Analytic Philosophy Of Religion Research Articles

Projecting Worlds Today

Abstract This essay aims at an appraisal of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s magum opus on the subject of art, the book Works and Worlds of Art, published in 1980 by the Clarendon Press in Oxford. The book is well known by analytic philosophers of religion, but its innovative value still seems to receive less recognition from other schools of thought and from artists and scholars in the area of Arts. Therefore, this introduction situates the book in the history of Philosophy of Art, with special focus on the state of affairs for the discipline in the twentieth century, engaging dialogue with other philosophical proposals in the period. Finally, the core concepts of Wolterstorff’s philosophy of art will be presented and defined in order to offer a glimpse of the richness that this book could still provide to contemporary scholarship.

Analytic theology

AbstractAnalytic theology is often described as something like the application of analytic philosophy's tools to theological studies, but what this means can be unclear. In this paper, I offer a primer on analytic theology which clarifies this common description of the field. Particularly, following Sarah Coakley, I sketch an account of analytic theology on which it consists of a relation of familial resemblance. That is, analytic theologians are those who investigate theological loci in ways akin to those seen in contemporary analytic philosophy. In so doing, I also briefly describe how analytic theology is conceptually distinct from both philosophical theology and analytic philosophy of religion. I then provide a threefold typology for understanding analytic theology's literary landscape whereby its practitioners can generally be understood to produce works which are either philosophically‐inclined, theologically‐inclined, or mixed in their inclination. Finally, I offer a brief survey of new frontiers being explored by analytic theologians.

The functions of natural theology in Thomas Aquinas: A presumption of atheism?

Abstract Antony Flew argued for a ‘presumption of atheism’ that intended to put the philosophical debate about God under a light which demands setting the meaningfulness and logical coherence of the theistic notion of ‘God’ before any arguments for His existence are suggested. This way of proceeding, discussing divine attributes before considering the arguments for the existence of God, became dominant in analytic philosophy of religion. Flew also stated that Aquinas presented his five ways as an attempt to defeat such a presumption of atheism. However, Aquinas proceeds in the reverse order, beginning with God's existence before discussing the divine attributes. He does so because he believes that natural knowledge of God must be drawn from creatures. Accordingly, from the Thomist perspective, natural theology is necessary not because it provides rational justification for religious belief in God's existence, but rather as a means to fix the referent for the word ‘God’ (semantic function) and provide an intelligible account of the divine nature (hermeneutic function). We should also acknowledge a correlative hermeneutic function of religious faith. Therefore, natural theology should not begin from a presumption of atheism nor proceed in the way suggested by Flew, because its main intention is not strictly apologetical.

A Wittgensteinian Antitheodicy

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, Sterba is not alone in disputing this generally accepted view in analytic philosophy of religion. D. Z. Phillips (1934–2006) has argued that the logical problem of evil has not been solved and he further holds that it has not even got off the ground. The aim of this article is to explore Phillips’ criticism of the free-will defense and mainstream theodicies. His critique is relevant for Sterba’s atheistic stance because Phillips’ arguments are partly applicable to forms of philosophical atheism that share the same assumptions with philosophical theism. In the first part of the article, I will briefly describe the starting points of the best-known solutions to the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion and refer to some aspects of Sterba’s arguments. After that I will explore Phillips’ ethical and conceptual criticism against frameworks used in the discussion of theodicy. Finally, I will pay attention to Phillips’ Wittgensteinian view of the task and the aim of philosophy in order to clarify some problematic aspects of his thought.

What is the Best Jewish Account of the Grounds of Worship of God?

This paper brings contemporary debate in analytic philosophy of religion regarding the notion of worship into conversation with Jewish sources and attempts to identify the most promising philosophical grounds for a Jewish account of the putative obligatoriness of worship. Some philosophers have recently debated the notion of worship, focusing in particular on the claim that human beings have an obligation to worship God and on whether and how such an obligation might be adequately grounded. I first canvass the major bases for worshipping God that have featured in this debate. I then turn to some relevant liturgical and philosophical sources of Jewish tradition, identifying grounds for the obligatoriness of (exclusively) worshipping God that have been advanced in those sources. I next consider which grounds of the putative obligatoriness of worship are the most promising for a Jewish account in terms of both philosophical cogency and rootedness in Jewish tradition. I argue that a version of a divine command grounding of prayer in a Soloveitchikian mode is both well-rooted in Judaism and also plausibly surmounts philosophical objections to divine command accounts. In the final section, I briefly raise the issue of whether the concept of worship is truly well-suited to a Jewish context, suggesting that the rich Hebrew notions of avodah and tefillah are perhaps more appropriate in articulating a fully adequate Jewish understanding of the pertinent issues. In particular, I argue that these notions fit well with the Soloveitchikian divine command grounding of the obligation to worship God.

Rethinking Religious Epistemology

This article uses recent work in philosophy of science and social epistemology to argue for a shift in analytic philosophy of religion from a knowledge-centric epistemology to an epistemology centered on understanding. Not only can an understanding-centered approach open up new avenues for the exploration of largely neglected aspects of the religious life, it can also shed light on how religious participation might be epistemically valuable in ways that knowledge-centered approaches fail to capture. Further, it can create new opportunities for interaction with neighboring disciplines and can help us revitalize and transform stagnant debates in philosophy of religion, while simultaneously allowing for the introduction and recovery of marginalized voices and traditions.

Job's Final Insight, Narratives, and the Brain

In continental philosophy of religion, the hermeneutics of narratives takes a central role. Analytic philosophy of religion, on the other hand, considers religious statements mostly as assertions of fact. It examines the logical form and semantics of religious statements, addresses their logical commitments, and examines their epistemological status. Using the example of a passage in the Book of Job, it is investigated whether the methods of analytic philosophy are also suitable for analyzing religious narratives. The question is explored whether there is a genuine form of knowledge, besides propositional factual knowledge, which is bound to the form of narration. Particular attention will be paid to the inter-personal pragmatic embeddedness of narratives. The connection between second-personal knowledge and narratives is examined. Using the historical example of Ignatius of Loyola's theory of religious knowledge, it is argued that propositional argumentative knowledge is only one form of religious knowledge among others. The others are second-personal and narrative in character. Having thus established this distinct form of knowledge, it is asked whether our best empirical knowledge of the neurophysiological basis of intuitive and non-argumentative cognition provides a foundation for better understanding inter-personal religious cognition within narratives.

Special Issue: Analytic Philosophy of Religion

Special Issue: Analytic Philosophy of Religion

Separating the Theological Sheep from the Philosophical Goats

Andrew Torrance has recently argued that we can distinguish analytic theology from analytic philosophy of religion if we understand theology as, fundamentally, a scientific enterprise. However, this distinction holds only if philosophy of religion is not itself a science in the sense intended by Torrance. I argue that philosophy of religion is a science in this sense, and so, that Torrance cannot distinguish theology from philosophy of religion in the way suggested. Nevertheless, I offer two alternative routes to the distinction based on the nature of the respective objects of study in theology and philosophy of religion. Thus, I demonstrate that there is a coherent model available to Torrance which preserves the distinction he seeks.

Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: a Defense of Doxasticism

Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 81, 161–169, 2017), is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism is false. Rath’s approach of analyzing a case from scripture has the advantage of allowing her to provide evidence for the claim that a subject had propositional faith but lost belief. However, I argue that Rath faces a dilemma: on the interpretation of the passage necessary for her argument, either Christ did lose his propositional faith that God was with him, or else he did not lose his belief that God was with him. Either way, she must reject a key premise in her argument.

Is Palamism a Form of Classical Theism, Theistic Personalism, Panentheism, or What? Some Conceptual Clarification for Analytic Philosophers

The precise understanding of “classical theism” varies somewhat within analytic philosophy of religion. Sometimes it is understood as something like a synonym for generic Christian theism (in contrast to deism or pantheism or the theisms of other world religions). Alternatively, the label is often understood by reference to a specific understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity (namely that promulgated by such figures as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas) and the larger conception of God which flows from it. The latter usage of the label is quite common within the recent literature, such that classical theism in this sense is viewed as competing with other prominent ways of conceptualizing Christian theism, notably panentheism, theistic personalism, and open theism. Where does the Palamite understanding of God (normative within Eastern Orthodox theology) fall within a contemporary taxonomy of Christian theisms? I seek to answer this question. By way of a literature review consulting representative contemporary sources on the various alternative theisms plus Palamism, I clarify the distinctive commitments of each position and draw out their assorted conceptual relationships and interconnections. I then go on to suggest that Palamism is uniquely well-situated to function as a bridge-builder and corrective force within the current literature, capable of dialoguing productively with the aforementioned range of Christian theisms.

Perfect Being Theology and Analogy

Thomas Williams has argued that the doctrine of univocity (the thesis that God and creatures can be predicated of univocally) is true and salutary. Such a claim is frequently contested, particularly in regard to the property—if there be any such—of existence or being. Inspired by the thought of Francisco Suárez, I outline a way of understanding the thesis of the analogy of being that avoids the criticisms levelled by Williams and others against analogy. I further suggest that the metaphysically committed version of univocal predication favoured by many analytic philosophers of religion causes difficulties for the practice of perfect being theology, which is often taken to play an important role in the construction of kataphatic philosophical theologies. My exposition of the analogy of being is, I suggest, better fitted to the practice of perfect being theology and, thus, salutary for the practice of Christian natural theology.

Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the Difference?

Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the Difference?

Psalm 89 and the Logical Problem of Evil: A Comparative-philosophical Perspective

This study takes as its starting point the consensus in research on the relationship between divine attributes and suffering in Psalm 89 which holds that some of the beliefs expressed in verses 39–52 contradict those in 1–38(53). In an attempt to address a related gap in the research in a new and supplementary way, a comparative-philosophical perspective is offered regarding the reasoning operative within the Psalm’s associated religious language. As counterpart, the so-called “Logical Problem of Evil” (LPE) in analytic philosophy of religion was identified. Conceptual and correlation-relations in Psalm 89 are clarified through correlation and contrast. The study argues that the logical status of the beliefs involved, as contradiction, makes more sense if interpreted as part of the protocol when prayer and poetry have to satisfy the conditions of a possible atheodicy. Thus, restating the Psalm’s associated content on its own terms, even if not in them, contributes to our understanding of why certain states of affairs in the world of the text are the way they are, or why they are at all. https://doi.org/10.17159/2312–3621/2021/v34n1a17

Beverley Clack, Brian R. Clack, The Philosophy of Religion. A Critical Introduction

This volume, the third edition of The Philosophy of Religion: A critical Introduction, authored by Beverley and Brian Clack is a handbook, a useful introduction to the main debates on analytical philosophy of religion and a sample of methodological clarity. The book explores contemporary arguments for the existence of God shaped under the natural theology framework; then, the main challenges to theism are presented, and radical reviews of theism are put forward. The main stages in the develop...

A Brief Overview of the Many Alternatives to Classical Theism, and How to Decide between Them

Abstract In the analytic Philosophy of Religion, much ink has been spilt on the existence of some sort of supernatural reality. Such work is usually done by theists, those who find classical theism to be probably true. It is my contention that the premises invoked in the common arguments or derivations for God’s existence do not necessarily lead to the god of theism. In this article, I note that these premises could also lead to various alternative naturalistic and supernaturalistic hypotheses (some of which are actualised throughout the non-Western world). As such, the main focus here is on describing some of the many naturalistic and supernaturalistic alternatives to classical theism, especially since several of these alternatives are generating discussion in the recent literature; explaining why a number of these alternatives are considered plausible by their proponents; and proposing how we might decide which theory is true, eventually endorsing a Bayesian approach.

Eric Perl’s Theophanism: An Option for Agnostics?

Recent work in analytic philosophy of religion has seen increased interest in nontheistic, but still non-naturalist (indeed, broadly religious) worldview options. J.L. Schellenberg’s Ultimism has been among the most prominent of these. Another interesting option that has yet to receive much attention is the Theophanism advocated by the Neoplatonism scholar Eric Perl. In this paper, I summarize Perl’s theophanism (which he describes as being neither theistic nor atheistic) and assess it on two fronts: (a) whether it might be an acceptable philosophical option for agnostics, specifically, and (b) to what extent it is independently defensible philosophically.

Agnosticism I: Language, perspectives and evidence

AbstractThe subject of agnosticism about the existence of God has emerged in many of the major conversations within analytic philosophy of religion, such as the debate on the nature of evidence for and against religious beliefs. In this article, I outline a map of the debate on agnosticism in religious epistemology—especially in relation to evidentialism—highlighting the significance of the problem of the ambiguity of evidence and connecting said problem to discussions of religious language and peer disagreement.

Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal duration” with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941), can respond to the most significant objections aimed at Stump and Kretzmann’s re-interpretation of Boethian eternity. This paper deals with three of these objections: the incoherence of the notion of “atemporal duration,” the impossibility of this duration being time-like, and the problems involved in conceiving it as being related to temporal duration by a relation of analogy. I conclude that “atemporal duration” (which has unfortunately come to be regarded with suspicion by most analytic philosophers of religion) — when combined with Bergson’s durée to become an “atemporal durée” — is a coherent understanding of divine eternity.

Book Review: Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Introduced

Book Review: Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Introduced