The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises, by Oran R. Young

Abstract

This book is a comparative study of four international crises: Berlin blockade of 1948-i949, of 1958 in Taiwan Straits, East-West clash over Berlin in 1961, and Cuban missile of 1962. In introductory chapters and in an appendix on epistomological problems, Mr. Young attempts a strict justification of his choosing these particular conflicts for his comparison. In particular, he develops certain criteria concerning orientation of that are tested in main part of his book. Mr. Young's arguments are not entirely persuasive. There is no good reason (except one of convenience) for considering 1961 rather than 1958 beginning of second Berlin crisis; nor can exclusion of other crises, for example, Suez of 1956, be justified on anything but pragmatic grounds. But author's analytical effort ought certainly not be belittled by pointing to small universe of cases to which his conclusions pertain. Other analysts are free to enlarge that universe, if they feel so inclined, and examine additional crises in order to see how Mr. Young's findings stand up. Mr. Young has followed a rigorous procedure. He has organized material on each in a discontinuous manner. Each of his four cases is considered thirteen times, each time in light of another hypothesis. This procedure facilitates a truly comparative analysis. As to hypotheses on bargaining that have been tested in this way, Mr. Young acknowledges his debt to Thomas Schelling's work, but he has added some refinements and advanced a few new analytical propositions. Inevitably, not all of his hypotheses are of equal interest. The hypothesis that the influence of salience as a principle of coordination will rise with onset of a crisis is not as weighty as are propositions dealing with restraints on violence (chaps. 8 and 13) or with modes of communication (chap. 6). Mr. Young has made excellent use of rich secondary literature on four crises, although some additional insights on Soviet behavior during second Berlin and Cuban missile might have been derived from Michel Tatu's monograph, Power in Kremlin (1968). Robert Kennedy's account of events of October 1962 and Dean Acheson's interesting criticism of it were not available to Mr. Young at time he wrote his book. Similarly, certain journalistic sources like Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Le Monde, and SBZ Archiv might have been more useful to him than were Time or Newsweek.