Argumentation Theory Research Articles

The Making of Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-dialectical View

In ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience.

Formalization of Mathematical Proof Practice Through an Argumentation-Based Model

Proof requires a dialogue between agents to clarify obscure inference steps, fill gaps, or reveal implicit assumptions in a purported proof. Hence, argumentation is an integral component of the discovery process for mathematical proofs. This work presents how argumentation theories can be applied to describe specific informal features in the development of proof-events. The concept of proof-event was coined by Goguen who described mathematical proof as a public social event that takes place in space and time. This new meta-methodological concept is designed to cover not only “traditional” formal proofs but all kinds of proofs and inference steps, including incomplete or purported proofs. Our approach attempts to make proof-events more comprehensive to express the complete trajectory of a mathematical proof-event until the ultimate validation of the proving outcome. Thus, we advance an extended version of proof-event calculus which is built on argumentation theories designed to capture the internal and external structure of collaborative mathematical practice and highlight the relationship between proof, human reasoning, and cognitive processes. In addition, another area in which argumentation can make a significant contribution is dealing with the defeasible knowledge of the Web which is a product of its open and ubiquitous nature. This approach seems to be sufficient for the presentation of Web-based proving processes as manifested in the case of the Mini-Polymath 4 project.

Rethinking paranoid ideation and reasoning: A pilot study based on the argumentative theory of reasoning

Background and objectivesCognitive theories assume an imbalance of intuitive and analytical reasoning in paranoid ideation. The argumentative theory of reasoning offers an approach on the primary function of reasoning and its flaws. It assumes social exchange as main purpose of reasoning. We applied this theory to delusion research and tested experimentally whether social exchange in the form of production and evaluation of arguments influences subsequent reflective reasoning. Additionally, we examined whether the social network and the frequency/preference for discussions are associated with distorted reflective reasoning and paranoid ideation. Methods327 participants completed the Social Network Index (SNI), the Paranoia Checklist (PCL), and the Cognitive Reflection Test-2 (CRT2). Moreover, preference and frequency of discussions were assessed. In the discussion group (N = 165), participants produced arguments and evaluated counterarguments on two socially relevant topics. The control group (N = 162) watched a nature video instead. ResultsThe discussion group showed lower distorted reflective reasoning than the control group. Discussion preference and/or frequency was associated with frequency and disturbance of paranoid thoughts, as well as overall paranoid ideation. LimitationsDue to the online format environmental factors could not be held constant and no intrasubject comparison of the CRT2 could be computed in the trial. Furthermore, the sample mainly consisted of psychology students. ConclusionThe results contribute to the understanding of distorted reflective reasoning and provides preliminary evidence that the argumentative theory of reasoning may offer a promising perspective for delusion research.

Putin's Claims on the War in Ukraine: A Pragmatic Study

The present study was devoted to the pragmatic investigation of Putin’s claims on the war in Ukraine. Putin, as a political figure, adopted different manipulative and persuasive strategies in his speeches to justify his decisions regarding the war in Ukraine. The strategies he utilised were believed to contain different pragmatic aspects and interpretations. Therefore, this study aimed at identifying the pragmatic aspects which were found in the selected speech and figuring out the logicality of Putin’s claims and justification concerning the addressed issue. The study was a qualitative in nature which was based on an eclectic model that included Walton’s (1995) and Johnson’s (2000) theories of fallacies and argumentation. One of Putin’s speeches, in which he addressed the Security Service Board, was selected as a sample of the current study. After analysing the selected data, it was assured that Putin used different pragmatic strategies via which he intended to manipulate and convince his audience of the logicality of his claims and justification. The criteria that he violated and the pragmatic devices which he depended on proved him to be illogical and his decisions were unreasonable.

Integrated preference argumentation and applications in consumer behaviour analyses

Consumer preference studies in economics rest heavily on the behavioural interpretation of preference especially in the form of Revealed Preference Theory (RPT). Viewing purchasing decisions as a kind of human reasoning, in this paper we are interested in generalising behaviourism to preference-based argumentation where existing frameworks are arguably governed by the opposing mentalistic interpretation of preference. Concretely our contributions are three-fold. First we re-construct and unify two main approaches to RPT in argumentation terms by developing a Revealed Preference Argumentation (RPA) framework. We show that key RPT-based consumer analyses such as different rationality checks of a consumer behaviour and various kinds of such behaviour's extrapolations can be translated to computational tasks in RPA. RPA is in turn subsumed by the second contribution - an Integrated Preference Argumentation (IPA) framework which fully integrates mentalism and behaviourism. In particular we show that RPA is just a special case of IPA with only revealed preference, while existing preference-based argumentation frameworks can be viewed as IPA frameworks with only stated preference. As the third contribution, we develop a complete set of IPA algorithms and establish their correctness and termination for a general class of IPA frameworks. For demonstration we implement the algorithms in Prolog to obtain an IPA reasoning engine and test the engine with various RPT-based consumer behaviour analyses. In sum, it is argued that the current paper provides not only a theory of Integrated Preference Argumentation, but also a related development tool for future applications of argumentation to behavioural economics - a largely unexplored area so far though Dung used the stable marriage problem in microeconomic game theory to partly motivate the argumentation theory.

Persuasive presuppositions

A recurrent claim, coming from different approaches to pragmatics, argumentation theory and related disciplines, is that informative presuppositions have a special persuasive force. My aim in this paper is threefold: first, it is to achieve a better understanding of this claim. I argue that we should carefully distinguish between persuasion, which involves forming a belief, and accommodation, which requires acceptance of a proposition for the purpose of the conversation. Consequently, we should distinguish between the persuasive force of presuppositions and a different claim concerning our tendency to accommodate presuppositions. Second, I briefly discuss the evidence available for these claims, from the perspective of the distinction introduced. Finally, I argue that the Stalnakerian approach to presuppositions has the resources needed to offer an account of their persuasive force.

Bridging dialogic pedagogy and argumentation theory through critical questions

This article explores the relationship between argumentation theory and dialogic pedagogy. Arguments made in everyday discourse tend to be enthymematic, i.e., containing implicit premises. Thus, dialogue is often necessary to uncover hidden assumptions. Furthermore, evaluating logical arguments involves dialectical and dialogic processes. We articulate the role of critical questions in this process and present the Critical Questions Model of Argument Assessment (CQMAA) as a (mostly) comprehensive framework for evaluating arguments. Students can be taught to ask and discuss these critical questions. Yet to facilitate and sustain discussion of these questions, teachers need additional tools drawn from dialogic pedagogy. We draw on Robin Alexander’s conceptual framework for this purpose as well as Michaels and O’Connor’s work on Academically Productive Talk. Alexander’s framework includes six pedagogical principles and eight repertoires of talk. We focus specifically on teacher and student talk moves and propose that critical questions should be considered an important subset of productive talk moves that can bring rigor and purpose to classroom argumentation. Other talk moves are also needed to help students construct arguments, listen and engage with one another, and help sustain discussion of the critical questions. The CQMAA provides both a theoretical and practical link between (1) logical analysis and critique and (2) dialogic teaching.

Questioning in Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy and argumentation theory

This paper examines differences between Bakhtin’s dialogic view and argumentation theories with respect to questioning and analyzes the significance of these differences for the theories of pedagogy. In argumentation theories, a question is thought to be shared among the parties in a discussion. In the fields of argumentation and education, in particular science education, not only is a question shared, but also an answer is integrated into one among the participants (Schwarz and Baker 2017). Bakhtin’s view on questioning, advanced in his later writings, shows how new questions emerge continuously in answers to the previous questions so that a question is not shared by a questioner and an answerer. Using the Bakhtinian framework in the analysis of some Japanese pedagogical thoughts and classroom interactions, it is shown that each student can develop her/his own unique understanding of the topic – not the shared, integrated understanding – by finding out a new question in seemingly wrong answers, or by discovering different questions in the same problem. Finally, the reason why new questions emerge in question-and-answer exchange is investigated within a constructivist perspective from cognitive science.

Introduction to the Special Issue “Boundaries between dialogic pedagogy and argumentation theory”

Dialogue and argumentation are two processes that complement and mutually influence each other. However, this essential relationship is not sufficiently acknowledged by current educational research. This neglected relation is also mirrored by the lack of sufficient dialogue between two fields that are defined by the dialogical approach to education and argumentation, namely dialogic pedagogy and educational argumentation. In this Special Issue, we argue that dialogue pedagogies and argumentation theory and practice should communicate more, bridging their somehow different perspectives for the common goal of engaging learners in productive and constructive discussions.

Exploring mathematical connections in the context of proof and mathematical argumentation: A new proposal of networking of theories

Extended theory of mathematical connections (ETC) and theory of mathematical argumentation (TMA) based on Toulmin’s (1984) model were articulated for the study of mathematical connections activated in the argumentation process. For this purpose, a “networking of theories” was made to obtain the complementarities between both theories. Then, a class episode was selected that dealt with the demonstration of the continuity theorem of functions of real variable “<i>if a function is derivable at a point then it is continuous at that point</i>”, made by an in-service mathematics teacher of differential calculus, who participated in a non-participant observation, where his classes were videotaped. The arguments of this episode were analyzed through with Toulmin’s (1984) model, after with thematic analysis method to identify mathematical connections, and, finally, the connections in the proof and mathematical argumentation were analyzed. The main result of the research reveals that the mathematical connections play a fundamental role in the argumentation process of the episode, given that, connection is important for the establishment and identification the argument and the warrant that supports it. In addition, complementarities were found between both theories, which makes this networking a useful tool for a better analysis of mathematical argumentation processes.

The Dialectical Principle of Charity: A Procedure for a Critical Discussion

This paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation.

The Art of Argumentation in Ancient China

The subject of the study is the ideological heritage of ancient Chinese thinkers, one way or another related to the theoretical understanding of the practice of public debate. The process of institutionalization of the dispute in Ancient China is considered in detail, it is substantiated that its prerequisite was the existence of a specific argumentative discourse in the form of the so-called "beliefs" - teachings, edifying speeches of advisers to their rulers. Arguments against the occurring identification of "beliefs" with real public disputes that were widespread during the Zhangguo period - the "Rivalry of a Hundred Schools" are considered. It is shown that a number of ideas developed during this period will subsequently acquire a normative status and become the hallmark of the Chinese dispute. During the consideration of various types of disputes, techniques specific to the Chinese type of argumentation were identified: the method of associations, references to precedents, the use of the last word; the role of examples as the basis of inductive reasoning is shown. Based on the consideration of the Confucian concept of "correction of names" and the Mohist doctrine of the correct use of language, it is shown that the socio-political context and practical considerations played a decisive role in the theoretical understanding of the art of argumentation. The productive methodological ideas of the ancient Chinese "Dispute Program" are revealed. The role of analogy and examples as topoi of the ancient Indian dispute is shown. The theory of reasoning and the theory of dispute of the late Mohists are analyzed, the conclusion is substantiated that the principles of justification and persuasion, as well as the rules for conducting a dispute contained in them, are applied logic, the normativity of which allows us to consider it as the first theory of argumentation.

From Virtue Argumentation to Virtue Dialogue Theory: How Aristotle Shifts the Conversation for Virtue Theory and Education*

AbstractAndrew Aberdein recently explored whether Aristotle held a (proto‐)virtue argumentation theory, which would evaluate a good argument in terms of whether the arguers engaged virtuously. Aberdein admits, however, that connections between virtue, character, and argumentation are scarce within Aristotle's works. Accordingly, here Cassie Finley approaches this question from a different angle, comparing Aristotle's concepts of dialectic and rhetoric with virtue theories of argumentation. She argues that the essential features of dialectic and rhetoric are in tension with the defining characteristics of virtue argumentation theories. However, this tension raises a deeper methodological tension within virtue argumentation theories regarding their “intuitive” conception of arguments. Finley outlines a more viable route forward for virtue argumentation theorists, one that dissolves this tension through reframing their project as a virtue dialogue theory. This shift toward dialogue would help to assuage the main objections to virtue argumentation theories regarding adversariality, incompleteness, and vulnerability to ad hominems. At the same time, developing toward a virtue dialogue theory better aligns with the intuitive sense of engaging well with others that defines the virtue argumentation project, and it also more fruitfully sets up the project to encourage future scholarship connecting virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and philosophy of education.

Sequencing Critical Moves for Ethical Argumentation Practice: Munāẓara and the Interdependence of Procedure and Agent

The aim of this paper is to highlight an interdependence between procedural and agential norms that undermines their neat separation when appraising argumentation. Drawing on the munāẓara tradition, we carve a space for sequencing in argumentation scholarship. Focusing on the antagonist’s sequencing of critical moves, we identify each sequence’s corresponding values of argumentation: coalescence, reliability, and efficacy. These values arise through the mediation of virtues and simultaneously underpin procedural as well as agential norms. Consequently, an ambiguity between procedure and agent becomes apparent. This ambiguity hints at the potential for a virtue theory of argumentation that draws on procedural norms.

Covid-19 Research in Alternative News Media: Evidencing and Counterevidencing Practices

The Covid-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an excess of accurate and inaccurate information (infodemic) that has prevented people from finding reliable guidance in decision-making. Non-professional but popular science communicators—some with a political agenda—supply the public with scientific knowledge regarding Covid-19. This kind of communication represents a worrisome force in societal discourses on science-related political issues. This article explores online content (<em>N </em>= 108 articles) of two popular German “alternative news” media (<em>NachDenkSeiten</em> and <em>PI News</em>) that present and evaluate biomedical research concerning Covid-19. Using thematic analysis, we investigated how scientific evidence was presented and questioned. Regarding the theoretical background, we drew on the concept of “evidencing practices” and ideas from argumentation theory. More specifically, we studied the use of the following three evidencing and counterevidencing practices: references to Data/Methods, references to Experts/Authorities, and Narratives. The results indicate that the studied alternative news media generally purport to report on science using the same argumentation mechanisms as those employed in science journalism in legacy media. However, a deeper analysis reveals that argumentation directions mostly follow preexisting ideologies and political agendas against Covid-19 policies, which leads to science coverage that contradicts common epistemic authorities and evidence. Finally, we discuss the possible implications of our findings for audience views and consider strategies for countering the rejection of scientific evidence.

Introduction

This special issue represents some of the recent developments within argumentation studies. The following overview provides some historical context for the five papers which constitute this special issue. The Aristotelian roots of modern argumentation studies are briefly presented, as well as some further developments within Greek and Roman rhetoric. Furthermore, the most important developments in argumentation studies during the last few decades are sketched. Several modern approaches to argumentation theory are introduced, among them Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric, Toulmin’s model of argumentation, formal dialectics, fallacy theory, informal logic, the Argumentum Model and Pragma-Dialectics. Finally, the thematic focus of the five papers is described.

An argumentation semantics for rational human evaluation of arguments.

In abstract argumentation theory, many argumentation semantics have been proposed for evaluating argumentation frameworks. This article is based on the following research question: Which semantics corresponds well to what humans consider a rational judgment on the acceptability of arguments? There are two systematic ways to approach this research question: A normative perspective is provided by the principle-based approach, in which semantics are evaluated based on their satisfaction of various normatively desirable principles. A descriptive perspective is provided by the empirical approach, in which cognitive studies are conducted to determine which semantics best predicts human judgments about arguments. In this article, we combine both approaches to motivate a new argumentation semantics called SCF2. For this purpose, we introduce and motivate two new principles and show that no semantics from the literature satisfies both of them. We define SCF2 and prove that it satisfies both new principles. Furthermore, we discuss findings of a recent empirical cognitive study that provide additional support to SCF2.

Argumentative Scheme for Abduction

Introduction. The paper scrutinizes abduction through the lens of the argumentation theory. Abduction is treated as an argument with a special argumentative scheme. Argumentation schemes are seen as stereotypical patterns of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse. The main issue of this publication is to specify the scheme of abductive argument and supply it with so-called critical questions. Such questions should identify, reconstruct and evaluate abduction in dialogs.Methodology and sources. At first, I analyze D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker’s patterns of abductive argument, scrutiny their advantages and disadvantages. Then, based on the results of relatively new logical and philosophical investigations, I systemize the peculiarities of abduction. The role of D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model is especially emphasized.Results and discussion. Both approaches (D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker) are not free of problems. However, several recent logico-epistemological specifications of abduction can reduce them. I mean the position that abduction preserves ignorance and presumes J. Wood’s conclusionality relation. This reasoning is weak and cannot be distinguished from other arguments. These proposals and almost unknown (with interrogative conclusion) Ch. S. Peirce’s scheme of abduction produce a core of argumentative scheme.Conclusion. I provide a version of argumentative scheme of abduction with the set of critical questions. Its formal structure is defined as a move from the consequent to antecedent with the investigand mood conclusion while the material side is seen as reasoning from surprise to investigation. Modified D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model clarifies the controversial aspects of this argumentative scheme. It also specifies critical questions functions since they lose their traditional role of evaluation.

Argumentum Ad Alia: argument structure of arguing about what others have said

Expertise, authority, and testimony refer to aspects of one of the most important elements of communication and cognition. Argumentation theory recognises various forms of what we call the argumentum ad alia pattern, in which speakers appeal to what others have said, including Position to Know scheme, Witness Testimony scheme, Expert Opinion scheme and the classical ad verecundiam. In this paper we show that ad alia involves more than merely an inferential step from what others (a person in position to know, a witness, an expert) have said, and that studying this type of argumentation requires going beyond the argument structure of propositional contents to account for different speech activities. We also demonstrate that using the words of others, attacking what has been said, and reasoning from how others reason constitute a rich repertoire of communication strategies which we need to model in order to be able to analyse them manually and to process them computationally.

In the name of the nobility of the cause, what I did is right

Abstract Discourse-focused analyses of political communication show a complex interplay between narration and argumentation. Yet, current analytical tools fall short of accounting for the multifarious ways in which narratives perform as arguments. This paper adopts the notion narrative argument, developed in argumentation theory, to examine the ways the ‘hero-protector’ narrative serves as argument. The paper analyzes four speeches given by Donald Trump and Joe Biden, whereby the use of force on foreign grounds is justified via the ‘hero-protector’ narrative. The analytical framework combines the argumentation strategies of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) with pragma-dialectics’ argumentation schemes. The analysis shows that each narrative sequence constituting the ‘hero-protector’ narrative constructs specific argument schemes, and the logical connections between these sequences link arguments in chains to collectively justify the rightness of claims. The paper, thus, seeks to illustrate the possibility of conceptualizing narrative discourse as an effective way to argue for or against a claim.