Anthropomorphic Explanations Research Articles

All Models Are Wrong, and Some Are Religious: Supernatural Explanations as Abstract and Useful Falsehoods about Complex Realities.

Many cognitive and evolutionary theories of religion argue that supernatural explanations are byproducts of our cognitive adaptations. An influential argument states that our supernatural explanations result from a tendency to generate anthropomorphic explanations, and that this tendency is a byproduct of an error management strategy because agents tend to be associated with especially high fitness costs. We propose instead that anthropomorphic and other supernatural explanations result as features of a broader toolkit of well-designed cognitive adaptations, which are designed for explaining the abstract and causal structure of complex, unobservable, and uncertain phenomena that have substantial impacts on fitness. Specifically, we argue that (1) mental representations about the abstract vs. the supernatural are largely overlapping, if not identical, and (2) when the data-generating processes for scarce and ambiguous observations are complex and opaque, a naive observer can improve a bias-variance trade-off by starting with a simple, underspecified explanation that Western observers readily interpret as "supernatural." We then argue that (3) in many cases, knowledge specialists across cultures offer pragmatic services that involve apparently supernatural explanations, and their clients are frequently willing to pay them in a market for useful and effective services. We propose that at least some ethnographic descriptions of religion might actually reflect ordinary and adaptive responses to novel problems such as illnesses and natural disasters, where knowledge specialists possess and apply the best available explanations about phenomena that would otherwise be completely mysterious and unpredictable.

The personality of anthropomorphism: How the need for cognition and the need for closure define attitudes and anthropomorphic attributions toward robots

Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to attribute human characteristics to non-human agents such as robots. These attributions could depend on some dispositional factors such as the individuals' will to engage in reflective processes (need for cognition), to predict their environment (need for closure). Indeed, these traits may moderate how we explain artificial agents’ behavior that is our motivation to use cognitively more effortful reasoning about artificial agents against easily accessible anthropomorphic explanations. In the present study, we measured participants (n = 1141) need for cognition and closure in order to predict attitudes toward robots and anthropomorphic attributions on various robots which differed in terms of human-like characteristics. We found that both dimensions of personality influenced attitudes and anthropomorphism. In addition, these effects were emphasized by the human-like characteristics of the robots. In addition, we used a novel approach of clustering and machine-learning validation to delineate personality profiles based on the need for cognition and need for closure as most predictive variables to provide a first predictive categorization of tendency to anthropomorphize and attitudes toward robots. Our results argue for the importance of considering the interaction between the dispositional traits on the one hand and the design of robots on the other for anthropomorphism.

The perception of humanness in conversational journalism: An algorithmic information-processing perspective

How much do anthropomorphisms influence the perception of users about whether they are conversing with a human or an algorithm in a chatbot environment? We develop a cognitive model using the constructs of anthropomorphism and explainability to explain user experiences with conversational journalism (CJ) in the context of chatbot news. We examine how users perceive anthropomorphic and explanatory cues, and how these stimuli influence user perception of and attitudes toward CJ. Anthropomorphic explanations of why and how certain items are recommended afford users a sense of humanness, which then affects trust and emotional assurance. Perceived humanness triggers a two-step flow of interaction by defining the baseline to make a judgment about the qualities of CJ and by affording the capacity to interact with chatbots concerning their intention to interact with chatbots. We develop practical implications relevant to chatbots and ascertain the significance of humanness as a social cue in CJ. We offer a theoretical lens through which to characterize humanness as a key mechanism of human–artificial intelligence (AI) interaction, of which the eventual goal is humans perceive AI as human beings. Our results help to better understand human–chatbot interaction in CJ by illustrating how humans interact with chatbots and explaining why humans accept the way of CJ.

The US Presidents' Example: An Anthropomorphic Explanation of Comprehensive Two-Dimensional Gas Explanation of Comprehensive Two-Dimensional Gas Chromatography with Mass Spectrometric Detection Chromatography with Mass Spectrometric Detection

The US Presidents' Example: An Anthropomorphic Explanation of Comprehensive Two-Dimensional Gas Explanation of Comprehensive Two-Dimensional Gas Chromatography with Mass Spectrometric Detection Chromatography with Mass Spectrometric Detection

連合学習理論は擬鼠主義の産物か

Many researchers have been interested in cognitive abilities of animals and investigated those issues by using several methods. Associative learning theory, which is mainly adopted in classical and operant conditioning literature, has been considered “simple” and sometime “appropriate” account of animal behavior from the point of view of Morgan's canon. In present article, criticism toward associative account and another reason why associative account is appropriate for animal behavior were reviewed, proposing proper usage of associative learning theory in complex animal behavior. One possible answer in present discussion is that associative learning theory is some kind of “intermediate language”, which can work as the bridge among neural mechanism, psychological faculty in animals, and anthropomorphic explanations.

An Interactive Computer Model for Improved Student Understanding of Random Particle Motion and Osmosis

Effectively teaching the concepts of osmosis to college-level students is a major obstacle in biological education. Therefore, a novel computer model is presented that allows students to observe the random nature of particle motion simultaneously with the seemingly directed net flow of water across a semipermeable membrane during osmotic simulations. Specifically, the simulations are intended to help students understand that the membrane-crossing probability of water molecules depends solely on their concentrations on both sides of the membrane. The interactive model allows for user-controlled concentration gradients and should also help students avoid some common osmotic misconceptions including those that derive from the use of teleological or anthropomorphic explanations. The model is implemented in the multiagent NetLogo environment and is accessible as a platform-independent Java applet.

Kritik terhadap Eksistensialisme Ateistik tentang Penolakan Eksistensi Tuhan

The article describes the atheist existentialists’ concept of God, arguments of taking away God, and then tries to criticize their concepts and arguments. General account on existentialists’ concept of God, which is represented in Nietzsche’s statement on the death of God, begins the paper. The following part is about arguments in denying the existence of God, followed by some critiques of them. The criticism of Muhammad Iqbal, who is a Muslim existentialist, on atheistic existentialistic concept of God ends the thoroughly paper. The result of this research is that atheist existentialists understand God in anthropomorphic explanation; the relation between God and human is identical with that of human and human. Even though they denied the existence of God with the reason of determinism, their arguments implied a new determinism, and the freedom they struggled indicated pseudo freedom.

Lifting the taboo regarding teleology and anthropomorphism in biology education?Heretical suggestions

Teleological and anthropomorphic explanations are considered illegitimate by many biology educators. This article is a position paper advocating the removal of the taboo regarding anthropomorphism and teleology in biology education. This position is defended by several arguments: (a) Regardless of science educators' position in this issue, children will continue to encounter endless teleological/anthropomorphic formulations in popular science movies and books. (b) A review of philosophers' and biologists' ideas shows that there is definitely no consensus on a universal rejection of teleological formulations and explanations. (c) The results of an empirical cognitive study show that, for high school students, the acceptance of anthropomorphic or teleological formulations does not necessarily imply anthropomorphic or teleological reasoning. (d) Results from an empirical field study designed to assess the influence of a textbook with numerous teleological/anthropomorphic formulations on biology students indicate that the use of such a book is not followed by an increase in students' application of teleological/anthropomorphic formulations or explanations. Students' reflections upon their own learning processes testify that teleological/anthropomorphic formulations have heuristic value. Practical implications for biology education are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 82:679–697, 1998.

Nature of worldview presuppositions among science teachers in botswana, indonesia, japan, nigeria, and the philippines

AbstractThe focus of this study was to identify the nature of worldview presuppositions held by a group of science teachers from five non‐western cultures. The results show that the subjects, irrespective of their cultural backgrounds, hold identical worldview presuppositions. It is not clear at this exploratory stage to what extent the subjects' alternative viewpoints influenced their scientific outlook or their science teaching. However, an analysis of the subjects' viewpoints suggests either poor conceptualizations of the nature of science or a form of collateral thinking, whereby an individual accepts or uses both mechanistic and anthropomorphic explanations depending on the context in question and without exhibiting any sign of cognitive dissonance. The implications of such a scenario for the teaching‐learning process are highlighted.

Tylor's Anthropomorphic Theory of Religion

Edward Tylor is the classical social scientific exponent of the view that religion and science are incompatible. For Tylor, religion and science are incompatible because they offer incompatible explanations of the physical world. For Tylor, the religious explanation is inherently anthropomorphic: it attributes all events to the decisions of gods. By contrast, the scientific explanation ascribes events to impersonal, mechanical processes. Yet for all Tylor's preoccupation with anthropomorphism as the heart of the religious explanation, he never makes clear why the religious explanation is necessarily anthropomorphic, why an anthropomorphic explanation is necessarily unscientific, and why an anthropomorphic explanation is necessarily false.