Anticompetitive Behavior Research Articles

The Quest for Uniformity between National Competition Authorities and Courts

In the three-pillared system established by Regulation 1/2003, and particularly in the decentralized enforcement environment that this parallel system corresponds to, the need for uniformity arises not only as far as the national level (NJs and NCAs v. the Commission is concerned), but also within the national level itself. This essay aims at exploring the possible solutions, based on European Union law, to the potential shortcomings regarding coherence arising at this level. A prominent feature is Article 9 of the Directive on damages actions, which establishes that a .nal decision of a NCA or a review court should be binding in subsequent actions for damages brought before their national courts. This provision is assessed in the context of the principles of European Union law relevant for the co-ordination between NJs and NCAs. Second, the only direct communication tool between NJs and NCAs set out in regulation 1/2003, i.e., Article 15(3), is examined closely. On the basis of this two-phased analysis, the actions that NJs should take pending proceedings before an NCA or in case of a previous decision of the NCA on the same or on related anti-competitive behaviour falling within the scope of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU, and vice versa, are sketched out and discussed.

Monitor and the Competition and Markets Authority

As part of its enforcement duties under the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, and in exercise of the powers assigned to it by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the health care sector regulator for England (Monitor) is co-competent with the competition watchdog (Competition and Markets Authority) to enforce competition law in health care markets. Oddly, though, unlike other sector regulators, Monitor does not have a duty to promote competition but ‘simply’ to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. Monitor is also competent to carry out reviews and to decide bid disputes concerning procurement carried out by health care bodies, provided there is no formal challenge under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006.This paper contends that such a concentration of regulatory, competition enforcement and procurement review powers puts Monitor in a unique situation of (potential) structural conflict of interest that can diminish significantly its ability to act as an effective (co-competent) competition authority. This paper focusses on this difficult structure for the enforcement of competition law in the health care sector in England, in particular due to the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime created by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Concurrency Regulations 2014. As examples of such conflict of interest and its implications, the paper assesses Monitor’s incentives to bend the interpretation of both art.101(3) TFEU and the new special regime on procurement of social services (arts.72-77 dir 2014/24). The paper concludes that this situation requires regulatory reform to devolve powers to the Competition and Markets Authority.

Vertical Relations and Procompetitive Policy Effects in the Fund Industry: Evidence from Korea

:This study indicates, through the first two moments (mean and variance) of distribution fees and market shares, that competition in Korea’s equity fund industry has intensified since the enforcement of procompetitive policies. However, the results demonstrate that the policy effects are impeded by vertical relations among financial companies. Therefore, along with horizontal anticompetitive behaviors, fund distributors’ excessive sales concentration in the affiliated funds needs to be controlled to heighten the policy effects under oligopolistic market structures. This regulation can strengthen investor protection and promote the growth of the fund industry in an emerging financial market.

비대칭적 네트워크 가치 환경에서의 인터넷망 대가정산 모형

Internet is composed of many independent networks referred to as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and each provider is generally interconnected based on a commercial agreement. Though many countries are engaged in deregulation in internet interconnection, there is still debate whether the large ISPs are unwilling to peer with small providers, have incentives to lower the quality of data transmission of transit operators or set the interconnection charge regarding the actual costs incurred by the interconnection. Korean government introduced regulations in internet interconnection after observing noticeable anti-competitive behaviors from 2005. This paper analyzes whether there is margin squeeze problem/market concentration, and suggests political proposals in Korean regulation status.

Characterisation and inhibition studies of Helicoverpa armigera (Hübner) gut α‐amylase

The survival of a devastating pest, Helicoverpa armigera, is mainly dependent on the availability of α-amylase. Therefore, characterising H. armigera α-amylase and targeting it with effective inhibitors could aid in reducing its damaging effects. H. armigera gut possessed four isozymes of α-amylase. The molecular weight of the major purified isozyme ranged from 79 to 81 kDa. The purified enzyme was identified to be α-amylase on the basis of products formed from starch. The optimum pH and temperature were 10.0 and 50 °C respectively. The activation energy was 5.7 kcal mol(-1) . The enzyme showed high activity with starch and amylopectin, whereas dextrins were poor substrates. The Michaelis constant Km with starch, amylose and amylopectin was 0.45, 1.23 and 0.11 mg mL(-1) respectively. ZnSO4 , FeSO4 , CuSO4 , citric acid, oxalic acid and salicylic acid were potent inhibitors. ZnSO4 , salicylic acid and pigeonpea α-amylase inhibitor (∼21.0 kDa) acted primarily as competitive inhibitors, FeSO4 and citric acid displayed mainly anticompetitive behaviour, while CuSO4 and oxalic acid behaved mainly as non-competitive inhibitors. The identification of effective ecofriendly inhibitors could help in managing H. armigera infestation. © 2014 Society of Chemical Industry.

Soft Law in EU Competition Law and its Judicial Reception in Member States -- A Theoretical Perspective

The EU competition enforcement regime underwent quite some changes in both its substantive and procedural workings when Regulation 1/2003 – the 'Modernization' Regulation – entered into force on May 1st 2004. The procedural decentralization and the change in the logic of substantive enforcement the Regulation introduced created challenges for the new system, especially in light of the general principle of legal certainty. Mindful of possible (and plausible) enforcement inconsistencies, the European Commission maintained that certainty is going to be well served by the already existing and well-developed competition case law of the CJEU, the Commission’s own decisional practice, and, last but not least, its soft law guidance in the forms of guidelines, notices, communications, etc.It is these latter instruments and their value for steering judicial discourse in EU Member States that the current paper is interested in. Since the year 2004, the significance of Commission-issued soft law has increased because the latter instruments provide an in-depth account and guidance of, respectively, the enforcement practice and priorities of the Commission. These are important functions to perform in a highly uncertain and fluid policy enforcement setting, where the multiplicity of decision-makers and new substantive enforcement goals make it increasingly difficult for businesses to predict what constitutes anti-competitive behavior and what not. In this sense, and in view of legal certainty, it would be desirable that not only businesses and national competition enforcement agencies (NCAs), but also the national judiciary took heed of the said soft instruments. The question asked in this paper, thus, is whether and if so – how – do national courts take Commission-issued competition soft law into account in their judgments? Since there are indications that the provisions of competition soft law are being disregarded at the supranational level (take the recent Expedia judgment of the CJEU), it could be that national courts exhibit a similar approach. Such a development, however, is deemed undesirable from the theoretical standpoint of legal certainty, since instruments which contain and elaborate on the substantive core of the re-designed regime, and which are explicitly designed to ensure consistency in a moment of fluidity in the law, cannot simply be ignored, especially by the judiciary. As ultimate instances of normative ordering, courts have the responsibility to maintain legal certainty, and to do so, in the context of EU competition law, they should engage with the pertinent soft instruments. To this end, the current paper proposes a theoretical framework for national judicial engagement with competition soft law instruments.

Refusal to Deal, Abuse of Right and Competition Law in Electronic Markets and Digital Communities

Abstract: Economic activity is today to a great extent, totally or partially, developed in the electronic realm. Commercial transactions are more and more frequently concluded within electronic markets and other trading platforms, supplementing or even entirely replacing traditional negotiating channels and marketplaces. Likewise, non-commercial activities and professional and social interaction increasingly take place in digital spaces from P2P systems to social networks. These closed, network-based and community-building platforms compete with each other for gaining and retaining users, clients or participants. With such a purpose, electronic markets and platforms may be tempted to impose exclusivity obligations to ensure a minimum efficient scale or adopt leveraging and exploitative practices. At the same time, for certain disclosed reasons or merely on an arbitrary basis, platforms' managers may refuse to accept the application of a user or the offer of a business entity willing to join the network and become a member. As a premise, it can be argued that the electronic market is so exercising the right to run business activities, decide whom to deal with, and on which commercial conditions, under the free enterprise principle. Notwithstanding, such a refusal to deal can entail an abusive exercise of right ignoring constitutional principles and involve in practice an anticompetitive exclusionary behaviour resulting in market foreclosure or an effective social marginalization of the user, especially in the case of excessive concentration, market dominance or even essential facilities. Therefore, private autonomy in dealing with decisions, specifically in refusing admission, has to be carefully examined under public policy principles, considering, in particular, the specific features of the 'electronic markets' market' and the rules of the digital economy.

Transversal Agency and Crowding Out

A country'’s competition agency is transversal in the sense of being active in the whole economy. We study the interaction between the competition agency and sectoral regulators and establish a scope for sectoral regulators to crowd out each other’'s efforts: More effort on monitoring anti-competitive behaviour by one sectoral regulator causes others to do less. We also find that when government agencies interact under consensus the competition agency spends more effort on the industry with the more consumer-biased sectoral regulator, while the opposite is true under independent decisions.

Revisiting the Single and Continuous Infringement of Article 101: The Significance of Anic in a New Era of Cartel Detection and Analysis

The ability of the Commission to assess various elements of anti-competitive behaviour as manifestations of the same single and continuous infringement of Article 101, by reference to a common overriding objective, remains one of the most fundamental principles underpinning the Commission's assessment and analysis of the evidence in cartel investigations. However, whilst jurisprudence may have successfully navigated a course through the legal challenges to the single and continuous infringement, the consistency and accuracy with which the concept is discharged by the Commission and the circumstances in which its application is appropriate remain the subject of debate. Amid this uncertainty, there have nevertheless developed a number of clear and discernable reasons for practitioners to give adequate consideration to whether a party's involvement in a cartel may amount to one or several infringements of Article 101. In particular, with the Commission's assessment of the evidence in cartel investigations driven increasingly by direct engagement with the alleged participants, practitioners should be aware of the implications of the combination or disaggregation of infringements prior to making submissions under the Commission's leniency regime or engaging with the Commission through settlement discussions.

Anti-competitive behaviour in the agri-food and steel value chains in the South African manufacturing sector

Despite the fact that it has existed for over ten years, the Competition Act has had little impact in diluting the dominance of big business in the South African manufacturing sector. This study sought to ascertain the extent of anti-competitive behaviour in two sub-sectors of the South African manufacturing sector and to determine whether the competition authorities should focus on supporting SMEs as competitors to big business. The findings indicated that SMEs in these two sub-sectors face unique difficulties in fighting anti-competitive behaviour, and that there is scope for the competition authorities to facilitate the participation of SMEs in the economy through the use of tools such as market inquiries, the Corporate Leniency Policy and structural remedies.

Do markup dynamics reflect fundamentals or changes in conduct?

Intertemporal shifts in conduct, such as a transition from competitive to anti-competitive behavior, induce shifts in the firms’ equilibrium price configurations. Such shifts generate non-stationary price dynamics in addition to those which originate from exogenous fundamentals. We exploit this statistical feature to detect potential changes in conduct, as well as measure their effect on prices. Our approach requires only data on prices and fundamentals without necessitating strong assumptions regarding industry structure. Application to United States and European banking sectors indicates substantial differences between conventional credit spreads and components associated with changes in conduct.

Anti-Competitive Behaviours and the Remedies Available for Redress

In this chapter, core doctrines of competition law generally applied by national authorities are reviewed. Most competition laws examine anti-competitive behavior in relation to agreements between enterprises, on the one hand, and monopolization or abuse of dominant position, on the other. Anti-competitive activity is further viewed as either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’. Horizontal anti-competitive activity refers to conduct among independent enterprises that are suppliers of competitive (or potentially competitive) goods or services. Vertical anti-competitive activity refers to the supply chain controlled by a producer, beginning with inputs to production, into production, intermediate distribution and, ultimately, the retail sale of goods or services.Some types of agreement between enterprises are so inherently anti-competitive that proof of the existence of the agreement is sufficient to establish a violation. Such agreements are referred to either as per se anti-competitive or hard-core competition law violations. Other types of conduct that may seem anti-competitive on their face may also have a pro-competitive justification, such that competition authorities assess the balance. This balancing is often referred to as assessment under the “rule of reason”. For a competition law violation to be found, the anti-competitive aspect of the arrangement should outweigh potential pro-competitive benefits.Examples of horizontal anti-competitive behavior that are per se illegal in most jurisdictions include price-fixing among competitors, output restraints and allocation of geographic territories. Examples of vertical restraints that are per se illegal in many, but not all, jurisdictions are resale price maintenance (or fixing the minimum price at which retailers may sell) and “exclusive grantback” requirements in patent licenses.There are some significant risks of anti-competitive conduct in pharmaceuticals markets that are fairly widespread and deserve close attention from competition authorities. These include bid manipulation in procurement of health technologies, whereby a group of potential competitors may agree not to submit bids below a set price and to allocate the ‘lowest set price’ bid to a particular firm. Such activity may also involve inappropriate payments to government officials who might otherwise report the anti-competitive practice. Anti-competitive conduct by patent-owning enterprises may include requiring a distributor or retailer of health technologies to purchase a complete line of products as a condition of purchasing a particular product or products (i.e. a tying arrangement). Perhaps the most widely discussed form of anti-competitive conduct involving patent owners involves ‘buying out’ generic challenges to patents that might otherwise result in generic products entering the market at an early date. Such buyouts upset the balance legislators strive to achieve between granting patents and authorizing their challenge to foster competition. Mergers and acquisitions may adversely affect product markets by, for example, allowing combined companies to raise prices for therapies previously in competition with each other.Anti-competitive conduct affects markets for innovation, such as when a patent is illegitimately used to prevent the development of new products not within the scope of the patent, or when patent-owning companies combine to control markets. Mergers and acquisitions can affect markets for innovation by reducing potential RD it may unilaterally dictate terms. One objective surrounding the control of mergers and acquisitions is to prevent an enterprise from combining with others precisely to take a dominant position in the market.This chapter concludes with a discussion of the types of remedies that are available to national authorities and private parties as redress for anti-competitive conduct. It is not uncommon for the government to enter into some form of settlement agreement with an accused enterprise pursuant to which that enterprise agrees to cease its anti-competitive activities and may also make a payment either as damages or as a penalty. Such settlements may be approved and/or supervised by courts.In some jurisdictions, particularly the United States, a good deal of competition enforcement is undertaken by private actors suing for damages. Anti-competitive conduct may also be subject to criminal penalties including substantial fines, and imprisonment for individuals. Specific types of remedies may be used to address anti-competitive conduct that is undertaken to block the introduction of generic products. This may include requiring pharmaceutical patent owners to compensate public procurement authorities, generic producers and others for damages occasioned by the unwarranted invocation of patents. Strong consideration should be given to prohibiting patent owners from “buying out” generic producers’ challenges to patent validity or assertions of non-infringement. Other types of specific remedies may be considered.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions from Wholesale Energy Markets

A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization auction for use in wholesale electric power markets with an intention to lower procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns have been raised for this proposal while assuming that the true production costs would be revealed to the auctioneer in a competitive market. Using an experimental approach, the study compares the performance of these two complex-offer auctions, controlling for the level of unilateral market power. The analysis finds that neither auction results in allocations that correspond to the true cost revelation. Two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, consumer prices in a competitive environment approach the prices of an environment with market power. It appears that the expected institutional effects for procurement cost and efficiency are greatly dominated by the effects of anti-competitive behavior due to the offer complexity and a cyclical nature of market demand.

Justifications and Anti-competitive Unilateral Conduct: An International Analysis

Many jurisdictions across the globe prohibit companies with market power to engage in anti-competitive unilateral conduct. This prohibition is anything but absolute, however. Several reasons can offer a justification for conduct that would otherwise be unlawful. Although such justifications can make the difference between whether or not unilateral conduct should be allowed, they have not been subject to many cross-border comparative studies. This article seeks to propel a much-needed global debate on this topic. It discusses how various jurisdictions around the world deal with justifications as regards prima facie anti-competitive unilateral behaviour. It takes EU law as a starting point, and attempts to distil lessons from the non-EU jurisdictions under review: Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa and the United States.

Open Competition or Discrimination on Tracks? Examples of Anti-Competitive Behaviour of The Deutsche Bahn

Abstract The article provides an analysis of a competitive situation in railway transport in Germany and defines areas where the Deutsche Bahn holding, which integrates both infrastructure operators and carriers, may behave in an anti-competitive way. First of all, conditions of liberalisation in German railways and position of competition in partial sections of transport are introduced. Subsequently, areas which are - from the economic point of view - necessary for operation of competition in the railway sector are identified: it is the height of fees charged for utilisation of transport routes, fees for the use of railway stations, and finally, traction energy fees, too. On the basis of research into development in the last two decades, steps which are possible to consider to be (minimally) concealed anti-competitive behaviour of the Deutsche Bahn, was were revealed in all areas. This is substantiated by decisions of several decisive regulatory authorities, most predominantly of Bundesnetzagentur and courts, which have repeatedly ordered Deutsche Bahn to revise price lists and other terms. In consequence, the example of Deutsche Bahn demonstrated a great disadvantage of an integrated company including infrastructure administrator and carrier, as it is offered a great space for influencing competitive environment. In the German example, this often comprised in raising competitor´s costs which, however, do not manifest themselves in economic results of the holding company. Should transport policies of the state decide to separate the infrastructure administrator and the carrier, a great deal of hard-to-reveal and thus punishable “complications” preventing establishment of conditions of free competition on the railway market shall cease to exist.

The Proposed Damages Legislation: Don't Believe the Critics

The Commission’s proposed Directive concerning private enforcement of Competition Law certainly would be beneficial for victims of anticompetitive conduct because it would allow some victims to obtain a certain degree of compensation. It does not, however, go far enough. Because it does not allow opt-out class action or contingent fee cases it will continue to leave most victims uncompensated. Some critics claim the proposed Directive will move Europe closer towards a US-style of private antitrust enforcement that they characterise in almost apocalyptic terms. An extremely negative view of US private enforcement is indeed the accepted wisdom in the international competition community. Proponents of expanded private rights in Europe are forced to go to great lengths to demonstrate they are not proposing a US-style system. Nevertheless, anyone interested in learning lessons from the US experience should take note that these critics have never offered reliable proof of its alleged defects. If you examine their assertions carefully you will see that their ‘evidence’ consists only of anecdotes (which often are self-serving), hypotheticals, and opinions. Critics of private enforcement tend to make two (largely inconsistent) claims: that it does too little—it fails to provide meaningful recovery to victims—and that it does too much—it forces defendants to settle even groundless claims. Neither assertion has empirical support. As to compensation, the best data show that private antitrust enforcement in the United States has produced tremendous benefits for victims of anticompetitive behavior. Professor Joshua Davis and I recently completed a study of 60 large private US antitrust cases demonstrating that victims recovered more than $33 billion dollars. Only an overall average of 19 per cent of recoveries went for attorneys fees and claims administration expenses. At least $6–8 billion was recovered from non-US companies, including more than $3 billion in cases against members of the vitamins cartels. These totals do not include recoveries of products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive relief or legal precedent. Thus the $33 billion seriously understates the true benefits of these cases. And, of course, we studied only 60 of the many hundreds of private cases filed in recent years. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, ‘Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) 48 Georgia Law Review 1, available at ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2217051.. Critics also claim that in the USA plaintiffs often receive huge sums in meritless cases and that private antitrust actions often amount to ‘legalized blackmail’. Since almost every private recovery is a settlement one fairly might ask, for example, whether the 60 cases Professor Davis and I studied involved anticompetitive conduct. Although opinions about specific cases naturally will vary, it is significant that in 17 of these cases there also was a criminal penalty, in 17 the government obtained civil relief, in 15 defendants lost at trial in the same or in a related case, in 14 plaintiffs survived or prevailed at summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, etc. Only seven of 60 cases didn’t have at least one of these indicia of validation (and none contained evidence of a lack of merit; the seven cases settled too early for a substantive evaluation of their merits). While none of this is proof these cases involved anticompetitive conduct, what evidence do critics provide to show private actions lack merit? Essentially . . . nothing. Only anecdotes, hypotheticals, and opinions. No studies, statistics, or reliable evidence. It is ironic that the conventional wisdom about the lack of merit of US private antitrust enforcement itself lacks merit. It is true that today European victims can sometimes recover in suits filed under the laws of EU member states. Would the proposed Directive therefore lead to over-compensation of victims? Very unlikely. The US experience strongly suggests overcompensation will not

The Conflicting Economic Views Emerging from the Microsoft Antitrust Case: Literature Review

NATURE AND SCOPE: The essay seeks to review the Literature that is available on the economists’ conflicting viewpoints that have emerged from the 1998 US v Microsoft case. Part I has some background information needed to understand the economic aspects of the case. Part II reviews the literature available on the case regarding the economic aspects of the alleged anticompetitive behavior of Microsoft.LIMITATIONS: This project does not deal with in-depth economic analysis of the software market or the legal procedure of the case in question. It also does not deal with the remedies advanced by the Court in pursuance of its decision.RESEARCH QUESTION: What are the conflicting economic views on whether Microsoft was a monopoly in the relevant market and whether it had abused its monopoly and acted in an anticompetitive manner?

New Rules forrHealthhCareeProcurementtinnthe UK..A Critical Assessmenttfrom the PerspectiveeoffEUUEconomiccLaw

The recently adopted UK National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 include an interesting (and somehow unsettling) provision authorising anti-competitive behaviour in the commissioning of health care services by the National Health Service (NHS), if that is in the (best) interest of health care users. Generally, it seems that under the new public procurement and competition rules applicable to the NHS, whatever is considered in the “interest of patients” could trump pro-competitive requirements and allow the commissioning entity to engage in distortions of competition (either directly, or by facilitating anti-competitive behaviour by tenderers and service providers) — as long as a sort of qualitative cost-benefit analysis shows that net advantages derived from the anti-competitive procurement activity. The apparent oddity of such general “authorisation” for public buyers to engage in anti-competitive procurement of health care services deserves some careful analysis, which this paper carries out. The paper assesses Regulation 10 of the NHS Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations 2013 and the substantive guidance published by the UK's health care sector regulator (Monitor) from the perspective of EU economic law (and, more specifically, in connection to public procurement and competition rules). The paper claims that there is a prima facie potential incompatibility between Regulation 10 of the 2013 NHS Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations and both EU competition law and public procurement law — which are, in principle, opposed to any anti-competitive or competition restrictive behaviour in the conduct of public procurement activities. Consequently, there is a need for an EU law compliant, restrictive interpretation and enforcement of the provision — at least where there is a cross border effect on competition and/or a cross border interest in tendering for the health care contracts, which triggers the application of both EU competition law and public procurement law.

The Cost of Antitrust Law to Malaysia's Financial Services Sector

Judging by only economic incentives, Malaysian financial institutions (particularly banks) should completely ignore the Competition Act. The data show that Malaysian banks probably benefit from anti-competitive behaviour. Political and family connections likely facilitate such behaviour. Given that the Malaysian Competition Commission will likely lack the resources to investigate and sanction anti-competitive behaviour in Malaysia’s banking industry – the banks’ best response to the Act probably consists of ignoring it. Maximum fines of 10 million ringgit and revenue-tied penalties of only 10% of worldwide revenue mean that banks still have strong incentives to engage in anti-competitive behaviour and to pay any low fine that might be levied. The best compliance programme for banks in Malaysia likely consists of actions that avoid detection rather than detecting and preventing anti-competitive behaviour. Private rights of action are unlikely to provide any stronger economic incentives for Malaysian banks to adopt strong antitrust compliance programmes and internal audit programmes. By staying the course, Malaysian banks can continue to earn about 15 billion ringgits (approximately US $4.6 billion in anti-competitive rents).

Outsourcing Retail Pricing to a Category Captain: The Role of Information Firewalls

It has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance. Retailers may seek category management (CM) advice from a manufacturer, referred to as a category captain (CC). A CC's recommendations affect all brands in the category, not just her own. Despite an increase in the number of CC collaborations, retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as CCs, whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers. The Federal Trade Commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a CC's organization as a best-practice guideline. In this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of CC arrangements with information firewalls on retailers, manufacturers, and consumers. We show how these effects could be influenced by the (de)activation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the CC's organization.