Propositional Analysis Research Articles

Kant's application of the Analytic/Synthetic distinction to Imperatives

In the first Critique Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction and illustrated it with theoretical propositions. As his main aim in that work was to justify synthetic a priori propositions, Kant was able to bring his central questions into relief and discuss the methodology of their solution by contrasting synthetic propositions, such as: “Every event has a cause” with analytic propositions, such as: “Every effect has a cause.” Consequently, few commentators have any difficulty in stating as propositions the propositions Kant is justifying in the first Critique or in pointing out the difficulty of justifying such propositions.

Analytic method and Analytic Propositions in Kant's Groundwork

At the beginning of the third Section of the Groundwork, Kant appears to state the synthetic a priori proposition which it is the business of that Section to justify. It is: “An absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always have as its content itself considered as a universal law.” I shall contend that a consideration of Kant's use of analytic method shows that he is committed to regard this proposition not as synthetic, but rather as analytic. Hence, I shall contend that his statement of the proposition to be justified in the third Section is a slip, which hinders the study of the third Section and which, therefore, requires a textual emendation. Kant, I claim, does not attempt to justify this proposition but another.

The Radical Empiricism of William James (review)

280 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY makes rewarding reading. White thinks there is tension in Peirce's thought between his careful, scientific thinking, represented in his early, sober version of the pragmatic criterion, and his extremely speculative metaphysics. The later realistic version of the criterion, according to White, is what gave rise to, or made possible, his speculative ventures. However, it must be pointed out that rightly or wrongly Peirce thought that his metaphysical views of tychism, and so on, do have testable, empirical consequences. This question, of course, is extremely complex and much is being written about it currently. Finally, the discussion of whether James anticipated the rejection of a firm distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions, as indicated previously, is worth close study. White points out in passing that Peirce accused Wright of leading James astray in this respect and observes that Wright was led in this direction by J. S. Mill. Indirectly then White is committing himself to the view that Mill is a precursor of Quine's and his own rejection of the distinction. This line of thought is interesting. It would be good to see this point developed in great detail elsewhere (it would have been out of place in the present volume). It may have been done already, but I do not know where. White's approach to the history of American philosophy in general is an important one, and he has done his usual good job of imparting a compelling quality to philosophical ideas and of getting to the heart of crucial issues. EDWARD n. MADDEN State University of New York at Buffalo The Radical Empiricism o/ William James. By John Wild. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969) Constructive philosophical work of great importance is often done by reexamining the thought of a philosopher from an earlier generation. John Wild's sympathetic, yet critical, treatment of the philosophy of William James is an excellent illustration of this fact. Wild's special historical interest is to show that James's broadly empirical approach to philosophy led him to insights which make an important contribution to the general phenomenological movement. Through his detailed exposition of all of James's work, from the early essays (e.g., "The Sentiment of Rationality" and "Reflex Action and Theism") and The Principles o/ Psychology to the later writings on pragmatism and radical empiricism, Wild clearly demonstrates that James both shared and anticipated many views held by phenomenologically oriented thinkers "who, about the turn of the century, became profoundly dissatisfied with the abstractness and artificiality of traditional, systematic philosophy, and turned to concrete experience and its real structures for firmer guidance" (p. 414). On the other hand, Wild's study of James is not merely historical scholarship. He believes that James's thought contains living insights that are important for us to appropriate now. As a result, his interpretation of James's views on knowledge, freedom, meaning, truth, etc., take the reader on a genuinely philosophical journey. Through an encounter with both James and Wild, the reader is led to consider almost every important philosophical question, and he is presented with ideas that can be helpful in working out positive solutions of his own. To illustrate these latter points, consider one of the important themes which Wild develops in his interpretation of James. Recent phenomenology emphasizes that the conceptual frameworks, theories, and language that we use in organizing our experience BOOK REVIEWS 281 are not the primordial factors of our lives. There is a more basic dimension of experience--prereflexive, preconceptual, and prelinguistic--which is characterized by feeling, "vagueness, and ambiguity, but which is also a direct cognitive access to existence. That is, this primordial level of our experience gives us genuine knowledge of reality. Conceptual and theoretical clarification may be required to bring this awarehess to light and to free it from confusion, but knowledge is not restricted to a conceptual or linguistic level, as many philosophers have argued. Knowledge is not only grounded in direct perception and feeling, but in one of its forms it exists there as well. A view similar to this intriguing thesis is articulated and defended by James, and Wild takes it to be...

Cartesian Simple Natures

Cartesian Simple Natures

The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises, by Oran R. Young

This book is a comparative study of four international crises: Berlin blockade of 1948-i949, of 1958 in Taiwan Straits, East-West clash over Berlin in 1961, and Cuban missile of 1962. In introductory chapters and in an appendix on epistomological problems, Mr. Young attempts a strict justification of his choosing these particular conflicts for his comparison. In particular, he develops certain criteria concerning orientation of that are tested in main part of his book. Mr. Young's arguments are not entirely persuasive. There is no good reason (except one of convenience) for considering 1961 rather than 1958 beginning of second Berlin crisis; nor can exclusion of other crises, for example, Suez of 1956, be justified on anything but pragmatic grounds. But author's analytical effort ought certainly not be belittled by pointing to small universe of cases to which his conclusions pertain. Other analysts are free to enlarge that universe, if they feel so inclined, and examine additional crises in order to see how Mr. Young's findings stand up. Mr. Young has followed a rigorous procedure. He has organized material on each in a discontinuous manner. Each of his four cases is considered thirteen times, each time in light of another hypothesis. This procedure facilitates a truly comparative analysis. As to hypotheses on bargaining that have been tested in this way, Mr. Young acknowledges his debt to Thomas Schelling's work, but he has added some refinements and advanced a few new analytical propositions. Inevitably, not all of his hypotheses are of equal interest. The hypothesis that the influence of salience as a principle of coordination will rise with onset of a crisis is not as weighty as are propositions dealing with restraints on violence (chaps. 8 and 13) or with modes of communication (chap. 6). Mr. Young has made excellent use of rich secondary literature on four crises, although some additional insights on Soviet behavior during second Berlin and Cuban missile might have been derived from Michel Tatu's monograph, Power in Kremlin (1968). Robert Kennedy's account of events of October 1962 and Dean Acheson's interesting criticism of it were not available to Mr. Young at time he wrote his book. Similarly, certain journalistic sources like Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Le Monde, and SBZ Archiv might have been more useful to him than were Time or Newsweek.

The Empirical Content and Longevity of Ricardian Economics

There is generally recognized gap, though of uncertain width, between abstract analytical propositions of Ricardian economics and concrete implicit in their use by contemporaries as guides to legislative action. The first purpose of this paper is to inquire into nature of economic statements made by Ricardo, and by John Stuart Mill. Can their key propositions be construed as, and did they intend them to be, empirical statements? What tests did they accept to measure truth of their theory? How did they bridge gap between their abstractions and real world? A second purpose, to which first inquiry is necessary preliminary, is to throw some light on related historical issue of some importance. Mark Blaug has recently charged Mill with having given an artificial extension of life to Ricardian system, after it had become empirically untenable. Blaug argues that the body of doctrine which Ricardo bequeathed to his followers rested on series of about course of economic events which were subject to empirical verification, in strictest sense of term. These included a rising price of corn, rising share of national income going to rent receivers, constant real wages, and gradual vanishing of investment opportunities in industry. But statistical evidence, available in 1830s and 1840s, falsified these predictions. At that stage, Blaug argues, system was retained only because of its usefulness to opponents of Corn Laws. Still more, therefore, with repeal of those laws in 1846, should system have been rejected as obsolete. For then even its basic assumption-an insulated economy-was no longer realistic. Thus, in 1848 Mill revived system which, it is claimed, had been falsified as to its key deductions, and rendered irrelevant by attainment of its chief policy objective.2 Mill effected this in some instances, Blaug suggests, by conveniently ignoring gap between facts and his theory. In others, it is charged, he actively sought to remove theory from any possibility of falsification by facts. This involved two gambits. One was to turn Ricardo's definite predictions into vague statements of tendency, guarded by

El origen de los primeros principios según Tomás de Aquino. Una dificultad interpretativa

En el libro I de su Comentario a los Analíticos Posteriores, Tomás de Aquino explica que toda demostración supone la existencia de principios evidentes e indemostrables que aseguren la certeza de las conclusiones. Para garantizar la existencia de verdades ciertas e indemostrables, introduce la idea de las proposiciones per se notae. Estas proposiciones son típicamente caracterizadas por tener un predicado que forma parte del contenido inteligible del sujeto, es decir, por ser proposiciones analíticas. Ahora bien, al final del libro II, cuando explica cómo se obtienen los principios de las demostraciones, la doctrina expuesta no parece ser perfectamente congruente con la de las proposiciones per se notae, por describir un proceso inductivo más apto para explicar el surgimiento de proposiciones no analíticas. El objetivo del este artículo es proponer una solución de este problema, distinguiendo entre dos tipos de principio. La pertinencia de tal distinción se intentará demostrar comentando algunos textos de Roberto Grosseteste y Alberto Magno.

Changing Politics in the SouthThe Politics of the Southern Negro. By Harry Holloway Harry, Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics. By J. Harvie Wilkinson, III

Previous article No AccessReviewsChanging Politics in the South The Politics of the Southern Negro. By Harry Holloway Harry, Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics. By J. Harvie Wilkinson, III Allan P. SindlerAllan P. Sindler Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Polity Volume 2, Number 2Winter 1969 The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/3234102 Copyright 1969 PolityPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Analyticity and Necessity in Moore's Early Work

Analyticity and Necessity in Moore's Early Work RONALD JAGER All real judgment is synthetic--that is, involves the carrying over of a predicate of one subject to affect the predicate of another subject numerically distinct. Any other form of judgment is tautological and hence no judgment at all. (G.F.S.--Baldwin's Dictionary, H, 441) IN DISCUSSIONSof necessity and analyticity there cropsup periodically the worry about whether a genuinely analytic proposition, one whose subject and predicate are in some sense partially or wholly 'the same', can really be regarded as a proposition at all. Though one can, I suppose, resolve the question by fiat. one cannot by the same sl~oke discern what has been gained or lost thereby. Viewing it historically, we may say that the worry crops up most naturally where one's conception of proposition is linked to the classical notion of judgment, or where propositions are more or less realistically conceived. Moreover, the very existence of scruples about a matter of this sort doubtless contributed both to the positivistic eclipse of propositions in the fight of something more linguistic and to the resultant complacency about analyticity. But, in the heyday of positivism Professor Broad wrote: [ do not know that it would be universally admitted that there are analytic propositions . The alleged instances of such propositions which are commonly given in logic books are, in my opinion, not instances of propositions at all.... I very much doubt whether it [''all equilateral triangles are eqnilateral'~J stands for a proposition, i.e., for something that can be true or false, that can be known or believed or entertained and so on, at all.., we seem to have here just one more instance of the disastrous results of blindly following the suggestions of language,x Can analytic propositions be known, believed, disbelieved? Obviously Broad thinks that there is a serious issue here, and not one merely de jure. More recently, Arthur Pap has succinctly expressed something of the impulse that has kept the problem alive: "Are There Synthetic Apriori Truths?" PAS supplementary volume (1936), pp. 104105 . [4411 442 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The word "proposition" has several proper uses, whereof "possible object of beliefs"... is only one. An equally proper use for it is "meaning of a declarative sentence." . . . But it is not enough to be aware of this duplicity of meanings of "proposition." One further ought to see their relationship, which is this: anything which it is possible to believe (and to disbelieve) is something which it is possible to mean by a declarative sentence, but not conversely. 2 We might relate Broad's remarks to Pap's in this way: To understand 'proposition' merely as "meaning of a declarative sentence" may lead to one of "the disastrous results of blindly following the suggestions of the language." And indeed, difficulties are likely to stem from our being able to mean while not being able to disbelieve what is expressed by analytic sentences. But with belief the door opens upon a host of other modal and epistemic concepts that may be affected by one's attitude toward our problem. Presupposing is one such instance. Judging is another. There is in fact a cluster of problems that stem from the question whether ostensibly analytic propositions are really propositions. If, as I suggested, the ancestry, but not the descendents of this question may be traced to the notion of 'judgment', it is not surprising that the problem itself first seemed really acute at that point in semantic history where 'judgment' was being supplanted by 'proposition', and where the characteristic problems of idealism were being faced by philosophers of avowedly realistic bent. That is: around 1900. As far as I can discover there is only one place in this century's literature where the issue is the vehicle for a total assault on the conception of analytic truth, an assault like that suggested but not developed by Broad and Pap. This attack appears historically just where one might have expected, though Broad and Pap made no reference to it. It is in an early paper of G. E. Moore's.3 I do not know that Moore's own argument has...

Deductive foundation and analytic propositions

1. The deductive foundation or the deductive proof is usually identified with the deductive inference. The deductive inference is defined as an inference whose conclusion follows logically from its premisses. The deductive proof defined in such a way is an indirect foundation of the truth of some proposi? tions (conclusions) by appealing to the truth of other propositions (premisses). The sequence of inferences which we can perform is always finite; hence there are always in our inferences ? if we avoid the fallacy of vicious circle ? some propositions which are not founded indirectly. It is obvious therefore that ? when using such a concept of a deductive proof ? we cannot say that some propositions are proved (or provable) deductively but only that they are proved (or provable) deductively by virtue of certain other propositions. The deductive science is defined as a science in which only deductive in? ference is performed. It is also almost commonly assumed that each deductive science is an axiomatic system. It follows from our previous remarks that we cannot say that a proposition of a given deductive science is proved (or pro? vable) deductively. We can only say that it is proved (or provable) deductively by virtue of the axioms. But the axioms cannot be founded deductively. Such a conception of the deductive proof as an indirect foundation is com? monly accepted in the methodology of sciences. As I know it has not been criticized till now.

Are Some Analytic Propositions Contingent?

Are Some Analytic Propositions Contingent?

The Neo-Classical One-Sector Growth Model: A Geometrical Exposition and Extension to a Monetary Economy

The neo-classical one-sector growth model has become a standard piece of equipment in the economic theorist's tool kit. Nevertheless, most of the available expositions of it are needlessly complicated and mathematical, and tend to obscure the simplicity of the central analytical propositions. This article presents a geometrical exposition of the model for the simplest possible case.2 It then goes on to indicate how various relaxations of the assumptions of this case can be accommodated, how the model can be used to illustrate various theories of the nature of the problem of economic development, and how it can be extended to take account of certain problems of growth in a monetary economy.

Speculative Truth

IN delivering this lecture I am to speak on some aspect of truth. The practice of examining the various contexts in which a word may be used, in order to disclose what its usages have in common as a clue to its meaning, is of respectable antiquity. If I indulge this practice I find an “embarras de richesse” in modern philosophical literature under two headings, the truth of analytic propositions and the truth of synthetic propositions: the first deals with criteria of consistency and the second with criteria of verifiability.

Some Observations on the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Propositions

Some Observations on the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Propositions

On the Synthetic Aspect of Mathematics

In the most recent edition of Language, Truth and Logic, Professor A. J. Ayer still maintains that pure mathematics is analytic, being in fact merely a vast system of tautology. He is much more confident about this than are most contemporary professional mathematicians who have investigated the foundations of their subject. Following the breakdown of the efforts both of Frege and of Russell and Whitehead to derive pure mathematics from logic, i.e. to prove that the denial of any one proposition of mathematics would necessarily be self-contradictory, Hilbert attempted to prove the more modest thesis that pure mathematics is consistent, i.e. that no two propositions of mathematics can contradict each other; but in 1931 Gödel discovered that even this thesis was undecidable according to the “rules of the game.” As Weyl has recently lamented, “From this history one thing should be clear: we are less certain than ever about the ultimate foundations of (logic and) mathematics.”The sense in which Ayer uses the terms analytic and tautology implies also that in his view the activities of pure mathematicians lead to nothing new. It is true that he remarks that “there is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs.” But, he continues, “we can also see that there is a sense in which they may be said to add nothing to our knowledge. For they may be said to tell us what we know already. ” This denial of novelty in mathematics is as typical of contemporary positivism as the prophecy of Comte that the composition of the stars would never be revealed to us and the objections of Mach to the atomic hypothesis were characteristic of nineteenth century positivism. Indeed, one wonders why the term positivism should have been appropriated by successive philosophers whose common outlook could be so much more fittingly described as negativism.

Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions

TheoriaVolume 16, Issue 2 p. 91-117 Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions YEHOSHOUA BAR-HILLEL, YEHOSHOUA BAR-HILLEL JerusalemSearch for more papers by this author YEHOSHOUA BAR-HILLEL, YEHOSHOUA BAR-HILLEL JerusalemSearch for more papers by this author First published: August 1950 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1950.tb00899.xCitations: 6AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume16, Issue2August 1950Pages 91-117 RelatedInformation

X.—Are there Analytic Propositions?

X.—Are there Analytic Propositions?

Analysis, Analytic Propositions, and Real Definitions

Analysis, Analytic Propositions, and Real Definitions Donald C. Williams Donald C. Williams University of California at Los Angeles Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 3, Issue 5, June 1936, Pages 75–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/3.5.75 Published: 01 June 1936