Abstract

ABSTRACT While companies usually prefer private to hybrid governance, they sometimes transfer governance to governments. This paper assumes that this emerges from a decline in a firm’s relative market position. It tests this assumption in a two-stage qualitative analysis: First, it conducts a fuzzy-set QCA of these decisions based on BP’s Annual Company Reports. Second, it presents a process tracing of the voluntary self-nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation. The paper produces three core findings: First, threats to a company’s survival enable a preference reversal in favour of governmentalisation. Second, shareholder dissatisfaction is a crucial motivator for governmentalisation. Third, managers with an entrepreneurial role-model are more sensitive to autonomy costs and more likely to opt for unconventional governance options.

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