Anselm Of Canterbury Research Articles

Living toto corde: Monastic Vows and the Knowledge of God

Monastic vows have been a source of religious controversy at least since the Reformation. Today, new monastic movements recover many elements of the tradition (e.g., community life and prayer, material solidarity and poverty), but vows—understood as a lifelong or binding commitment to obedience, stability and conversion to the monastic way of life—do not appear to capture much enthusiasm. Even the Benedictine tradition in the Catholic Church appears, at least in certain regions, to struggle to attract young men and women to give themselves away through vows. In this context, I ask whether vows should belong to the “future of Christian monasticisms”. I will look at Anselm of Canterbury for inspiration regarding their meaning. For him, monastic vows enact the “total” gift of self or the “total” belonging to God. I will suggest, following Anselm, that such vows enable an existential commitment that is in a unique way morally and intellectually enlivening, and that such vows should remain an element in any future monasticism wanting to stand in continuity with the “Christian monasticism” of the past. During my conclusion, I acknowledge that our imagination regarding the concrete forms the total gift could take may develop.

Anselm of Canterbury and the Search for God by John T. Slotemaker

Anselm of Canterbury and the Search for God by John T. Slotemaker

Christ, the Power and Possibility of God in St. Anselm of Canterbury

In this article I examine the modal theism of St. Anselm of Canterbury, arguing that the person of the divine Son plays an important role in how Anselm thinks about God’s power and possibilities. Beginning with his first major theological work, the Monologion, I show how Anselm’s characterizes God’s knowledge of creation, not in the traditional, Augustinian terms of an intellectual divine “idea,” but in the comparatively more linguistic terms of a divine “locutio” or “utterance.” I go on to argue that this sets Anselm up for a somewhat unique modal theology, one in which God is best understood as acting and creating, not against the backdrop of an already defined and existing domain of possibilities, but in a way that makes him the inventor and creator of his own possibilities. In the second part of the article, I turn to Anselm’s influential work of Christology, Cur Deus Homo, to examine how his “theistic actualism” is paralleled in select aspects of his account of the divine Son’s Incarnation in the person and work of Jesus Christ.

‘The love that pierces the heart’: a critical analysis of the concept of sanctification in the writings of St Anselm of Canterbury

AbstractContemporary analyses of Anselm's objective description of Christ's atonement have often resulted in a trend of interpretation that tends to ignore the relevance of this model to a development and understanding of a western doctrine of Christian sanctification. Through the examination of some overlooked insights offered inCur Deus homoand their integration with other spiritual writings in Anselm's corpus, the present article attempts to redirect current scholarship towards a more holistic engagement with Anselm's doctrine of atonement, out of which an original doctrine of Christian perfection can be outlined.

I Want to Break Free

Abstract Albertus Magnus is known for his rational approach to explaining various phenomena; a method that would be acquired and applied by his pupil Thomas Aquinas as well. In this paper, I focus on the concept of freedom, i. e., on the question of what it is that constitutes the freedom of free will in the account of Albert the Great. I investigate this question from the perspective of natural philosophy, a field that Albert was particularly interested in. In the first part of the paper, I study Albert’s definition of free will and its implications as they are tackled in De homine, De anima, and Ethica. Albert regards free will as a capacity of the rational soul, capable of choosing from opposites. Albert confronts the definitions of free will presented by Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Anselm of Canterbury, and in each of these cases he advances his argument from the perspective of psychology. In the second part of the paper, I identify the topics in which the general definition of free will is applied in a naturalistic context. Those are the debates on fate and free will, on the question whether animals have free will and, finally, on natural circumstances such as age or gender, limiting the freedom of free will. Subsequently, I aim at expounding Albert’s balanced, yet not tension-free position in the debate between determinism and free action. Although several extensive studies on fate in Albert have been produced, the problem of free choice in Albert’s works remains surprisingly understudied. The present paper intends to open a path for further research and debates on this relevant topic.

Anselmian apocatastasis: the fitting necessity of universal salvation in St Anselm'sCur Deus Homo

AbstractThis article makes a case for universal salvation based on the soteriology of Anselm of Canterbury'sCur Deus Homo. It argues that without an affirmation of universal salvation, Anselm's argument fails on the grounds of its own soteriological logic, which unites the fitting and the necessary for God, assumes the primary importance of divine aseity for understanding salvation history, and affirms the ontological unity of the human race as the object of God's redemptive love. Also detailed is the development of the relationship between mercy and justice in Anselm's thought from theProslogiontoCur Deus Homo, and it is shown how Anselm's developed soteriology in the latter challenges major features of the Augustinianism he inherited. The article concludes that a robust theology of divine aseity like Anselm's will entail that creation be understood as a theatre for the manifestation of God's eternal love for his creatures.

Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham by Thomas M. Osborne, Jr.

Reviewed by: Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham by Thomas M. Osborne, Jr. Matthew R. McWhorter Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham by Thomas M. Osborne, Jr. (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2014), 250 pp. Thomas Osborne's Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham provides a helpful comparative analysis of three key medieval thinkers with respect to their distinct accounts of human action or theories of "moral psychology" (xvi). These thinkers, Osborne states, "are arguably the three most significant philosophers and theologians of the central period in the development of Scholastic thought" (xiii). His work is written in an accessible style that renders it useful not only as a resource for specialist researchers in [End Page 352] the medieval era but also as a supplemental text for course instruction at the graduate level. While the exact focus and content of this study is unique, it is comparable in approach to other recent volumes in medieval ethics and moral theology such as M. V. Dougherty's Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas (2013), or to the comparative medieval studies of Marilyn McCord Adams, Richard Cross, or Russell L. Friedman. Osborne states that his study aims to provide an overview of the issues with which medieval moral psychology grappled and that this, in turn, will serve to illuminate key philosophical questions in ethics, as well as to provide historical background for understanding Reformation and early modern thought (xvi). While Osborne states that his primary goal is to provide a systematic overview of the three thinkers under consideration, his study also illustrates a contextual historical understanding of the authors in question. For example, at times, he provides occasional contextual references to other important medieval ethicists such as Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Albert the Great. Osborne is explicitly conscious of the methodological need to avoid conforming the authors under consideration to a superficial historical narrative in which Scotus is construed as reacting to Aquinas, and Ockham in turn to Scotus (see 222–23, where Osborne briefly critiques two common historio-graphical trends). On this point, Osborne recognizes that Aquinas in the era prior to his canonization did not have as significant an intellectual import for Franciscan thinkers as contemporary scholars might expect (xix). Overall, Osborne indicates that his comparative studies should serve to provide his reader both with basic familiarity with the moral psychology of each thinker and with a cognizance of the doctrinal currents that proved to be influential upon subsequent Western thought (xxv). In this respect, Osborne points to three main themes that he indicates establish a reliable historical narrative concerning the doctrinal developments in fundamental ethics from Aquinas to Ockham: "(1) a developing separation between nature and will, (2) an increased emphasis on the will's activity, and (3) a changing view of mental causation" with respect to elicited exterior acts (xxiv–xxv, cf. 227). These themes collectively provide a helpful orientation for continued study of these thinkers, a framework that other scholars will benefit from exploring and evaluating. Osborne's work is organized into five chapters enveloped by an introduction and a conclusion. Each of the five chapters is focused on [End Page 353] a particular ethical topic, such as the causes of a moral act (viz., an agent's intellect and will), the stages of a moral act, or the specification of a moral act. Regarding the structure of the book, Osborne states that it "develops thematically" (xxii). The topical arrangement of the study is intended generally to follow the ordo doctrinae found in questions 6–21 of the prima secundae of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, which Osborne maintains is the most complete and systematic treatment of moral psychology found among the works of the three thinkers under consideration (xvi). Each of Osborne's chapters is further divided into four parts. This schema for the most part follows a common pattern of first expositing Aquinas's position on the ethical topic at hand and then the positions of Scotus and Ockham and closing with a synopsis that compares and contrasts the main positions of...

Futura contingentia, ockhamizm (retroaktywizm) i tomizm (eternalizm)

In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise.

The Philosophy of the Criminal Law of the Middle Ages

The author of the article analyzes in sufficient detail the contribution of medieval thinkers: Aurelius Augustine, Anita Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, Pierre Abelard, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, to the philosophy of the criminal law emerging in the Middle Ages, noting that at present this is either not given due importance, or it is significantly underestimated. Many researchers forget that it was in the Middle Ages that European nations began to emerge and that modern states were being formed, and the languages we speak were emerging; to the Middle Ages many of the cultural values that formed the basis of our civilization come up. The author believes that an in-depth knowledge of the creativity of these medieval thinkers enables us to form a true and integral image of the criminal law philosophy, one that stood at its origins. The legacy of the noted thinkers does not allow one to agree with the popular opinion about the Middle Ages as being timeless or as a failure for the criminal-legal thought in the period. Moderators of medieval thought were no less than enlighteners and reformers of the New Time, humanistically aligned with the goals and tasks of criminal justice. In conclusion, the author calls on the modern science of criminal law not to deny the usefulness of the legacy of the Middle Ages for the development of philosophical and legal thought, since it is unquestionable that theological thought, like the natural science or philosophy, is born of human consciousness and has an object of its human interest, his spiritual order.

Prayer and Proof, Affect and Argument: The Role of Joy in St. Anselm’s Proslogion

Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion is a Benedictine prayer-exercise that contains a famous argument for the existence of God. This article highlights how the argument is intertwined with the prayer. The article argues that since the understanding of God leads to a joyous affect, the logic of the argument must be causally connected with joy. While much of the secondary literature applies a division between ‘prayer’ and ‘proof’, this article suggests a reading of the Proslogion proof as a prayer-practice, and the prayer-practice is in turn analyzed through the logic of the proof. The result is a description of how contemplation of the argument drives affect, leading to the conclusion that the affect of joy achieves the intended result of the proof: the joy leads the mind to God. The article thus shows that the Proslogion is an intellectual affective prayer-practice.

Rewriting Mortality: Gift and Atonement in Cur Deus Homo

The model of atonement presented in Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus Homo has aroused a host of worries from theologians. The gist of their criticism is that Anselm inscribes redemptive violence into theology and thus encourages passive acquiescence to abusive power structures or even licenses the violence of abusers. Some suggest that the way forward would be to jettison Anselm's account and develop alternatives that are not liable to the same abuses. This paper argues that while alternatives may be desirable, Cur Deus Homo looms so large in theological imaginations as to defy jettisoning. We should instead try to perform better readings. This paper presents a close reading of this text as a monastic meditation on mortality oriented less toward resolving a problem of systematic theology than drawing readers into a renewed experience of devotion to God. To do that, Anselm works to rewrite the meaning of human mortality, making it less about the necessity of losing one's life and more about the possibility of a gift of death. The ethical paradigm that emerges is far from a complete moral vision, but is still more alluring than the one about which Anselm's contemporary critics worry.

Katherin A. Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism. Oxford: OUP, 2015, 248 pp.

Katherin A. Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism. Oxford: OUP, 2015, 248 pp.

Ramon Llull. Intelectualismo moral, determinismo cósmico y libertad humana

tytuł i abstrakt w języku oryginalnym artykułu

Cultivating the Heart: Feeling and Emotion in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Religious Texts

Cultivating the Heart: Feeling and Emotion in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Religious Texts

Culture and Knowledge of Reality

This essay addresses the problem of the decline of interest in the Liberal and Fine Arts, and the humanities, East and West, accompanied by a reductionist understanding of reality and life. That reductionism results in a trivialization and brutalization of culture. The essay considers three prominent modes of understanding: Scientism, Relationalism, and Wisdom-seeking. A scientistic relationalism is anti-intellectual and anti-cultural. In contrast, a Wisdom-seeking relationalism affirms human dignity, and is grounded in a qualitative ontology necessary to an intellectual and moral life. The historical turning-point in the West in which the intellectual and practical pursuit of Wisdom was replaced by a scientistic relationalism is personified by the contrasts between St. Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard.

Consideramus in speculo – fragments of a Hegelian mirror in dialectical theology

AbstractThe article re-examines Karl Barth's claim that his 1931 book on Anselm of Canterbury's proof of the existence of God from Proslogion 2–4, the Fides Quaerens Intellectum, provides a ‘vital key’ for understanding the rationality of his later theology. The article takes up the question of what ‘dialectics’ denotes in Barth's theology. Re-engaging the issue of dialectics in Karl Barth's theology, particularly in light of the developments of his thought, leads to a critical revision of Bruce McCormack's influential interpretation of Barth's dialectical theology.Through a close reading of the section, ‘The manner of theology’, from the first of the two parts of Fides Quaerens Intellectum the article sheds light on how Barth envisions the construction of the theoretical concepts of theology in light of his concrete exegetical praxis. By focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis, an understanding of Barth's dialectical theology as a form of ‘speculative reading’ emerges. This notion of dialectics as developing in light of a practice of speculative reading allows us to compare certain aspects of concept-formation in the theology of Karl Barth and the dialectical philosophy of the German Idealist, G. W. F. Hegel. Drawing explicitly on Hegel's analysis of infinite judgement from the second volume of his 1812 Science of Logic, Barth's use of the tautology ‘God is God’ in his second commentary on Romans from 1922 is shown to provide important insight into the structure of Barth's dialectical thinking. This explicitly relates to the important issue of the relationship between faith and reason in Karl Barth's theology, which sheds a new light on how his understanding of the rational basis of the theory and praxis of theology developed from his second Romans commentary onwards.Finally, Barth's use of dialectics and his account of the rationality of theology as a form of ‘speculative reading’ permits some final reflections on the significance of pneumatology for constructive theology by underscoring how Barth insists on the priority of praxis over theory. To understand Barth's theology and the way it changes over the years is to understand the rationality of its concrete praxis.

Saint Anselm of Canterbury and his legacy. Edited by Giles E. M. Gasper and Ian Logan. (Durham Medieval and Renaissance Monographs and Essays, 2.) Pp. xii + 461. Durham: Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies/Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012. €80. 978 0 88844 861 8

Saint Anselm of Canterbury and his legacy. Edited by Giles E. M. Gasper and Ian Logan. (Durham Medieval and Renaissance Monographs and Essays, 2.) Pp. xii + 461. Durham: Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies/Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012. €80. 978 0 88844 861 8

Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.

Anselm of Canterbury on the fall of the devil: the hard problem, the harder problem, and a new formal model of the first sin

AbstractThe fall of the devil poses two distinct philosophical problems. Only one of those problems has received sufficient scholarly attention. The hard problem asks how the devil's choice to disobey God can be both suitably free and morally significant. The harder problem asks how it can be subjectively rational. Explaining the former does not suffice for explaining the latter. Drawing on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury, I develop a model of the first sin that uses the framework of consumer preference theory to show how Satan's act of disobedience can be free, morally significant, and subjectively rational.

Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word by Eileen C. Sweeney

Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word by Eileen C. Sweeney