Anselm Of Canterbury Research Articles

Understanding beyond language: perceiving meaning in reality

This article is an attempt to develop a counter-argument to the contention that meaning is bound by language. Locating itself within the realist ontology of language developed by Saint Anselm of Canterbury, it will be argued that language comprises representations of entities perceived both extra to the perceiver and through introspection. Thus, a language game cannot be a closed system in the sense that by its very existence representations of extralinguistic being are contained therein. If truth is defined as that which is the case, the task of the perceiver becomes apprehension of being beheld without the cloud imposed by symbols: representations are not what they represent, instead they serve as windows onto a view of what is. Following exploration of psychological studies on contemplation, it is argued that it is in desymbolised moments of attentive awareness of being that meaning, unfiltered by the representativeness of language (and indeed, other symbolic systems), can arise. It will be proposed that in contemplative traditions, being is not reduced in perception, and the moment of meaning comes to the fore in the engagement and encounter with being.

Anselm of Canterbury: his Life and Legacy. By Benedicta Ward SLG

Anselm of Canterbury: his Life and Legacy. By Benedicta Ward SLG

The Other Side of Omnipotence: Anselm on the Dialectics of Divine Power

One of the features distinguishing the work of Anselm of Canterbury is the systematic attempt to coordinate linguistic nuances with logical distinctions. At times this effort promotes subtle but provocative shifts in perspective that pass far beyond the frameworks of language and logic in their own right. Such a shift in perspective, I believe, marks Anselm's approach to a long-standing problem in Christian theology regarding the power of God. In seeking to clarify the ambiguous terminology of divine omnipotence, Anselm develops an intriguing sense of the “other side” of divine power—the susceptibilities and capacities of this world—that anticipates some of the most important philosophic tendencies of the twelfth century. It seems to me that Anselm's position in this respect has not been adequately recognized, and in this essay I would like briefly to try to situate him in that historic turn.

Perfection, near-perfection, maximality, and Anselmian Theism

Anselmian theists claim (a) that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived; and (b) that it is knowable on purely—solely, entirely—a priori grounds that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived. In this paper, I argue that Anselmian Theism gains traction by conflating different interpretations of the key description ‘being than which no greater can be conceived’. In particular, I insist that it is very important to distinguish between ideal excellence and maximal possible excellence. At the end of my paper, I illustrate the importance of this distinction by applying my discussion to the recent defence of Anselmian Theism in Nagasawa (Philos Q 58:577–591, 2008).

Anselm of Canterbury. His life and legacy. By Benedicta Ward. Pp. viii +133. London: SPCK, 2009. £12.99 (paper). 978 0 281 06104 4

Anselm of Canterbury. His life and legacy. By Benedicta Ward. Pp. viii +133. London: SPCK, 2009. £12.99 (paper). 978 0 281 06104 4

Envy, Jealousy, and the Boundaries of Orthodoxy: Anselm of Canterbury and the Genesis of the Proslogion

Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion is one of the most celebrated of medieval treatises. This discussion seeks to examine more closely the circumstances in which the Proslogion was conceived and took shape. In particular it analyses the account of the composition of the treatise by Anselm’s later companion Eadmer of Canterbury. Eadmer’s account has never been examined in detail before, and the story he relates of the loss (probably by theft) and destruction of drafts of the treatise is intriguing and instructive. The investigation questions the environment in which Anselm’s treatise was composed, and suggests a degree of factional political life within his monastery at Bec. The legacy of Lanfranc at Bec, the nexus of links between Canterbury and Bec in the last quarter of the eleventh century, and Anselm’s own defensiveness about his intellectual achievements are central aspects to the discussion.

Book Review: Anselm of Canterbury: His Life and Legacy

Book Review: <b>Anselm of Canterbury</b>: His Life and Legacy

Wszechmoc i istnienie

Article takes up from a philosophical point of view the problem of omnipotence as an attribute of God in the tradition of so-called classical theism. It first presents the main problems that emerged in the discussion on this subject in the history of philosophy, ranging from medieval philosophy (Augustine, Peter Damian, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus), through modern philosophy (Descartes), until modern times (e.g. J. L. Mackie, P. Geach, G. van den Brink). In the second part, the author proposes his own interpretation of omnipotence, in which omnipotence goes beyond any understanding of existence that we have. Hence, it must be assumed that God is omnipotent in an absolute sense, that is, He is able to do things that are logically impossible. Against this background, the article considers the problem of suffering, evil, and eschatological issues.

From a Topical Point of View: Dialectic in Anselm of Canterbury's de Grammatico by Peter Boschung (Brill Leiden/Boston 2006) Pp. 346 c.£80 hbk.

New BlackfriarsVolume 90, Issue 1026 p. 266-268 FROM A TOPICAL POINT OF VIEW: DIALECTIC IN ANSELM OF CANTERBURY'S DE GRAMMATICOby Peter Boschung IAN LOGAN, Search for more papers by this author IAN LOGAN, Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 February 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.2008.01272_3.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume90, Issue1026March 2009Pages 266-268 RelatedInformation

Reminiscências do De Libero Arbítrio de Santo Agostinho no De Veritate de Santo Anselmo

As part of the results of my post doctoral research program, this paper compares some doctrines on the Augustinian concepts of free will and truth, developed on De libero arbitrio, and those on the same notions, exposed by Anselm of Canterbury, on the Three Treatises on Holy Scripture - De verdate, De libertate arbitrii and De casu Diaboli. Looking for the theoretical foundations of Anselm’s definition of veritas as rectitudo, we’ve found some connections between the postulates of Anselm’s notion of veritas and those analysed by Augustine for the same notion. Three points of convergence between both authors are pointed out in this paper: 1. the foundation of the concept of things being truth in a Principle of Being, which is rational, eternal and per se subsistent. 2. the idea of being-as-duty (an ontological duty), which is grounded on the fact that things received being and truth from that Principle. 3. the idea that all beings may accomplish themselves carrying out their specific end. Doing that, their truth will be achieved as rectitudo. As rational beings can recognize their own end, they perform it using their free will. When this particular kind of beings chooses their own end according to what is their essential truth, truth becomes not only rectitudo but justice. Two important principles that both, Anselm and Augustine, defend, are underlined as two main conclusions of this paper: the crucial convergence between being and duty, and the principle that human judgment is basically axiological, because it is supported by the difference between reason and truth.

„Quod maius est“. Der springende Punkt in Anselms ontologischem Argument

In an earlier article I formalized Anselm of Canterbury's so-called ontological argument, and showed how the argument breaks down over the ambiguity of the two expressions 'esse in intellectu' and 'esse in re'. In the present article, I improve on my earlier formalization, and focus on what proves to be the crucial point of the argument: the phrase 'quod maius est'.

Social Justice in Love Relationships: Recent Developments

In all societies, people are concerned with justice. “What’s fair is fair!” “She deserves better.” “It’s just not right.” “He can’t get away with that!” “It’s illegal.” “It’s unethical!” “It’s immoral” are fairly common laments. In the 11th century, St. Anselm of Canterbury (Anselem of Canterbury: The major works, 1998) argued that the will possesses two competing inclinations: an affection for what is to a person’s own advantage and an affection for justice; the first inclination is stronger, but the second matters, too. Equity theory, too, posits that in personal relationships, two concerns stand out: firstly, how rewarding are people’s societal, family, and work relationships? Secondly, how fair and equitable are those relationships? According to equity theory, people feel most comfortable when they are getting exactly what they deserve from their relationships—no more and certainly no less. In this article, we will begin by describing the classic equity paradigm and the supporting research. We will then recount the great debate that arose in the wake of the assertion that even in close, loving, intimate relationships, fairness matters. We will end by describing what scientists have learned in the past 35 years about the competing claims of altruism, reward, and fairness in love relationships.

From a Topical Point of View : Dialectic in Anselm of Canterbury’s (review)

From a Topical Point of View : Dialectic in Anselm of Canterbury’s (review)

Traces of History in St. Anselm

AbstractThis paper is a schematic consideration of the relationship between reason and history through the figure of St. Anselm of Canterbury, the very exemplar, one might suppose, of the pre-modern absence of historical consciousness. I argue that while Anselm may offend a maximal number of contemporary scholarly habits of mind, whether historicist, secular, or simply argumentative, he is at the front lines of a classic question recently posed by Alain Badiou, namely how much can one think outside of one's time? This question expresses an anxiety concerning both what it is possible and/or permissible to think at any given time and what time or history have to do with thinking as such—an anxiety neatly symbolized, I claim, by the leaden specter of the ontological argument. What, it might rightly be asked, is Anselm's argument to us? A provocation, certainly; a theory, possibly.

Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance (review)

Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance (review)

Meditation as a way of philosophical thinking and existential being

Possibilities of existential philosophical meditation are discussed in the article. The epistemological and existential experiences are analyzed and forms and limits of understanding are described there. The article discusses considerations of T. Sodeika about modes of understanding: praying, silence, evidence, inter-passivity, irony, obedience. The modes are compared with standpoints of Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bonaventura, R. Descartes, M. Buber, E. Husserl, M. Mamardaschvili, P. Wust, T. Merton were described in the texts or discussions of Sodeika. Big attention is paid to comparison reflective praxis and practices of world constitution, construction. For these reason the article contradistinguishes inter-passive, hearing meditation to the ecstatic, active, creative one. Sodeika’s ironic standpoint on the ecstatic meditation practices which were developed for example in the works of G. Bruno and G. Bataille are discussed here.

Mental Language and Tradition Encounters in Medieval Philosophy: Anselm, Albert and Ockham

AbstractMedieval philosophy is often presented as the outcome of a large scale encounter between the Christian tradition and the Greek philosophical one. This picture, however, inappropriately tends to leave out the active role played by the medieval authors themselves and their institutional contexts. The theme of the mental language provides us with an interesting case study in such matters. The paper first introduces a few technical notions—'theme', 'tradition', 'textual chain' and 'textual borrowing'—, and then focuses on precise passages about mental language from Anselm of Canterbury, Albert the Great and William of Ockham. All three authors in effect identify some relevant Augustinian idea (that of 'mental word', most saliently) with some traditional philosophical one (such as that of 'concept' or that of 'logos endiathetos'). But the gist of the operation widely varies along the line and the tradition encounter is staged in each case with specific goals and interests in view. The use of ancient authoritative texts with respect to mental language is thus shown to be radically transformed from the eleventh to the fourteenth century.

Friendship in Anselm of Canterbury’s Correspondence: Ideals and Experience

This essay analyzes Anselm of Canterbury’s (c. 1034-1109) correspondence with two of his life-long correspondents and friends, Gundulf, Bishop of Rochester, and Countess Ida of Boulogne. Gundulf was a monk of both Bec and Caen who became bishop after Lanfranc ascended to the archbishopric of Canterbury, and Ida was the pious wife of Eustace II, count of Boulogne, and mother of the crusaders Godfrey of Boullion, Eustace III, and Baldwin of Jerusalem. Anselm wrote to both Gundulf and Ida throughout his life, and these friendships are more than mere rhetorical expression. Anselm valued each friendship on an individual, personal, and spiritual level, and the reality of these relationships is corroborated by other primary sources. An investigation into the letters that Anselm wrote to the two reveals Anselm’s ideals of friendship, his influences, and his affections for Ida and Gundulf. Building upon an established tradition, and using ideas found in John Cassian’s Collationes, Anselm articulated a classical Ch...

Anselm of Canterbury and the Beauty of Theology. By David S. Hogg and Anselm of Canterbury and His Theological Inheritance. By Giles E. M. Gasper

Anselm of Canterbury and the Beauty of Theology. By David S. Hogg and Anselm of Canterbury and His Theological Inheritance. By Giles E. M. Gasper

WORSHIPPING AN UNKNOWN GOD

This paper examines the religious tradition of ‘negative theology’, and argues that it is doubtful whether it leaves room for belief in God at all. Three theologians belonging in different degrees to this tradition are discussed, namely John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury and Nicolas of Cusa, and it is argued that all three, in maintaining the ineffability of God, reach positions that are in effect forms of agnosticism. There is a paradox here: if God is inconceivable, is it not self-refuting to talk about him at all, even to state his inconceivability? The final part of the paper examines the work of the nineteenth-century poet Arthur Hugh Clough, two of whose poems, Hymnos Aumnos, and Qui Laborat Orat, explore the paradox of talking about the inconceivable Godhead. Clough gives eloquent expression to the idea that leaving God unnamed is not equivalent to disowning him. There is room for a devout agnosticism.