Arab-Israeli War Research Articles

The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel

ABSTRACTLyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The ‘New Nazis’ or the ‘People of our God’? Jews and Zionism in the Latin Church of Jerusalem, 1948–1962

In the aftermath of the Holocaust the elaboration of Catholic perceptions of the Jewish people has been particularly problematic. The weight of a long tradition of Christian antisemitism and its influence on the Nazi extermination programme, as well as the revision of this attitude before and after the Shoah in various Catholic circles as a means of promoting a rapprochement, made it difficult to redefine the image of Jewish people in the Catholic imagination, and gave rise to different and conflicting interpretations. Some members of the Latin Catholic Church of Jerusalem began to argue for an analogy between Nazism and Zionism. This assertion took different forms as the political situation in Palestine evolved and in response to changing attitudes within the Church towards the Jews. This paper will reconstruct the ‘new Nazis’ paradigm in the Jerusalem Church, analysing three key periods: the 1947–9 Arab-Israeli war; the consolidation of the State of Israel in the 1950s; and the Eichmann trial of 1961–2.

The Enemy Achieves Surprise: Are Intelligence Failures Avoidable?

While Intelligence Agencies around the world have achieved great feats in intelligence gathering and preventing surprise attacks against nations concerned, the most visible part of their work to the world is the failures that have been recorded in history. Notable among the record in history are the failure of British and American invasion in Iraq to uncover Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the surprise attack by the Japanese against the United States Naval base at Pearl Harbor, the 9/11 Surprise attack against the United States in 2001, the Cuban Missile Crises, etc. These cases of intelligence failure have received several scholarly debates as to why the intelligence community failed in its work to avert the enemy’s surprise. The focus of this paper is on the Intelligence Failure of the United States 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 (also known as the Arab-Israeli War). This paper examines these two cases from a different perspective by analyzing whether the failures in these two cases were avoidable with references made to the conventional causes of the failures in literature. By situating analysis in Betts’ theory of intelligence failure, we argue that there are vulnerabilities in the intelligence process which can be located in the context of the structure of organizations (bureaucracy). This analysis reveals that the structure of organizations (bureaucracy) makes them prone to error. Some of the unforeseen vulnerabilities are created out of organizational reforms, communication gaps in the intelligence process and more importantly the overriding self-interest of decision makers which clouds their judgment during decision-making. We conclude that these identified weaknesses are natural to the intelligence process and efforts to perfect the system may only improve the results marginally. Therefore, the intelligence community is not insulated from surprise attacks which make intelligence failure an inevitable phenomenon.

Cold War Dilemmas, Superpower Influence, and Regional Interests: Greece and the Palestinian Question, 1947–1949

This article discusses official attitudes toward the creation of the state of Israel from the eruption of the postwar international crisis in Palestine until the end of Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949. In 1947–1949, Greek policy toward the Middle East was determined by a mix of regional, political, and ideological factors: the Greek security problem during the early Cold War era, including the Greek civil war; the existence of the Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem; the Greek government's need to take into account the position of the Greek diaspora community in Egypt; commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean; anti-Semitism; the need to secure Arab votes in support of the Greek question before the United Nations; and relations between Greece and its new superpower patron, the United States. Greek decisions were dominated by Cold War needs, but the United States did not impose policy on its junior partner.

The strategic and political consequences of the June 1967 war

This article analyses the direct, relatively immediate strategic and political consequences of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, focusing on Israel’s post-war security situation, the connection of the Six-Day War with the next episodes of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on important and relevant to the issue political realities emerging in the affected societies, such as the Palestinian national movement and refugee problem, the rise of Islam, and the Jewish colonisation of the occupied territories. It highlights the multicausality of its origins and the sequentiality of its implications, whose extent and scale led to it being widely considered a turning point for its belligerents and the Middle East in general. Its far-reaching effects are connected as in a chain, extending to the present. The article concludes that the Six-Day War was indeed a decisive moment of great historical significance, yet not a true turning point in the technical sense.

Bonding with the British: Colonial Nostalgia and the Idealization of Mandatory Palestine in Israeli Literature and Culture after 1967

Since the founding of Israel in 1948, the Yishuv's campaign against British rule has been idealized as a period of bygone heroism and commitment. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, this nostalgia for the pre-state, anticolonial struggle was complemented, even challenged, by a divergent nostalgic force—one that celebrates the romance of the Mandate's colonial features, yearns for the social and political opportunities made possible by the presence of the imperial regime, and ultimately laments its demise. Tracing and contextualizing expressions of this longing in Israeli literature, cinema, and theater, this article argues that "colonial" nostalgia for the Mandate is rooted in the geopolitical effects of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: driven by a growing sense of guilt over Israel's occupation, Israeli authors have depicted Mandatory Palestine as a cosmopolitan haven in which the Israelis, restored to the status of colonial subjects, are freed from the burden of sovereignty.

Things that matter: nostalgic objects in Palestinian Arab homes in Israel

ABSTRACTThis article addresses the complex identity of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens from an atypical perspective: through manifestations of their material culture. The cultural expressions that will be examined are objects from the past and objects that relate to the past, particularly to the rustic Palestinian life profoundly destabilized by the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. These objects, displayed in the homes of some of Israel's Arab citizens, are interpreted by contemplating their design, the design of their environment, their relationship to other objects, and their placement within the domestic sphere. Our study is animated by the desire to sketch a cultural portrait of Palestinian Arab Israelis, as well as by a methodological interest in interpretations based on a socio-architectural reading of objects.This article reveals the various layers of meaning within these nostalgic displays in all their diversity, and will discuss at length their uniqueness, which is linked to the past traumas and present difficulties of Israel's Arabs. Our main purpose is to develop a line of thought whereby objects that express nostalgia are understood as the embodiment of a consciousness that is characteristic of the present.

The Radical Crescent: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

ABSTRACTThis analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO’s diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington’s objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria’s June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria’s intervention, Kissinger’s actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.

The camouflage of war: planned destruction in Jaffa and Tel Aviv, 1948

ABSTRACTThe massive destruction of historic city centres during the Second World War was used, first in Britain and then in the rest of Europe, by contemporary architects and planners for justifying a modernist ‘clean slate’ approach to urban reconstruction; for them, war was ‘a blessing in disguise’ that could be exploited for adopting revolutionary planning concepts. In 1948 Tel Aviv, similar justifications were used for the total demolition of Manshiya, a centrally located ‘slum’ neighbourhood which allegedly suffered extensive and irrecoverable war damages during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This article argues that contrary to common perceptions, the 1948 Manshiya demolitions were not a ‘complementary’ act obligated by the destruction of war, but rather a deliberate exploitation of wartime confusion and misinformation in order to launch an ambitious (and illegal) ‘modernization’ project for the whole area of southern Tel Aviv. Unlike European post-war urban reconstruction, in Manshiya, war was deliberately used by Tel Aviv’s leadership as a camouflage for a large-scale planned ‘civilian’ destruction that realized town planning ideals in their most radical form. This made the events exceptional not only in the backdrop of the 1948 War, but also in the local history of urban planning as a whole.

Perang Enam Hari Arab Israel 1967 Menerusi Perspektif Teori Realisme

Realism approach has dominated the studies of world politics and international relations since the last of the World War II and until the start of the Cold War era. The focus of this study is to look into the factors that ignited the war other than identifying the policies or actions taken by the countries involved in the war. The question that arises lies in the extent to which the approach is able to explain the factors and actions taken by the leaders, to the point that it led to the 1967 war, and how this war can serve as guidance for our understanding of the Realism Theory. The objective of this study is to unravel the chains of events that had become the background of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War by concentrating on the root causes of the war and the policies of the countries involved, other than offering justification for the Realism Theory by looking closely into the characteristics, assumptions, and concepts under this approach. The methodology of this work employs document analysis and historical studies to obtain complete data. The analysis was carried out by applying the Arab-Israeli war events to the Realism Theory to prove that there is an association between the causes of the war and the theory through the analysis unit, key assumptions and substantial concepts contained in the Realism approach. The unit of analysis, which places the countries as the main actor in the international system, can be seen through the main role of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel throughout the period of war. Concepts such as power, power balance, national interests, national sovereignty and self-help are also associated with the causes behind this war through a series of facts that have manifested themselves in the event.

The United States and the European Community (1969-1974) Economic and Political Disputes

This paper aims to examine the economic and political disputes between the United States and the European Community between 1969 and 1974. Utilising the documentary research approach, the paper will first explore the main economic disputes which were manifested in two rounds of the United States-European Community Consultation in 1970 and 1972. Then, it will investigate the divergence between the United States and the European Community in their policy stances on energy and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War which together constituted the major political disputes between the two sides. With these economic and political disputes, the years 1969-1974 witnessed a difficult phase of the United States-the European Community relations.

George Brown and British Policy in the Middle East following the 1967 War

In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, relations between Britain and the Arab world improved, particularly with Egypt, and also with Jordan. This article shows the driver of this decisive shift in policy was the initiative of Foreign Secretary George Brown. Well aware of the aversion some of his colleagues felt toward Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser and anger over King Husayn of Jordan's defense pact with the Egyptian leader, Brown opted to maneuver behind the government's back and did not hesitate to manipulate and even deceive both the government and Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

The 1967 Arab–Israeli war: Soviet policy by other means?

ABSTRACTThis paper considers two aspects of historiography about the 1967 Arab–Israeli war – American and Soviet foreign policy in the region – to better appreciate the Soviet role in the outbreak of hostilities, as well as how the war concretized the USA–Israel ‘special relationship’ and weakened American–Arab relations. Relying especially on research from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library and Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), this paper argues that Soviet officials had little interest in pursuing measures to prevent war during the prewar crisis because the situation promised to undermine American interests in the region.

Negotiating the caliphate: British responses to pan-Islamic appeals, 1914–1924

ABSTRACTThis paper considers two aspects of historiography about the 1967 Arab–Israeli War – American and Soviet foreign policy in the region – to better appreciate the Soviet role in the outbreak of hostilities, as well as how the war concretized the US–Israeli ‘special relationship’ and weakened American–Arab relations. Relying especially on research from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library and Foreign Relations of the United States, this paper argues that Soviet officials had little interest in pursuing measures to prevent war during the pre-war crisis because the situation promised to undermine American interests in the region.

Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East

Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East

The Dark Side of the Crescent Moon: The Islamization of Europe and Its Impact on American/Russian Relations, by Georgy Gounev

Reviewed by: Simeon Mitropolitski, University of OttawaIn his latest book, Georgy Gounev, an expert in comparative Russian and American history, explores the possibility of a new American-Russian alliance against the rising global threat of radical Islam. The Dark Side of the Crescent Moon describes the obstacles that stand in the way of such an alliance and suggests ways to overcome them. Gounev divides his book thematically into two main parts. In one, the author tells the story of the rise of radical Islam and its search for global political domination. Specific chapters are dedicated to the process of Islamization in Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union and Russia. In the other, the author focuses on the evolution of American-Russian relations from the Second World War through the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Gounev discusses the highs and lows of these relations both within and outside of the context of the Islamic world.In relation to the threat of radical Islam, the author implicitly employs Samuel Huntington's vision of the clash of civilizations, emphasizing demographic and immigration factors as key avenues through which Muslim populations have gradually increased in size and influence in the most economically advanced Western countries. The aggressiveness of radical Islam, whose goal, Gounev claims, is to occupy the space left vacant by Christianity, is coupled with tolerance within Western countries, enabling radical Islam to function with impunity. Professing political correctness and multiculturalism, these countries encourage Muslim migrants and recent converts to remain isolated from host societies. Even after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, Western societies did not dare to name radical Islam by its proper name, preferring euphemisms such as extremism and on terror. Not least, radical leftist groups in Europe and the United States give moral credit to radicalized Muslims, seeing in them and their anti-Western hatred a logical consequence of Western imperialism and global inequalities.American-Russian relations during the last decades have been marked by periods of cooperation and confrontation. More often than not, the behaviour of Muslim countries and issues related to some of these countries have constituted important factors in the dynamics of these bilateral relations. Gounev provides historical examples--post-Second World War Arab nationalism, the Arab-Israeli wars, the special relationship between Washington and Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. In the global confrontation of the Cold War, both superpowers stimulated political radicalism among their client states and both underestimated the threat of this radicalism for their own future security.Following the framework of realist theory in international relations, both pre-structural and structural, Gounev claims that the United States and Russia, as countries subject to planned aggression, share common interests. …

The Arab Legion and the 1948 War: The Conduct of ‘Collusion’?

The partition of Palestine and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War proved to be one of the defining moments of the twentieth century and its continued contemporary resonance has helped maintain a lively historiography. One of the key contentions remains the question of ‘collusion’ between the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Zionists, with the approval of Britain, to partition Palestine in contravention of the UN partition plan. Based on unprecedented access to the unofficial archive of the strongest of the Arab armies—Transjordan’s Arab Legion—this article seeks to further the debate by examining the conduct of the Arab Legion, during the first half of 1948. This new material has enabled a more thorough assessment of the Arab Legion’s aims and actions than ever before. In so doing, this article dampens the revisionist notion of a firm or even tacit Hashemite–Zionist agreement, but nonetheless supports the revisionist argument that negotiations between the parties helped to shape the 1948 war. It reveals that the Arab Legion was used to establish Hashemite–Zionist partition by occupying the Arab areas of Palestine when the mandate ended and acquiescing in the establishment of Israel. Moreover, this article illustrates a significant nuance, concerning the intense fighting that took place, particularly in Jerusalem, after the end of the mandate, differentiating between the influence of King Abdullah of Transjordan and the British commander of his army, Glubb Pasha, in dictating the Arab Legion’s conduct.

These Papers are Intended to Mislead: Soldiers and Freedom Fighters in Mubārak Rabī`’s Comrades in Arms … and the Moon

This article addresses the misleading nature of the rewrite of the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war as portrayed in Moroccan Mubārak Rabī´’s 1976 novel Rifqat al-Silāḥ … wa-l-Qamar (Comrades in Arms … and the Moon). Papers partially burned by a retreating Moroccan officer lure the ‘enemy’ into attacking a fortified position, thus leading to an Arab victory. The fantastical nature of the war narrative informs a different reading of the novel, focused on Rabī´’s critique of and scepticism toward the possibility of unity among Arabs that such a victory would require. Rabī´’s critique centres on the distinction between jundī, regular soldier, and fidā’ī, freedom fighter; he explores Arab culture's relation to the two archetypes and redraws the fidā’ī in order to provide a broader and more progressive understanding of the goals and behaviour of those who desire radical change.

Admissibility Clause-dilemma Facing the ICC and the Concern of War in the Gaza Strip

This researched paper is an exposure of key legal challenges facing the international criminal justice framework and its effectiveness in the 21 st Century. The Arab-Israeli war, Israel Palestinian War, Israel-Hamas War, Israel versus Islam nations in the Middle East, have been historical events whose legal solution appear always to be dwindling with time. It is in the interest of the author to open up some of the critical problematic questions under discussion by international lawyers and diplomats about the atrocities going on in the Middle East region and especially in Palestine and Israel. However, the article does not give an illusion of an immediate legal solution to the problem that has been affecting many civilians, civilian populations with their objects being destroyed with impunity. It is noted that the hostilities taking place in the Gaza Strip and the entire region present a very delicate situation in the development of international criminal justice system. It is in the interest of the article to provide points for intellectual considerations before making conclusions. You can download the entire research.

Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a ‘land for peace’ formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with its Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring Resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the United States.