Editor's Note

Lessons of the Cold War

The direction and scope of the change in Soviet foreign policy after 1985 cannot be explained without reference to the impact of Gorbachev's representation of the Soviet security problem. Changes in the international distribution of capabilities and generational change are indeterminate explanations of the changes in Soviet foreign policy. Building on propositions from social cognition and organizational psychology, I argue that through inductive “trial-and-error learning” from failure, Gorbachev developed a new representation of the “ill-structured” Soviet security problem. Gorbachev learned in part because he was a relatively uncommitted thinker on security issues and was open to the ideas of experts. He was also highly motivated to learn because of his commitment to domestic reform. The complex interactive relationship between learning and action that provided quick feedback is captured by the social cognition of “learning by doing.” The conditionality of political learning suggests a rich research agenda for the analysis of foreign policy change.

Editor's Note

Disagreements between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s over both foreign policy — China's bombardment of Jinmen in August 1958 and border clashes with India in 1959 — and domestic policy — the Great Leap Forward in 1958–60 and the People's Communes Movement in 1958 — provoked a more contentious ideological dispute: which party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), more accurately represented orthodox Marxism? which party pointed the international Communist movement in the right direction? and which party should lead the movement? After the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, by which the twelve parties in power in socialist countries endorsed the decisions of the twentieth congress of the CPSU, to demonstrate the unity of the socialist bloc, the CCP moved to the left while the CPSU moved to the right.

Ironically, Brezhnev's observation still holds true today. However, the transformative power of the international communist movement has resulted not from its consolidation, as Brezhnev surmised, but from its disintegration. The 'world revolutionary process' predicted by Marx, initiated by Lenin, and promoted for seventy years by the Soviet Union has come to an abrupt halt. Whether temporary or permanent, its present demise has created one of the most fluid historical moments of the twentieth century. This paper seeks to assess the impact of this world-wide phenomenon on southern Africa by analyzing one of its dimensions — Soviet relations with Angola. The paper addresses two central questions. To what extent have Soviet conceptual and organizational changes in foreign policy affected Soviet policy towards Angola? How has this new Soviet policy influenced developments in Angola and southern Africa more generally? The analysis is divided into four sections. The first section outlines recent 'restructuring' within and between those institutions which formulate and execute Soviet foreign policy towards Angola. The second section describes and explains the conceptual and concrete changes in Soviet foreign policy regarding states of socialist orientation which affect Angola. The third section discusses another revised concept in Soviet foreign policy — 'new thinking' about regional security — and its impact on Soviet-Angolan relations. The final section concludes with an

BOOK REVIEWS Gilad Y. Ohana, editor Barnett, A., The Making of Foreign Policy in China ................ 233 Barrett, J., Impulse to Revolution in Latin America ................. 238 Bender, Coleman, and Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy .................................. 240 Bittman, L., The KGB and Soviet Disinformation ................... 224 Cohen, E., Citizens and Soldiers .................................. 245 Cohen, S. , Sovieticus ............................................ 224 Collins, J., The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan...................... 220 Darius, Amos, and Magnus, Gulf Security in the 1980s .............. 227 Dickey, C. , With the Contras .................................... 244 Feldman, E., Concorde and Dissent ............................... 229 Katz, M., Russia and Arabia ..................................... 220 LaI, D., The Poverty of "Development Economics" .................. 236 Lamm and Imhoff, The Immigration Time Bomb .................. 247 Laqueur, W. , A World of Secrets ................................. 226 MacFarlane, S., Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism .... 220 Mastny, V. , Power and Policy in Transition ........................ 246 McNaugher, T. , Arms and Oil ................................... 227 Menon, R., Soviet Power and the Third World ..................... 220 Parrott, B., ed., Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations ..223 Pepper, Janow, and Wheeler, The Competition ..................... 231 Reimers, D., Still the Golden Door ................................ 247 Reynolds, L., Economic Growth in the Third World ................ 236 Sharp, M., ed., Europe and the New Technologies .................. 229 Stanton, S., The Rise and Fall of An American Army ............... 245 Timberlake, L. , Africa in Crisis .................................. 241 Tsou, T., The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms ........... 233 Ungar, S. , ed. , Estrangement .................................... 242 Vogel, E., Comeback ........................................... 231 219 220 SAIS REVIEW Soviet Power and the Third World. By Rajan Menon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 254 pp. $25.00/cloth. Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation. By S. Neil MacFarlane. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 238 pp. $24.50/cloth. Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula. By Mark N. Katz. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 279 pp. $30.00/cloth. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy. ByJosephJ. Collins. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986. 195 pp. $24.00/cloth. Reviewed byJames Voorhees, Ph.D. candidate, SAIS, and editor at the International Food Policy Research Institute. The expansion of Soviet influence into the Third World has been a cause of concern in the West since the 1917 Revolution. In the current debate, some argue that the Soviet Union is relentlessly expansionistic, that it has a carefully planned long-range strategy, and that it is guided primarily by ideology. Others argue that Soviet actions are essentially reactive and are guided primarily by national interest. But many on both sides show more conviction than understanding . These four books help enlighten readers about how the Soviet Union approaches the Third World. Rajan Menon's Soviet Power in the Third World is a closely reasoned analysis of the Soviet side of East-West competition in this arena. Menon concentrates on three topics: Soviet theory about the competition, Soviet power-projection forces, and arms transfers as an instrument of Soviet policy. According to Menon, the Soviet Union entered the 1970s with a bright new image of itself. This new image found expression in military interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Soviet power shaped the outcome of political change in each of these nations, particularly the last. Menon argues, however, that the ability and willingness of the Soviets to act in the Third World is often exaggerated. They cannot match the West in the economic instruments of the competition for Third World allegiance. And the ability of the Soviets to project military power far from their borders is less than that of the United States and has been given a low priority in Soviet defense planning. The primary instrument used by the Soviets to gain power and influence in the Third World is the transfer of arms. Arms transfers have enabled the Soviet Union to establish a presence in important Third World countries. Nonetheless, the usefulness of arms transfers is strictly limited. Indeed, Menon points out, arms transfers often confer greater benefits on the recipient nation, both in terms of material gain and influence. Menon suggests that the Soviets have come to recognize that the West has advantages over the East in trading with and providing aid to the Third World and that this has...

JOHN F. KENNEDY World Leader Stephen G. Rabe Washington: Potomac, 2010. 249PP, $60.00 cloth. ISBN 978-1-597971478John F. retains an almost unequaled currency in American politics, which makes Stephen G. Rabe's study of his foreign policy, John F. Kennedy: World Leader, an exceptionally timed book, well suited for both interested readers and the college classroom.One must begin by noting the immensity of the challenge before Rabe: to examine concisely the president who faced two of the Cold War's most dangerous crises (which, themselves, have been the subject of entire books), but not to the exclusion of myriad other issues and relationships that do not make the history textbook but are essential to understanding Kennedy's foreign policy. Rabe, whose publications include two excellent books about Kennedy-era foreign policy toward Latin America, has an instinctive feel for the human cost of policies crafted at the dizzying heights of world power. The book has a number of attributes that make it well suited for the college classroom: Rabe helpfully provides a pre-1961 background to many issues he discusses, and an appendix of 16 documents nicely augments the author's narrative.Kennedy scholarship has moved between pendular extremes. The first generation of books about him, written in the immediate wake of his death, conferred a kind of sainthood upon him and helped to let loose the myth of Camelot. The second generation, strongly influenced by the Vietnam War, captured a very different president: an unyielding Cold Warrior, egged on by personal demons toward reckless acts of policy. A third wave began to emerge after the Cold War as documents became increasingly available. In particular, we have benefited from the release of audiorecordings of Kennedy's deliberations during the Cuban missile crisis. Third- generation scholarship has sought a middle ground, faulting him for aggressive policies but also crediting him with cool, prudent leadership amid crises, and reigniting debate over whether he had begun to transcend Cold War thinking in his final year.Rabe straddles the second and third waves of scholarship but sits a bit closer to the former. He is sharply critical ofa number of Kennedy's policies, particularly toward Latin America. He deems incapable of distinguishing between nationalism and communism, and indicts him for invariably choosing anticommunist dictators or colonialists over national or elected leaders with less certain Cold War bona fides (18). He takes aim at what he and others call Kennedy exceptionalism: the belief that would have made fundamentally better, more prudent choices than other Cold War presidents (120). At the same time, he credits with sound judgement during the Berlin and Cuba crises, and applauds the intent, if not the consequences, of his foreign aid policies. Rabe's is a paradox: hawkish but cautious amid crises, sympathetic to nationalism and yet fearful of it. As such, this portrait introduces readers to much of what fascinates and aminates debate about the 35th president.Like other scholars, Rabe grapples with fundamentally unanswerable issues, all of which concern Kennedy's final year in office. It is a thankless but necessary task, whue adding all the necessary caveats, to discuss where Kennedy's policies were heading in his final year and what he might have done had he not been assassinated. Three questions in particular are worthy of discussion: whether might have achieved an early detente with Khrushchev, whether he might have pursued a modus vivendi with Castro, and whether he might have removed US troops from Vietnam. …

592 SEER, 79, 3, 200I the analysissuffersfromthe fact that the processof publishingmaterialis slow and recent developmentshave thereforebeen omitted. The last chapter, by Claudia Lohnig, discusses the evolution of output structuresin transition countries and make some comparisons with Greece, Portugal and Spain (again, Ireland is excluded, without clear explanation). The author argues that convergence in the structures of manufacturing towardsthe EU patternsmay be linked to an increasein intra-industrytrade. Despite the fact that the argumentis compelling, insufficientevidence is given to supportthisthesis. On the whole, thisbook may be usefulfor those interestedin readingabout macroeconomic aspectsof capitalinflows,tradeand exchange ratepolicies. It offerssome new insights as well as a very good overview of the main issues. However anybody interested in up-to-date research results should consult more focusedpapers. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies T. M. MICKIEWICZ University College London Orttung, Robert W., Lussier, Danielle N., Paretskaya, Anna (eds). The Republics andRegions oftheRussian Federation. A Guide toPolitics,Policies, and Leaders. EastWestInstituteand M. E. Sharpe,Armonk,NY, and London, 2000. xxvii + 679 pp. Maps. Tables.Appendices. Index. $225.00. Lavrov,A. M., and Makushkin,Alexei G. (eds),with a forewordbyAlexander G. Granberg. TheFiscalStructure of theRussianFederation. FinancialFlows Between theCenter andtheRegions. M. E. Sharpe, NY, and London, 2000. xxxvii + 233 pp. Tables. Figures. Maps. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. $125.00. BOTH of these works are essential for anyone trying to make sense of the dynamics of Russian regionalism. The book edited by Orttung and his colleaguesat the EastWestInstitutein New Yorkis an encyclopaedicreference guide to Russia's 89 regions, offering an overview of each region, some demographic, economic and electoral statistics,a description of the region's political institutions, some discussion of the main policy orientations of the regional leadership, an analysisof relations with Moscow and other regions, and, where relevant, foreign policy issues. In addition, the book provides usefulthumbnailsketchesof majorregional actors, including the biographies of major political and economic elites, and some evaluation of the overall business climate in the region. Entries are alphabetical, beginning with Adygeya and ending with Yaroslavl, with each concluding with contact information for the regional leadership and important regional world-wideweb sites. In his Introduction Orttung generalizes some of the data contained in individualregional entries. Followinga general discussionof Russia'sfederal structure, Orttung provides a brief prosopographic analysis of Russia's governors.Thus we learn that in 2000 the averageage of a governorwas 53.5 yearsold, and that at thattime therewas only one female governor(Valentina Bronevichof the KoryakAutonomous Okrug,who lost her seat in late 2000). REVIEWS 593 Just over half the governors had a background in economic management, with twenty-one (24 per cent) beginning their professional lives in the agricultural sector, while sixteen (i8 per cent) were industrialists,and six workedin the constructionindustry.Not surprisingly,the dominant ideology of the guvernatorial corps is that of supra-partytechnocratic governance. Such an approach is reinforced by the fact that the single largest cohort (twenty-two, or 25 per cent) emerged out of the top officialdom of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union (CPSU), with two of them having been members of the party's Politiburo (Orel's Egor Stroev and North Ossetia's Aleksandr Dzasokhov). Overall, some 44 governors (49 per cent) had significant experience serving in the CPSU's ranks. Only one governor, Evgenii Mikhailov of Pskov, used another party (Vladimir Zhirinovskii's LiberalDemocratic Partyof Russia, LDPR) as his trampolineto power. The limitedutilityof partyaffiliationin Russia'sregionalpoliticswasdemonstrated by Mikhailov's subsequent repudiation of the LDPR, and more broadly by the chronic tensions between governors who are formally affiliatedwith the CPSU's successor party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), and the CPRF'sleadershipand rank-and-file. The key relationship stressed by Orttung is between the governor and Moscow. He suggests seven ways in which the Kremlin can influence regional politics, ranging from intervention in regional election campaigns to the signing of the 46 power-sharing treaties. In turn, governors exercise considerable authority in their own regions, often dominating the local economy, influencing regional and national elections, capturing federal agencies working in their region, and blocking the implementation of federal programmes. As time passed they became more adept at ensuring their own re-election, although in most cases this did not involve the direct...

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War sparked a debate in the study of world politics. Scholars scampered to offer explanations for these unforeseen events. Some argued that the end of the Cold War demonstrated the importance of agency and ideas— specifically Mikhail Gorbachev’s New Thinking. Others responded that traditional theories of power politics could explain the changes in Soviet foreign policy that transformed Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. We contend that one cannot explain the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War without placing Soviet Union foreign policy in its unique revolutionary context. Soviet foreign policy had been based on the principle of externalization, going back to the period immediately after the revolution. Threats from abroad justified extreme centralization, repression, and monopolistic one-party rule. Gorbachev strove to revitalize the idea of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary state and acted as a “counterrevolutionary” in attempting to change the fundamental assumptions of Soviet foreign policy, promoting a friendly international environment that would help to decentralize the Soviet system, end repression, and advance a more pluralist order. This counterrevolution failed and led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet empire, and the Soviet state itself.KeywordsForeign PolicyComparative International DevelopmentGerman Democratic RepublicWorld PoliticsInternational SecurityThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The goal of this historical survey at ten sites in Russia was to increase our understanding of changing work attitudes and behaviours during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras, and to assess how they were related to political loyalty to the Soviet system. A questionnaire was administered by Russian interviewers to 625 respondents at selected work sites in Moscow, its outlying regions, Samara, and St. Petersburg. We determined that there was evidence of diminishing support for the communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) among ordinary workers beginning already in the Brezhnev period, but reaching a low of 27.6% under Gorbachev. Negative behavioural patterns included drinking on the job (50.5%) and moonlighting (38.5%); while 20.2% expressed overt alienation from the system. But the picture was not all negative: 53.9% of respondents found their work to be creative; and 55.8% thought their salary was satisfactory. Those with the better jobs were most likely to remain loyal to the CPSU; moreover, for them the nature and quality of their work was more important than pay.

The article reveals the contents of the foreign policy of the USSR in the years 1918-1953 in the Middle East as an example of system analysis D. Easton and G. Almond. The author examines the foreign policy in terms of its ability to respond flexibly to incoming exposure expressed in response to pulses of “input” and “output”. The study draws attention to the characteristics of the external and internal incentives to promote change in Soviet foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The warm international atmosphere at the end of the 1980s bears little resemblance to the second cold war that characterised the beginning of the decade. To a considerable extent this is the result of changes in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet diplomacy has changed dramatically in the last four years. Indeed, the foreign policy reforms have been as profound as in the domestic economy and politics. The most obvious consequence has been a resumption of East-West detente. But there have been other surprising developments in Soviet foreign policy, as well as in the theory underlying policy and in the structure of foreign policy decision-making.

Between 1985 and 1991, the foundation of Soviet foreign policy changed from a Marxist-Leninist view of inevitable conflict between capitalism and socialism to an idealist vision of cooperation between states in solving global problems. Mikhail S. Gorbachev fundamentally altered Soviet foreign-policy theory and practice by adopting the ideals of the New Thinking, including global interdependence, universal human values, the balance of interests, and freedom of choice. Nor was this just rhetoric; he accepted the dismantling of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and asymmetric reductions in Soviet conventional forces, withdrew support from communist movements, and helped mediate an end to regional conflicts in the Third World. He applied the principle of freedom of choice to Eastern Europe, culminating in his decision to tolerate the fall of communism and to acquiesce to Germany's unification. The change in Soviet identity, in how the Soviet Union viewed itself in relation to the rest of the world and its mission in international politics, brought an abrupt end to the Cold War. For many observers the most striking aspect of the new Soviet identity was Gorbachev's and his comrades' determination to discard Soviet traditional Realpolitik without substituting any moderate, reformed version of realism for it. What explains Gorbachev's adoption of an idealist view of the world and of the Soviet role within it? Understanding the radical changes in Soviet foreign policy has both theoretical and practical significance. The Gorbachev revolution bears on the question of how states cope with a declining power position.

: In four years as leaders of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev has introduced radical changes in the theory and practices of Soviet foreign policy. In his self-proclaimed 'new political thinking,' he has down-played the importance of class struggle in international relations, emphasized 'mutual security' and the role of politics in resolving disputes, and stressed the interdependent nature of the contemporary world. He has called for common efforts to solve such problems as debt, hunger, pollution and above all disarmament. the Soviets have also invoked new political thinking to explain a series of surprising policy moves, including the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan the acceptance of on-site inspection in the 1986 Conference Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreements, and the payment of UN dues long in arrears

Realist or liberal explanations for the end of the cold war cannot account for the specific content of the change in Soviet foreign policy or for Western responses to it. These theories need to be complemented by approaches that emphasize the interaction between international and domestic factors and that take seriously the proposition that ideas intervene between structural conditions and actors' interests. Some of the strategic prescriptions that informed the reconceptualization of Soviet security interests originated in the Western liberal internationalist community, which formed transnational networks with “new thinkers” in the former Soviet Union. These new ideas became causally consequential for the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy and also had an impact on American and German reactions to it. Even though transnational networks were active in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, their success varied. Domestic structures like the nature of political institutions, state-society relations, and political culture determine the ability of transnational networks first, to gain access to a country's political system and second, to build “winning coalitions.” These differences in domestic structures can largely explain the variation in impact of the strategic prescriptions among the three countries.