Abstract
Recent work in analytic philosophy of religion has seen increased interest in nontheistic, but still non-naturalist (indeed, broadly religious) worldview options. J.L. Schellenberg’s Ultimism has been among the most prominent of these. Another interesting option that has yet to receive much attention is the Theophanism advocated by the Neoplatonism scholar Eric Perl. In this paper, I summarize Perl’s theophanism (which he describes as being neither theistic nor atheistic) and assess it on two fronts: (a) whether it might be an acceptable philosophical option for agnostics, specifically, and (b) to what extent it is independently defensible philosophically.
Highlights
The subfield that is analytic philosophy of religion remains focused primarily on issues pertaining to two competing perspectives or worldviews: metaphysical naturalism (MN) and Judeo-Christian theism (JCT)
McLean (2015, p. 17), for instance, writes: “So I propose that, in considering theism, we think of the orthodox Christian story . . . and that, in considering atheism, we think of naturalistic atheism
While cognizant of competing definitions, for the moment I will take agnosticism as an epistemic doctrine with the following content: at present, the most rational position for the normal inquirer to take regarding the question of theism is that she does not know (a) whether the God of JCT exists, does not know (b) whether the objective evidential probabilities lie heavily in one direction or the other, and does not know (c) whether the epistemic situation is liable to change much
Summary
The subfield that is analytic philosophy of religion remains focused primarily on issues pertaining to two competing perspectives or worldviews: metaphysical naturalism (MN) and Judeo-Christian theism (JCT). While cognizant of competing definitions, for the moment I will take agnosticism as an epistemic (rather than psychological or pragmatic) doctrine with the following content: at present, the most rational position for the normal inquirer to take regarding the question of theism is that she does not know (a) whether the God of JCT exists, does not know (b) whether the objective evidential probabilities lie heavily in one direction or the other, and does not know (c) whether the epistemic situation is liable to change much.
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