Abstract

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a ‘land for peace’ formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with its Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring Resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the United States.

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