Rethinking paranoid ideation and reasoning: A pilot study based on the argumentative theory of reasoning

Abstract

Background and objectivesCognitive theories assume an imbalance of intuitive and analytical reasoning in paranoid ideation. The argumentative theory of reasoning offers an approach on the primary function of reasoning and its flaws. It assumes social exchange as main purpose of reasoning. We applied this theory to delusion research and tested experimentally whether social exchange in the form of production and evaluation of arguments influences subsequent reflective reasoning. Additionally, we examined whether the social network and the frequency/preference for discussions are associated with distorted reflective reasoning and paranoid ideation. Methods327 participants completed the Social Network Index (SNI), the Paranoia Checklist (PCL), and the Cognitive Reflection Test-2 (CRT2). Moreover, preference and frequency of discussions were assessed. In the discussion group (N = 165), participants produced arguments and evaluated counterarguments on two socially relevant topics. The control group (N = 162) watched a nature video instead. ResultsThe discussion group showed lower distorted reflective reasoning than the control group. Discussion preference and/or frequency was associated with frequency and disturbance of paranoid thoughts, as well as overall paranoid ideation. LimitationsDue to the online format environmental factors could not be held constant and no intrasubject comparison of the CRT2 could be computed in the trial. Furthermore, the sample mainly consisted of psychology students. ConclusionThe results contribute to the understanding of distorted reflective reasoning and provides preliminary evidence that the argumentative theory of reasoning may offer a promising perspective for delusion research.