Abstract In our paper, we discuss the role of deception (apáte) in the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy. While Parmenides and Plato seek to escape the possibility of being deceived in general, their counterparts, the sophists and early theorists of rhetoric, emphasize that this is neither possible nor desirable. In contrast to their philosophical contemporaries, they do not assume a dualism of truth and deception, but rather a gradualist spectrum that contains many shades of gray. Furthermore, they emphasize a certain productivity of particular deceptions that can help us increase our imagination and prefigure possibilities of life and praxis that would not be possible without being deceived. Moreover, we ask whether and how the potential of classical rhetoric for theorizing deception can be used for a critique of deception that is aware of its own proneness to illusions. The guiding hypothesis is that rhetoric, as a technique of verbal deception, can also provide an important key for criticizing deceptive strategies. This applies in particular to the concept of dissimulatio artis, which goes back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and had been developed further by Quintilian, Ovid, and the anonymous author of the treatise Perí hýpsous. This concept makes it possible to describe simulations of unsimulatedness in philosophy as well as in politics.
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