The Anglo-American Alliance has been the cornerstone of British foreign policy for the last decade and a half. Abroad, it has involved growing British subordination to Washington to the point where British initiative and freedom of maneuver have been drastically curtailed though not yet eliminated. At home, the expanded armaments program which is the inescapable corollary of the Alliance has imposed a double burden on the already overloaded British economy, since it entails the diversion of nearly a million able-bodied young men from the labor market in the midst of a full-employment situation, and at the same time absorbs 12 percent of the national income. British industrial production is now around 50 percent and the volume of exports around 70 percent above prewar levels. And yet, largely (though not only) because of rearmament, per capita consumption in the relatively prosperous year 1953 was barely above 1937, and the ratio of gross investment to gross national product has consistently been well below that of the United States and Germany, Britain's two main commercial rivals—which, of course, means that Britain's long-run international competitive position is being seriously weakened. It is all the more ironic that rearmament makes no sense even on its own premises of an eventual American war against Russia, one of the first results of which would be Britain's annihilation.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.