386 SEER, 87, 2, APRIL 200g decidedtosupport theactivities ofCharter 77.It can be saidthattheCouncil diditsbesttoworkwiththedomestic opposition and democratically-minded sympathizers in othercountries to standup fortherights ofCzechoslovaks behindthe Iron Curtainfromits founding in 1949 untilthe collapse of Communism in 1989.In hisconclusion Povolny makesthisabundantly clear tothereader.Copiesoforiginal documents appendedat theendofthework add to itsscholarly integrity, as do theEnglish-language summary and the index. MojmirPovolny hasproducedan excellent workwhichwillsurely broaden thehorizonsofall who read it.The younger generations in post-ColdWar Czech Republicand Slovakiawoulddo welltofamiliarize themselves withthe sacrifices of truedemocratsat home and abroad. Though manypolitical, economicand social factorscontributed to the collapse of Communism in Europe,theefforts ofthosewho devotedtheirlivesto therestoration of freedom in their homelandshouldneverbe forgotten. Faculty ofSocialSciences Francis D. RaSka Charles University Brown,Archie.Seven TearsThatChanged theWorld: Perestroika in Perspective. OxfordUniversity Press,Oxfordand New York,2007. xx + 350 pp. Glossary. Notes.Index.£25.00. Professor Archie Brown's extensiveresearchon the Gorbachevperiod culminated in his 1996monograph, TheGorbachev Factor, whicharguedthat Gorbachevwas thecentralfigure in transforming bothhiscountry and the world.The workwas critically acclaimed,althougha minority feltBrown might havebeen overly generous to Gorbachev.In manyrespects, thislatest book can be seen as an attempt to defendBrown'searlierpositionagainst suchcritics. Halfthechapters havebeenpublished elsewhere, buttheauthor utilizes muchnewmaterial intheremainder ofthebooktobackup hiscase, including politburo discussions fromthearchivesand even an unpublished Gorbachevmonograph from1989. ArchieBrownportrays Gorbachevas a radicalwithin thepolitburo who had largely abandonedtheideologyofMarxism-Leninism forsocialdemocracybyabout1990 .According tothisaccount,Gorbachev wasa skilful politicianwhousedthepowerofhisposition as GeneralSecretary topushthrough his reforms, oftenin the face of considerable opposition.Gorbachev,it is argued,was also mostreluctant evertocontemplate theuse ofmilitary force, and itcertainly was a mostremarkable achievement forMoscowtowithdraw from EasternEuropewithout a shotbeingfired inanger.Athome,force was used on a numberof occasionsagainstnationalists, but Brownmakesthe case thatitwas onlyformally approvedbyGorbachevon one occasion- in Azerbaijanin 1990(p. 297). In generalterms, I foundArchieBrown'scentralarguments compelling. Gorbachev, itseemsto me,was indeedpivotalin democratizing hiscountry and endingthe Cold War. However,Brownmay not win over all of his REVIEWS 387 earliercritics fortwomainreasons.First, theanalysis focuses verymuchon elitepoliticsin Moscow whichinevitably places Gorbachevat thecentreof events.Undoubtedly, elitepoliticsis important, especially in a dictatorship, and ArchieBrownis at hisverybestin tracing thecomplexpowerrelations in theKremlinthroughout thisperiod,butdebatesin thepolitburo remain onlypartofthestory. The analysis wouldhavebenefited, on occasion,from closerscrutiny ofwhatwas actually happening on theground.In thechapter on theendoftheCold War,forinstance, Brownwrites thatGorbachevcame intooffice arguingforSovietwithdrawal fromAfghanistan. This mayhave been true,buthisfirst policydecisionon Afghanistan was to increaseSoviet troopnumbers withtheapparentintention oftrying to winthewar.Brown spendsa lotoftimedownplaying President Reagan's relative importance in thesamechapter, butWashington's decisionto support themujahideen was important inpreventing theSovietUnionfrom pacifying Afghanistan which, in turn, affected theoutcomeoftheCold War. Thisleadson to thesecondissue.Gorbachevcan claimveryrealachievementsduring histimein office, buthe neverseemedto be in quiteas much control ofevents as sometimes suggested here.Thingsrarely worked outquite as planned.Gorbachev wantedtoendtheCold War,buthe hopedthiswould lead to an increasein Sovietinfluence aroundtheworld,notprecipitate its decline.Gorbachevinitiatedimportant liberaland democraticreforms at home,as Brownrightly emphasizes, butthentheSovietleaderwas forced to watchon as theyled to politicalunrestand, ultimately, thecollapseofthe USSR whichhe had striven so hardtopreserve. Worstofall,from thepoint ofviewoftheordinary Russianpeople,Gorbachev's reforms led,nottoraised living standards as promised, buta downward spiralineconomicperformance from 1988.ArchieBrowndoestalkabouteconomicproblems, butforme the economy shouldhavebeengivenmoreprominence, foritwas thedeepening economiccrisis whichledtoa general lossoffaith inGorbachevas leaderand perestroika as a whole.Gorbachev'sfailure lookedall themorepronounced whencomparedto the recordlevelsof growth experienced in Communist China after Deng's economicreforms of1978. Asalways, ArchieBrownhasproducedan excellent book.Itiswell-written, and researched withmeticulous care. It is a fineadditionto the growing collectionof workson the periodwhichwill,likeitspredecessor, provoke muchdebateoverGorbachev'shistorical legacy. School ofPolitical, SocialandInternational Studies Mike Bowker University ofEast Anglia Kenney, Padraic. The Burdensof Freedom: EasternEuropesinceigSg. Global History ofthePresent. Zed Books,London and New York,2006. ix + 179pp. Maps. Notes.Index.£12.99(paperback). The recent2004-07 expansionoftheEuropeanUnion (EU) to includeten former Communist countries ofEasternEuroperepresents a good opportunityto assesstheextentand depthofpoliticaland economicchangesthat ...