BOOK REVIEWS 501 No Regrets. Remorse in Classical Antiquity. By LAUREL FULKERSON. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xix + 263. Hardcover, $110.00. ISBN 978-0-19-966889-2. Emotion studies, the “affective turn,” contend that human emotions are not only interesting and potentially dangerous but deserve the attention allotted to scientific methods, mechanisms of legal reward and punishment, and theological geographies of hell. Recent volumes have explored the “rivalrous” emotions, eros, emotionsinartorhistoriography,andmiscellanies(pride,grief,anger,fear,gender differences, etc.), and the reviewer is organizing one on disgust. Limited by our own subjective experience and spotty awareness of past realities, can we now adequatelyunderstanddifferentcommunitiesoffeeling,thought,andperception? Regretandremorselacktheobvious,instinctual,anduniversalexternalsignals,the somatic markers thatreveal anger,joy, or fear. Some emotions are valorized by display, e.g. weeping and smiling.15 Other emotions, however, men (and women) keep, kept, or try to keep hidden. Therefore, remorse requires more words and clearer gestures to accompany penitent feelings. Men flourish most their remorse in rare eras that valorize acknowledging (or pretending to acknowledge) moral slippage, serious mistakes, and a change of heart, for example, Emperor Theodosius’ notorious massacre of riotingchariotracingfansin Thessalonica and his subsequentcontrition.16 In this book, Laurel Fulkerson offers a valuable fifty-page introduction examining ancient and modern vocabulary and concepts denoting responsibility acknowledged for bad outcomes. Then ten chapters reflect “emblematic” genres, authors,individuals,and groupsin order toexamine“the shape”oftheiremotions and their expression. The book’s goal (47) is to outline the shapes that ancient remorse took, its narrower limits, and its different “rules” that now obscure some ancient examples. Remorse had significant roles in antiquity, even if they are now “hypocognized.” Confessing a change of mind was problematic for them, then, although often a virtue for someof us, now. 15 Remorse, if a visibly marked, life-altering emotion, can now provide a source of power (cf. 218-19). 16 Fulkerson omits self-disgust and self-loathing. Neoptolemus the shame-filled ephebe, his character still forming, expresses a qualifying dyskhereia (Soph. Phil. 902-3, cf. 842, 1224, 1248-9). BOOK REVIEWS 502 Fulkerson contends that the expression of remorse experienced very little change in “pagan” antiquity. She shows that recorded feelings of μεταμέλεια, μετάνοια, and μετάγνοια17 suggest remorse (genuine and persistent moral perception of fault and willingness to pursue behavioral change). The author astutely examines ancient public processes and strategies of recognizing and acknowledging fault. Sometimes men were moving on and claiming to become better persons, but such postures could be merely status negotiations--not deep internal feelings (8). Public apologies, in any case, then and now, are often highly hedged, strategic verbal maneuvers. When, as usual, no genuine, perceptible mental pain or change of behavior occurs,one cannotdiscern remorse. The author demonstrates that presentations of penitence, redemptive actions, and moral progress were responses more likely to be felt, claimed, and acteduponbywomen,slaves,children,andotheroppressedparties,thatis,classes whose “weapons” lacked back-up. As she cleverly notes (12), the perceived inferiority of these groups reinforced pressing needs to express regret for disapproved deeds. She recognizes that people then and now manage emotions, rather than merelyendure them. In a chapter on the “Homeric roots of Remorse,” Fulkerson focuses on Achilles and Agamemnon’s very different performances. Achilles’ inclusion of all components of remorse persuades audiences, while Agamemnon’s face-saving excusesandpeculiar,over-the-topreparationsforhisclumsywrongsneverdeceive wary readers (Chryseis and Briseis, threats in assembly; cf. Odysseus’ reprimand of Agamemnon: Il. 19.181–3). How he conveys “sorry” to Achilles, what he says and does, and what he suppresses in person characterize merely regret, not remorse.Thus, the semanticsofapologydisallow Agamemnon’sshifty wordsand actions from the class “apology” and exclude him from a claim to “supplicant” (in Iliad IX and XIX).18 Consequently, Fulkerson’s “apologies” for Agamemnon’s remorse-freebehaviorsandunrefusable“deal”(54-6)inadequatelyanswerWalter Donlan’s and Donna Wilson’s persuasive analyses. They argue, from a fuller 17 Latinofferspaenitentia,andconscientia,bothpositiveandnegative.Remorse-relatedpudetand piget, like paenitet, are impersonal, for whatever reason, whether self-absolving or not. The witty author modestly claims to english all quotations with “effortless clumsiness.” Fulkerson locates examples of remorse “despite the absence of lexical markers,” since emotions are detectable in incidents lacking specific vocabulary (168). 18 William Miller’s...
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