Analytic Philosophy Research Articles

The Arbitrariness of Faith-Based Medical Exemptions

There are a variety of reasons for which one might claim an exemption from a public health mandate such as a required COVID-19 vaccine. Good-faith exemption requests—for medical, religious, or other reasons—are generally recognized as legitimate and granted to individuals when the imposition of the mandate on the requestor is perceived to outweigh the corresponding risk their lack of vaccination poses to the health and rights of others. This paper develops a method of analysis rooted in Western analytic philosophy designed to examine these issues and arrive at a framework for assessing the scientific, moral, and religious claims for exemptions from COVID-19 vaccinations. I argue that some empirical and moral beliefs are epistemically superior to others when they have a correspondence with agreed-upon facts about the world, are grounded in shared human experience, employ strong and substantive reasons for their claims, and embrace common convictions evidenced in the character of moral agents. Such facts must be demonstrable in the form of observably verifiable evidence and reliable testimony. Only then should a request for an exemption to an otherwise-required public health mandate (including a vaccine) be recognized. The alternative creates various difficulties, including the problem of moral arbitrariness.

The functions of natural theology in Thomas Aquinas: A presumption of atheism?

Abstract Antony Flew argued for a ‘presumption of atheism’ that intended to put the philosophical debate about God under a light which demands setting the meaningfulness and logical coherence of the theistic notion of ‘God’ before any arguments for His existence are suggested. This way of proceeding, discussing divine attributes before considering the arguments for the existence of God, became dominant in analytic philosophy of religion. Flew also stated that Aquinas presented his five ways as an attempt to defeat such a presumption of atheism. However, Aquinas proceeds in the reverse order, beginning with God's existence before discussing the divine attributes. He does so because he believes that natural knowledge of God must be drawn from creatures. Accordingly, from the Thomist perspective, natural theology is necessary not because it provides rational justification for religious belief in God's existence, but rather as a means to fix the referent for the word ‘God’ (semantic function) and provide an intelligible account of the divine nature (hermeneutic function). We should also acknowledge a correlative hermeneutic function of religious faith. Therefore, natural theology should not begin from a presumption of atheism nor proceed in the way suggested by Flew, because its main intention is not strictly apologetical.

Catch Me If You Can – Wittgenstein on the Ineffability of Logical Form

Logical form and logical analysis as the search for it have been introduced during the development of logic and analytical philosophy and are still widely considered as key tools or methods for the solution of philosophical puzzles. It is instructive to have a look at a criticism of these presupositions and I present Wittgenstein as the author who provides such a criticism. I present a development of his view of logical form which went from the thesis of the ineffability of logical form to the denial of the meaningfulness of the notion of logical form as such. This refusal is linked to Wittgenstein’s abandonment of the idea of the language of pure experience. The method of philosophical therapies is presented as an alternative to logical analysis and this methodology is linked with Wittgenstein’s consideration of game and family resemblance.

A contextual review of the Nei 內 (internality) / Wai 外 (externality) debate in the Mencius

ABSTRACT The theme of ren nei yi wai (rnyw) 仁內義外 in the Mencius has been crucial for the understanding of traditional Confucian/Mencian xin-xing theory. However, contemporary studies inspired by new discoveries in the Guo Dian Chu Jian and/or Western analytical tradition pose challenges to the conventional understanding of rnyw and/or xin-xing. Despite their innovativeness, these discoveries and/or interpretations appear to be divorced from the original text. Through a contextual review of both those relevant studies and the debate of rnyw/xin-xing in the original (con)text, this study uncovers a hitherto neglected ‘inclusive methodology’ in Mencius’ philosophy. Mencius’ inclusive vision provides invaluable insights into a means of not only creatively reading the Mencius in close connection with the original text, but also fostering an effective comparative study between Chinese and Western cultures/philosophies.

VARIETĂȚILE ANALIZEI ÎN FILOSOFIA ANALITICĂ

I agree that the unity of the method of analytic philosophy is an illusion and, as a result, I intend to discuss about the varieties of analysis in analytic philosophy. My strategy is to argue that the so called “linguistic turn” was followed by several attempts to develop a method in analitic philosophy and to assure at least its methodological identity. Therefore, I think that the decompositional analysis is, in the same time, in continuity with traditional philosophy and also the first way to perform in analitic philosophy. The logical analysis proposed by Frege become the main paradigm of analysis and, historically, it had some forms as logical reduction, logical contruction or rational reconstruction. The other main paradigm is the conceptual analysis developed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations. I think that a historical concept of analytic philosophy is useful for a better understanding of this variety of analyical method.

“Just teach them the law!”: the ethics of value inculcation within legal education

ABSTRACT To what extent should law teachers be permitted to advance controversial ethical, moral or political views as part of the LLB curriculum? This short paper grapples with that question by defending the ethical permissibility of such behaviour subject to the important proviso that it does not cause students “pedagogical harm”. In reaching this conclusion, three alternative views are considered and dismissed, each of which seeks either to eliminate value inculcation entirely or to restrict its scope to the moral-political values currently immanent within established law. The approach taken is argumentative, drawing upon analytical philosophy, with each contested and contestable view being presented in propositional form. Ultimately, it is concluded that value inculcation cannot be avoided within legal education and that, given this fact, the question becomes which values law teachers have a responsibility to advance. It is contended that this judgement, fraught though it might be for various reasons, is best left to individual teachers and that, for this reason among others, a permissive “no-harm” approach to value inculcation best justifies current pedagogical practices.

Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad Azadpur (review)

Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad Azadpur (review)

Analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial moment

Of all possible future directions for analytic philosophy of education, few are as overdue as thoroughly confronting the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial moment. Rightly credited with establishing the credibility and standing of philosophy of education, by 1980, analytic philosophy of education was the dominant though not unchallenged approach to philosophy of education in the Anglo-American world. While its dominance has declined and philosophy of education has become more diverse, analytic philosophy of education retains a strong international presence in educational theory. By contrast, postcolonial theory – the critical study of colonialism and its aftermath – has attracted growing interest across many academic disciplines, developing from the 1970s onwards from its early location in literary and cultural studies. After outlining the emergence of analytic philosophy of education, and the subsequent reshaping of philosophy of education, we describe postcolonial theory and the place of education in both colonialism and postcolonial thought. Having thus located analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial turn in their own times and contexts, we consider the postcolonial challenge to Western philosophy and how analytic philosophy of education could respond, developing our stance on a postcolonial future direction for analytic philosophy of education. We argue that the future of philosophy of education is now inescapably postcolonial and that it should retain its analytical strengths.

Empathy, Intentionality and "Other Mind": from Phenomenology to Contemporary Versions of Naturalism

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"? Theoretical basis. The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett). Originality. The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. Conclusions. Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation.

Stanley Cavell’s Philosophical Literary Criticism

An American philosopher Stanley Cavell (1926–2018) is one of those philosophers who, consciously starting from the assumption of the mutual complementarity of philosophy and literature, develop their theoretical reflection at the meeting point of both these fields and treating their reflection as a form of writing. In Cavell’s opinion, literature is in no way inferior to philosophy in terms of its cognitive values. He goes so far as to question the validity of the rigid, insurmountable division into these two areas, and describes his own writing as epistemic criticism which is a kind of philosophical literary criticism. Although he comes from the analytical school, Cavell remains extremely critical of this tradition of philosophizing, accusing it, as he puts it, of “forgetting the human voice”, losing touch with reality and being alienated from life and in the result calling analytical philosophy “the discipline most opposed to writing, and to life”. At the same time, he turns to the continental tradition and tries to combine these two different intellectual traditions on the basis of his considerations. In this way, Cavell places himself at the intersection of various intellectual currents. His area of interest is also extremely wide and varied, including philosophy, literature, film, theater and music.
 In my article I intend to focus on a few chosen aspects of Cavell’s work that is still not recognized enough in academic studies, namely on the Cavell’s use of philosophical concepts and chosen methods used by Cavell to analyze literary texts – the paraphrase method, the problem of the open work, the literalization of language method (in the context of Cavell’s analysis of Beckett’s Endgame), the problem of the ordinary connected with Cavell’s version of the ordinary language philosophy (in the context of the chosen features of Wittgenstein’s philosophy). In concluding part I also make some provisional remarks on Cavell’s hermeneutics and also suggest that it could be fruitfully read in the context of the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and his philosophy of the Other.

Defending the Hypothetical Author

Abstract In contemporary analytic philosophy of art, the intentionalist debate is about whether the author’s intention is relevant to the interpretation of her work. Various positions have been proposed, and in this paper I defend what I call hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism, the position that interpretation is based on the intention attributed to the author constructed from the work. There are three aims to achieve: (1) to give a general account of hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism; (2) to present a moderate version of hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism; (3) to defend the moderate version of hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism against actual intentionalism and actual author-hypothetical intentionalism. Against the current trend that focuses on actual authors, I hope to show that the hypothetical author account is still a sustainable contender in the intentionalist debate.

Demarcating the Foundations of Analytic Theology and Philosophical Theology

Analytic theology is a thriving research program at the intersection of theology and analytic philosophy. Prior to Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea’s launch of “analytic theology” in 2009, the discipline functioned under the moniker “philosophical theology.” Considerable ink has been spilled on what is analytic theology in the past decade, and most recently by William Wood (2021). Some theologians (e.g., Abraham 2009) have argued that it is systematic theology while others (e.g., Coakley 2013) have been content to remain in a family resemblance class rooted in philosophical theology. At the same time, analytic theology has welcomed Christian philosophers (e.g., Beall 2021) who have migrated into Christian doctrine via philosophy of religion. These philosophers are not systematic theologians, but, rather, philosophical theologians. This essay analyzes the relation between analytic theology, philosophical theology, and philosophy by examining their starting points and how they perceive and access truth, and then proposes a spectrum to graph their overlapping zones of research. I conclude that philosophical theology stands at the heart of the disciplines and thus remains an appropriate term for analytic theologians and Christian philosophers working somewhere in the vicinity of Jerusalem.

Natural kinds and a posteriori necessities: Putnam pro Kripke, Putnam versus Kripke

Most contemporary analytic philosophers of language and mind accept the view that there is a wide class of terms, “natural kind terms”, which includes names of substances (the most common example is “water”), of species of animals, and of many other kinds of things in nature, whose meaning and reference is determined in the way explained by the theory developed in the 1970s by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. The theory is often referred to as “the Kripke-Putnam theory” and is supposed to have such achievements as the overthrow of the earlier dominant Fregean theory of word-meanings (dubbed “descriptivism” by Kripke) as determined by the concepts in our minds, providing support for the “externalist” approach to linguistic meanings (in line with Putnam’s claim that “"Meanings" just ain’t in the head”), and the discovery that there is a wide class of truths (such as that water is H20) that are both a posteriori and necessary. Although the priority in the development of this theory belongs to Kripke, it could hardly gain such a wide acceptance without contributions by Putnam, which turned out to be very influential. However, the habitual idea of “the Kripke-Putnam theory”, as one theory, tends to play down the differences between Putnam’s and Kripke’s approaches and to hush up the fact that in his late works, of 1983 and 1990, Putnam revised and abandoned pretty much of his “Kripkean” views of 1970-ies; in particular, repudiated the pride of Kripke’s theory, the idea of necessary a posteriori truths. This article makes critical analysis and evaluation of Putnam’s ideas and arguments usually credited as important contributions to “the Kripke-Putnam theory”, and highlights the main points of the revision in late Putnam’s works. The case is made that Putnam's famous argument for externalism about meanings, the Twin-Earth thought experiment, is question-begging, fails to do justice to likely changes in the meanings of words with the development of knowledge, and conflicts with the linguistic practice in the relevantly similar case of “jade”. Putnam's argument for externalism from the division of linguistic labour is not cogent too, because “semantic deference” is itself a matter of what is there in “heads” - of some (non-expert) heads deferring to other (recognised as expert) heads. Eventually, on close inspection and in the light of Putnam's later reexplanation and revision, his account of meaning and reference turns out to be a sophisticated variety of conceptualism/internalism.

К 100-летию феноменолога А.-Т. Тименецки (1923-2014)

In connection with the forthcoming anniversary of the Polish-American phenomenologist the formation of her creative way which absorbed influence of aesthetics, philosophy of life, phenomenology, analytical philosophy is discussed. The paper compares the phenomenological concept of Tymieniecka to contemporary cinema as an isomorphic system reflecting reality.

Philosophy and the Public. (Review of the 11th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, September 12-15, 2022, Berlin, Germany).

The review outlines the content of the main public events of the 11 th International Congress “Philosophy And The Public”, which was held by the German Society for Analytical Philosophy in association with the Institute of Philosophy of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin on September 12-15, 2022 in Berlin (Germany). The activity of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy was introduced. The third mission of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin is considered and the role of analytical philosophy in its implementation is revealed.

Structural / Possible / Fictional: A few notes on the shift from structural poetics and stylistics to the theory of fictional worlds in the perspective of Lubomír Doležel’s work

Abstract This article deals with the fictional worlds semantics (FWS) from the perspective of its relation to structural poetics and some branches of analytic philosophy, while these connections are explored via the general term meaning. Three questions are stated: 1.) how does the relation between structural notions and FWS perspective look like and what are possible dissimilarities; 2.) what is the role of analytic philosophy in this relation; 3.) how the meaning is constructed between the (fictional) text and the recipient? Some open problems in analysing the relation between structural concepts of meaning/reference re-construction and their adapting by FWS are thus inquired, especially in connection to thoughts presented by a prominent scholar in the field of FWS, Prof. Lubomír Doležel. Finally, a possible direction for grasping the meaning/reference problem in FWS from the perspective of dynamic semantics and game-theoretical semantics is proposed.

The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology

AbstractThis article addresses the theme of ‘death and immortality’ from the perspective of consciousness, and takes as its starting point a root text of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (c. fourth century ce). The text posits a dualist ontology in which consciousness is separate and autonomous from a material reality that includes body and mind. The goal is to be ontologically situated in a ‘pure’ consciousness (non-objective), which signifies existential liberation. There are mundane ways to understand this claim, such as referring to cognitive states that produce affective dissociation, or more radical interpretations, such as a post-death state. This article explores the question of what Sāṃkhya's consciousness is like: it is said to be immortal, plural, individuated, and contentless. What is the motivation for and implication of engagement with a system that describes an existential freedom that may only be known in a dualist reality or after death? And how can Sāṃkhya's concepts be brought into conversation with contemporary investigations into mind–body questions? Sāṃkhya rationality counters the argument of eternal oblivion or of consciousness as an illusion confined to the brain. Yet there are resonances with Chalmers's notion of consciousness as fundamental. This article concludes that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion can be enhanced by adding Sāṃkhya thought to its purview.

Much Ado about nothing.R.G. Collingwood versus Martin Heidegger on the status of metaphysics

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the completely neglected relation between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics by highlighting their respective reactions to Alfred J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap. In his article “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” from 1931, Carnap exposed the metaphysical statements, used by Heidegger in his inaugural lecture What is Metaphysics?, as pseudo-statements. Three years later, Ayer published the article “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”. In the late 1930s, Ayer's position was attacked by Collingwood in An Essay on Metaphysics. In the British debate, the tables of the German debate were thus turned. Whereas the analytic philosopher Carnap reacted against the metaphysician Heidegger, the metaphysician Collingwood reacted against the analytic philosopher Ayer. Accordingly, a correct understanding and evaluation of the relation between Collingwood's and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are dependent on knowledge of their respective reactions to Ayer and Carnap. Three steps are taken. First, the discussion between Carnap and Heidegger is presented. Second, the friction between Ayer and Collingwood is outlined. In the final section, the similarities and differences between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are explored and situated within their divergent views on the Western history of philosophy.

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

AbstractThe apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.

Muhammad U. FARUQUE: Sculpting the Self: Islam, Selfhood and Human Flourishing

The subject of the self has been around, arguably, since people first began to systematize their thinking about the world and themselves, though it has never been studied as systematically as in the last fourteen centuries. That is to say, after the foundations of institutional learning and scientific investigation had been laid in the Islamicate world, more or less in the form we take for granted today. In this thoughtful and deeply knowledgeable study, Prof. Muhammad U. Faruque turns his attention to a set of themes at a moment of “major crisis” for the “theories of selfhood and subjectivity”. The crisis he has in mind is conceptual in nature and attributable to the myriad technological innovations that have overturned virtually every claim about selfhood inspired by neuroscience, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, anthropology and religious studies.