Anglo-Persian Oil Company Research Articles

The Ambivalence of Urban Modernity and Marginality: The Making of Abadan Under the Anglo-Persian/Iranian Oil Company

The discovery of oil in Masjed Soleyman, Iran, in 1908 prompted the foundation of the British-owned Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC), and the construction of a massive refinery in Abadan in the southwest. It also sparked astonishing industrial and urban development in the region. Within a span of fifty years following the discovery of oil, Abadan developed from a small tribal village to one of Iran’s major modern industrial cities. This study examines how the rapid modern transformation of Abadan under the management and control of APOC influenced the everyday lived experiences of the local population. As a typical colonial company town of the era, Abadan’s patterns of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization became archetypes for other oil cities in Iran and the Middle East. Shaped by dependence on a single commodity, the architecture and urban planning of Abadan reveals hierarchies of economic, social, and political domination. Using the oral histories of Iranians familiar with the period and the area, this research argues that early twentieth-century company towns in Iran such as Abadan served as rhetorical instruments, which foreign-owned companies and their hired architects and planners used to impose specific visions of modernity upon subaltern or indigenous populations.

The Rivalry between Italy and Great Britain to Obtain a Monopolistic Concession on the Albanian Oil

After his return to power in 1924, the problems of the weak Albanian economy made Ahmet Zogu seek quick solutions to stabilize both the state and his regime. Albania started welcoming foreign financial capitals to solve its economic problems, which were also political. Meanwhile, the longtime competitors, Italy and Great Britain, through their powerful companies, tried to invest in strategic sectors of the Albanian economy. In this way, big international companies, such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Standard Oil Company, the powerful Italian company “Ferrovie dello Stato Italiano”, “Le Syndicat Franco-Albanais” representing the French capital etc., emerged in Albania. This created a political scene charged with tensions and ongoing negotiations between all the affected actors, including the Albanian state. In 1925, the aftermath of the international diplomatic efforts put under the spotlight the two main rivals for prevalence in Albania, Italy and Great Britain. While the first was directly and vitally concerned about Albania and the Balkans, the second was merely interested in the stability of the region. Speaking of Albania’s interests, in the achieved agreements with the different foreign companies, there were indeed a series of articles that were disadvantageous for the state and its economy. However, Ahmet Zogu made an utmost effort to play a significant role, above the real possibilities Albania had at that time.

Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway

Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway

Great Britain in the conflict over Iran oil: the First World War period

The article highlights the activities of Great Britain in the competition for control over oil fields and the oil industry in Iran (Persia) and the South Caucasus in 1914-1918, which was not the subject of special research in Russian historiography. On the eve of the war, Great Britain actually controlled the production and refining of oil in Persia through the AngloPersian Oil Company. With the outbreak of the war, British interests in the region were put under threat by Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which sought to challenge the British monopoly on Persian oil. Despite the fact that the territory of Persia remained far from the major battles of World War I, the country was a strategically important war theater for Great Britain. The British troops stationed in Persia controlled the territory of southern Persia, while the north of the country was controlled by Russian troops. After Russia’s withdrawal from the war at the end of 1917, there was a threat of strengthening the positions of Turkish troops and their allies in Persia and their advance to the Caucasus, to the oil fields of Baku. To counter this threat, a special taskforce was formed, called «Dunsterforce». During its 8-month stay in Persia, Dunsterforce strengthened the British position in the country, successfully suppressing anti-British forces with weapons, diplomacy and the pound sterling. Dunsterforce failed to protect Baku from capture by the Turks in September 1918. However, in November 1918, British troops managed to take over Baku. As a result, by the end of the war the western, eastern and southern shores of the Caspian Sea were under the full control of the British military. under the full control of the British military.

KUWAITI WORKERS AND WESTERN OIL COMPANIES 1946-1960

Kuwaiti oil was very important for oil companies of colonial powers such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, APOC, and Gulf Oil Company. Those two companies managed to acquire oil concession inside Kuwait. Although they achieved huge financial profits led to welfare and happiness of American and British peoples, they, however, broke the terms of the concession agreement regarding Kuwaiti workers rights by not providing jobs, training, qualifying, high position and other rights. In return, Kuwait witnessed a successful labor movement led to having workers’ rights. Moreover, that movement had a potential role in the decision of nationalization of foreign oil companies later in 1975. In light of the above, this study aims at highlighting the most important companies that had oil concessions in Kuwait. Also, it seeks to identify their real policies toward Kuwait and its workers. In addition, the finding tries to show the Kuwaiti workers response on the companies which exhausted Kuwait’s resources and depraved Kuwaitis from their normal rights. As far as the method followed by the study, nature of the research requires applying the suitable analytical approach. That is, via the references and sources used in study, the linked points with the subject are being specified, analyzed and objectively criticized in order to show the injustice that had taken place from colonial oil companies upon Kuwaiti workers.

Why Companies Bring the State Back In. The Voluntary Self-Nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Rise of ‘Governance by Government’

ABSTRACT While companies usually prefer private to hybrid governance, they sometimes transfer governance to governments. This paper assumes that this emerges from a decline in a firm’s relative market position. It tests this assumption in a two-stage qualitative analysis: First, it conducts a fuzzy-set QCA of these decisions based on BP’s Annual Company Reports. Second, it presents a process tracing of the voluntary self-nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation. The paper produces three core findings: First, threats to a company’s survival enable a preference reversal in favour of governmentalisation. Second, shareholder dissatisfaction is a crucial motivator for governmentalisation. Third, managers with an entrepreneurial role-model are more sensitive to autonomy costs and more likely to opt for unconventional governance options.

Infrastructures of Empire and Sovereignty: The Port of Basra in Interwar Iraq

This article traces the legal and political-economic disputes surrounding the construction of the Basra port in the era of World War I and the Mandate. Although the port was nominally an Iraqi institution, British colonial authorities vested it with a jurisdictional reach that actually extended beyond its own physical boundaries. It grew to encompass local municipalities, multinational corporations, and central state authorities on either side of the porous river border between southern Iraq and Iran. While this anomalous spatio-political arrangement facilitated British colonial extraction in Iraq and a wider imperial project in the Gulf, it also repeatedly broke down amid competing claims to space and sovereignty by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Pahlavi state. The history of these conflicts helps bring together the often siloed historiographies of Iraq and the Gulf, and position both in larger scholarly debates on the political geography of borderlands, infrastructure, and empire.

In Search of “Equitability”: Sir John Cadman, Rezā Shah and the Cancellation of the D’Arcy Concession, 1928‒33

From 1928 to 1932 the Pahlavi regime of Iran negotiated with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) to revise the D’Arcy Concession. These negotiations, conducted by ‘Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtāsh and the chairman of APOC Sir John Cadman, ended in failure when Rezā Shah unilaterally cancelled the D’Arcy Concession in November 1932. This article argues that “equitability” was the goal of the negotiations. An agreement was ultimately impossible to reach, due to differing ideas on either side regarding what was equitable, changes in the international oil economy and instability within Iran itself, leading to an unequal agreement in April 1933 that confirmed APOC’s long-term security but served only the short-term needs of Iran.

Obstruction as Power: Rethinking Britain's Caucasus Occupation 1918–20

ABSTRACTThis article draws on French and British archival sources to rethink the history of Britain's 1918--1920 occupation of the Caucasus. The extant historiography casts London as eager to reinvigorate the region's oil exports in order to buoy its own supplies, but this article suggests that various elements within and close to the British administration sought to obstruct oil exports. Preventing Caucasus oil from reaching global markets seems to have helped parts of the British administration reach their aims during negotiations with the French government and Royal Dutch Shell. It also improved the viability of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by denying valuable oil supplies to rival firms. Acknowledging the British oil interests that steered state policies during this period allows a richer story to unfold, one that demonstrates how imperial power in the wake of the Great War could be brought to serve the aims of, and even adopt the methods of, transnational oil companies operating in an emerging global fuel market.

Morris Young, pioneer physician.

This concise biography of Morris Young shows how he developed the medical services of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and ended his career working with Sir Alexander Fleming at St Mary's Hospital in London. Young is an important figure in the history of medicine in Persia, and this biography introduces the achievements of this modest man who devoted his life to medicine.

The Coup

In his most recent work, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of ModernU. S.-Iranian Relations, Ervand Abrahamian (Distinguished Professor of Iranianand Middle Eastern History, Baruch College of the City University, NewYork) recounts a definitive moment of modern Iranian history that overshadowsIranian-American relations to this day. Drawing on a remarkable varietyof sources – accessible Iranian official documents, the Foreign Office andState Department files, memoirs and biographies, newspaper articles publishedduring the crisis, recent Persian-language books published in Iran, aCIA report leaked in 2000 known as “the Wilber document,” and two contemporaryoral history projects (the Iranian Oral History Project at HarvardUniversity and the Iranian Left history project in Berlin) – the author providesa detailed and thorough account of the 1953 coup.Challenging the dominant consensus among academicians and politicalanalysts that the coup transpired because of the Cold War rivalries betweenthe West and the Soviet Union, he locates it within the paradigms of the clashbetween an old imperialism and a burgeoning nationalism. He then traces itsorigins to Iran’s struggle to nationalize its oil industry and the Anglo-Americanalliance against this effort.The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter, “Oil Nationalization,”narrates the history of Iran’s oil industry and various encounters betweenthe Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the Iranians. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), an English company founded in 1908 followingthe discovery of a large oil field in Masjed Soleiman in southern Iran, wasrenamed AIOC in 1935. AIOC gradually turned into a vital British asset andprovided its treasury with more than £24 million a year in taxes and £92 millionin foreign exchange in the first decades of the twentieth century ...

OIL AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY - FROM DISCOVERY OF OIL TO FORMATION OF THE ANGLO PERSIAN OIL COMPANY TO 1933 OIL AGREEMENT

ABSTRACT William Knox D’Arcy, an Englishman who had made a fortune in the gold mines of Australia, is the man who first discovered oil in Iran. He was able to receive a concession from Persian king, Mozaffar ed-Din Shah, in 1901 to explore and exploit oil in the designated southern area of Iran for a period of 60 years. He had to pay annually 16 percent of the net profits to Iranian government. D’Arcy established the first Exploration Company in May 1903 with a capital of 600,000 in shares of £1 each. Oil was struck on May 26, 1908, and subsequently in 1909 the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed with an initial capital of £ 2,000,000. When British Admiralty decided to convert the British navy from coal to oil burning, the British government in 1914 bought 51 percent share in the APOC in exchange for infusion of new capital. Reza Khan, an officer in the Persian Cossack, was able to carry a bloodless coup and declared himself the first King of Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Reza who tried to modernize Iran needed cash for his ambitious development projects. He unilaterally cancelled the oil concession of 1901. The cancellation created a political crisis between Iran and the British government on behalf of the APOC. However, after lengthy negotiations a new concession was signed between the Iranian government and APOC in 1933 known as the “1933 oil agreement.” Keywords D’Arcy concession, APOC, 1933 oil agreement, oil & Iranian economy

Popular Politics, the New State and the Birth of the Iranian Working Class: The 1929 Abadan Oil Refinery Strike

Popular Politics, the New State and the Birth of the Iranian Working Class: The 1929 Abadan Oil Refinery Strike

From defeat to victory: logistics of the campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918

Britain and the Government of India embarked on the campaign in Mesopotamia for several reasons. The discovery of oil in south Persia in 1901 resulted in the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The oil produced from this company was supplied to the Royal Navy. Germany's plan to construct a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad and Basra send tremors at London and Delhi. Germany's attempt to operate behind the façade of Turkish and Persian intrigues threatened the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipeline at the island of Abadan, the oilfields and the refineries. Britain was afraid that the Germans might instigate the Arab tribes to revolt. Further, capture of Basra by a hostile power would threaten Britain's sea lines of communication between Egypt and India. Logistics to a great extent had determined the texture of campaign in Mesopotamia. The logistical aspect of the Mesopotamia campaign during the Great War is yet to be studied thoroughly. The issue of supplying the British and Indian units in Mesopotamia proved crucial in shaping the course of the campaign. The first half of the paper shows how the problems of maintaining the units accelerated the disaster at Kut in April 1916. And the next section highlights the organizational restructuring of the logistical affairs which enabled the British and the Indian authorities to maintain larger number of troops with greater effectiveness from late 1916 onwards.

Building for the Shah: Market Entry, Political Reality and Risks on the Iranian Market, 1933–1939

Unlike other Western European companies operating in Iran between the first and second world wars, the Danish construction firm Kampsax pursued a forestalling strategy in dealing with the political imperative of Reza Shah. The British Bank of the Middle East and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, by contrast, pursued an absorption strategy. That is, they actively tried to “Iranize” their operations by appointing native Iranians to important managerial positions. Kampsax, however, made no attempt at “Iranization,” depending entirely on contractual relations with local builders and labor forces. This no doubt contributed to the firm's exposure as a totally foreign enterprise and lessened their chances of gaining favor with the Shah's advisors, who pursued an overtly nationalistic set of policies. The history of Kampsax in Iran therefore offers a useful case to use the concept of the political risks in relation to multinationals working in dictatorial settings. This paper undertakes such a study and concludes that the absorption strategy that was already being pursued by British firms offers a better way of managing such risks.

Building for the Shah: Market Entry, Political Reality and Risks on the Iranian Market, 1933–1939

Unlike other Western European companies operating in Iran between the first and second world wars, the Danish construction firm Kampsax pursued a forestalling strategy in dealing with the political imperative of Reza Shah. The British Bank of the Middle East and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, by contrast, pursued an absorption strategy. That is, they actively tried to “Iranize” their operations by appointing native Iranians to important managerial positions. Kampsax, however, made no attempt at “Iranization,” depending entirely on contractual relations with local builders and labor forces. This no doubt contributed to the firm's exposure as a totally foreign enterprise and lessened their chances of gaining favor with the Shah's advisors, who pursued an overtly nationalistic set of policies. The history of Kampsax in Iran therefore offers a useful case to use the concept of the political risks in relation to multinationals working in dictatorial settings. This paper undertakes such a study and concludes that the absorption strategy that was already being pursued by British firms offers a better way of managing such risks.

Russia and the United States: No Longer Rivals, Not Yet Partners

At the start of the twentieth century, consumer oil supplies were almost entirely controlled by Russia and the United States. Today, the market is much less monopolistic: there are major oil export centers in the Middle East, North and West Africa, South America, and the North Sea. But Russia remains a leading oil supplier to the global market. In 2006, it became the world leader in deliveries, surpassing Saudi Arabia. The United States, on the other hand, has, over the past century, become the world's largest oil importer. Half of the oil used in the United States is brought in from other countries.Despite the changes that have taken place, the former rivals have not become strategic partners. In looking for alternatives to Persian Gulf oil supplies, the United States is inclined to West Africa. Seeking to reduce its dependence on the European market, Russia is increasing its cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.Although they need each other, Russia and the United States are nonetheless moving in opposite directions. This is regrettable, particularly if you consider that the world is on the threshold of creating a global natural gas market.Beginning of the Twentieth Century: The Rise and Fall of Baku OilFor Russia, the beginning of the twentieth century was marked by the active development of the Baku oil industry. In 1901 the area produced 220,000 barrels per day (bpd), more than half of the world's output. As in the United States, the main role in the development of the Russian oil production sector was played by private capital.However, in the United States this capital came from within the country. The founder of the famous Standard Oil Trust was John Davison Rockefeller, the son of a doctor from New York. Investors in Russian oil production were not only domestic companies (the Nobel Brothers Petroleum Company and the Russian General Oil Corporation) but also French (the Rothschilds) and later Anglo-Dutch (Royal Dutch/Shell).The 1917 revolution and subsequent nationalization changed the direction of development of the Russian oil industry.For American and European companies, the 1920s and 1930s were a period of active international expansion. In 1928 the managers of Royal Dutch/Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey (the future Exxon), and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the future BP) reached an agreement on joint measures to explore and develop deposits in the world's main oil-producing regions. They were later joined by Standard Oil of California (the future Chevron), Standard Oil of New York (the future Mobil), Texas Company (the future Texaco), and Gulf Oil. The informal association came to be called the Sisters. The consortium's coordinated actions allowed it to monopolize oil production and supply on the world markets for several decades.At the same time, the Soviet Union was making efforts to restore production-which had decreased considerably because of the civil war and the nationalization of the oil industry-in the Baku region. This was achieved only on the eve of World War II. However, the successes were undermined by the striving of Hitler's Germany to obtain control over the Baku oil fields. Production capacity had to be evacuated to the central regions of the country, and as a result, Baku's oil production once again fell to 1901 levels.The 1950s and 1960s: The USSR as the New Player on the World MarketThe postwar years were marked by the increasing influence of the oil-producing states on the development of the global oil industry. The understanding that Enrico Mattei, head of the Italian concern ENI, reached with the Iranian authorities played an important role in this development. Attempting to break the monopoly of the Seven Sisters, offered new, more profitable cooperation terms to the host side. For the first time, in 1957, income was split between the investor (ENI) and the host country (Iran) in a 25:75 ratio (the Mattei Formula). …

The Politics of Debt: The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Bakhtiyari Khans

The loss of political independence through increasing indebtedness is a familiar phenomenon in modern Middle Eastern history. Although well-known as an affliction of states and governments, indebte...

Social Engineering and the Contradictions of Modernization in Khuzestan's Company Towns: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman

After the discovery of oil in Masjed-Soleyman by employees of the D'Arcy Concession in 1908, the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) was incorporated in London. The oil cities of Abadan, Masjed-Soleyman, and at least seven other sister towns designed and constructed by the APOC in the first quarter of the twentieth century in Khuzestan, were the first modern and industrial towns in Iran and the Middle East. This essay studies Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman – company towns with, on the one hand, a modern and authoritarian structure and organization, and on the other hand, thanks to the heterogeneity and energy of their population, as well as the forbidding scale the cities had reached despite the company's wishes, a conditional modernity. The result of these contradictions were cities and urban cultures that were energetic and dynamic, but also eclectic and hybrid.

London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902-1922

Prologue: power and responsibility. Part 1 British ascendancy: the British in the 19th century London's architecture of power nine major cabinet ministers labelling the Middle the Middle and the 20th century. Part 2 status quo 1902-1905: London's mood after the Boer War Balfour at Downing Street Lansdowne's diplomacy ending diplomatic isolation Fleet Street and the Baghdad Railway Russia's defeat and the entente with France. Part 3 Diplomatic defensives 1905-1911: the Liberals in power, Grey at the Foreign Office Persia and the Anglo-Russian convention ignorance of languages and customs the young Turks finance, trade, and The Near East Cromer's Egypt. Part 4 Preparing for war 1911-1914: Lloyd George's budgets and Churchill's navy Turkish defeats Kitchener in Egypt and beyond railway settlements Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Whitehall's war against the Turkish Empire war and censorship. Part 5 Great powerlessness 1914-1916: committees, Asquith, and Lloyd George, Westerner vs. Easterner strategy Dardanelles and Gallipoli Salonika and Baghdad the Arabs and secret diplomacy general staff opposition to Side Shows Northcliffe's press and cover ups. Part 6 War imperatives 1916-1918: financial dependence on the United States Lloyd George's manipulation of policy advancing to Baghdad & Jerusalem the Balfour declaration and war aims whither Russia? crises on the Western and Home Fronts armistices with Bulgaria and Turkey. Part 7 Mounting demands 1918-1922: Lloyd George's personal diplomacy Curzon and post-war Persia a Devil's Cauldron economic and Irish troubles impatience in Fleet Street and Westminster Churchill's Ungrateful Volcano facing Egyptian and Turkish nationalism. Epilogue: London's legacy.