Aristotelian Science Research Articles

Imam Gazzali: A Great Philosopher of Islam

Imam Gazzali is known one of the most prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, logicians and mystics of the Islamic Golden Age. He is considered to be the 5th century’s mujaddid, means a renewer of the faith, who, according to the prophetic hadith, appears once every hundred years to restore the faith of the Islam and its community. His works were so highly acclaimed by his contemporaries that al-Ghazali was awarded by the honour of the title “Hujjat al-Islam” means “Proof of Islam” Gazzali believed that the Islamic spiritual tradition had become moribund and that the spiritual sciences taught by the first generation of Muslim had been forgotten. This belief led him to write his mugnum opus entitled ‘Ihyaulumad-din’ (The Revival of the Religious Science). Among his other works, the Tuhfat al- Falasifa (Incoherence of the philosophers) is a landmark in the history of philosophy, as it advances the critique of Aristotelian science developed later in 14th century in Europe. Others have cited his opposition to certain stands of Islamic philosophy as a detriment to Islamic scientific progress. Besides his work that successfully changed the course of Islamic philosophy the early Islamic Neo-Platonism that developed on the grounds of Hellenistic philosophy, for example, was so successfully criticized by al- Ghazzali that it never recovered—he also brought the orthodox Islam of his time in close contact with Sufism. It became increasingly possible for individuals to combine orthodox theology and Sufism, while adherents of both camps developed a sense of mutual appreciation that made sweeping condemnation of one by the other increasingly problematic.Al-Ghazzali occupies a unique position in the history of Muslim religious and philosophical thought by whatever standard we may judge him. Al-Subki went so far in his estimation of him as to claim that if there had been a prophet after Muhammad, al-Ghazzali would have been the man. Various spiritual phases developed by him. He was in turn a canon-lawyer and a scholastic, a philosopher and a skeptic, a mystic and a theologian, and a moralist. His position as a theologian of Islam is undoubtedly the most eminent. Through a living synthesis of his creative and energetic personality, he revitalized Muslim theology and reoriented its values and attitudes.His combination of spiritualization and fundamentalism in Islam had such a marked stamp of his powerful personality that it has continued to be accepted by the community since his time. His outlook on philosophy is characterized by a remarkable originality which, however, is more critical than constructive. In his works on philosophy one is struck by a keen philosophical acumen and penetration with which he gives a clear and readable exposition of the views of the philosophers, the subtlety and analyticity with which he criticizes them, and the candour and open-mindedness with which he accepts them whenever he finds them to be true. Nothing frightened him nor fascinated him, and through an extraordinary independence of mind, he became a veritable challenge to the philosophies of Aristotle and Plotinus and to their Muslim representatives before him, al-Farabi and ibnSina. The main trends of the religious and philosophical thought of al-Ghazali, however, come close to the temper of the modern mind. The champions of the modern movement of religious empiricism, on the one hand, and that of logical positivism, on the other, paradoxical though it may seem, would equally find comfort in his works. The teachings of this remarkable figure of Islam pertaining either to religion or philosophy, either constructive or critical, cannot, however, be fully understood without knowing the story of his life with some measure of detail, for, in his case, life and thought were one: rooted in his own personality. Whatever he thought and wrote came with the living reality of his own experience.

Problémy abstrakce a matematiky u Tomáše Akvinského

Aquinas employs formal abstraction to secure the possibility of mathematics conceived as a theoretical Aristotelian science. Mathematics is a science that investigates real quantity and it grasps its necessary, universal, and changeless properties by means of formal abstraction. In accord with it the paper is divided into two parts. In the first part Aquinas’s conception of (formal) abstraction is explicated against the background of the Aristotelian theory of science and mathematics. In the second part the problems associated with formal abstraction in mathematics are critically assessed.

Metaphysics between Experience and Transcendence: Thomas Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science by Rudi A. te Velde

Reviewed by: Metaphysics between Experience and Transcendence: Thomas Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science by Rudi A. te Velde O.P. Philip-Neri Reese VELDE, Rudi A. te. Metaphysics between Experience and Transcendence: Thomas Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2021. vii + 246 pp. 38,00€ In the opening chapter of Metaphysics 4, Aristotle states not only that there is a science of being as being and its per se properties but also that it is the task of the metaphysician to investigate the principles and causes of such being. Does this mean that metaphysics comes in two parts—namely, an ontology that investigates being and its properties, followed by a theology that investigates the first principle of being? Or does it mean that the very investigation into being and its properties involves an investigation into the first principle of being—that is, that ontology in some sense is theology? The central purpose of Rudi A. te Velde's newest book is to show that, at least for Thomas Aquinas and those who would follow him, the answer is emphatically the latter: Thomistic metaphysics is essentially the resolutio, or tracing-back, of common being (ens commune) to divine being (ens divinum). This process of resolution situates Aquinas's metaphysics "between experience and transcendence." Unlike natural philosophy, metaphysics is not focused on reality as it is given to us in and through sensory experience. Unlike Christian theology, metaphysics is not focused on God as revealed to us in and through supernatural faith. Rather, it is focused on what both of these—experience and transcendence—presuppose, namely, the fundamental truth that all of reality comes from, and points back to, God as its principle and source. For te Velde, Aquinas's metaphysics is etiology or, as he puts it, "the science of presuppositions." Chapter 1 offers the reader a synoptic view of the basic outlines and contours of Aquinas's metaphysics, both positively and negatively. Positively, te Velde points out that Aquinas understands metaphysics to be an Aristotelian science, that is, a discipline unified around its subject. For the properties of a subject are what we aim to demonstrate when we engage in Aristotelian science, and its principles are what we appeal to when doing so. Negatively, te Velde contrasts Aquinas's view of metaphysics with that of his contemporary, Siger of Brabant, and that of our contemporary, John Haldane. Unlike the former, Aquinas's metaphysics takes common being, which is participated and created (and so does not include God), as its subject. Unlike the latter, Aquinas's [End Page 162] metaphysics is unified by the intelligibility of being in light of its principles. In chapters 2 through 5, te Velde focuses in on particular themes that are of central importance to Aquinas's account of metaphysics. Chapter 2 examines the role of separatio in distinguishing metaphysics from physics and mathematics. Where physics considers things that require matter both to be and to be understood, and mathematics considers things that require matter to be but not to be understood, metaphysics considers things that require matter neither to be nor to be understood. It does so by means of a judgment of separation—a judgment that something (for example, substance, form, and so on) can be without matter. Chapter 3 turns to the topic of resolutio, wherein the mind moves "from the concrete particular to its intelligible ground." Aquinas's metaphysics is marked by a twofold resolution: one in which being and its attributes are grasped as the intrinsic principles of all things, and a second in which God and separate substances are grasped as the extrinsic principles of all things. Chapter 4 then investigates the notion of transcendentality, which arises in the first of those two resolutive processes—for insofar as being and its attributes are common to all things, they are not limited to just one of the ten categories (that is, they are transcendental). Nevertheless, the way in which predicates like "one," "true," and "good" cut across the categories that divide common being is different from the way that they cut across the divide between God and creatures. This difference ushers in chapter 5's discussion...

Stanley Jaki: Science and Faith in a Realist Perspective

Stanley Jaki: Science and Faith in a Realist Perspective

Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing by Daniel D. De Haan

Reviewed by: Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing by Daniel D. De Haan Jon McGinnis Daniel D. De Haan. Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Pp. 442. Cloth, $166.00. Avicenna scholars know well that Avicenna (980–1037) aspired to present his metaphysics in the form of an Aristotelian science. The mélange of topics that make up Avicenna’s Metaphysics often appears disjointed and rambling, making it difficult to see how successful he was in this aspiration. Daniel D. De Haan’s book provides an aerial view of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, which argues that Avicenna succeeded. More specifically, De Haan suggests how Avicenna’s conception of the “necessary” links the general subject of metaphysics (namely, being qua being) to its ultimate goal (namely, a scientific study of God). In this respect, De Haan’s work is less of a commentary on Avicenna’s Metaphysics than a metacommentary. Thus, [End Page 158] it is not for a casual reader of the history of philosophy nor of Islamic philosophy nor even of Avicenna’s general thought. It is intended for those who want to take a deep dive into Avicenna’s Metaphysics, and those willing to do so will find De Haan’s text richly rewarding. To contextualize De Haan’s work, let me provide a brief overview of Aristotelian science. According to Aristotle, every science assumes the existence of its proper subject, which is a genus of the things that the science investigates. For instance, physics studies the genus of bodies qua changing. In addition to assuming the existence of its subject, Aristotelian science assumes (1) the definitions of the objects that it studies, (2) various hypotheses or existence claims (e.g. in physics, that change exists), and (3) certain axioms, which are deductive principles. Armed with these “first principles,” one deductively identifies and confirms the various species of objects that fall under the science’s genus as well as the necessary accidents that belong to the genus and its species. Metaphysics poses a challenge to this picture. First, what is its subject? Aristotle and Avicenna both think that it is being/existent qua being/existent, but they also believe that being/existent is not a genus, in which case it cannot function as the subject of a science. Moreover, scientific definitions are given in terms of a genus and difference, but again being/existent is not a genus. Similarly, if being/existent is not a genus, there cannot be species of it to investigate. These are a few issues that loom for Avicenna’s aspirations and that De Haan addresses. Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing consists of four parts: (1) “The Logical Context of the Metaphysics of the Healing,” (2) “Scientific Order of the Metaphysics of the Healing,” (3) “Scientific Principles and the Senses of Being,” and (4) “Basic and Fundamental Principles in the Metaphysics of the Healing.” Part 1 consists of two chapters, in which De Haan presents Avicenna’s own understanding of Aristotelian science. In chapter 1, we see how Avicenna integrates into his account of science the notions of conceptualization (taṡawwur) and assent (taṡdīq) and their relation to the scientific question “What is x?” and “if” there is an x. These notions are central to medieval Arabic epistemology and are also central to the discussion of chapter 2, where we are introduced to how Avicenna envisions scientific definitions and demonstrations. In the two chapters of part 2, De Haan considers how Avicenna’s construal of a demonstrative science applies to metaphysics, specifically exploring the subject and ultimate goal of metaphysics and then verifying metaphysics’ first principles. In general, these chapters are close readings of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, book 1. Chapter 3 takes up the subject of metaphysics, namely, being qua being, where being/existent is viewed not as a genus but a “quasi-genus.” Aristotle’s ten categories serve as being’s “quasi-species,” while its “quasi-proper accidents” are identified with the prior-posterior, act-potency, perfect-imperfect, universal-particular, and cause-effect. The...

Formal Abstraction and its Problems in Aquinas

Formal abstraction is a key instrument Aquinas employs to secure the possibility of mathematics conceived as a theoretical Aristotelian science. In this concept, mathematics investigates quantitative beings, which are grasped by means of formal abstraction in their necessary, universal, and changeless properties. Based on this, the paper divides into two main parts. In the first part (section II) I explicate Aquinas’s conception of (formal) abstraction against the background of the Aristotelian theory of science and mathematics. In the second part (section III) I present and critically assess the problems associated with formal abstraction in mathematics. With all due respect to Aquinas’s genius, I find his conception of formal abstraction (as well as mathematics) unsatisfactory and list the main reasons for its failure in the conclusion.

Arnau Vilanova i la concepció de la medicina com a ciència aristotèlica

Arnau considered medicine to be an Aristotelian science, grounded on natural philosophy. However, he did not link medicine to philosophical speculation but rather con-ceived it as an art, a technique to be practiced by following Aristotelian principles. The ability and experience of the physician were fundamental to producing knowledge.

The Natural Theology of Nicholas Bonetus

This contribution investigates the first treatise on natural theology intended as such by its author. Nicholas Bonetus is the author of this treatise. The article examines Bonetus' life, works, and commitment to Scotism before surveying Duns Scotus' views on natural theology. Scotus is shown to have been optimistic regarding whether some doctrines now regarded to be strictly theological, such as the Trinity, can be proven by pure reason. Bonetus followed in Scotus' footsteps. The article surveys Bonetus' fundamental ideas on the nature of natural theology. It is shown that he organized the science along the lines of an Aristotelian science, with the result that natural theology has a subject, and attributes that are demonstrated of the subject. The subject according to Bonetus is the first immoveable mover, and the science demonstrates various attributes of God, such as divine intellect and will, from which Bonetus derives the Trinitarian processions. Following the article is an appendix containing descriptions of the manuscripts, where it is shown that the majority do name the text «theologia naturalis».

Matematização da Natureza: do século XVI ao XVIII

This work weaves a timeline of the changes suffered in relation to the way of viewing science and mathematics throughout the 16th and 18th centuries. Transitions between Aristotelian science and modern science are addressed. In the interval in question, there were different traditions of thought, the inclusion of numbers in scientific thought, the Baconian experimental tradition, naturalistic beliefs, the so-called scientific revolution and the universalization of mechanical laws, the mathematization of nature and the unification of what we call mathematical physics. From this historical and philosophical overview, it can be seen that science and mathematics have undergone substantial mutations throughout their historical constructions, in order to make nature mathematized.

Dialectic and Metaphysical Skepticism in Jacob Anatoli

AbstractJacob Anatoli (c. 1181–c. 1247 CE) would seem an unlikely skeptic. As the Hebrew translator responsible for bringing a complete program of Aristotelian logic to European Jewry, he is an unlikely skeptic of science. As author of one of the most influential medieval commentaries on the Bible, he is an unlikely skeptic of religious belief. Still, he advances arguments against the possibility of certain knowledge of both Aristotelian science and the tenets of belief. Yet, he does not recommend that thoughtful people reject science and uncritically adopt religious beliefs in the face of uncertainty. Nor does Anatoli recommend a suspension of judgement (epoche) that would allow for freedom from worry (ataraxia) or tranquility. Instead, he pushes constant dialogue, even debate between competing claims to knowledge. The life of the mind that Anatoli recommends, then, is a dialectical interrogation of science and religion that provides not freedom and tranquility but intellectual disquiet and toil.

Physical earth and its sciences in Istanbul: a journey from pre-modern (Islamic) to modern times

Abstract. Researching, compiling and analysing geophysical ideas and measurements in historical periods will contribute to the historical development of earth science. Also, this is important for geophysicists working on time-dependent (historical) data and revealing the physical properties of the earth. This paper is focused on the earth and its sciences (with concepts, ideas and measurements) in classical Islamic science in the Ottoman Empire and the evolution of these thoughts and concepts in the context of the transition to modern science. The pre-modern period of science in Islamic geographies is represented by Aristotelian science and some original contributions. In the geophysical sciences of the Ottoman Empire, earthquakes and weather events are explained by his views and ideas. Modern concepts and scientific measurements of geophysical events such as magnetic, seismologic and meteorologic events were systematically begun by observatories. Before this, there are some individual measurements.

Two Aspects of Moral Habituation in Aristotle’s Practical Science

Abstract Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical wisdom is mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter.

Explanation and essence in Posterior Analytics II 16-17

In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum . However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second problem in II 16-17: the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having the essence it has, which suggests that both the essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstrations.

The Jesuit Heresiological Discourse as an Enlightenment Project in Early Modern China

Refutations of Buddhism, Daoism, and various Chinese popular cults formed a vital balance to the gestures of cultural accommodation attempted by the Jesuits in late-Ming and early-Qing China. Yet this heresiological discourse remains largely invisible in the prevailing historiography, which prominently features the accommodating Jesuit bent on forging synthesis between the East and West. This article seeks to address such neglect by centrally engaging this discourse and arguing that the Jesuits and their Chinese converts, in their consistent stress on reason and (Aristotelian) science as a basis of their criticisms of Chinese religion, articulated a hybrid notion of heterodoxy that anticipated in significant ways post-Enlightenment conceptions of superstition. Thus the article offers a case study in support of the emerging revisionist scholarship that interprets the European Enlightenment as a multi-stage historical process originating at least partially outside Europe in the sites of cross-cultural encounters during the Age of Discovery.

The Role and Limits of Dialectical Method in Aristotelian Natural Science

The Role and Limits of Dialectical Method in Aristotelian Natural Science

Losing Touch with Nature: Literature and the New Science in Sixteenth-Century England. Mary Thomas Crane. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. ix+227.

<i>Losing Touch with Nature: Literature and the New Science in Sixteenth-Century England</i>. Mary Thomas Crane. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. ix+227.

Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

Thoughts on Leo Strauss's Interpretation of Aristotle's Natural Right Teaching

AbstractThe essay discusses the interpretation of Aristotle's natural right teaching by Leo Strauss. This interpretation ought to be seen as the result of an investigation into the history of philosophy and of an attempt to philosophically address political problems. By virtue of this twofold origin, the Straussian commentary is unorthodox: it deviates from traditional Aristotelianism (Aquinas and Averroes) and it seems alien to the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. Strauss's criticism of medieval variants results from their incapacity—shared by contemporary political thought—to address a perplexing issue: political exception. He sees in Aristotle's political teaching a way to escape from this failure: the unification, in natural right, of the requirements of statesmanship and ethics. The discovery of this way allowed Strauss to produce an interpretation of natural right that articulates important points pertaining to Aristotelian political science.

Book Review: Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God. Works of St. Bonaventure, Volume XVI

Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God. Works of St. Bonaventure, Volume XVI. Bonaventure Texts in Translation Series. Translation, introduction, and notes by R. E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone. Saint Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2013. Ixxii + 344 pp. $49.95 (paper).This volume presents annotated translations of selections from books 1 and 3 of Saint Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences. Bonaventure wrote his Commentary on Peter Lombards Sentences from 1250 to 1252 and revised it after becoming a Master of Theology. It remained his major philosophical and theological work. In these selections he discusses the nature and knowledge of God, drawing extensively on the philosophy of his day, particularly Aristotle's categories.The volume begins with an excellent introduction by editors R. E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone, which sketches the life and career of Bonaventure and gives an overview of his intellectual context. The editors briefly explain Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship of faith and reason, then summarize and comment upon the chief arguments in his attempt to develop an understanding of God on the model of an Aristotelian science. In addition to this well-written and informative introduction, Bonaventure's texts are excellently annotated, so that the reader has ready access to information on his sources, summations of his key arguments, and an understanding of the intellectual heritage upon which he drew.Topic 1 discusses the subject of the book, the relationship of faith to scientific knowledge, and the nature of faith as a form of knowledge. Bonaventure uses his method of reduction, tracing sense objects back to their first cause in God, to argue that God is the subject of this book, as the principle to which everything can be reduced. Christ, as the integral whole, is the subject to which all conclusions are reduced. The subject as a universal whole is the object of belief. With the aid of philosophical reasoning, Bonaventure seeks to make this object more intelligible, thus taking up Anselm's program of theology as faith seeking understanding.Topic 2 discusses whether God can be known. For Bonaventure, people are wayfarers, who in this life can only have a partial knowledge of God. This will be perfected with the coming of the eschaton. In regards to knowledge of God, reason can clarify the knowledge of faith so that it becomes wisdom, but reason remains dependent upon faith. Topic 3 treats philosophical arguments for the existence of God and introduces a crucial distinction in Bonaventure's metaphysics between the simplicity of God and the nature of creation as a mixture of being and non-being. …

Criticism of Aristotelian science in fourteenth-century Jewish thought

Modern scholarship has observed that the New Science did not emerge ex nihilo , but had its roots in the scholastics’ criticism of Aristotelian science in the fourteenth century. Until about a decade ago, the dominant view in the literature was that the Jewish philosophers did not participate in this scholastic trend until Hasdai Crescas (1340–1410), who was the first Hispano-Jewish philosopher to elaborate a basic and systematic criticism of Aristotelian physics and propose an alternative to it. The present article demonstrates that Jewish criticism of Aristotelian science was more widespread than has been thought and touched on much broader issues. We will look at two fourteenth-century Spanish thinkers, Abner of Burgos (1260/70–1348) and Moses ben Judah (mid-fourteenth century), and their critiques of two elements of Aristotelian physics: (1) the status of prime matter, and (2) natural place and its relations to motion.