Anglo-Russian Rivalry Research Articles

A RECENTLY DISCOVERED LETTER FROM CAPTAIN ARTHUR CONOLLY

ABSTRACT This article publishes a recently discovered letter apparently written by the 19th-century British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly. Conolly is best known as the author of the term 'The Great Game' in connection with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia during the mid-19th century. The letter was written in April 1841 while Conolly stopped on the bank of the Amu Darya River, the northern boundary of Afghanistan en route to Bukhara. He was travelling partly in an attempt to rescue a fellow British officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart, who was detained there. The mission failed and both men were executed in Bukhara the following year. The letter is addressed to the Austrian general August Giacomo Jochmus, who was the commander of the combined forces of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and Austria during the Syrian War of 1839–1841. The letter was discovered by the authors in the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art in Moscow.

The Khivan Campaign of V.A. Perovsky 1839-1840 in the Context of Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia

Traditionally, when studying the campaign of the Orenburg military governor V.A. Perovsky to Khiva in 1839-1840, among the motives that prompted the Russian authorities to sanction this approach, researchers primarily noted economic interests and the desire to end the raids of Khivans on Russian caravans. At the same time, the international context of this campaign which coincided with the first Anglo-Afghan war was pushed into the background. The purpose of this article written within the framework of a systematic approach to the study of international relations is to prove the correlation between the actions of the Russian and British authorities in Central Asia at the turn of the 1830s and 1840s. Studying the logic of the events preceding the Khiva campaign of V.A. Perovsky and referring to documents directly related to the preparation of this campaign allow us to conclude that the concern of a number of Russian political figures (among whom V.A. Perovsky was) with the activation of British agents in Central Asia and the actions of the British army in Afghanistan was one of the main motives for organizing the campaign, the purpose of which was to strengthen Russian positions in the named region. Despite the failure of V.A. Perovsky’s idea, the authorities of British India, frightened by the movement of Russian troops and suffering defeats in Afghanistan, contributed to the settlement of contradictions between Russia and Khiva in order to preserve the regional status quo. The actions of the British side, as well as the insufficient interest of the Russian authorities in the Central Asian direction in comparison with the European and Middle Eastern ones, contributed to a decrease in Russia’s activity in Central Asia after the unsuccessful campaign of V.A. Perovsky.

К ДИСКУССИИ О ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОМ ЗНАЧЕНИИ МИССИИ Н. Г. СТОЛЕТОВА В АФГАНИСТАНЕ ЛЕТОМ 1878 ГОДА

The article analyzes the events that led to the beginning of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881). In particular, the military and political side of the Anglo-Russian conflict at the final stage of the Eastern crisis (1875-1878) is sub-jected to a more detailed study. The author examines in details a particular episode – the departure to Afghanistan in the summer of 1878 the diplomatic mission of Major-General N. G. Stoletov to conclude an alliance against England, which was accompanied with a military demon-stration of the Russian army in relation to British India. Based on the comparison of the domestic and foreign researcher’s points of view, as well as by involving various groups of historical sources, an attempt is made to give an objective assessment of these events and to identify their influence on the genesis of the second Anglo-Afghan war, which became a natural consequence of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the East at the end of the XIX century.

The Church Missionary Society (CMS) Medical Missions and Anglo-Russian Rivalry, 1865–1914

This essay examines the public views of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) (medical) missionaries in North-western British India of Anglo-Russian rivalry. In their reports, the missionaries recognized the value of their work as worth a “regiment” to the British government. The essay shows that this claim is comparable to views of some of the early nineteenth-century missionaries, who talked about the providential-purpose of the empire, arguing that the extension of the national church was beneficial culturally, religiously, and politically. In contrast to these missionaries, however, the CMS missionaries did not talk about the spread of Christianity per se or the dissemination of the English race or ethical values. Rather, they claimed their work was politically important because it had been instrumental in obtaining people’s “trust” and “friendship”. They justified this view on at least two grounds: firstly, they claimed they could generate a new archive of knowledge about the region; secondly, they declared they were winning local people for the colonial establishment by changing their feelings. Overall, the essay introduces a point of view from which to tell the story of missionaries and Anglo-Russian rivalry. Moreover, it contributes to emerging studies that have scrutinized the often-ambivalent political effect of “friendship” across axes of colonizer–colonized divide.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry in the American Arctic, Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries

First published advance online September 30, 2019Attempts to penetrate into the Arctic coast of the North American continent were made from the west and from the east beginning in the eighteenth century. From the east the main role was played by the British, from the west by the Russians. The tsarist government and the Siberian authorities sent several research expeditions to the Bering Strait area, where the southern border of the Arctic lies. The First Kamchatka Expedition of Vitus Bering, which in 1728 passed through the strait between Asia and America, was the most famous. The British showed interest in this region much later. The first explorer to do so was the eminent British seafarer James Cook who passed through Bering Strait in 1778, causing considerable alarm in St. Petersburg, which feared British penetration into the “backyard” of the Russian Empire. However, after the Cook expedition the British did not appear in the Arctic waters of Alaska for several decades for various economic and political reasons. Anglo-Russian rivalry only resumed in the American Arctic in the 1820s, when several exploratory maritime expeditions were sent to the Bering and Chukchi Sea areas. These were replaced after the second half of the 1830s by land expeditions that were sent to the Arctic territories of Alaska by competing fur-trading companies: the Russian-American Company (RAC), which operated in Alaska from 1799, and the British Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) from neighbouring Canada. Subsequently, up until the sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867, Anglo-Russian rivalry was embodied in the form of trade competition between RAC and HBC agents.

EASTERN DIRECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AT THE TURN OF XVIII-XIX CENTURIES: THE GEO-ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS

The article shows the main stages, trends, objectives and tasks of the eastern direction in Russian foreign policy at XVIII-XIX centuries. Its place and role in the international relations, participation in solv- ing the major international problems, mechanisms and development factors, causes and changes effects in the world politics are discussed, as well as the impact of these processes on the competition among Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia. The article also reveals the causes and circumstances of the Anglo-Russian rivalry and the main stages of the development of relations between Britain and Russia in the second half of the XIX century. Key words: Sweden, Turkey, England, Russia, Central Asia, rivalries, colonialism, geopolitics. &nbsp

The Port Hamilton (Geomundo) Incident (1885–1887): Retracing Another Great Game in Eurasia

ABSTRACTThis paper traces a much overlooked historical event, whose impacts threatened to upend the status quo in the Far East and potentially escalate the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Eurasia. With the occupation of Port Hamilton (Geomundo) by a hegemon, Britain, Korea was catapulted into the centre stage of the international system, where it garnered unprecedented attention from major powers. It was also during this period that neutralisation was contemplated both within and without Korea. By exploring this incident through contemporary neutralisation discourse, this work illustrates neutralisation's role in providing an analytical framework to assess the geopolitical importance of this incident in international relations. After suffering a crushing defeat in the Crimean War, Russia was forced to modify its designs in the Mediterranean and adjust itself to a new regional order. Since its room for manoeuvre was constrained by its chief rival, Britain, the Russian government was forced to tread more cautiously in European geopolitics and to refrain from military means in advancing its interests there. Similarly, the British offensive on Geomundo thwarted Russian expansion into the Far East and denied Russia access to the Pacific, allowing Britain to repeat the feat that it had achieved in the Crimean War.

The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia, by James Hevia

Based solidly on archival sources in the India Office Records, The National Archives (including Foreign Office and War Office papers) and a wide range of secondary material, this book by James Hevia explores two historical dimensions. One is the ways in which the Intelligence Branch of the Indian Army exploited its methods of collecting topographical, statistical and human (anthropological) information to plan military campaigns; and the second is to explain the importance of intelligence collecting to our understanding of the creation of the modern state. In short, Hevia’s argument is that imperial expansion, notably in India, created the techniques for modern state self-preservation. By de-romanticising the Great Game of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, the author claims to locate the origins of United States and British counter-insurgency ‘operations systems’ employed during the Cold War with the Soviet Union (pp. 258–60). This review will, first, examine Indian Army methods behind military planning; and, second, it will evaluate the claim of continuity into the twentieth century.

Bismarck and the Great Game: Germany and Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890

AbstractOtto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of a unified Germany, was an active participant in the Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of Central Asia. Even though Germany had no direct interests there and was never involved on the ground during the two decades of his chancellorship, Bismarck invested considerable resources in working to shape the course of events in that part of the world, stoking the flames of conflict whenever it suited the dictates ofRealpolitik. Over a twenty-year period, he actively pursued a consistent strategy that focused on tying down Russian troops in the remote Asian steppes, i.e., as far away from Central Europe as possible. At the same time, he manipulated Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia to achieve various foreign policy goals that would further German interests. This article explores in detail all of these objectives, as well as their interrelationship. In particular, it unravels the perplexing mystery of how Bismarck was able to influence the politics of Central Asia from his distant headquarters in Berlin.

Sergeev, Evgeny. The Great Game 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia (review)

SEER, 92, 4, OCTOBER 2014 772 Sergeev, Evgeny. The Great Game 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central andEastAsia.WoodrowWilsonCenterPressandJohnsHopkinsUniversity Press, Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, MD, 2013. xix + 530 pp. Selected chronology. Notes. Appendix. Selected archival sources and bibliography. Index. $65.00; $35.00. The imperial rivalry in Asia between Russia and Britain played a central role in shaping the international relations of the Great Powers in the half century before the First World War. Sergeev’s book describes the course of the ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia in detail, concentrating on the period between the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and the signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. Strangely, the book nowhere mentions that it is effectively a translation of Sergeev’s 2012 work published in Russia (E. Iu. Sergeev, Bol´shaia igra, 1856– 1907: mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii v Tsentral´noi i Vostochnoi Azii, Moscow 2012). Sergeev begins by putting Russo-British relations into a broader context through discussions of the their development during the first half of the nineteenth century and of the wider phenomenon of imperialism. He suggests that it was the Crimean War which marked the beginning of a period of intense rivalry between Britain and Russia, as both states began to concentrate on expanding their power and influence in Central Asia. St Petersburg, feeling its European ambitions frustrated, began to expand vigorously into Central Asia while the British acted to protect their Indian possessions in the wake of the 1857 revolt (for which Sergeev uses the term ‘Sepoy mutiny’). The book proceeds to trace the course of Anglo-Russian rivalry over the following half century in depth, identifying Afghanistan as the fulcrum for competition between the two states. Sergeev shows how British pressure on Russia in the Balkans and the Near East at the end of the 1870s prompted more assertive elements in the Russian military to propose marching troops into Afghanistan as a step towards threatening British India. Russian intervention in Afghanistan in the summer of 1878 proved, however, to be unsuccessful, as by the end of the year the British had entered Kabul and for almost the next twenty years the two powers faced a stalemate in Central Asia. Changes in the European balance of power at the beginning of the twentieth century, with Germany emerging as a potential threat to British interests, persuaded the London government to try to break the deadlock in its relations with Russia. The resulting Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 essentially neutralized the rivalry between the two states in Asia, opening the way for the wartime alliance of 1914. Sergeev’s book is based on a wide range of sources from both the Russian and British sides and the discussion of this intense imperial rivalry from both standpoints represents the major strength of the work. He shows how threat REVIEWS 773 and counter-threat reinforced each other, and how the process built upon deepseated perceptions of Asia in both Britain and Russia. The Great Game was a central part of nineteenth-century European imperialism, and both Russia and Britain felt themselves justified in bringing what they perceived to be political, economic and cultural benefits to Asian peoples. Sergeev’s book itself continues to perpetuate some of these stereotypes: he asserts that in the mid nineteenth century ‘Central and East Asia were characterized by more or less medieval political, social and political features’ (p. 329), stuck for centuries in ‘social apathy, economic backwardness and political anarchy’ (p. 330). He sees both Britain and Russia as pursuing ‘civilizing missions’ (p. 346) in their desire to cement their power in Asia. The intellectual challenge posed by Edward Said to European interpretations of the wider world is acknowledged in Sergeev’s book, but his view of the rivalry between Britain and Russia is firmly within the tradition that Said ably dissected. This book takes very much a traditional view of relations between European powers and Asia: it places Britain and Russia as the central figures in a struggle for influence, with Asian states and peoples as merely subjects in the interplay between the two European powers. Sergeev rejects the idea that Anglo-Russian rivalry...

The Waning of Empires: The British, the Ottomans and the Russians in the Caucasus and North Iran, 1917–1921

During the First World War, Iran, although not a belligerent, was occupied at different times by Russian, British, and Ottoman troops. After a century of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, an Entente between the two powers had been signed in August 1907, essentially dividing the country into a Russian sphere of influence in the north, a British sphere in the south, and a neutral sphere in the middle. As well as effectively ‘betraying’ the supporters of the Iranian constitution, the general effect of the Entente was to give Russia an even freer hand in Iranian politics than had previously been the case, although for a number of reasons, Britain's considerable interests in Iranian oil (APOC's oilfields were located in the ‘neutral sphere’) were to have a more lasting impact. The situation in the Caucasus was equally confused, especially after Russia's invasion of eastern Anatolia. After the fall of the Tsarist government in 1917, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia declared their independence from the Russian state at various times in 1918, while Bolshevik, British, German and Ottoman forces attempted to seize or consolidate territory in Iran and the Caucasus. In 1919, seeking to maintain its authority in Iran while the Bolsheviks were thought to be in no condition to interfere, Britain made an unsuccessful attempt to impose a protectorate. Two years later, with the Protectorate now in abeyance, a Soviet-Iranian Treaty was signed in Moscow on February 26, 1921 a few days after Reza Shah's seizure of power. Under its terms, the Soviet government ‘forgave’ the loans made to Iran by the Tsarist government, and transferred all Russian assets in Iran to the Soviet government. The paper will try to set out the main parameters of this confused and often confusing chain of events.

The Role of the Karguzar in the Foreign Relations of State and Society of Iran from the mid-nineteenth century to 1921. Part 1: Diplomatic Relations

AbstractThe foreign relations of Iran from 1800 to 1921 have on the whole been discussed in terms of diplomatic relations between states, of ‘Great Power’ policy, and of the impact of the world economy upon a comparatively weak and traditional society. A brief survey of the existing literature reveals that Iran's lack of progress has been attributed among other factors to her form of government, foreign interference and to her predicament as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. The traditional power structures of Iran, as dominated by an absolute monarchy intent on personal interest with a concomitant lack of realism when engaging in war, was, in Ramazani's view, the origin of the country's weakness. Kazemzadeh saw the subject from the point of view of Anglo-Russian rivalry at the highest levels, and argued that both powers sought to impose hegemony on Iran by a variety of means, including, putting pressure on the Shah and chief ministers, using commercial concessions and exercising intimidation. The competition of Britain and Russia was so intense that each was determined to undermine any plan of development proposed by the other, opportunities were numerous, as, for example, in the introduction of railways. Yapp, to some extent, questioned this argument by pointing out that British interests were more complex than those of the Russians; on the one hand a stronger Iran was a more efficient buffer-state, but on the other hand it could undermine British influence in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Yapp also noted that the British and Russian presence gave advantages to Iran in terms of the development of international trade, the control of internal disorder and in the imposition of regional security. Greaves saw Britain's diplomatic connections with Iran as dominated by her preoccupation with the defence of India, and believed that its attitudes to Iran were neither consistent nor strong. Issawi, in his study of economic development, also presented a more complex picture which emphasises the variety of the factors involved, and also the fluctuations in the economy over the period. He pointed out that trade did grow steadily, that the country benefited from new technology, for example the telegraph and the construction of the Suez Canal, and that it lived within its means. On the other hand, involvement in the international economy from 1890–1914 led to rapidly increasing foreign financial and political factors, which undermined the county's independence. Wright provided a different approach in that, while acknowledging the baleful effects of aspects of Anglo-Russian rivalry on Iran, he was more concerned with the experiences of a variety of ‘English’ amongst the Iranians, and thus offered a study of interaction between foreigners and Iranians at a level below that of international politics.

Representations of Central Asian Ethnicities in British Literature c. 1830-1914

This article evaluates representations of Central Asian ethnicities in British literature between 1830 and 1914. It commences by evaluating the ways in which representations of Central Asia were influenced by the Mongol campaigns in Europe of the thirteenth century and proceeds to examine the ways in which these changed during the debate over the 'Central Asian Question' in the second half of the nineteenth century. It argues that the way in which different ethnicities were depicted was contingent upon a number of factors. The first was the extent to which they were deemed to conform to 'Tartar features' (the greater the perceived resemblance, the more unfavourable the assessment). The second was geopolitical factors (the extent to which they were perceived as allies or enemies in the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia between 1830 and 1914). The third was social Darwinism, most notably the notion of 'degeneracy' articulated by proponents of eugenics.

The Islamic world in decline: from the Treaty of Karlowitz to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire

Introduction The Ottoman-Safavid Conflict Turbulence on Persia's Frontiers Balance of Power in Southeastern Europe Beginnings of the Russo-Ottoman Conflict Decline and Fall of the Safavid State The Era of Nadir Shah Russian Imperialism under Catherine the Great Developments in the Ottoman and Persian Spheres Napoleon Enters the Middle East The Era of Muhammad Ali Anglo-Russian Rivalry in the Persian Sphere The War of 1828 and Its Aftermath The Crimean War Britain and Russia in Persia and Central Asia The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 Confrontations in the Persian Gulf and Egypt Resurgence of Anglo-Russian Rivalry The Close of the Ottoman Era The Last Ottoman War Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire Bibliography Index

Le legs afghan

The Afghan Legacy, by Olivier Roy The Afghan State, Consolidated by its role as a buffer State during the nineteenth century Anglo-Russian rivalry, must today redefine itself within the new strategie context. Existing borders tend to be blurred as Afghanistan and the region as a whole are increasingly divided along ethnie Unes. The Russian retreat from Central Asia seems to be permanent, and the new strategie deployment is focused upon Caspian supplies of hydrocarbons, for which Afghanistan offers apotential transit, at least whilst the American embargo against Iran lasts. Pakistan is thus endeavouring to establish a protectorate over Afghanistan in order to fill the void left by the Russian retreat. However, a remaining sense of Afghan identity may create anti-Pakistani feelings, whilst the end of the American embargo against Iran would rob Afghanistan of all strategie interest.

A Mild Rejoinder

SINCE THE AHR has already allotted generous space to both the commentators and me, I feel I should not attempt a detailed rebuttal, even where inclined to, but merely indicate briefly what the lines of reply might be, leaving the details to my forthcoming book. I would like to thank all the commentators for their kind words and for the substantial measure of agreement even from the critics. I have no further reply to Robert Jervis at all-only additional thanks for another elegant demonstration of why we international historians should pay more attention to political scientists and theorists of international relations like him. I fear that where Enno Kraehe and I disagree, we simply read the evidence very differently. My reaction to his spirited and witty critique (which he may find infuriatingly patronizing, but it is not meant that way) is that he does as well as anyone can in sustaining a balance of power interpretation, but that it finally will not work. Kraehe's first main thesis, that the transactions and negotiations at Vienna were basically a kind of balance-of-power realpolitik for which the talk about legitimacy, rights, and law served as a fig leaf, seems to me unable to account either for the process or the results. Of course the ideas were narrowly and self-interestedly conceived, arbitrarily and inconsistently applied. That is the nature of politics, of life, of law itself. That the Vienna statesmen were determined to achieve a balance of rights, worked to adjudicate claims rather than impose solutions by force majeure, and break with the old politics by establishing a new comprehensive basis of guaranteed treaty rights for everyone, so that international politics would now be bounded by law, seems to me beyond serious dispute. His second main argument is that there was a world balance of power and a real rivalry for world power between Britain and Russia. Once again, I simply do not see it. To make another of the sweeping generalizations he found irritating: there was a serious Anglo-Russian rivalry all through the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, covert at some periods, overt in others (1800-1801, 1807-1812), and Russia lost that contest. It lost a war with Britain decisively in 1807-1812 before it fought and won the war with France. Another serious Anglo-Russian world struggle would begin with the Crimean War, partly as a result of it. Between 1815 and 1854, there was no such struggle worth talking about. What one sees from

Central Asia and Kashmir: A Study in the Context of Anglo-Russian rivalry. By K. Warikoo. pp. ix, 264, 2 maps (one on endpapers). New Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1989. Rs. 250.

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The improbable survivor: Yugoslavia and its problems, 1918-1988

appears to many observers a country riddled with ethnic divisions, financial problems and consequent instability - which the present inefficient leadership in Belgrade is unable to heal. Yet in spite of everything, including the vacuum that still remains following the death of Tito, the country survives as a single entity. This essay embraces the main pressure-points of Yugoslavia's first seventy years - the monarchy; the character, career and rule of Tito; the break with Stalinism; the nationalities; the Albanian minority; religion; and Yugoslavia's place in the world. Stevan Pavlowitch also wrote Yugoslavia and Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837-39.

The Persian Army, 1880–1907

The Persian Army in 1880-1907 was plagued by corruption at all levels. It was also rigidly hierarchical, ill-organized, and lacking in discipline. Moreover, the institution which should have shouldered responsibility for the enforcement of government control and the preservation of national sovereignty and independence, could not remain unaffected by Anglo-Russian rivalry in the area. After all, the interests of the two interventionary powers were inimical to the existence of a strong national army in Persia, the 'territorial integrity' of which, in the opinion of the rivals, depended on their bilateral balance competitive yet collusory rather than on their host country possessing a powerful military force. Russia's opposition to the formation of an effective Persian Army presumptively stemmed from its aim of securing access to the Indian Ocean with a 'warm-water' port in the Persian Gulf an aim which could only be realized by its absorption of extensive areas of Persian territory. Russia's geostrategic position in relation to Persia gave it a distinct advantage. Its frontier lay within a mere 80 miles of Tabriz and 160 miles of Tehran, and the Trans-Caspian Railway, completed in 1888, could bring armed force from Trans-Caspia and Turkestan to a desired point of deployment with relative speed. Russian strategic and military supremacy in the area was openly apprehended by the British authorities, one of whom once remarked.

The Political Implications of Demographic and Industrial Developments in Soviet Central Asia*

Western studies of Russian or Soviet Central Asia originated in England, spearheaded by Anglo-Russian rivalry in the area in the second part of the nineteenth century. British research was dominant until after World War II, covering the field from classical academic study (Royal Central Asian Society) to current affairs (Col. Wheeler's Central Asian Research Center).