Anglo-Russian Rivalry Research Articles

The Bakhtiyâri Khans, The Government of Iran, and the British, 1846–1915

Great power rivalry in nineteenth and early twentieth century Iran and the Qajar dynasty's dependence upon British and Russian support have long attracted the attention of western scholars. Recent scholarship also has begun tocus on internal power shifts in response to these conditions. An important element in these processes, but one which has been relatively unstudied, is political change within the great tribal confederations, especially the Bakhtiyâri. A number of elements contributed to the political transformation of the Bakhtiyâri. To begin with, the heightening of political activity in the tribe coincided with a decline of central power and authority and the growth of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran. Also significant was the concentration of powerand wealth within one princely family of the Bakhtiyâri. In addition a number of economic and strategic factors played a role in creating a new alignment of power among the Bakhtiyâri and Tehran and Great Britain. Chief among these elements were the increasing strategic and economic importance of the Bakhtiyâri winter pasture area in Khuzistan following the discovery of the oil fields there and the new national political role played by the Bakhtiyâri following the Persian Revolution.

Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837-1839: The Mission of Colonel Hodges. Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1961. 207 pp.

Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837-1839: The Mission of Colonel Hodges. Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1961. 207 pp.

The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History

ONE of the constants of nineteenth century diplomacy was, every schoolboy knows, Anglo-Russian rivalry sharpening at times into hostility and undermined always by mutual distrust. The same all-knowing schoolboy is also aware that British fears of Russian aggression toward India were also a constant factor in the relations between the two major powers. The Afghan Wars were, of course, outgrowths or manifestations of this general situation. So were the fairly numerous scare articles which appeared recurrently in British periodicals and the more elaborate but equally sensational books such as The Russians at the Gates of Herat.l Scarcely less sensational were some of the diplomatic and consular despatches of the period. Sometimes the charges were sweeping-that the Imperial Russian government planned an invasion of India or at least of the borderlands of India. Variations upon this were claims either that such plans were being made by the Russian military behind the backs of the Russian diplomats or that certain individuals (e.g., Generals Kaufman and Skobelev) had more aggressive ambitions along these lines than did the government at St. Petersburg. Whatever the explanation offered, the main thesis was rarely challenged. There seems no doubt that belief in the Russian threat to India was one of the motivations of British policy toward Russia in the nineteenth century. The question here addressed is not, therefore, the sincerity or reality of the British opinion nor of its effects. But, rather, were

Some of the Problems Facing Persia

THE problems facing Persia at the present day may be broadly divided into those which concern her relations with foreign Powers, notably Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., and those which concern her internal affairs. These are not, however, two separate sets of problems, but are closely related one another: many of Persia's internal problems cannot be solved until the problem of her relations with foreign Powers and in particular Russia have been solved, while at the same time her relations with foreign Powers are affected by the failure solve internal problems. To put it more plainly internal chaos and disorder give a pretext, however flimsy, for interference in the internal affairs of Persia by foreign Powers. The background of Persia's relations with Great Britain and Russia, and it is that aspect of Persia's foreign relations which I shall confine myself in this paper, is formed by the nineteenth and twentieth century Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia and the repeated attempts of Persia play off one against the other; and a traditional belief that Persia suffers more when these two Powers agree than when they are rivals. Rivalry between them, it is argued may, and often has, caused loss and inconvenience Persia, but when these two Powers agree over Persia her very integrity and independence may be vitally injured. The 1907 agreement, for example, was considered be incompatible with Persian independence. This rivalry of the two Great Powers in Persia has led a split in internal politics between those who look Russia and those who look Great Britain. Such a state of affairs in which Persia, divided against herself, has been holding an uneasy position between two Great Powers, has greatly aggravated the political and social insecurity which is, and probably has been for centuries, one of the main features of Persian social and political life. In parenthesis, I might say that it is against this background that Persia's inclination both in 1914 and in 1939 look Germany should be considered. The basis for Persian relations with Great Britain and Russia since the beginning of 1942 is the Tripartite Treaty' concluded in January of that year. By this treaty Great Britain and Russia undertook jointly and severally to respect the territorial integrity, and sovereignty and the political independence of (Article 1) and to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression (Article 3). Persia undertook co-operate with the allied Powers in every way possible in order enable them fulfil this undertaking and give the Allies, for certain military purposes,