Game Theory Analysis Research Articles

DECODING COLLUSION: AN ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR UNDER DIFFERENT PRICING SCHEMES

This research delves into the intricate dynamics of collusion behavior within markets, exploring cooperative interactions among entities under various pricing schemes. Titled "Decoding Collusion," the study employs game theory and econometric analyses to investigate how different pricing mechanisms influence collusion tendencies. By scrutinizing the behaviors of market participants across diverse pricing structures, the research aims to unravel the complexities of cooperative strategies and shed light on the factors influencing collusion in economic environments.

A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics

A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics

A Game-Theory Analysis of Political Decision-Making in Geopolitical Hotspots: Perspective on Crisis Management in Border Disputes

This This review analyses the application of game theory and behavioural economics to political decision-making in geopolitical hotspots, with a focus on border disputes. Using case studies, it highlights how strategic interactions and psychological factors like loss aversion influence crisis management. The paper aims to provide insights for mitigating tensions and improving conflict resolution strategies

The Research on Prisoners Dilemma in Prenatal Sex Determination

Inequality in the sex ratio is a significant issue in China. Some illegal sex determination mechanisms that give parents of young children gender information significantly contribute to the sex ratio imbalance. As a result, some parents make prejudiced decisions to abort girls. Regulation of prenatal sex determination by governmental and medical institutions will be challenging due to the high degree of information asymmetry. A few of the governments initiatives have yet to show obvious results. Medical institutions and women of childbearing age automatically cooperate in spite of information asymmetry. The prenatal sex determination regulation model is given a new interpretation in this paper using the game theory analysis method. Additionally, the paper explains the causes of the regulations difficulty and proposes ideas, countermeasures, and solutions. The idea of cooperation contained in game theory is of great significance in resolving interest conflicts and achieving social harmony under the condition of interest differentiation.

Evaluating the Organizational Effectiveness of Industrial Enterprises Using Game Theory

Assessment of organizational effectiveness is critical to any organization. The purpose of this paper is to present a mixed approach using game theory analysis to assess the performance of organizational effectiveness within organizations. To assess the competence of each unit in assessing organizational effectiveness, the relationship between different departments within an organization is modeled based on effectiveness indicators. Furthermore, indicators related to each aspect of organizational effectiveness are expressed as inputs and outputs for determining effectiveness. The proposed model has been implemented in 20 different industrial enterprises within Slovakia, based on the information obtained in 2022. This paper is based solely on the financial and economic data of various manufacturing companies in Slovakia. With approximately 500 statements, over a period of 6 years, this paper is expected to be able to describe organizational effectiveness, which may provide a potential indication of the company's level of viability in the coming years. Statistical analyses are also performed to monitor the general practicality of the data.

Should low-carbon subsidies be given to real estate developers or homebuyers? An evolutionary game theory analysis on small-world networks

Subsidies can stimulate the development of low-carbon housing. However, the question arises: which is more effective, subsidizing homebuyers or subsidizing real estate developers? This study can provide a basis for the formulation of more efficient subsidy policies. To investigate the effectiveness of different subsidy approaches, this study establishes an evolutionary game model within a framework of small-world networks, analyzing the evolutionary stability of the system and its overall benefits. The simulation results indicate the following: (1) The initial strategies of developers and homebuyers significantly influence the direction of system evolution, indicating that low-carbon subsidy policies are effective only when the initial willingness values of both parties exceed a certain threshold. For homebuyers, this threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.7, while for developers, it ranges from 0.3 to 0.4. (2) Subsidizing developers outperforms subsidizing homebuyers in accelerating the evolutionary process towards low-carbon strategies. (3) Subsidizing developers results in greater benefits for the government, developers, and homebuyers, with the optimal subsidy amount ranging between 100CNY/m2 and 200CNY/m2. At the 35th iteration, with B = 200 CNY/m2, the system achieves the maximum average revenue of 43.9 CNY/m2. When B = 100 CNY/m2, the system's average revenue increases with the number of iterations, rising from 40.5 CNY/m2 to 43.0 CNY/m2. (4) Subsidizing developers is more conducive to the prosperity of the low-carbon housing market.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in non-zero-sum games: Algorithms and applications

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) algorithms have been utilized in resource allocation modelling, game theory analysis, formation of alliances and so on. The potential for future research and applications of MARL in non-zero-sum games is vast, including integrating MARL with game theory and mechanism design, developing online learning algorithms for dynamic environments, and exploring applications in various domains. Currently, there is a relative lack of review literature on this area of research. This paper, therefore, aims to fill this gap. This work will first introduce the role of MARL in non-zero-sum games. Then it will discuss in detail the practical applications of MARL in economics, social sciences, and political science, which are typical of non-zero-sum games while presenting possibilities and challenges for future research. Finally, a summary is given at the end of the paper. This article provides insights into the current and future possibilities of using MARL in non-zero-sum games.

A tripartite game analysis of industrial structure upgrading and green development of regional economy: A case study of Shanxi Province, China

In the contemporary context, both the upgrading of the industrial structure and the implementation of environmentally sustainable practices within the regional economy have emerged as central avenues for achieving quality development. This study examines the strategic behavior of local governments, capital, and people through the construction of a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, six different evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) are subjected to a comprehensive analysis. Finally, the parameters influencing the strategic decisions of each party are meticulously examined through simulation. The results of this study can be summarized as follows: First, it is shown that under appropriate conditions, all three entities support the scenario of stable development prospects associated with industrial structure upgrading (1, 1, 1). Second, the strategic choices made by capital and people depend on several factors, including existing profits, future benefits, and the costs associated with transformation. At the same time, local governments show a propensity to adopt incentive strategies. Ultimately, the research underscores the pronounced impact of future benefits, transformation costs, and the probability of success in industrial upgrading on all stakeholders, shaping their evolutionary trajectories and results. In particular, the probability of successful industrial structure upgrading exerts the greatest influence on evolutionary trajectories, while the possibility of government imposing carbon taxes and initial willingness primarily determine the evolutionary trajectory. This paper attempts to provide a new perspective on industrial structure upgrading and green development of the regional economy by combining evolutionary game theory and scenario analysis methods to promote the process of industrial structure upgrading and sustainable development.

A game theory analysis of intelligent transformation and sales mode choice of the logistics service provider

In order to study whether the logistics service provider (LSP) should carry out intelligent transformation strategy of logistics services, this paper constructs a logistics service supply chain consisting of one LSP and one logistics service integrator (LSI), and discusses whether the LSP is independent or participate in LSI. The paper shows that choosing the intelligent transformation of logistics services under any mode can improve the profits of the LSP and the LSI. The joint transformation of logistics services to improve the profit of the LSI is not affected by the choice of mode, while the profit of LSP under the resale mode remains unchanged when she chooses joint intelligent transformation. When the intelligent transformation level is high, the LSI tends to choose the resale model; otherwise, the LSI tends to choose the platform model. When the LSP chooses intelligent transformation by herself, if the share ratio is low, the LSI tends to choose the resale model. If the share ratio is high and the level of intelligent transformation of logistics services is not high, the LSI more inclines to choose the platform model.

Analysis of Tripartite Dynamic Game Theory in Ecological Law Enforcement

The ecological governance issues of the police department have always been urgently needed to be addressed and explored. This article will take the ecological areas of the Yangtze River Basin as an example to construct a tripartite dynamic game model between police enforcement department, fishermen and fishing enterprises and the ecology of the Yangtze River Basin. Through equilibrium point analysis and MATLAB numerical simulation, the strategic evolution process of the police department and various entities is demonstrated to demonstrate the necessity of ecological law enforcement and provide relevant suggestions.

Sustainable Cooperation between Schools, Enterprises, and Government: An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Promoting close and sustainable cooperation between schools, enterprises, and government has become an important concern in many countries. However, the factors that influence the cooperation between schools, enterprises, and government have not been sufficiently explored in previous studies. Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, in this paper, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of schools, enterprises, and government in order to analyze the strategies of different players and their influencing factors. The results show that the main factor that influences the stability of the strategies of schools and enterprises is the reward for positive cooperation from sources other than the government, and the main factor that influences the stability of the strategy of the government is the benefits from a positive cooperation strategy under the scenario where schools cooperate with enterprises. Some suggestions to promote sustainable cooperation between schools, enterprises, and government are proposed at the end.

Nash equilibrium and tennis serve performance: a game theory analysis

ABSTRACT This study presents an in-depth analysis of the serve in men’s singles tennis matches at Wimbledon based on game theory, with the quantitative tool of the stroke performance relevance (SPR) model. This model quantifies tennis tactics more precisely, taking “each stroke” as the observation unit, and it includes scoring, losing points, and sequential information. Unlike traditional methods that consider “each point”, the SPR metrics captures the role of specific technical actions throughout the match more comprehensively. While standard serve data like aces and double faults have no significant impact on match outcomes, the serve SPR index does. In a game matrix model with two pure strategy Nash equilibria, both the winner and loser show higher SPR indices than those with fewer equilibria. Winners consistently exhibited a higher serve SPR index, indicating that the two pure strategy Nash equilibria significantly influenced match outcomes on grass courts. This underscores the role of tactical strategies and Nash equilibrium in determining match results, offering scientific and theoretical support for tennis athletes’ and coaches’ tactics.

Assessment of urbanization impact on cultural heritage based on a risk-based cumulative impact assessment method

Urbanization is inevitable in both developing and developed countries. However, this growth and transformation of the urban area can pose a significant threat to urban cultural heritage, which is a sensitive component of the urban environment. As cities modernize and change, a risk of irreparable loss of cultural heritage exists. Therefore, taking steps to protect and preserve these sites for posterity is crucial. To better protect urban cultural heritage, decision-makers must rapidly assess the impact of urbanization on cultural heritage while maintaining a balance between cultural heritage preservation and urban growth. This study developed a risk-based cumulative impact assessment (CIA) method that integrates a set of quantifiable indicators to address these issues. This method generates standardized assessment results based on game theory and set pair analysis theory. In contrast to other CIA methods, this risk-based approach effectively manages scientific complexity and uncertainties, thus enhancing the quality of the assessment results. This method was applied to 21 classical gardens in Suzhou, China. The results show that Suzhou classical gardens are impacted by urbanization. This study confirmed that adopting a risk-based CIA method that considers the impact of adverse urbanization on cultural heritage sites is an efficient approach. Successful implementation of the proposed method can provide decision-making support for different types of cultural heritage in other areas.

Game-Theoretic Analysis for Green R&D Investment Strategies in the Vehicle Market

With the implementation of new environmental policies such as “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality”, reducing carbon emissions through the development of clean technology in the automobile industry has become a key priority. However, the high cost of researching and developing green technology has led to high vehicle prices, which poses a major barrier to expanding the market share of such vehicles. The decision of whether to invest in research and development (R&D) has become a challenging one for automobile manufacturers. In this paper, we propose a game theory analysis scheme to study the R&D investment decisions of two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) — an electric vehicle manufacturer (EM) and a fuel vehicle manufacturer (FM) — who, respectively, produce electric vehicles (EVs) and fuel vehicles (FVs). Since the manufacturers exhibit bounded rationality and their R&D investment decision-making involves a long-term, continuously learning and adjusting process, we model this dynamic R&D investment decision-making process as an evolutionary game to study manufacturers’ stable evolutionary behaviors in optimal R&D investment strategies. Different from previous literatures, where the prices for vehicles with high or low R&D investment were predetermined, we optimize the price of each vehicle, market shares, and optimal utilities of OEMs using a two-stage Stackelberg game for each investment strategy profile. Additionally, we use the Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) mechanism to help reduce carbon emissions. The main contribution of this paper is exploring the conditions for the evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of the evolutionary game based on the optimal utilities of the OEMs under different strategy profiles. The impact of preference parameters and green R&D coefficients on the OEMs’ decisions, as well as consumers’ purchase choices are also discussed. Finally, numerical simulations using real-world data are conducted to verify the theoretical results on ESSs.

Regulating the Big Data-Based Discriminatory Pricing in Platform Retailing: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Nowadays, with the rapid development of the platform economy, Big Data-based Discriminatory Pricing (BDDP) has become a common phenomenon in which big data and algorithms are applied to excessively seize consumer surplus and thus damage the rights and interests of consumers. This work aims to explore the equilibrium strategies of the consumers, the government, and the service platform and discuss factors affecting the BDDP practice of the service platforms. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among consumers, service platforms, and the government. Two evolutionary equilibrium strategies are derived and validated using simulation. Numerical experiments are conducted using MATLAB to reveal players’ evolutionary stability strategies under various settings. The study shows that (1) the strategies of the government and the platform always influence each other, (2) a reasonable adjustment of tax rate helps regulate the platform’s behavior, and (3) the proportion of consumers who switch the platform after they realize themselves suffering BDDP is an important factor influencing platform’s strategy. This study lastly summarizes the managerial insights for dealing with the platform’s BDDP behavior and safeguarding consumers’ rights from the perspectives of macro-regulation and privacy data protection. The conclusions of this study can help promote the high-quality development of the platform economy.

The mystery of choice of equity incentive model: based on the game theory analysis between shareholders and top executives

PurposeBased on the background of the restricted stock has gradually replaced stock option and has become the mainstream equity incentive model in China, this paper aims to investigate the which factors affect the choice of equity incentive model, and the impacts of equity incentive model.Design/methodology/approachThe theoretical analysis is based on the game theory between shareholders and top executives. The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2017; the logit method and least square method are implemented to estimate the regression coefficients and Black–Scholes options pricing model to estimate the value of restricted stock/option granted to the CEO.FindingsThis paper documents that enterprises with serious agency problems, high investment risks, high stock price synchronicity and great executive power are significantly and positively related to restricted stock. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. In addition, restricted stock can significantly improve corporate performance when the performance evaluation index is strict and the validity period is long, while for the sample group with loose performance index and short validity period, restricted stock significantly reduces corporate performance.Originality/valueThis paper analyzes the “black box” of equity incentive model selection from the stakeholders’ game perspective by constructing a game theory model to investigate the reasons for the choice of equity incentive model in various situations, which enriches the research in this field. Moreover, this paper finds that restricted stock has both incentive and welfare characteristics, and the rationality of performance appraisal goals is the key factor leading to the difference in incentive effects. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can improve corporate performance, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of restricted stock model and provides a reference for their decision-making.

Applied Research Analysis of Game Theory and Markov chain

Since probability theory was put forward, it has been applied in all aspects of life and many science and technology. A good use of probability thinking can make a more rational, wise, and correct judgment and improve the probability of winning. Among them, game theory and Markov chain are the most influential. They have become one of the important theoretical foundations of various industries and fields, and gradually mathematize various fields, playing a vital role in their applied research field, promoting the development of society and science and technology. The prisoner's dilemma model of game theory was analyzed in various situations and explained how to apply it to economics, how to affect the social economy, and how to solve some social economic problems. By analyzing and utilizing the integrability, constant return, periodicity, and ergodicity of Markov chain, it is applied to signal transmission, traffic management, and bad debts of banks. Markov chain is used to model various transmission processes to facilitate the application field.

Trade Liberalization and Trade Protection Based on Game Theory

Under the background of economic globalization, economic and trade exchanges are increasingly close. While countries enjoy the dividends brought by the global economy, trade competition is also more intense. In order to protect their own economic and political interests, countries usually adopt the policies of trade liberalization or trade protection policy protectionism. The total economic volume of China and the United States is huge, so the trade frictions between the two countries will attract the attention of the world trade countries. The choice of trade policies between the two countries will also affect the economic level and economic and trade relations of both countries and even the development of the entire world economy. Therefore, from the perspective of game theory and international trade, this paper analyzes the choice of trade policy in world trade by calculating the Nash equilibrium in the choice of trade policy and the welfare changes caused by the implementation of tariffs. Through game theory analysis, the results show that trade protection and trade liberalization in world trade are both contradictory and coexist. In order to protect the development of their important industries, countries can adopt reasonable subsidy policies or protection policies to support them under the framework of WTO. However, countries should actively promote global economic governance and actively promote the development of multilateral trade and regional economy. It provides some ideas for the choice of trade policy in the context of trade war.

Analysis of the Korean Bank Run Phenomenon Based on Game Theory

At the beginning of 2011, a number of savings banks in South Korea experienced a liquidation crisis, which caused widespread global concern. This paper attempts to use the relevant basis of game theory to explain the Korean bank run in 2011. From the perspective of the causes of bank runs, this paper makes a game analysis of the actual results of bank runs. The research results show that the main reason for bank runs is depositors' distrust of banks, so when banks face a run, they should strive to become a powerful bank. However, depositors trust strong banks more. Using the tools of game theory analysis, a basic description of the behavioral characteristics of the subjects involved in the process of bank runs can provide possible options for preventing and resolving bank run crises. This study has important practical significance for the healthy and sustainable development of the banking industry.

Review of: "The Uncertainty of Fairness: a Game Theory Analysis for a Debt Mutualization Scheme in the Euro Area"

Review of: "The Uncertainty of Fairness: a Game Theory Analysis for a Debt Mutualization Scheme in the Euro Area"