The End of the Lithuanian Political "Patriarch's" Era

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Research for this article was supported by the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, which granted me a residential fellowship from September 2002 to May 2003. I would like to thank Grigorii V. Golosov for his valuable comments on the earlier drafts of the manuscript. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose comments allowed me to substantially improve the article. Those errors of fact and interpretation that remain, as well as the views expressed, are entirely mine. Michael Laver makes a distinction between government duration and government durability. The former is an essentially empirical concept, while the latter is essentially theoretical. See Michael Laver, 'Government Termination', Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 1, June 2003, pp. 23 – 40. Investiture is the formal procedure of the parliament's approval of a new government. Kaare Strom, Eric C. Browne, John P. Frendreis & Dennis W. Glieber, 'Contending Models of Cabinet Stability', American Political Science Review, 82, 3, September 1988, pp. 923 – 941. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 78 – 85; Paul Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994); see also Alan Siaroff, 'Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', International Political Science Review, 24, 4, October 2003, pp. 445 – 464. Daniel Diermeier & Peter Van Roozendaal, 'The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies', British Journal of Political Science, 28, 4, October 1998, pp. 609 – 626. Jean Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World (London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1985), especially pp. 130, 136 – 137. Lawrence C. Dodd, 'The Study of Cabinet Durability: Introduction and Commentary', Comparative Political Studies, 17, 2, July 1984, pp. 155 – 161. Eric C. Browne, John P. Frendreis & Dennis W. Gleiber, 'An "Events" Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability', Comparative Political Studies, 17, 2, July 1984, pp. 167 – 197. Paul Warwick & Stephen T. Easton, 'The Cabinet Stability Controversy: New Perspectives on a Classic Problem', American Journal of Political Science, 36, 1, February 1992, pp. 122 – 146; Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 'Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies', Journal of Economic Theory, 94, 1, September 2000, pp. 46 – 79. For a detailed literature overview see Laver, 'Government Termination'. Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). Gregory M. Luebbert, 'Coalition Theory and Government Formation in Multiparty Democracies', Comparative Politics, 15, 3, April 1983, pp. 235 – 249. William Bernhard & David Leblang, 'Political Parties and Monetary Commitments', International Organization, 56, 4, Fall 2002, pp. 803 – 830. Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart, 'Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal', The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper No. 200, July 1993. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, pp. 122 – 125. Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62, 1, March 1968, pp. 144 – 168 at pp. 145 – 146. Peverill Squire, 'Membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23, 1, February 1998, pp. 23 – 32. Morris P. Fiorina, Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977). John M. Carey, Frantisek Formanek & Ewa Karpowicz, 'Legislative Autonomy in New Regimes: The Czech and Polish Cases', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24, 4, November 1999, pp. 569 – 603; Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif (eds), Legislative Politics in Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 415 – 417. Lyn Ragsdale & John J. Theis, 'The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924 – 92', American Journal of Political Science, 41, 4, October 1997, pp. 1280 – 1318 at pp. 1290, 1303. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, pp. 135 – 136. Michael Curtis (gen. ed.), Introduction to Comparative Government (New York, Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 35 – 114 at pp. 82 – 83. R. A. W. Rhodes & Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (Basingstoke, St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 11 – 12. Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay & Kenneth Newton (eds), Political Data Handbook OECD Countries (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1991). Heikki Paloheimo, Governments in Democratic Capitalist States 1950 – 1983. A Data Handbook (University of Turku, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Studies on Political Science No. 8, 1984). Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 'Introduction', European Journal of Political Research, 24, 1, August 1993, pp. 1 – 13. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, p. 82. This method is often used in comparative studies of ministerial duration. See Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, pp. 79 – 81. www.systema.ru/ and law.optima.ru/; db.informika.ru:8082/home.htm; www.vcom.ru/law/rf_law_2.shtml; businesspravo.ru/. www.integrum.ru/; www.eastview.com/; www.public.ru/. www.nns.ru/; www.panorama.ru/; www.cityline.ru/politika/; allrus.info; www.rfefl.org and www.friends-partners.org. Laver, 'Government Termination', p. 25. Arend Lijphart, 'Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation', Comparative Political Studies, 17, 2, July 1984, pp. 265 – 279; Eric C. Browne, John P. Frendreis & Dennis W. Gleiber, 'The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 30, 3, August 1986, pp. 628 – 650; Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Lijphart, 'Measures of Cabinet Durability'; Carol Mershon, 'The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments', American Political Science Review, 90, 3, September 1996, pp. 534 – 554. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London and New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 79. The cabinet of Mikhail Fradkov is the eleventh cabinet. The official title of the head of the Russian government was and has been the 'Chairman of the Government'. 'Prime minister' is an unofficial title of the chief executive. Jean Blondel & Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds), Cabinets in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001), p. 196. Current Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov is included. Michael Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a detailed exploration of this argument in a comparative perspective see Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, chapter 6. According to the 1993 Constitution, the president appoints and dismisses the cabinet, which is named the 'highest organ of executive power' in Russia. Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 April 1999. Neil Robinson, 'The Presidency: The Politics of Institutional Chaos', in Neil Robinson (ed.), Institutions and Political Change in Russia (London, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 11 – 40. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, chapter 5. Josephine T. Andrews, When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament, 1990 – 1993 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 113 – 123. John P. Willerton, 'Yeltsin and the Russian Presidency', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds), Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, 3rd edn. (Durham, Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 25 – 56 at pp. 33 – 39; Thomas F. Remington, The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989 – 1999 (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 93 – 98. In October 1991 President El'tsin requested authority to form a government without approval by the parliament. The parliament agreed to give El'tsin powers he requested for a period of one year. The Duma votes on confirmation of the prime minister and on motions of no confidence in the cabinet. If the Duma rejects the president's nominee for the prime minister position three times in a row, the president dissolves the parliament. Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, 28, 4, November 1984, pp. 739 – 777. Mathew D. McCubbins, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33, 3, August 1989, pp. 588 – 611. Peter Aranson, Ernst Gellhorn & Glen Robinson, 'A Theory of Legislative Delegation', Cornell Law Review, 68, 1, November 1982, pp. 1 – 67; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority', in Roger G. Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 175 – 196; David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 75 and 85. Iulia Shevchenko, 'Who Cares about Women's Problems? Female Legislators in the 1995 and 1999 Russian State Dumas', Europe-Asia Studies, 54, 8, December 2002, pp. 1201 – 1222. Iulia Shevchenko, The Central Government of Russia: From Gorbachev to Putin (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004). Such circumstances accounted for the removal of the government of Mikhail Kas'yanov. See Aleksandr Osobtsov, 'Yazyki za kremlevskimi zubtsami', Rossiiskie vesti, 24 – 30 March 2004. President El'tsin as prime minister in 1991 – 92 is excluded. The figure also excludes chairmen of the council of ministers of the autonomous republics located on Russian territory who up to the end of 1993 were central government members ex officio. The current government of Mikhail Fradkov does not include women. Both total and interrupted averages are slightly lowered because the tenure of those seven ministers who continue in office in the Fradkov government is limited to February 2004. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, pp. 86 – 92. Blondel & Müller-Rommel, Cabinets in Eastern Europe, p. 197. According to the 1992 Law on the Government, four so-called power ministers (foreign affairs, defence, security and internal affairs) were to be appointed with the Supreme Soviet's consent. This norm, however, was repealed as soon as the parliament was disbanded. If a dismissed minister is offered another ministry, different from the one he/she previously headed, such a reshuffle is counted as well. Resignations of ministers who then join a new cabinet to continue to head the same ministries are disregarded. Reappointments of ministers who preserved their positions in a new cabinet are disregarded. Gordon M. Hahn, 'From Chernomyrdin to Kirienko', Problems of Post-Communism, 45, 5, September – October 1998, pp. 3 – 16. John D. Huber & Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political Science, 34, 1, January 2004, pp. 27 – 48. Iulia Shevchenko, 'Explaining Electoral Results: 1993 – 1996', in Vladimir Gel'man & Grigorii V. Golosov (eds), Elections in Russia, 1993 – 1996: Analyses, Documents, and Data (Berlin, Edition Sigma, 1999), pp. 200 – 225. Edwin Bacon, 'The Power Ministries', in Neil Robinson (ed.), Institutions and Political Change in Russia (London, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 130 – 150. Nodari Simonia, 'Economic Interests and Political Power in Post-Soviet Russia', in Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 269 – 285 at pp. 274 – 275. Bacon, 'The Power Ministries'. Eugene Huskey, 'Overcoming the Yeltsin Legacy: Vladimir Putin and Russian Political Reform', in Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 82 – 96. Up to the establishment of the presidency, the executive branch was altered by the parliament. In 1991 – 93 both president and parliament took part in government reorganisation. Since 1993 the executive branch has been altered by the president. Once appointed, the prime minister submits proposals to the president on the structure of the executive. The notion of 'reorganisation' includes abolition, alteration or a fall in the institutional status which leads to exclusion from the cabinet. See also Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, pp. 171 – 172. Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev is excluded. There was a short break in Shoigu's ministerial career because from November 1991 to May 1992 his agency was attached to the presidential office rather than being an independent unit of the government. See also Jean Blondel, The Organization of Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Governmental Structures (London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 146 – 148. The Presidium of the government was abolished in 2000. Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 109. See also Michael McFaul, 'Why Russia's Politics Matter', Foreign Affairs, 74, 1, January – February 1995, pp. 87 – 99. In the last decade of Soviet rule the Soviet government had 11 regular deputies and two first deputies. Article 8 of the law. The appointment of Fradkov as prime minister was not entirely in line with a political tradition because Fradkov was not a cabinet member. However, his post of Russia's envoy to the European Union was assigned ministerial rank. In Fradkov's cabinet Khristenko was appointed minister of industry and energy. In the spring of 2003 Matvienko became presidential envoy to the Northwest federal district and then won the early gubernatorial election in St Petersburg. The numbers of deputy premiers differ from the numbers given at the beginning of the section because some officials were promoted to a deputy premiership more than once. In January 1996 President El'tsin dismissed the agriculture minister and appointed deputy prime minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha acting head in his place. Zaveryukha performed the duties of agriculture minister until May 1996. Shevchenko, The Central Government of Russia. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies, p. 4. Iulia Shevchenko & Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Legislative Activism of Russian Duma Deputies, 1996 – 1999', Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 2, March 2001, pp. 239 – 261. Carey et al., 'Legislative Autonomy in New Regimes'; Morgenstern & Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America, pp. 415 – 419. Ezhenedel'nyi zhurnal, 15 March 2004; Vremya novostei, 10 March 2004.

In constitutional form and in practice, the Japanese national government is parliamentary. Authority is centered in the Diet, and power is held by the parties in the Diet. Unlike the pre-war system, for example, the Diet parties really do choose the Prime Ministers.The post-war party system changed fundamentally in 1955, when the non-socialist parties combined and formed the mammoth Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Since its formation in 1955, the LDP has always had a safe majority in both Houses of the Diet. But, from its beginning as a union of several political streams to the present, the LDP has been made up of several rather stable factions. These factions are the key actors in the biennial election of the party president, who naturally becomes the Prime Minister. As a general rule, votes in a party presidential election are on straight lines. So a Prime Minister is chosen by a coalition of LDP factions which controls a majority of votes at the party convention. Furthermore, the factions present nominees for Cabinet posts, and Ministers are chosen from among these nominees. Cabinet posts become rewards for the factions which voted for the Prime Minister, inducements to opposing factions to enter the Prime Minister's coalition, and buffers to soften or weaken the opposition of hostile factions. In short, the struggle over top political leadership in Japan—the president and the top officials of the ruling party, the Prime Minister, and other Cabinet members—is waged by the LDP factions. (The struggle over policy, on the other hand, is waged by other actors, within the framework established by the outcome of the factions' struggle over leadership.) And because of the wide range of opinion within the LDP, the outcomes of the factions' struggle over top political leadership are very important for Japan. A switch from an Ishibashi to a Kishi, or from a Kishi to an Ikeda, is certainly as significant as, say, the replacement of a Laniel by a Mendès-France.

The notion that the British prime minister had outgrown the parliamentary system enabled some scholars to theorise that the prime minister had become more ‘powerful’ over time and allowed critics to lambast Tony Blair for being unnecessarily and unreasonably powerful. Keith Dowding (2012) suggests it is time to ‘finally put an end to the presidentialisation argument’ (p. 2), but the notion— in both its uses—had fallen from favour long before his recent attempt to administer a coup de grâce. For one thing presidentialisation was forever undone by proof Blair was often hamstrung politically by his chancellor, Gordon Brown. By itself this illustrates that Blair, harried by Brown for the entirety of his premiership, was no president, even if at times a very powerful prime minister. No member, say, of any US president’s executive (not even the vice president, the only person who can succeed the president) could ever engineer the president’s ousting in the way Brown and his followers in Labour’s parliamentary party obliged Blair to step aside in June 2007. No US Treasury secretary (nor any other cabinet member) could ever have been as obstructive, insubordinate or disloyal to the president they serve as Brown was to Blair. Presidentialisation fell further from favour when Brown proved a weaker and less effective prime minister. Few suggested Brown was so empowered a prime minister he had become a president. And fewer still, given the realities of coalition government, refer to David Cameron in such fashion when he has presently to share some degree of power—over both the choice of policy and of ministerial personnel—with the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg (Bennister and Heffernan, 2012).

One of the characteristics of the system of government in the Fifth French Republic is the strengthened position of the head of state, but also the existence of the first minister as a constitutional category with a significant role. The constitution provides the political responsibility of the government with the Prime Minister and ministers before parliament. Certain French writers have opinion that the Prime Minister appears as the central figure of the constitutional structure. The Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Government. This is 21 of Constitution. Also, there are specific powers that put the Prime Minister in the position of its real head of government. Among the prime minister's most important powers is his right to elect members of the government. It is the right to propose to the President of the Republic the appointment but also the dismissal of members of the government. The Prime Minister is authorized to re-sign certain acts of the President of the Republic. In case of temporary impediment of the head of state, the Prime Minister chairs the councils and committees for national defense, as well as the Council of Ministers. The paper analyzes the constitutional provisions that lead to the conclusion that the position of the Prime Minister is institutionally constructed as strong. Political practice, with the exception of periods of cohabitation, has indicated that most prime ministers have been overshadowed by mostly powerful heads of state. For that reason, it is necessary to analyze the political practice of all eight presidential governments. A review of the already long political life that has lasted since 1958. points to the conclusion that in its longest period, presidents of the Republic dominated the public political scene. The Prime Minister has a more pronounced role in the executive branch during cohabitation periods. However, nine years in three cohabitations cannot change the central conclusion of this paper that the dominant political practice of the Fifth Republic has led to the Prime Minister being essentially in the shadow of the head of state.

God and State in Egypt

The article considers the role and the way of functioning of the opposition in the political system of the Swiss Confederation.It is shown that the absence of an opposition in the political life of the country in the traditional sense is explained by the agreement or concordance between the main political forces, drawn up officially in the form of the so-called “magic formula”. A federal government functioning according to this principle in combination with a well-developed mechanism of direct, or more precisely, semi-direct referendum democracy: on the one hand, it allows the effective implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to participate in the political life of the country, and on the other hand, it allows to avoid permanent parliamentary and governmental crises. Particular attention is paid to the Swiss People’s Party, a powerful political force that has consistently achieved high results in parliamentary elections over the past ten years and has every right to consider itself as opposition party. In this connection, the author raises the question of the possibility of using the political system existing today in Switzerland, and, even more so, the way the opposition functions, as a model for other countries? The publication reveals in detail how the institution of direct democracy works in practice. It is emphasized that the people’s initiative and the referendum give the citizen the opportunity to constantly influence the constitutional process in the state and bring projects developed by the government to the people’s court. Frequent appeals to voters in this way forces society to constantly worry about topical political issues. At the same time, large authoritative parties use this right less often than small social organizations or extra-parliamentary opposition groups. In addition, the Swiss manage in this way to constantly keep the political course of the government under control, and the Federal Council, according to the country’s constitution, must constantly consult with the people, who express their opinion on political proposals by dropping ballots into the voting baskets. At the same time, it is emphasized that the main challenge to Swiss federalism lies not in the multiculturalism of the nation, which did not develop as a result of the immigration of citizens, as, for example, in the USA, Canada or Australia, but on the contrary, has its roots in the age-old history of the communities that originally lived in Switzerland. Switzerland’s relations with the European Union during the last twenty years are briefly described. Characterizing Ukrainian-Swiss relations, the author emphasizes the importance that Switzerland has for our country, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The advantages and disadvantages of direct referendum democracy are analyzed. Certain conclusions are drawn regarding the possibility of using Swiss experience in the political life of other countries.

During a year in which Cambodia was afflicted by both a prolonged drought and subsequent costly floods, there is no question as to what was the dominant feature of the country's politics. Throughout 2002, Prime Minister Hun Sen continued to consolidate his position as the most powerful politician in the kingdom. He marginalized his opponents and not-so-subtly made clear that King Norodom Sihanouk, while welcome to play a ceremonial role, has no place in the country's political life. To a large extent, Hun Sen's primacy may be seen as the continuation of a trend that began in July 1997, when the Prime Minister used a savage coup to shatter FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National Pour Un Cambodge Ind?pendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coop?ratif), the major alternative political force within the country, which is led by Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Yet more than just continuity was involved, as the year saw Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) achieve a remarkable sweep of commune elections and the steady decline of FUNCINPEC into factional squabbling. At the same time, the always vocal Sam Rainsy, leader of the small opposition Sam Rainsy Party, was unable to be more than an annoying gadfly on the broader body politic. Hun Sen's dominant role has not meant that Cambodia during 2002 was free of controversies ? far from it. The issue of trials for former Khmer Rouge (KR) leaders remained unresolved and problems of corruption associated with the logging industry continued to dog this vital export industry. The programme for the demobilization of Cambodia's excessively large military is not complete, with attendant links to corrupt practices on the part of the army's top brass. In terms of the application of justice, the frequently criticized culture of impunity for the rich and privileged has not disappeared. How to develop the economy remained a matter for debate that spilled over into issues associated with the management of Cambodia's major tourist attraction, the great temple complex at Angkor. Nevertheless, and despite the many valid criticisms that were levelled at the governance of Cambodia, particularly by the wide range of non-governmental

The resignation of Menachem Begin as prime minister in September 1983 may not usher in an entirely new era in Israel's politics, or bring about a volte-face in its policies, but it is nonetheless significant. In the twenty years since Ben Gurion's second and final resignation from the premiership in 1963, observers have claimed time and again that the generation of Israel's founding fathers no longer played an active role in the country's political life. (Indeed, some were inclined to view Begin's six years in office as a relapse into a bygone age.) This time however there can be little doubt that this group has finally left the political stage. Begin's departure is the end of an era in other respects as well. Despite the differences in personality among the country's early leaders, they all, including Begin, had in common a certain charismatic appeal and other leadership qualities. It seems likely however that for some time to come and whichever party or parties are in power, Israel's political leadership is going to be far more pedestrian in style, though not necessarily uninspired, and much more technocratic in approach, though not totally lacking in ideology.

Book Review| February 01 2001 From Book to Screen: Modern Japanese Literature on Film From Book to Screen: Modern Japanese Literature on Film. By Keiko I. McDonald. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000. xv, 344 pp. $25.95. Joseph A. Murphy Joseph A. Murphy University of Florida Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Journal of Asian Studies (2001) 60 (1): 218–220. https://doi.org/10.2307/2659546 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Joseph A. Murphy; From Book to Screen: Modern Japanese Literature on Film. Journal of Asian Studies 1 February 2001; 60 (1): 218–220. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2659546 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsJournal of Asian Studies Search Advanced Search Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 20012001 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Playing Kings, Ultimatums, and AbdicationsThe Apple Cart and To Play The King Bernard F. Dukore The first word of my title has two meanings: competing against, as in playing cards, and enacting a role—in life, not onstage. In The Apple Cart and To Play the King a prime minister opposes a king who has difficulty performing the role of king in a constitutional monarchy, and in these works ultimatums and abdications figure prominently. Bernard Shaw’s The Apple Cart was written in 1928 and first produced in 1929.1 Michael Dobbs published the novel House of Cards in 1989. In 1990 BBC-TV broadcast Andrew Davies’s adaptation of it. Both were so successful that Dobbs wrote two sequels, To Play the King (1992) and The Final Cut (1995), which Davies adapted for BBC-TV (1993 and 1995)—also successful. Together, the TV movies constitute the House of Cards Trilogy.2 This essay compares and contrasts The Apple Cart and To Play the King, both novel and TV movie, exploring chiefly how To Play the King illuminates aspects of The Apple Cart, but also how The Apple Cart enlightens facets of To Play the King. Because the antagonists of each are a right-wing Prime Minister and a left-wing King who has difficulty enacting the role of fangless sovereign and whose abdication becomes an issue, some resemblances are inevitable, whether or not Dobbs or Davies knew Shaw’s play.3 Despite resemblances, all three works differ substantially from one another. Among obvious dissimilarities to The Apple Cart, both King and Prime Minister in To Play the King are new to their jobs. In the novel the unnamed King has reigned less than four months; the TV movie starts with his coronation. The Conservative Party, which like the opposition Labour Party is not named, has just elected Francis Urquhart Prime Minister. Their Shavian counterparts have been in office so long they are familiar with each other’s tactics. Shaw makes a joke of King Magnus’s incumbency. When a new Cabinet member warns he will say things never before been said to a king, the monarch urbanely responds, “I thought I had already heard everything that could be said to a king. I shall be grateful for the smallest novelty” (VI 289). Shaw wrote The Apple Cart—set in a nonspecific future after 1962, when the father of one of the King’s secretaries died—while Stanley Baldwin led the Conservative Government (Labour’s Ramsay MacDonald did not return to power [End Page 267] until June 1929), which was well before Great Britain became a welfare state (after World War II). He does not treat party politics. To Play the King is about such politics, which Dobbs wrote with an insider’s knowledge. He was an advisor to Margaret Thatcher when she led the Opposition. When she became Prime Minister in 1979 he was a Conservative Party speechwriter, later Chief of Staff. His novels and Davies’s adaptations have an air of authenticity. The actions of its unscrupulous politicians are, one feels, what behind-the-scenes politics are like. Dobbs does not sugarcoat his party’s views and the King of the anti-Royalist Davies may be the movie’s most sympathetic character. Although realism and fair play to opponents of the author’s views usually characterize Shavian plays (for instance, Sartorius in Widowers’ Houses and the Inquisitor in Saint Joan), they do not do so in The Apple Cart. His Preface (1930) complains that some critics considered it “a struggle between a hero and a roomful of guys”—that is, fools, clowns, and oafs (VI 254). Actually, these critics had a point. Most of the Cabinet members—at the time Shaw wrote The Apple Cart Cabinet members were more powerful in making decisions than they were when Dobbs and Davies wrote To Play the King, when the Prime Minister had become the dominant figure—are comic dolts. They boast of manufacturing such trifles as Christmas crackers and squabble about who bungled what, hereby evading the Cabinet’s serious business; and when Magnus announces he will abdicate the men sing “For he’s a jolly good fellow” (VI...

Gaurav Kampani provides a compelling account of the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 1999 and rightly highlights how the need for secrecy “stymied India's operational advances.”1 “Secrecy concerns,” he argues, “prevented decisionmakers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military” (p. 82). In his eagerness to argue this point, however, Kampani is too quick to dismiss other explanations for India's slow pace of operationalization. In this letter, I argue that a more complete account of “New Delhi's long nuclear journey” should incorporate civil-military relations as another influential factor.Most accounts of India's nuclear weapons program agree that India's political establishment largely excluded the military from shaping the program's pace, direction, and progress. According to Verghese Koithara, “[K]eeping the military at arm's length and sidelining military competencies the way India has done has no parallel in global nuclear weapons development history.”2 He attributes this situation to the “barren relationship that developed between the political leadership and the armed forces of the country soon after independence.”3 Ashley Tellis blames India's nonoperationalization of nuclear weapons on its “peculiar organization of civil-military relations.”4 Raj Chengappa claims that “despite the Indian Army providing all the logistics support [for both of India's nuclear tests] … it was rarely privy to India's nuclear secrets. … All this was part of a deliberate design by successive governments to rein in the armed forces.”5 More recently, Vipin Narang has written that “a distrust of India's armed forces … [produced] a civil-military relationship in which India's political leadership is patently unwilling to entrust any dedicated nuclear subcomponents to the armed forces.”6 Kampani presents little concrete evidence to undermine these views.Kampani makes four points to support his contention that “the distrust that pervades India's civil-military institutions” was not a factor in the development of India's nuclear weapons program (p. 108). None supports his claim.First, Kampani asserts that “[i]f civil-military institutional tensions were the cause [of India's slow nuclear operationalization], … one would [have] see[n] greater aggregation of information among civilians” (ibid.). He does not explain, however, what he means by a “greater aggregation of information among civilians.” What kind of information and about what? The nuclear weapons program, delivery options, nuclear targeting philosophy? If he means all of these, then there was a designated civilian official who possessed this “aggregated” knowledge: the scientific adviser to the defense minister. In the period under discussion, two individuals held this post—V.S. Arunachalam from 1982 to 1992 and Abdul Kalam from 1992 to 1999. Another key official was former Defense Secretary Naresh Chandra, who, as Kampani notes, was brought in as a “specially designated coordinator” (p. 89). In addition, members of the scientific-technocratic enclave such as K. Santhanam and R. Chidambaram would have had information far in excess of that of any member of the military.7 Still, one can argue that none of these officials would have had “aggregated information” if the military aspects of the nuclear weapons program were included—that is, the operational details and capabilities of designated aircraft and delivery options, the military's standard operating procedures, and so on. But the argument would then be tautological: if the military was deliberately kept “at the margins,” as Kampani states, then how could civilian officials stay informed about its capabilities (p. 94)? Such an arrangement would have structurally prevented the “greater aggregation of information” among civilians, as predicted by the author.Second, Kampani quotes an unnamed senior Indian defense official who justified keeping the military out the loop “because of the danger of secrecy being compromised.” The official added, “[T]he military's complaints have more to [do] with a sense of privilege and pride. Why should they be told? The cabinet ministers weren't told, the defense minister, their political boss was not told. So why should the armed services chiefs be told” (ibid.)? Kampani's use of this quote as evidence of a lack of civil-military distrust is problematic on several counts. To begin, it contradicts his earlier assertion that “the regime of information scarcity operated with nearly equal severity on both the civilian and military sides of the nuclear equation” (ibid.). Information scarcity, however, could not have been of “nearly equal severity” if, according to this interviewee, a deliberate decision had been made to keep the military away from the program. More important, Kampani accepts uncritically what he was being told. If he had challenged the logic of the interviewee, he would have found several inconsistencies. For instance, if one were to analyze the period from the time the decision for nuclearization was made—Kampani argues it was in 1989–90—to the 1998 nuclear tests, the prime minister also held the defense minister's portfolio for more than half that duration.8 It is inconceivable that information about the nuclear weapons program was withheld from such a senior official. Moreover, according to some accounts, knowledge about the nuclear program was shared with India's two defense ministers—Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh Yadav—who held this post for a considerable period during this time.9 Additionally, if the logic offered by the interviewee is correct, then no secret—on any subject—should ever be shared with the military. Perhaps the biggest inconsistency, however, is how the interviewee could justify keeping the military uninformed when it was responsible for delivering India's nuclear weapons.Third, Kampani argues that civil-military distrust would have manifested itself in other ways, citing examples where this seemingly has not occurred. He argues that two facts—that the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating India's conventional war plans and that it engages extensively in countering domestic insurgencies—reflect civilian trust in the institution. This is a spurious argument, because neither observation necessarily suggests a lack of civil-military distrust. As is well known, the predominant narrative emerging from the 1962 Sino-Indian War blamed the collapse of the Indian army on ill-informed civilian intervention. Since then, India's civil-military relationship has been “informed by the notion that civilians should eschew involvement in operational matters.”10 That the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating conventional war plans should therefore not be surprising, because this function is considered to be within the military's “domain.”11 In this context, the military also enjoys considerable autonomy in other fields, including specifying weapons systems, doctrine, training, defense planning, and service promotions (up to the rank of brigadier).Similarly, the military's extensive involvement in counterinsurgency operations does not necessarily suggest harmonious civil-military relations. Instead, India's civilian and military leaders have agreed to an arrangement wherein the military enjoys considerable legal immunity when engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Tellingly, civil-military tensions have escalated when civilians have tried to alter this arrangement—for instance, when trying to amend or even overturn the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which provides legal immunity to the military.12 Rightly or wrongly, however, nuclear weapons were not considered to be in the military's domain, and hence civilians were able to keep the military away from the program.Kampani's assertion that there is no civil-military distrust in India not only challenges the conventional wisdom but does not comport with contemporary events. India's problem is not a possible loss of civilian control but problematic civil-military relations, a constant theme in the literature.13 Tensions between civilians and the military were even acknowledged in two official committee reports written in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war.14 Most recently, the controversial tenure of Chief of Army Staff Gen. V.K. Singh “saw civil-military relations reach their lowest ever in the history of independent India.”15Fourth, Kampani argues that “India's civilian leaders have shown little hesitation in institutionalizing the military's role in nuclear planning post-1998. … This change has occurred without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of India's civil-military relations” (p. 109). Kampani's claim oversimplifies a complex civil-military dynamic surrounding the development of India's nuclear arsenal. Moreover, it contradicts the available evidence. To be sure, the government established the Strategic Forces Command in 2003 to administer all of India's nuclear and strategic forces, and it has given the military unprecedented access to nuclear weapons. At the same time, civil-military integration has not been as smooth as Kampani would have us believe. According to one school of thought, most prominently associated with Verghese Koithara, civilians have resisted incorporating the military fully into the nuclear command and control chain.16 Supporters of this claim point to the fact that the “operational controller” of the Strategic Forces Command is not a military officer but the national security adviser.17 Elsewhere, Kampani notes this strange arrangement, observing that the Strategic Forces Command essentially functions “directly under the Prime Minister's Office through the national security advisor, bypassing the defense ministry and the military's normal chain of command.”18 Adm. Arun Prakash, chief of India's naval staff from 2004 to 2006, complained about the “complete exclusion of the armed forces from all aspects of planning and structuring of strategic programmes.”19In a rare speech on nuclear deterrence on April 24, 2013, however, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan dismissed the “perception that India's armed forces are not fully part of the strategic decision-making process.” He curiously added, however, that “one cannot accept that the credibility of India's nuclear deterrence demands management by its military.” Although his definition of “management” is unclear, later in the speech he acknowledged the need to “encourage better civil-military relations and coordination.” He went on to say that “the military's inputs into strategic planning and execution should be enhanced to make India's nuclear deterrent more effective.”20 Writing a few months after Saran's speech, former Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik argued that “weaknesses” existed because the military “is not consulted adequately or given political directions and resources … for an assured and effective operationalization of nuclear capability.”21 According to a former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), who wishes to remain unnamed: “[A]lthough the strategic target list is decided by the COSC, the Chairman is never consulted about vital issues relating to the effectiveness of the deterrent. For example: missile ranges and CEP [circular error probable] of nuclear warhead yields and reliability or development of PALs. … [A]ll these are decided ‘in-house’ by DAE & DRDO scientists. … [T]he ‘user’ [i.e., the military] is well out of the loop.”22India stands as an outlier for the manner in which it kept its military away from its nuclear weapons program. According to an unnamed former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, “[T]he Indian program never took the army into [its] confidence. We didn't discuss details with them. It wasn't a military program.”23 Moreover, the scientists wanted to prevent an “untoward build-up of the deterrent and its use, which they believed would accrue were the military to be brought into the decision-making and weapon handling loop.”24 Although the custodians of the nuclear program—scientists, technocrats, and selected bureaucrats—may have held such seemingly noble beliefs, it can also be argued that they were afraid that bringing the military into the loop might curtail their near-total operational autonomy.25 Indeed, one of the fears of the scientific-technocratic community that controlled the program was that the military might make a bid for greater involvement, ownership, and perhaps even control.26 An episode from early 1998 illustrates this point. In a meeting with Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, General Malik reported that the service chiefs jointly conveyed the need for a nuclear doctrine. Abdul Kalam, then scientific adviser to the defense minister, who was present at the meeting, claimed that there was one but that it was not to be shared with the armed forces. Expressing his incredulity, General Malik claims that this was part of “a nexus that kept the armed forces away from the nuclear weapons program.”27When talking about a civil-military gap in India's nuclear program, the custodians of the bomb will of course deny that one existed and will justify exclusion of the military from the program on the grounds of secrecy (as they did in interviews with Kampani). The civil-military divide would have been evident, however, if the author had focused on the decisionmakers at the time. Hence, on a number of occasions Kampani alleges failure on the part of Indian defense and policy “planners” (see p. 82, 88, 92, 99, and 100). But who were these “planners?” As far as we know, they were mostly scientists, technocrats, and a few select bureaucrats, such as Naresh Chandra. They did not include any military representatives.The main problem with Kampani's otherwise excellent article is his rejection of alternative explanations for the slow pace of India's nuclear program. Civil-military relations and the decision to keep the military on the margins played an important role in the program's delayed operationalization. One could similarly argue that the military was excluded because nuclear weapons were not considered weapons of war. Or perhaps the strategic culture argument explains the failure of Indian politicians to oversee the coordination of the scientific and military aspects of the program. To be fair, the need to maintain secrecy could still be the primary factor explaining this slow pace, but it was not the only one.—Anit MukherjeeSingaporeKudos to Gaurav Kampani for his deeply researched narration of the “excruciatingly long” course India has taken “to develop an operational nuclear capability.”1 “New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey” corrects some mistaken details of earlier treatments of this history, including my own in India's Nuclear Bomb.2 Anyone wanting details on the material and institutional evolution of India's nuclear capabilities should value Kampani's contribution.The article is less persuasive in explaining the history it uncovers. The central flaw is Kampani's attempt to ascribe India's nuclear muddling to one factor—secrecy born of “fear of the nonproliferation regime” (p. 81). Here one perceives the tyranny of academic theorizing and its diktat of “parsimony,” which an aspiring academic political scientist dare not reject. The problem is twofold: no single driver can explain most of the Indian nuclear story; second, secrecy is an effect of other causes, and therefore a weak cornerstone for a compelling theory of how the nonproliferation regime affected India's (or anyone else's?) development of operational nuclear forces.Kampani duly explores other candidate causes of India's irresolute nuclear course: “the normative beliefs of decisionmakers who pitted their moral aversion of nuclear weapons against more prosaic realist national security concerns”; decisionmaker preferences for “existential deterrence out of normative concerns for strategic stability in South Asia”; “a unique Indian strategic culture of restraint”; and “the dysfunctional nature of Indian civil-military institutions” (pp. 82–83). He offers evidence of Indian actions that can be interpreted to conclude that each alternative fails to explain key developments in India.Yet, the failure of any of these single explanations to cover all or most of the relevant developments in a decade of nuclear history does not mean that their sum is invalid or without utility. In fact, the four explanations that Kampani considers do help significantly to illuminate India's nuclear history from 1989 to 1999. The quest for a single decisive independent variable is unnecessary and misleading.Secrecy's inadequacy as a central causal explanation in the Indian case is evident in several Most important, one to why India's nuclear capabilities and have been so Kampani Indian officials who that secrecy from of “the of the he it is also that and have been (p. against makes of do officials in a ever to any other for If national defense is the for but the effect of secrecy is to national decisionmakers should not it too to more One wishes Kampani had into domestic why Indian political leaders have (or secrecy for so notes that prime ministers in the were in India's nuclear (p. 100). same could have been for several earlier prime He also reports that after Indian scientists and the challenges of political leaders from the weapons within and that would them operational in the military sense of the (p. 81). more than an in secrecy to keep in the these to the nuclear weapon program. and that of that these prime ministers were and about the and of nuclear weapons for nuclear weapons was not that important among the other and security India to In of the secrecy and in the Indian program prevented the military from being able to and the civilian weapons establishment and the political This on secrecy the among Indian political and that the with its and in Indian nuclear policy would to of the of nuclear weapons and to on as occurred in the and the theory is by the fact that the operationalization of India's nuclear weapons found in the defense policy and in the civilian nuclear The in all of these bureaucratic and political including of the at the of the defense and nuclear have secrecy and to and their from within as India's nuclear weapons scientists and long to the military from involvement in their the that Kampani has not been a Indian leaders have been privy to at four or among other India's nuclear and operationalization. Prime Minister V.P. Singh in one K. Gen. K. and Arun in 1999 the Kargil by K. was by the Arun Singh on Defense in The Naresh Committee on national security a in The in each of these reports were in the policy They all to India's defense including in the nuclear no prime minister has to the central of these For the Kargil and the Singh both of an defense staff chief would then have a role in nuclear planning and operations. however, among the armed forces and among political leaders have this still the that Kampani so and the 1989 to 1999 period he causes are and more than any theory can Still, they can be as Kampani's narrative to and rejection of my that secrecy was the cause of India's slow nuclear operationalization in the because it prevented successive Indian governments from a institutional within the has given for after their alternative explanations and them against the of the available I their claims his with the claim that my is a of the of academic and the of that an aspiring political scientist dare not One could similarly of on when there is He with the that I secrecy as the independent variable in my I maintain that secrecy was an variable and its cause in India's case in the to from the nonproliferation the not the nonproliferation regime as my He my argument on both his of a explanation for India's slow pace of and lack of operational planning in the political moral their in India's culture of strategic and the Indian domestic asserts that each of the alternative explanations I dismiss might not adequately explain India's their sum is greater than their The however, is that each of these explanations under the of which their into a explanation leaders by moral do not An deterrence does not into deterrence and of deterrence within a decade Strategic are not of India's of “existential to its for strategic stability with the factor in India's nuclear If deterrence and strategic stability were the of India's nuclear in the then Indian leaders could have that with to 1998 or in the after the nuclear Indian however, did not this More important, the domestic in India's to nuclear have the did not prevent India from a nuclear in but the to India's nuclear capabilities in the two and to India's and were in in Delhi's nuclear at several of all who has this history in can deny this Indeed, one of the of India's 1998 nuclear was the of a strategic with the to have central made in the early that India's from the and political of its political is that India was not It was India tried to develop a operational deterrent in the as as it but secrecy from fears of the that 1989 India the to nuclear weapons and this time, Indian defense and development to make for this which makes Indian the of moral prime ministers India's nuclear policy on because they could do little a from they on operational given the policy the with the from the that would India's and India's nuclear operationalization program therefore the of a and The secrecy surrounding it to the of The in knowledge between the scientists and the on the one who the challenges of operationalization and and their political on the who were of operational and the This is a of a to that leaders make with to them. however, is with prosaic examples of decided by Indian prime ministers the development of operational because of concerns that they could the nuclear to the as In the only of the the service with nuclear were privy to India's nuclear secrets. the government operational planning, the army and would have excluded from the was little for the civilians to the loss of control the policy The key for not through with the operational planning was to policy and that could of India's of a key Indeed, after India claimed nuclear and nuclear with the of the civilians remain in of the nuclear The among both in India and is that civilian defense scientists remain in the of the nuclear weapons program. the from the decade and the decade it do not support also makes the claim that is to India's defense and nuclear As the that India's nuclear program in the was part of the same that government operations more The problem with this argument is that can have can but need not a cause or That on India's nuclear program has the of of the lack of institutional and on the means to my explanation is to an and India's nuclear operationalization during the and the decade the in the program's pace, its during the and its in the decade the In this to the failure of successive Indian prime ministers to the of to a chief of defense staff to to the government on defense and nuclear is to the argument at is of explanations for India's slow secrecy can the of explaining the during this of India's nuclear But explanation on the logic of my rejection of India's problematic civil-military relations as a to the secrecy The problem with however, is that the of he Verghese Koithara, Ashley and Vipin does little to help his his from the is and that from the decade is an of not the for the he or the that at the my argument and India's civil-military as the cause of its slow nuclear makes a to the Indian in the to This observation is both and because the was the service of for the of nuclear delivery and operations in the more offers a of Indian nuclear policy It largely from academic and is of evidence from the of its The of written was to the of India's emerging deterrent. Tellis the main of his argument by all of the for India's to 1998 without them or their concerns how and civil-military nuclear among nuclear is of my rejection of civil-military tensions as a in the slow pace of Indian nuclear operationalization in the but he these and presents no evidence to my He is if my claim about defense ministers out of the nuclear loop is We can to this point when he greater on this He points out that Indian prime ministers held the defense portfolio for half of the decade and have about the nuclear program. I never argue that prime ministers were out of the He it that civilians in India would to keep the military out of nuclear Indeed, civilian scientists who with the in the they were to operational planning with their military a from the political argument is not that civil-military tensions in India were or are I argue that civil-military tensions were not to slow the pace of and operational planning in the For all the that pervades civil-military in the operational autonomy by the military as well as the lack of hesitation in its in with extensive domestic India's are evidence of a have an to for of claims to the that civilian have the military a role in India's nuclear and planning nuclear operations. point, is that the of civil-military nuclear is with that nuclear operations. This is and my own to however, the in India's civil-military institutional development and in the details of institutional to for had argued that civil-military tensions India from an operational nuclear Instead, the civilians have the role of the military in with civilian defense scientists under the leadership of the national security adviser in the prime minister's all of the claims made to 1998 about in the way of India an operational of its political strategic culture and the lack domestic and civil-military by the and its in successive Indian governments from a institutional is the explanation for India's long nuclear during the

Chinese national music art, is the art of ancient Chinese culture for thousands of years, is unique to Chinese history and culture, expression, aesthetic reflects the art of music, this is our nation's own heart Love, sound, and rhyme is China National of three big basic features, colorful of national language and brilliant of China traditional culture gave birth to has China National this a flashing with Chinese spirit and wisdom of art varieties as China National art of unique of aesthetics character, they has sharp of national features and aesthetic style and spirit, is China National Art aesthetics theory of a permanent subject paper on China National art of love, and sound, and rhyme for discussion, Precisely in order to grasp its essential basic characteristics and aesthetic theory of Chinese national music art makes some preliminary explanation. This article is about the national singing is a reference to the modern music scene of this singing style is based on the traditional music art, with our country's political life, life is constantly changing and constantly improve the development of, the strengths of other arts and integration and the formation of the continuous choice. The national singing title talked in this paper is proposed by China's modern music circle, and this singing art develops and improves constantly with the constant change of China's political and cultural life on the basis of traditional music art. To constantly choose other arts strengths and integration and the formation of the 1930s Yangko opera singing method, is the prototype of national music, so to speak. Opera after the huge success of the white-haired girl, marked the beginning of Chinese national music's true, it is a new era of Chinese national music art development. Contemporaneous and 560 have been created and played a large number of new Opera and new folk songs. These people's new life, a new feeling, a new spirit of new musical styles and a new way of singing and added a strange light in the music. After liberation, the music education began the teaching of national music study, set up a private class, national opera troupe and the undergraduate professional. From that point on into China's national music art higher musical institution, and singing at the singing style, began a comprehensive and detailed study of theory and practice of teaching. Into the eighties, has been China's national music art is art garden of fragrant, closely related to the lives of people of all ethnic groups, closely related to gorgeous flowers. Most Conservatory has established a vocal professional, in the direction of teaching, course content and teaching styles and teaching

Individual and Ideological Immunity?The Resilience of Indian Foreign Policy Constantino Xavier (bio) Following his victory in the 2014 Indian general election, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to promise revisions to foreign policy. His government proclaimed the arrival of a new India that would be a "leading power," suggesting that the country's past policies had been too passive and defensive. Within South Asia, Modi spoke of a "neighborhood first" approach, alluding to regional neglect by his predecessors. In Southeast Asia, the Look East policy was renamed Act East, with a new focus on the wider Indo-Pacific and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Meanwhile, internally, members of Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) accused the country's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his Indian National Congress (INC) party of having sacrificed national security to appease Pakistan and China since the 1950s. Going beyond this noise, Ian Hall's Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy offers a deep and dispassionate assessment of these many promises and accusations to conclude that, in practice, Modi's foreign policy has been mostly marked by continuity with the past. Except for "some deviations" (p. 39), Hall observes that the individual role of the popular prime minister and the ideological role of Hindu nationalism promoted by the BJP have failed to reinvent India's external engagements: the "continuities in policy and implementation from earlier governments were clearer than the changes" (p. 125). Hall's conclusion departs from an important assumption, especially for international observers who had expected Modi's charismatic populism and his party's cultural conservativism to break with nonalignment and other cardinal principles. Did Modi not order unprecedented surgical strikes in Kashmir to punish Pakistan beyond the disputed Line of Control? Did he not welcome U.S. president Barack Obama and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe while playing tough with China during Beijing's military incursion into neighboring Bhutan? Did he not deepen Indo-Pacific partnerships and revive the quadrilateral dialogue with Japan, Australia, [End Page 179] and the United States? Did he not announce the first ever chief of defense staff to increase India's military preparedness and interservice coordination? On all these and many other accounts, however, a closer look reveals that nothing was truly novel: many of these actions had been either initiated or promised before Modi's premiership, with some dating back to the turn of the new century. Some observers may flesh out nuances to argue that there have been occasional departures and changes in emphasis—such as in reaching out to the Indian diaspora, normalizing relations with the European Union, or building new power-projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean—but one or two adjustments do not a revolution make, Hall argues. In fact, the book suggests that a radical reinvention of Indian foreign policy was never really even attempted in the first place, but rather was a rhetorical and tactical move focused on consolidating Modi's domestic support base. Many may disagree with this cynical reading, but Hall touches a deeper nerve in Indian foreign policy analysis. The scholarly debate about how domestic factors such as individual leaders or party ideologies shape foreign policy in democratic India goes back several decades and is impossible to settle.1 In recent years, given new archival sources and a closer examination of specific cases, however, the pendulum has swung in favor of continuity and reduced the agency attributed to specific leaders, including even Nehru.2 This line of research has also deflated the alleged foreign policy differences between political parties, especially the INC and the BJP.3 For those interested in deeper debates about India's external engagements since 1947, Hall's book thus confirms that individuals and ideology are overrated. Mostly immune to Modi and the BJP, India's grand quest for strategic autonomy, coupled with institutional deficiencies in foreign policymaking, has once again prevailed to dictate continuity. Hall's book departs from the popular narratives about the new Modi doctrine and BJP ideology that allegedly transformed India's external relations, whether with the diaspora, the United States, or [End Page 180] India's neighbors.4 His close examination of economic liberalization...

The degree of human development in any society is measured by the extent to which women participate in political life, and Iraqi women, together with many third-world countries, have suffered a real crisis concerning women's participation in the country's political life, and many factors have been played in reducing the share and size of women's participation in political life, including the growing role of the military in political life and the militarization of society during the eight-year war and subsequent events that led to the women's dissociation and reduction of their role. The role was only after women were granted no-election women share in Iraq's new constitution after 2003. Women's political participation is not only about obtaining their political rights but also about their political rights in the legitimacy of freely expressing their ideas within the framework of the institutions and groups of society and participating in political decision-making and practice. Therefore, women's political skills must be expanded by improving educational opportunities, leadership courses, and exchange programs, and removing institutional and legal barriers limiting Iraqi women's political participation.

Brief Report| June 01 2021 Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications: Annotated Arabic Bibliography: Brief English Reviews of New Arabic-Language Releases in Critical Arab Scholarship Gabi El-Khoury Gabi El-Khoury Librarian and Head of Documentation, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Contemporary Arab Affairs (2021) 14 (2): 118–126. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2021.14.2.118 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Gabi El-Khoury; Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications: Annotated Arabic Bibliography: Brief English Reviews of New Arabic-Language Releases in Critical Arab Scholarship. Contemporary Arab Affairs 1 June 2021; 14 (2): 118–126. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2021.14.2.118 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentContemporary Arab Affairs Search Heba Gamal El Deen M. El-Azab, Spiritual Diplomacy and the Abrahamic Interfaith: Colonial Plan of the New Century (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2021). 256 pp. ISBN 9789953829296 Many questions have been raised in recent years in the debate relating to the notion of “Abrahamic interfaith” as a major approach to global religious peace and a basis for eliminating extremism and violence, and even for eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable development. Interest in research and investigation into the concept of Abrahamic interfaith and its objectives has become prevalent as the notion has featured in the discourse of several American and Israeli circles in relation to the monotheistic religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) in an attempt to politically exploit the common denominators between the three religions and use them in a larger framework of what has become to be known as “spiritual diplomacy.” The author argues that the concept of... You do not currently have access to this content.