Anthony Eden Research Articles

The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala

Buried in the memoirs of Anthony Eden, the former prime minister of Great Britain, is a recollection about the ouster of President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954 that reveals much about the character of the Anglo-American special relationship during the Cold War and attests to its enduring effect on the course of international events. Eden, trying to explain his mistaken belief that Washington would back Britain during the Suez crisis, claims that the United States reneged on a tacit agreement to support him in Egypt after Britain assisted the United States in removing Arbenz. In Guatemala, Eden writes, “the United States had encouraged the overthrow of a Communist-influenced government…. We had understood her action there and done what we could not to hamper her in the Security Council. The United States was now behaving in a precisely contrary manner towards us. When this point was put to the United States officials, they had no answer.”1

Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919–1941

With the opening of the 100 mile long Suez Canal, connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, in November 1869 a new and vital British interest was created. Fifty years after its inauguration, Anthony Eden would describe the canal as 'the swing-door of the British Empire which has got to keep continually revolving if our communications are to be what they should'.l By then five-sevenths of the red map lay beyond Suez. From the start British shipping consistently topped the table of canal users. In 1882, when Britain occupied Egypt to protect Suez, 83 per cent of canal users were British registered vessels and in the succeeding decades before the Second World War the figure was rarely to fall below 50 per cent.2 This British dominance reflected the economic importance of empire trade via Suez with India, the Malay States and Burma. Between Bombay and Liverpool the use of Suez halved shipping time. This advantage over the Cape of Good Hope route was less marked but still pronounced for the Far East. In 1922 Hong Kong, which catered for the largest merchant shipping tonnage of any empire port, exported £22 million worth of goods to Britain while exports in the other direction were also considerable. That same year, the mineral-rich Malay States provided 70 per cent of Britain's rubber and over half her tin requirements. By 1937 Malaya was exporting $100,222,267 of raw materials and merchandise to Britain.3 Generally, Britain sent finished industrial goods and received raw materials. Oil from Iran and Iraq, seen as a means to lessen dependence on America, Britain's main supplier, increased in importance, though not until 1948 did it become the dominant product carried through Suez. After the Import Duties Act of 1932 provided free entry to over 80 per cent of imports from the empire, trade with Australia and New Zealand was stimulated. Some of this traffic came via the Suez route, though the Suez Canal Company's (sec) excessive dues and the threat posed by successive wars in Abyssinia and Spain made the Cape route more favoured

The economic diplomacy of the Suez crisis

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country.The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success.Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare.Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy.Originally published in 1991.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Living with collusion: Anthony Eden and the later history of the Suez affair

Living with collusion: Anthony Eden and the later history of the Suez affair

Presidential address: One man's odyssey

Presidential address: One man's odyssey

Redefining the Suez ‘collusion’

At 3 p.m. on 14 October 1956, two French emissaries, Minister of Labour Albert Gazier and General Maurice Challe, met British Prime Minister Anthony Eden at Chequers. Since 26 July, when Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal Company, the British and the French had sought to regain control of the Canal and remove Nasser from power, but they could not find the pretext for military action against Egypt. Gazier and Challe had secretly travelled to Britain to furnish this pretext. They proposed that Israeli forces, at the invitation of Britain and France, should invade the Sinai Peninsula. The British and French would then land in

Eden the Diplomatist, 1931–56: Suezide of a Statesman?*

Anthony Eden. By Robert Rhodes James Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931–1938. By A.R. Peters The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955. By John Colville Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951–56. By Evelyn Shuckburgh The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina. By James Cable The Failure of the Eden Government. By Richard Lamb

Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1938

Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1938

Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940–1941 (review)

144 Reviews Robin Higham, Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940—1941. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press. 1986. Pp. viii + 261. $27.00. The reasons for the failure of the 1941 British expedition to Greece are generally known, but Robin Higham offers a considerable number of new details from archival sources and personal interviews, and he offers a provocative interpretation. As editor of Military Affairs and author of several publications on British military history, he is well-versed in the subject. Higham places the responsibility for the disaster on Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. Churchill, he insists, failed to understand and adjust to the importance and need for thorough planning and good administration in the conduct of modern warfare. The author pits an impulsive Churchill against "rational, systematic officers" (p. 24), like General Sir John Dill, Air Chief Marshall, Sir Arthur Longmore, and General Sir Archibald Wavell, and the realistic Greek leaders, head of state, John Metaxas, and his Commander in Chief, General Alexander Papagos. In his determination to find the means to press the reluctant and exhausted Greeks to accept British aid, Churchill is presented as "changing his mind about objectives like a puppy in a fire hydrant factory" (p. 76). This an exaggeration, Higham makes a sound case. When the War Cabinet decided on 5 February 1941 to aid Greece, it did so more on wishful thinking than on hard analysis and good planning. Higham reminds us that the Greeks had less than a three-month supply of ammunition and coal to fuel Greek trains. In spite of British shortages in men and matériel, Churchill convinced himself of "mythical" (p. 84) reserves in Egypt. Further, the British planners neither insured the availability of adequate shipping to move the British expeditionary forces to Greece rapidly, nor did they check the availability of airfields and aircraft for use in Greece. Air Vice Marshall John D'Albiac expected these airfields to be ready at the end of April, which Higham points out "was two months after the Germans were expected to attack! And a month before that the Greeks might well be out of ammunition" (p. 84). But no one, aside from the Greeks, would say no to Churchill, who was determined to have a "great coup" (p. 24). Higham claims that no British officer would stand up to Churchill and tell him that "the Greek armed forces were inadequately equipped, that the British could not reequip them, and Wavell did not have the forces to do the job envisioned" (p. 54). The author argues that Metaxas and Papagos understood these points well and that if Metaxas had lived, he would have refused the British offer. IfDiIl and Wavell were indeed "rational and systematic" officers, Reviews 145 why did they agree to the expedition against their better judgment? Higham dismisses Dill as weak and concentrates on Wavell, who he argues fully understood the domestic and international political pressures on the British Prime Minister to achieve a victory against the Axis. The goal was to create a Balkan front of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Wavell believed that preparations and aid to Greece could be a catalyst for the front, but unlike Churchill he never lost sight of his first priority to protect his recent gains in the Western front against Italy. Higham makes a leap of imagination and claims that Wavell believed he could solidify the Balkan front with "a gallant gesture at almost no cost at all" (p. 236). Since he could read the German preparations for the invasion through ULTRA, Higham contends that Wavell intended to time the arrival of the British expeditionary forces to coincide with the German crossing of the Greek frontier from Bulgaria. If the front had crystalized by that time, there would be chance of success against the German attacks. But if the front had not been formed, he would be able to evacuate his force safely and intact to Egypt. The scheme went awry because of bad weather and German delays which pushed the German attack back into April. This interpretation is unlikely to go unchallenged. Although the Greek side is not a major focus of the book, Higham offers a...

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:Anthony Eden. By Robert Rhodes James.Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951–1956. By Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh. Ed. John CharmleyAnthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931–1938. By A. R. PetersCutting the Lion's Tail. Suez through Egyptian Eyes. By Mohammed H. Heikal.The Political Culture of Modern Britain: Studies in Memory of Stephen Koss. Edited by J. M. W. Bean.Nationalised Industries & Public Control: legal, constitutional & political issues. By Tony ProsserThe Sources of Social Power, Vol. I: a history of power from the beginning to a.d. 1760. By Michael Mann.Utopia and Anti‐Utopia in Modern Times. By Krishan Kumar.The Nature & Logic of Capitalism. By Robert L. Heilbroner.Authority and Inequality Under Capitalism and Socialism. By Barrington Moore, Jr.

The Impact of Illness on World Leaders

As Dr Park remarks in his introduction, analyzing leadership effectiveness, historians have largely ignored the medical factor (p xxii). He sets out to remedy this defect by seeking to diagnose illnesses that affected the political judgment and accomplishments of eight 20th-century statesmen: Woodrow Wilson, Paul von Hindenburg, Ramsay MacDonald, Josef Pilsudski, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Adolf Hitler. In each case, he finds that illness significantly affected the statesman's conduct of public office, especially at the end of his career. Dr Park is a neurosurgeon, sensitized to processes of dementia and brain damage, and it is this sort of illness that attracts most of his attention. His diagnoses reflect the different levels of information about the health of the men he has chosen to study. Thus, he is quite definite in dealing with Woodrow Wilson's mild but progressive dementia, possibly occurring on the basis of multiple small-vessel

The iron lady rides again

In a week when the Prime Minister has been deciding the fortunes of doctors is there cause for doctors to consider the wellbeing of the Prime Minister? That she is a case for clinical study there can be no doubt. Not because she is sick, but rather the opposite?her astonishing good health. On Monday next Margaret Thatcher will have been Prime Minister continuously for eight years. That is longer than any of her predecessors this century apart from Asquith, whom she will overtake in six months or so. Moreover, she seems poised for a third term and a potential span of 12 or 13 unbroken years in office. The question is not whether we can stand it but whether she can. What should be the medical advice? If it is to be based on past studies of the pathology of power then Mrs Thatcher plainly defies precedent. Case histories raise daunting questions about the state of body and mind of national leaders long before they have reached Mrs Thatcher's tenure. In the BMJ's spring books section two weeks ago Dr Hugh L'Etang reviewed the fearful record of sick men in power, including Churchill, Hitler, and Roosevelt (18 April, p 1013). Of the 18 British premiers this century perhaps only two, Alec Douglas-Home and Edward Heath, resigned in as good health as when they began?and that was thanks to their terms being prematurely cut short. Voices of experience, notably Stanley Baldwin and Robert Peel, advise that no prime minister should serve longer than five years, yet here is Margaret Thatcher heading for at least 10 and still in good shape. She is adding a new chapter to the medical study of political power. In his Anatomy of Power (1979) my late colleague, James Margach, whose experience went back to the 1920s, wrote that taken over the years the health record of prime ministers was appalling. Campbell Bannerman (1908), Bonar Law (1923), Ramsay MacDonald (1935), and Neville Chamberlain (1940) all died within weeks or months of resigning. Baldwin's apparent indolence was really nervous exhaustion. Attlee was in hospital for duodenal surgery at the time that Bevan resigned. Churchill declined with organic brain syndrome after a series of strokes, and Anthony Eden's wretched health was fearfully obvious. Harold Macmillan gave up because he believed he would not recover from prostate trouble (James Callaghan thought his career was ended for the same reason, but went on to become prime minister). The mystery of Harold Wilson's resignation is partly explained by mental and physical exhaustion at the age of 60, from which he never fully recovered. As Margach said, far too many left No 10 Downing Street physical and nervous wrecks. He added that while at No 10 they obviously aged at twice or three times the normal rate of advancing years. It is an observation that any Westminster watcher could confirm. Nor is it surprising given the demands put on all prime ministers. Other heads of government on visits to parliament are often shaken by the sight and sound of prime minister's question time. I recall Richard Nixon before he became president of the United States confessing that no American president could face up to that kind of ordeal twice a week. Given the job specification and the clear case histories available, there is good justification for every prime minister's dispatch box to carry a government health warning. Few in my experience even stick to the simple rules of health campaigns, such as the one launched by the new Health Education Authority last week. Most prime ministers do not smoke and they do go easy on alcohol, but they cannot be said to eat healthily, take exercise, or avoid stress. As medical history shows there comes a point after a few years when neurological disorders often influence decision making with historically disastrous consequences. The besetting sin of prime ministers is the tenacity with which they cling to office long after that point is reached and in some cases while suffering a fatal illness, though none has actually died in office. But now students of prime ministerial morbidity are having to reckon with the phenomenon called Margaret Thatcher. Her record of longevity in office is about to break not only this century's record but most of last century's as well. What is more, at 61 her energy and drive show no sign of slackening and she is rather more than a match for male opponents who are still in their 40s. Whatever the issues at the election, the Prime Minister's health will not be one.

Anthony Eden and Descent to Suez: diaries 1951–56

Anthony Eden and Descent to Suez: diaries 1951–56

British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945–1951

Labour took office in 1945 amid high hopes that its socialist message could be applied abroad as well as at home. Although Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, and other Labour leaders had had almost as much responsibility as their Conservative counterparts for Britain's wartime foreign policy, it was widely believed that once on its own Labour would play a different role in world affairs.Let Us Face the Future, the party's election manifesto, pledged to “apply [a] Socialist analysis to the world situation.” Bevin's famous “Left understands Left” remark was widely taken to mean that Labour would be more sympathetic to revolutionary developments throughout the world but above all to the Soviet Union. For many in the Labour movement, a socialist foreign policy and sympathy for the Soviet Union also implied distrust of the United States and its attempt to create what theNew Statesmancalled a capitalist “economic empire.” For the Labour movement as a whole, the story of these years can be summarized simply: the reluctant abandonment of hopes of Anglo-Soviet friendship and the grudging acceptance of an Anglo-American alliance.Labour leaders, of course, did not fully share the assumptions of their more enthusiastic followers, and they made clear from the start that they intended no radical break with the foreign policy of the wartime coalition that they had helped to shape. Ernest Bevin told the Commons in his first major speech as foreign secretary that he accepted the foreign policy of his predecessor, Anthony Eden. But a commitment to continuity in foreign policy did not immediately entail complete hostility to the Soviet Union or a special relationship with the United States.

Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office 1931–1938

Journal Article Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office 1931–1938 Get access Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office 1931–1938. By A. R. Peters. New York: St Martin's; Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1986. 402pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 0 566 05117 6 Susan Walker Susan Walker Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 63, Issue 4, autumn 1987, Pages 670–671, https://doi.org/10.2307/2619693 Published: 01 October 1987

<sc>v. trukhanovsky</sc>. <italic>Anthony Eden</italic>. Moscow: Progress; distributed by Imported Publications, Chicago. 1984. Pp. 351. $8.95

Journal Article v. trukhanovsky. Anthony Eden. Moscow: Progress; distributed by Imported Publications, Chicago. 1984. Pp. 351. $8.95 Get access Trukhanovsky V.. Anthony Eden. Moscow: Progress; distributed by Imported Publications, Chicago. 1984. Pp. 351. $8.95. Sidney Aster Sidney Aster University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 91, Issue 5, December 1986, Pages 1205–1206, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/91.5.1205-a Published: 01 December 1986

Great Britain's Latin American Dilemma: The Foreign Office and the Overthrow of ‘Communist’ Guatemala, June 1954

In regent years Anglo-American relations have been periodically disturbed by Washington's policy towards its Latin American neighbours. Since 1973, the overthrow of the president of Chile, Salvador Allende, US posture towards El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the invasion of Grenada all have fed British doubts about the foreign policy of the United States, and led to condemnation from the Labour left, and sometimes (at least in the case of Grenada) to strained relations between the two governments. The first time Washington acted to overthrow a 'pro-Communist' regime in Latin America, however, was twenty years before, in June 1954, when the president of Guatemala, Jacoba Arbenz, was toppled in a CIAbacked invasion. Then too, the voice of Labour rose against US 'imperialism', unflattering parallels with Hitler and Mussolini were drawn, and the British government was forced to defend US policy in the house of commons. The full story of CIA involvement has been known, and fully discussed, by US historians since the 1970s.1 Now, however, newlyreleased documents from the Public Record Office show how strongly the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, and his officials at the foreign office then objected to US policy, and how striking are the parallels between the events in Guatemala thirty years ago, and those in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Grenada today.

British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (review)

164 Reviews In an odd way, the historical articles in this first issue leave Greece proper pretty much on the sidelines. The literary articles do something to adjust that balance, since they all concern Greek writers and literary expression. I do not feel competent to pass judgement on the translation of Solomos' The Women of Zakynthos by Peter Colaclides and Michael Green, nor can I evaluate an article on the symbolism of Takis Papatsonis' poetry by Kostas Myrsiades, other than to say that the language the author uses is impenetrable to the uninitiated. Eugene McCarthy on George Seferis, by contrast, is a lucid, delightful tribute from a man known more for his political than for his poetical career. L. S. Myrsiades on the Karaghiozis and their use of history, together with an article appraising two works by Andreas Karkavitsas by William Wyatt and a brief tribute to Theodore Saloutos by Rudolph Vecoli complete the table of contents of this issue. Overall, the Yearbook is a fine sample of what Greek scholarship is like. The editor is to be congratulated, and time will tell whether the Yearbook and the JMGS can both maintain the level of quality each seeks to establish. William H. McNeill University of Chicago Procopis Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944. Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. 274, £25. "Greek politics is a hot and sticky porridge and I abhor the idea of putting my finger into this mess." This remark by Anthony Eden (made in November 1941) will probably seem justified to many readers of Procopis Papastratis' detailed study of Anglo-Greek relations during the occupation of Greece and it is quoted there (p. 23). On several occasions the fortunes of Greece have been profoundly influenced by Britain, but British influence was probably more important during the Second World War than at any other time. If Britain had then abstained from direct and energetic intervention in Greece (as she did abstain, reluctantly, in the rest of the Balkans) political conditions in Greece today would almost certainly be very different from what they are. Reviews 165 The theme of Procopis Papastratis' book is thus a very important one for Greek history, and it fully deserves the kind of detailed study and analysis which he has provided. It seems to this reviewer, however, that his time-limits are uncomfortably narrow: the book begins after the German victory over the Greeks and the British expeditionary force in April 1941, and it ends before the British armed intervention in Athens in December 1944. Thus it covers a somewhat shorter span than is implied by the title. This may not matter too much, as specialist readers, for whom the book is clearly intended , will be familiar with the problems concerning the British aid to Greece in 1941 and the decision to oppose ELAS in late 1944. Both were costly and difficult decisions for the British, and they are important also for the understanding of the period covered in this book which is, essentially, a history of Anglo-Greek relations during the Italian and German occupation. In a long opening chapter entitled "Cairo and London," Papastratis describes, in often minute detail, British attempts to persuade the exiled Greek Government and King George II to behave as the British thought they must, if they were to have any chances of returning to power in Greece. In the chapter 2, "The King and the Government in Cairo," Papastratis concentrates on the several crises among the Greek politicians and the highly politicized Greek soldiers in the Middle East. He shows that the British had few illusions about the personal suitability of King George for the role of National Symbol which they tried to make him play, but the point is rightly emphasized that the British in spite of this never seem to have wavered in their support for the King. Chapter 3 is concerned with the terrible famine in occupied Greece. In a careful discussion, Papastratis argues that the British authorities were well aware of the awful consequences and that it was a combination of political and humanitarian reasons which led them to accept eventually an agreement under which Swedish ships...

Talking to Tito: the Eden visit to Yugoslavia, September 1952

Josip Tito first met a leading British statesman, in August 1944, when he had discussions in Naples with Winston Churchill about the future of the Yugoslav resistance movements.1 After the war however the Yugoslav communist leader did not meet another leading statesman from the West until September 1952. The visitor on that occasion was Churchill's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Between the two dates there had been remarkable changes in Anglo-Yugoslav relations. In the years 1944–1948, as the world slipped towards Cold War, the British aid given to Tito's guerillas in wartime seemed to have been wasted; Yugoslavia apparently became firmly rooted in the Soviet bloc. Many now argue that Churchill ought to have supported other Yugoslav resistance groups who were supporters of the Yugoslav monarchy and, presumably, more pro-western. British support for Tito during the war, however, had logical force: Tito was popular with his countrymen and able to unite them, a capable leader who knew how to use the geography of his country against its enemies, and a man who was ultimately able to liberate Yugoslavia without large-scale Soviet assistance.2 And, in 1948, to the surprise of many in the West he proved that he was no mere Russian puppet either. He opposed attempts from Moscow to extend its influence over Yugoslav government and politics and, in June, was expelled by Stalin from the Soviet-led ‘Cominform’ Faced by economic blockade from the East, Tito turned increasingly to the West for support. In November 1951 he took a major step by accepting American military aid. As yet there were limits to his western commitment: he was still a communist, on poor terms with some of his western neighbours (especially Italy), and determined, whilst accepting western aid, to keep his distance from both power blocs. But it seemed that he could be won over securely to the West in the long-term. Recently released British files on the Eden visit reveal much about the state of Tito's relationship with the West at this time.

Churchill's ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951–1952

There are several points in post-war history at which, it is argued, Britain lost an early opportunity to enter the European community. The refusals to join the Schuman Plan and Messina deliberations in the 1950s, and the failure of the E.E.C. applications of Macmillan and Wilson, are most commonly mentioned. But some commentators have pointed to another ‘missed opportunity’, following Winston Churchill's return to Downing Street in October 1951. For, in opposition, Churchill had seemed a great exponent of European unity, and several of his ministers – foremost among them the home secretary, Maxwell Fyfe, and housing minister, Harold Macmillan – had shown great enthusiasm for his ideas. Hopes that Churchill's government would favour a more positive approach to European unification were quickly disappointed, however: within weeks the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, had ruled out any direct British role in Europe's emerging ‘supranational’ institutions, and in 1952 he defeated some determined efforts by Macmillan to change his policy. The ‘pro-Europeans’ did not forget this ‘betrayal’, however. They argued that a real opportunity to take the leadership of Europe had been lost and in the ensuing years, as Britain's failure to join the European community became more generally criticized, their thesis seemed credible. An examination of the evidence, however, allows a very different picture of this ‘missed opportunity’ to be painted.