the development of Aristotle's doctrine of categories.The article can contribute to the history of philosophy.

Alexandre dʼAphrodise et la κίνησις ἀναίτιος

Alexander of Aphrodisias has defended an aristotelian conception of responsability, particularly in his treatise On Fate , which presents "Aristotle's doctrine about fate and what depends on us" ( De fato , 1), and in some texts of Mantissa or Quaestiones. This defence led him to reiterate traditional anti-determinist arguments (for example the argument by legal, moral and social consequences) as well as to propose new ones. Among his rather creative and bold arguments, we can include one that admits the existence of a movement without cause, kinesis anaitios. This point is developed in Mantissa XXII, through a passage whose authenticity is highly discussed. I will attempt to show that, even if this text cannot be attributed to Alexander with certainty, it echoes some genuine alexandrian arguments, developed in the treatise On Fate .

Lógos apofántico y apertura al mundo. El carácter derivado de la verdad proposicional en "Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit"

This work considers Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle's doctrine of logos apophantikos. Through a singular interpretation of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, Heidegger rejects the traditional notion of truth as "adaequatio" that takes place in judgement to offer an alternative comprehension in terms of unconcealment.

When organizations are too good: Applying Aristotle's doctrine of the mean to the corporate ethical virtues model

AbstractAristotle's doctrine of the mean states that a virtue is the mean state between two vices: a deficient and an excessive one. The Corporate Ethical Virtues (CEV) Model defines the mean and the corresponding deficient vice for each of its seven virtues. This paper defines for each of these virtues the corresponding excessive vice and explores why organizations characterized by these excessive vices increase the likelihood that their employees will behave unethically. The excessive vices are patronization, pompousness, lavishness, zealotry, overexposure, talkativeness, and oppressiveness.

Elementos Neoplatónicos en el Sirr al-Asrār (Secretum Secretorum). Atribuido a Aristóteles

Inheritors of the Alexandrian and Athenian Hellenistic tradition, the Arabs drew from a Neoplatonized Aristotle systematized through different attributed works, among them, the Sirr al-asrār, the Secretum secretorum in the Latin translation in which some genuine Aristotle doctrines are blended with Platonic, Neoplatonic, Neopythagorean and Hermetic elements. Brought in as a letter from Aristotle to Alexander, one of its chapters provides a Neoplatonic explanation of the Universe: while claiming that God’s nature is a simple spiritual substance from which the rest of the creation arisen, man is viewed as the unifying element of all created essences.

The Substance of De Spiritu.

The aim of this paper is to depict the anatomical and physiological doctrines of the treatise entitled Περι πνευματος, or De spiritu. By closely examining the contents of the treatise on its own accord, rather than through its Aristotelian or Hellenistic contexts, we attempt to overcome the aporetic and often disconnected style of the author, and to present a coherent picture of his doctrine of pneuma, its roles in the body, the anatomical structures in which it acts, and its relation to the soul. We argue that the author envisions three main systems in the body: artēriai, by which external air is taken in, turned into pneuma and distributed to different parts of the body; phlebes, by which blood is produced and distributed; bones and neura, which support the body and effect locomotion. Pneuma is shown to run through the system of artēriai, whereby it performs vital activities such as thermoregulation, digestion and pulsation. It is also engaged in activities such as perception and locomotion, in the form of the "connate pneuma," which, we propose, is a component of bodily parts. The author connects pneuma very closely with soul, and although he is familiar with Aristotle's doctrine of the soul, he does not see to embrace it.

Science and Self

Imagine saying to Hegel that his dialectic patterns occur in the behavior of magnets and rivers and trees, and that the self-understanding of spirit is an operation going on in brain tissue. That the descriptions in his Phenomenology of Spirit picture the behavior of social groups and changes in cultural norms and memes. Hegel's reaction would be complex but not hostile. You would find yourself in a discussion with him about different kinds and levels of categories, and the relation of physical science to his overall logic.Now imagine saying to Heidegger that his description of the care structure of Dasein is a sophisticated reworking of folk psychology, and that it is the result of what amounts to a software program. That his Fourfold is a description of the appearing of a world, based upon neurological and social processes. That his history of being is open to sociological analysis and historical and economic explanation. Heidegger would react to such claims more sharply. You would find yourself in a discussion with him about being caught in das Gestell, and the need to step back from attempts to absolutize one language and one revelation of beings.How would these different reactions play out in a discussion of the ontology of the self? This present essay approaches these major continental thinkers with a question from analytic philosophy, to see how they might respond.In standard mind/body discussions we find two rival descriptive languages with different sets of entities. One talks about ideas, purposes, awareness, meanings, concepts, norms, intentions, and so on. The other talks about the behavior of cells and electrical currents, brain activities, and entities described by physics.There are thinkers who argue that folk talk about thoughts and meanings could be in principle abandoned even in everyday life, replaced by descriptions that involved only physical scientific entities. Others argue that folk talk is not dispensable. Daniel Dennett and Wilfrid Sellars would say that we need to take up the intentional stance and avow social and linguistic norms in order to function in a meaningful social world. Kant had already argued that there is a practical necessity to view ourselves as free agents, no matter what our science may say. These considerations suggest that the tension between the modes of discussion cannot be easily wished away by eliminating one of them.DIFFERENT ONTOLOGIESOne could say that these two languages are using different ontologies. I am using ontology here in a sense derived from analytic philosophers who ask your ontology include . . . [relations, sets, second level properties, mereological wholes, abstract entities, Cartesian souls, etc.]? An ontology in this sense is the list of approved types of entities that are being affirmed as ultimately real. In most such discussions there is little talk about ontology in an older sense, namely, about the mode of being of those beings which analytic discussions often presuppose to be immediate factual presence. Much more active modes of being are affirmed in Whitehead or in Bergson or Deleuze, or in Aristotle's doctrine of potentiality. For none of these thinkers does being equal simple, positive presence. For them such presence is a result, and it is so independently of whatever processes bring it to presence for us in experience.But if we do ask about modes of being, beyond the factual lists, then other more traditional ontological questions arise: In Aristotle's terms, are the movements of Hegel's dialectic substantial changes or accidental, or relational, or what? Is Heidegger's Dasein or Hegel's spirit a substance? Or a set of emergent properties? How do we individuate Dasein(s)? Does Hegel's spirit have its own individuated self-consciousness? What kind of being do the components of the Fourfold have, and how do they relate to everyday objects and scientific entities?Ontology matters. When David Hume looks for his self, he can't find it. …

Aristóteles y el objeto de la ciencia en la lógica tardomedieval

La idea de ciencia desarrollada por Aristóteles en sus tratados de lógica fue una referencia necesaria para los pensadores medievales. No obstante, la interpretación que propusieron Ockham y los nominalistas llevó a una revolución lingüística en la formulación de este concepto. Vincent Ferrer, aunque continuando con la tradición tomista, asume la transformación lingüística que trajo el nominalismo y reformula la doctrina aristotélica.

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics (review)

Reviewed by: The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics Matthew Walker Paula Gottlieb. The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xix + 241. Cloth, $85.00. In this work, Paula Gottlieb offers a wide-ranging overview of Aristotle's virtue ethics that puts Aristotle's doctrine of the mean at the center of discussion. She distinguishes this doctrine from a doctrine of moderation, and identifies the doctrine as one of equilibrium: just as a well-calibrated scale registers the right weight, the well-calibrated, virtuous agent responds appropriately in his circumstances. The virtues, then, are balanced dispositions (between extremes). Further, they are in a mean "relative to us," where, Gottlieb argues, the specific features of the agent that such relativity concerns vary according to the sort of situation that the agent faces. Against this background, the first half of Gottlieb's book examines various issues that surround Aristotle's theory of virtue. Gottlieb argues that Aristotle can appeal to the doctrine of the mean to identify and independently establish certain dispositions as virtues, even if they are not recognized as virtues in a particular cultural context. Hence, Gottlieb's account emphasizes Aristotle's "nameless" virtues, and suggests that Aristotle's theory does not simply recapitulate conventional Greek ethical beliefs. After rebutting the claim (attributed to Philippa Foot and Christine Korsgaard) that virtues are remedial dispositions that correct flaws in human nature, Gottlieb appeals to the doctrine of the mean to explain why certain dispositions (e.g., perseverance) plausibly fail to possess virtue-status, just as she explains how such putative virtues as benevolence show up on Aristotle's table in the form of generosity, magnificence, and friendliness. In a brief discussion, Gottlieb applies the doctrine of the mean to defend the virtue-status of certain dispositions that Aristotle does not explore (e.g., tolerance). In examining Aristotle's unity of the virtues thesis, Gottlieb offers a useful discussion of the sense in which ethical virtue is a disposition "involving" (meta) reason, not one merely "according to" (kata) reason. On a traditional reading, dispositions are "according to" reason if they follow a source of reason external to the agent (e.g., the agent's parents), whereas they "involve" reason if they follow the agent's own reasoned understanding. On an alternative reading (proposed by J. A. Smith), by contrast, dispositions "involve" reason if they are merely accompanied by reason, but are "according to" reason if they are actually caused by reason. On Gottlieb's proposal, however, dispositions "involve" reason when they are thoroughly integrated with reason, whereas dispositions are merely "according to" reason when they incidentally follow what reason prescribes (as happens, e.g., in the case of the enkratic agent). In the second half of the book, Gottlieb turns her attention to Aristotle's views on ethical reasoning, and she explores such topics as the practical syllogism, fine motivation, what the virtuous agent needs to know, and the political implications of Aristotle's theory of virtue. In a stimulating chapter, Gottlieb examines how Aristotle would treat problems of dirty hands and tragic dilemmas. According to Gottlieb, Aristotle denies that virtuous agents facing bad options perform base deeds that taint their characters. Rather, Aristotle allows that an action bad without qualification can nevertheless be good with qualification (in certain pressing circumstances). For instance, if an agent finds himself in a situation in which he must obey a tyrant's orders to save his family, he may nevertheless do the best he [End Page 397] can in the circumstances—and perform the right action—by obeying the tyrant. While the agent may feel regret for obeying the tyrant, the agent's character need not be tainted; the agent's regret need not extend to himself, but may extend only to the bad circumstances in which he has found himself. Gottlieb is a straightforward writer. Her accessible prose makes this a suitable volume not only for Aristotle specialists, but also for students of normative ethics who seek an overview of Aristotle's virtue ethics and its differences from Kantian and utilitarian moral theories. Her book performs the worthy task of highlighting the doctrine of the mean's important...

Where is the Truth in History? How does the Discipline of History Relate to ‘The Faith of the Gospel’ (PHIL. 1:27)?

History began as the first of the Arts, using personal investigation to judge human affairs. Philosophy defined the nature of the cosmos using logic to show that it was complete, and therefore incapable of change. After a millennium Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the universe was refuted. The saga of creation in Genesis gave the world a history, open to testing by experiment. The gospel of Paul expected that the old would pass awaj in the end. History would not now repeat itself, so rhetorical lessons were displaced by verbatim citation to document developments.

Creation, the Trinity and Prisca Theologia in Julius Caesar Scaliger

Among Renaissance, the various Platonism schools had of ancient the most philosophy decisive impact which on were the rediscovered intellectual scene. in the Renaissance, Platonism had the most decisive impact on the intellectual scene. After Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) translated all the Platonic dialogues into Latin, this philosophical current was disseminated widely among the intellectuals of the time. Although it never challenged the longstanding dominance of Aristotelianism, its impact was considerable enough to arouse debates between the followers of Plato and those of Aristotle. The Platonists claimed that Platonic philosophy was compatible with Christian faith, while the doctrines of Aristotle were irreconcilable with it. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, insisted on the superiority of Aristotle. There were also some thinkers who tried to reconcile the two great philosophers. These debates, which are now called the 'Plato-Aristotle controversy', began in the middle of the fifteenth century and continued over the course of the next century.1 Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) was one of the leading Aristotelians of this period.2 His philosophical masterpiece Exotericae exercitationes (Paris 1557), written as a critique of the Milanese physician Girolamo Cardano's (1501-76) De subtilitate (Nuremberg 1550), became a major textbook of metaphysics and natural philosophy in transalpine countries during the first half of the seventeenth century. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), who was familiar with this tradition, used Scaliger's name as a synonym for a great philosopher.3 Historians have also pointed out that his unique interpretation of Aristotle was incorporated in the doctrine of early modern atomists such as Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) and David Gorlaeus (1591-1612).4 Yet,

Pojęcie duszy w naukach kognitywnych.

Do the traditional, commonsense and philosophical concepts of the soul have any place in the contemporary cognitive sciences, which start from the premise that everything is scientifically explainable using naturalistic categories? To answer this question we should mention that most cognitive naturalists today - philosophers and scientists - are materialists, and methodological materialism is probably universally accepted among scientists these days. It is very difficult to find a place in such a picture of the world for the soul as it appears in our commonsense picture of how things are. It is the tension between these two pictures that generates the contemporary problems connected with the soul. In order to try to resolve this tension we first describe the concept of the soul and its close connection with the organic body. Then we present a critical characterisation of two things: 1) the development of the empirical sciences - Galen, Descartes, Newton, Gall, Galvani - and the resulting eliminativistic implications for the philosophical concept of the soul; 2) a pair of naturalistic philosophical explanations of the soul-body problem: the nonreductionist view of the soul and the eliminative materialist view. The third part of the article involves giving a short answer to the question of how Aristotle's doctrine regarding the soul is based on his attempt to explain internal and external movement. After that we compare his explanation of these forms of movement with two kinds of contemporary neurological explanation: a) that of the neurologist R. Llinas, who, for explanatory purposes, postulates the existence of a theoretical (i.e. epiphenomenal) self; b) the more realistic explanation presented by the neurologist A. Damasio, who posits three different versions of the self, before trying to link them to corresponding parts of the human brain that, in turn, are closely connected with the body. It can then be shown that there are several similarities between Aristotle's conception of the soul and Damasio's cognitivist conception of the self, and that, because of the different starting points and explanatory goals involved, the contemporary concept of the self does not completely exclude the traditional concept of the soul.

The Deformation of Professional Formation: Managerial Targets and the Undermining of Professional Judgement

Is it helpful to model the idea of professional formation on ethical formation? ing from the specifically ethical interest of Aristotle's own doctrine, in the ‘narrow’, ‘moral’ sense of ethical, and aiming at the same time for an inclusive, ‘broad’ formulation which extends to various types of métiers (occupations/professions), this paper argues that an Aristotelian perspective offers a more robust concept of personal, professional and civic responsibility—‘responsibleness’—than any that our present ‘managerial’ rationality can promote. Drawing on some Aristotelian texts, I show that the practical knowledge of one with ‘formation’ (appropriate to the métier in question) enables an agent to find the relevant end and the appropriate act in the name of that end—as if simultaneously. The end and the means to the end are perfectly suited to one another. Crucially, the structure of the agent's practical reasoning is grounded on the telos which guides the agent and this is summoned implicitly from formation. This Aristotelian model of practical rationality stands as a rival to the public rationality that now predominates, a rationality which sees the meeting of explicit, pre-specified outcomes, objectives or targets as the chief way in which the accountability of agents may be secured.

Student participation in health professions education research: in pursuit of the Aristotelian mean

In research ethics reviews, traditional approaches of research ethics boards (REBs) balance the risks with the potential for benefit of proposed studies, and this review process has been similar for health professions education research (HPER) as it has been for clinically based studies. Health professions students are the primary population from which most education researchers draw their participants although relatively little discussion has taken place in the literature regarding student participation in HPER. The majority of HPER studies could be considered minimal risk and therefore many have suggested that such studies be exempted from REB review. However, there are not only risks to student participants which require consideration, but I argue that when this issue is viewed through the lens of Aristotle's virtue ethics, there are also potential benefits to the student, for which REB oversight can be helpful, that have not factored strongly into discussions. This paper seeks to highlight the key factors involved in student participation in HPER; to explore Aristotle's doctrine of the mean and to evaluate how this ethical framework can add value to the discussion; and to propose possible applications of the Aristotelian mean to this issue and address some of the challenges that would arise with its application.