The question is almost as old as Western philosophy itself: What is the relation of morality to the will of the gods? Plato's Socrates famously asks: Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?I Within monotheistic religious traditions there is ample historical precedent for disagreeing with Plato and taking morality to be dependent on the will of God. Though theological voluntarism has not been popular among contemporary moral philosophers, there has been a revival of interest in it during the past two decades among analytic philosophers of religion. This revival has been sensitive to the fact that the extreme view according to which divine volitions are wholly arbitrary is just one among many forms of voluntarism and may well not be the most plausible version of the position. I begin this paper by taking stock of what has so far been accomplished in the course of that revival. But my aim is not merely to summarize what has already been done; I also mean to make a contribution to the project of breathing new life into theological voluntarism. So I go on to make a proposal about what should be done next on behalf of this neglected tradition of moral thought, and I then act on my proposal by discussing two promising strategies of argument in support of the view that morality depends on the divine will. One should, of course, be appropriately modest in one's hopes and expectations for success in a project that many philosophers are bound to regard as quixotic. It is most likely not to be expected that philosophers whose deepest loyalties bind them to the predominantly secular assumptions of contemporary academic moral philosophy will be persuaded that theological voluntarism deserves to be taken seriously. It is, however, reasonable to hope that such philosophers can be brought to acknowledge that there are intellectually vital and respectable traditions of moral