Neoconservative Research Articles

The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West

THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS Islam and the West Gilles Kepel Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 336pp, US$23.95 cloth (ISBN 0-674-01575-4)GLOBALIZED ISLAM The Search for New Ummah Olivier Roy New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. xii, 351pp, US$29.50 cloth (ISBN 0-231-13498-3)WAHHABI ISLAM From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad Natana J. Delong-Bas New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix, 37opp, $56.00 cloth (ISBN o19-516991-3)UNDERSTANDING ISLAMISM Middle East/North Africa Report 37 Cairo and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2 March 2005. 20pp, www.crisisgroup.orgSince 9/11, Muslim jihadist groups have proven to be an elusive bunch, following up their attacks in New York and Washington with strikes in numerous other countries, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 2005 turned out to be particularly active year, with bombings in London, Bangladesh, and Jordan in addition to the ongoing jihadist contributions to the insurgency in Iraq. While all of these pale in political comparison to the catastrophic events of 9/11, they nonetheless make clear that Islamic extremist networks have not only shown their resiliency in the face of ongoing security efforts to thwart their activities, they have also spread globally. Gilles Kepel, an eminent French scholar on global Islamism, writes of the growing localization and decentralization of Islamist terrorist networks, comparing them to cancerous cells that were metastasizing throughout the world (149). Writing of al in particular, he suggests that it has become like a franchise with bin Laden merely the logo for small time operations managed by independent micro-entrepreneurs working under license to purvey terrorism (141). In similar fashion, Olivier Roy, another leading French scholar on global Islamism, describes these groups as subcontractors, made up of radicalized young denizens of run-down inner cities and suburbs who are trying to make an impression by identifying with Al Qaeda (320).Why the continued grassroots appeal of small but deadly al franchises? And what can be done to thwart their continued and seemingly invisible proliferation? The following review of three recent books and one article on the ideology and practice of global Islamist networks provide extremely useful insights. This review is divided into three sections: first, it will outline and compare some of the main arguments used to explain the general rise of global Islamism; second, it will focus on efforts by the various authors to provide more accurate typology of the various Islamist tendencies, examining in particular those groups that fall within what Roy calls neo-fundamentalism; and third, it will review recommendations aimed at thwarting radical Islamism's continued proliferation and development.UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF GLOBAL ISLAMISMKepel and Roy are at their strongest in providing explanations-or root causes-for the rise and continued relevance of global Islamism, including its jihadist tendency. Their focuses, however, provide the reader with dramatically different, though not mutually exclusive, approaches. Whereas Kepel privileges the geostrategic realm with its greater emphasis on the mobilizing influences of the debacles in Palestine and Iraq and the counterproductive agenda of the neoconservative networks in Washington, Roy delves into the underlying sociological processes that have disrupted both the material location and identity of Muslims in the modern world.Kepel's tightly knit narrative about the origins of radical Islamism and al is well-known. At its core are political developments in three crucial arenas: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq. It was in Afghanistan, for example, where the seeds of a complex web of more globally oriented jihadist networks were sown under the banner of al (89); in Palestine, where the deterioration of the peace process in the 1990s and the rise of Palestinian suicide bombings created an opportunistic advantage for al to launch its own spectacular act of martyrdom in September 2001 (103); and in Iraq, where the misguided decision by American neoconservatives to topple the Ba'athist regime has served to reenergize the global spread of al Qaeda-like networks and create the very clash of civilizations dynamic that the neoconservatives in Washington had hoped the invasion would help to destroy (111). …

‘An Angel Directs the Storm’: The Religious Politics of American Neoconservatism

In his inaugural speech, President George W. Bush suggested that the mission of America to spread freedom and democracy in the world is a divinely authored mission. The intention first announced in Bush's inaugural to globalize an American Christian vision of freedom and democracy, and of free market capitalism, reflects the theological underpinnings of the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration. In this article I trace the remarkable continuities between the neo-conservative political theology of Bush and his acolytes and more mainstream Niebuhrian approaches to democracy and the ‘manifest destiny’ of America. I then subject the emergence of an American imperium, and the political theology associated with it, to a critique in dialogue with early Christian critics of Roman Empire, and with the Christian pacifist tradition as recently retrieved by North American theological ethicists John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas.

Articulating Race—Asian American Neoconservative Renditions of Equality An Analysis of the Brian Ho Lawsuit

The Brian Ho, Patrick Wong, & Hilary Chen v. San Francisco Unified School District case was waged by a group of Chinese Americans that effectively ended race-based school integration in the San Francisco Unified School District (Ho v. SFUSD). The Chinese American plaintiffs were not only suing the San Francisco public school district but also contested the legal decision awarded to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). It was the NAACP's original suit that resulted in the desegregation policy established in 1983, known as the San Francisco Unified School District's Consent Decree. The plaintiffs specifically targeted the differential entrance requirements to Lowell High School, the premier academic secondary school in the district, for different racial and ethnic groups. The aftermath of the Ho lawsuit resulted in the end of racial considerations in the school district-thus, providing evidence of political and public policy shifts away from an overt focus on race in educa...

Articulating Race—Asian American Neoconservative Renditions of Equality An Analysis of the Brian Ho Lawsuit

This article discusses race-based policies in education and the merit and racialization of groups. The issue explores the consequences of the Consent Decree of 1979. The Ho Lawsuit is discussed as reframing the issue from desegregation to affirmative action. The lawsuit legal battle created tension between politically powerful influential organizations such as the Chinese for Affirmative Actions. Thus the Asian American community becomes disjointed when some groups promote a political stance that is not beneficial to the entire community. Critical forum between the progressive and neo-conservative Asian American groups are needed. A debate is a good way to break through the stereotypes against race-based policies to uncover the misconceptions constructed by ‘color-blind’ rhetoric.

A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon versus the Catholic Neoconservatives

A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon versus the Catholic Neoconservatives

Thomas R. Rourke versus the Neoconservatives

Thomas R. Rourke versus the Neoconservatives

The Dialogue Between Catholic "Neoconservatives" and Catholic "Cultural Radicals"

The Dialogue Between Catholic "Neoconservatives" and Catholic "Cultural Radicals"

Demystifying the Asian American Neo-Conservative: A Strange and New Political Animal

Demystifying the Asian American Neo-Conservative: A Strange and New Political Animal

A Challenge to Liberalism - John Dijoseph: Jacques Maritain and the Moral Foundation of Democracy. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996 Pp. xv, 173. $52.50. $21.95, paper.) - Thomas R. Rourke: A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon Versus the Catholic Neo—Conservatives. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997. Pp. ix, 287. $62.50. $22.95,

A Challenge to Liberalism - John Dijoseph: Jacques Maritain and the Moral Foundation of Democracy. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996 Pp. xv, 173. 22.95, paper.) - Volume 60 Issue 1

A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon versus the Catholic Neoconservatives. By Thomas R. Rourke. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 287p. $62.50 cloth, $22.95 paper.

A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon versus the Catholic Neoconservatives. By Thomas R. Rourke. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 287p. $62.50 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Canada and the World at Risk: Depression, War, and Isolationism for the 21st Century?

Canada's statistical profile in the post -- Cold War era is in some important respects coming to resemble the summary depictions of life in the dirty 'thirties. Never in the post -- World War II era have there been so many Canadians out of work or 'casualized' or 'discouraged.' Almost five million Canadians, including nearly one-fifth of Canadian children, live below the poverty line. At no time since World War II has income polarization been as severe between top and bottom wage earners. Never before has the blinkered, stunted, soulless ideology of American neoconservatism so dominated the Canadian political landscape, bringing with it such extraordinary levels of governmental irresponsibility and public cynicism. That the damage inflicted upon American society is equally if not more grave is no cause for consolation or resignation: it merely adds to the danger of North American disengagement from global security management in years to come. For Canada's foreign and defence policies, the state of affairs is even worse than the condition of the national economy. Not since the 1930s has Canada's international presence seemed so wan, so self-enfeebled, so marginal. With the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTA) under implementation, foreign policy has been reduced to Team Canada trade missions to communist and ethnically repressive states (China and Indonesia) and fervent, well-intentioned but largely irrelevant speeches on disarmament and peacekeeping at a debt-ridden, paralyzed, and imploding United Nations. Thanks to the triumph of quasi-pacifist doctrine of the style found in Canada 21,(f.1) the future of the Canadian armed forces is unusually bleak. The foundations of Canada's international security policy have been eroded by profoundly unwise decisions over the past three years to 'restructure' the military for what politicians and policy-makers in Ottawa foolishly believe will be a comparatively benign post-Cold War era. The following developments in particular have done grave damage to Canadian power, position, and influence over the 'high' political issues on the global agenda: 1 The elimination of Canada's armoured firepower despite the offer of hundreds of modern American main battle tanks at little more than the cost of shipment in 1991-2. Modern tanks are essential protection for Canadian peacekeepers who may be sent into high-risk 'peacekeeping' environments and if Canada is to have the ability to participate in 'high intensity' military actions for 'peace enforcement' missions, whether under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations. Canadian public opinion, no less than American or Western European public opinion, will not tolerate significant battlefield casualties.(f.2) Canadian forces must therefore be as fully protected in their duties abroad as possible. Forgoing heavy armour seriously compromises the long-term political sustainability of sending Canadian personnel on both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement actions. 2 The painfully slow process to replace the cancelled EH-101 helicopter has for many years compelled the Canadian navy to use marginally airworthy and therefore dangerous Sea King helicopters on its new frigates for many years until a replacement is finally acquired. Until new shipborne helicopters are fully integrated into the Canadian navy's operations, the effectiveness of the new frigates for anti-submarine warfare will be dramatically reduced and will inhibit the government from sending them on serious, high-risk missions, whether to the Persian Gulf or to the waters adjacent to Korea. 3 The apparent decision not to replace the now obsolete national submarine capability, despite the rare opportunity provided by Britain in 1994-6 to purchase modern diesel-electric boats at a fraction of their real cost. Modern submarines are an essential component of any credible ability to control Canadian waters, and even the ancient Oberon-class boats were almost certainly a factor in deterring Spanish escalation of the turbot 'war' in 1995. …

Of passionate intensity: right-wing populism and the Reform Party of Canada

What can the rise of the Reform party tell us about the rise of populist parties and movements generally? Questions such as this lie at the heart of Trevor Harrison's book. What factors, for example, ensured the Reform party's emergence as a right-wing party? Was a left-wing alternative possible? What was the influence, in general, of economic factors in creating popular discontent in the West during the 1980s? What are the ideological roots of the Reform party? Is Reform merely a northern offshoot of American neo-conservatism? What was the structural, ideological, and political relationship between the Reformers and the fringe parties that sprang up in the West during the early 1980s? What are the structural locations of Reform party supporters? Why does the party's support appear to be greater in Alberta and British Columbia than in Saskatchewan and Manitoba? Is the Reform party supported by a particular class or elements of a particular class? Alternatively, are there aspects of nativism in the Reform party? What other social characteristics underlie Reform party support? What was the role of political-institutional and/or organizational factors in the rise of the Reform party? And, finally, what is the likely fate of Reform?

Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era

Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era

The Consciousness of the Neocons

The Consciousness of the Neocons

Civil Service Reform: Misdiagnosing the Patient

The political leadership that came into office in the 1980s in many Anglo-American style democracies sought to perform radical surgery on the civil service. Indeed, some argue that the decade was a watershed period in the development of Western bureaucracies (Levine, 1986, p. 195). Margaret Thatcher was first off the mark having been elected in 1979, and she was to play a leadership role not only at home but abroad where she pushed heads of other governments to reform their civil service. Politicians like President Ronald Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney hardly needed convincing. Reagan made clear his views on civil when he declared that he had come to Washington to drain the swamp (Bok, 1989, p. 49). For his part, Brian Mulroney pledged to give pink slips and running shoes to bureaucrats if he was elected to office (Zussman, 1986, p. 255). As the decade wore on, left of center politicians also got into the act. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, for example, decided to reform his civil along the lines of the Thatcher reforms in Britain (Hood, 1990, pp. 205-214). The purpose of this article is to review what the political leadership said it wanted to accomplish, review some of the measures introduced, and then assess the results of the reforms. We argue that the political leadership not only misdiagnosed the patient but also applied the wrong remedy. The focus was on strengthening the management capacity of public servants while at the same time attenuating their policy advisory role. The result has been that government departments and agencies that were well managed in the 1970s are now still well managed but the reforms have had limited impact on those that traditionally were not well managed (i.e., departments and agencies having a high policy content as opposed to carrying out routine tasks). In addition, the new order for public administration is much more challenging and less deferential to expertise. It requires a strong capacity to adapt and to deal with a better informed media, policy communities, interest groups, and the public. In short, governments now require a strong policy advisory capacity, precisely what the political leadership of the 1980s decided to ignore or even downplay. The Background The new political agenda had various labels, including Thatcherism, Reaganomics, the New Right, and Neo Conservatism. The agenda spoke to a number of issues but particularly to the role of government in society, and it had many targets, including government as an economic manager. The civil was singed out for criticism. The rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney took full flight when speaking about the civil service. They all regarded it as part of the problem and none tried to attenuate their obvious dislike for the institution, even in public speeches. Their rhetoric did not die down once they were elected, as it had with previous leaders. Indeed, they, in particular Thatcher, continued to speak about the need to deprivilege the civil service and repeatedly claimed that they would not let themselves be educated' by senior permanent officials (Hennessy, 1989, p. 628). The civil stood accused of many things--of being bloated, expensive, unresponsive, a creation of routine deliberately resistant to changes, and largely incapable of dealing with new challenges. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a remarkable degree of consensus among the political leadership of various countries about what was wrong about the civil service. This was true even in cases where important differences in the machinery of government existed, as in the case of Britain and the United States. Although the rhetoric was not always dear on what needed to be fixed and how it ought to be fixed, one could discern a number of key messages. First, the civil as an institution needed to rethink its ways. The political leadership spoke at length about the need to place new emphasis on clients and less on process, on efficiency and value for money and less on rules, regulations, and input costs. …

I. Reading fukuyama: Politics at the end of history

Abstract This article provides a critical reading of Francis Fukuyama's ‘The end of history’ thesis, focusing on its Hegelian methodology and questioning its conception of democratic perfection in order to undermine/deconstruct its geopolitical conclusions. Beyond these immediate aims, the article is intended as a kind of psychoanalysis of American neo-conservatism. It attempts to uncover right-wing views signalled indirectly in code rather than blatantly expressed in words. Once the protective mask of Kojevian-Hegelian philosophy has been torn away, positions are revealed which constitute the main threats to global peace, and may, indeed, bring about the ‘end of history’. Finally, the article argues for a non-teleological, dialectical Marxism and a non-Leninist form of socialist democracy as guides to an alternative conception of the future of humanity.

On Alain Finkielkraut's "Remembering in Vain": The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes against Humanity

When the French press muses about who is going to replace Sartre, Foucault, and Barthes in the pantheon of national intellectual figures, Alain Finkielkraut's name inevitably appears-precociously-on a list that includes older, established figures such as historian Francois Furet, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, philosophers Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, and writer and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva. Today's French intellectual, the argument goes, is less grandiose, less oppositional, more interested in the analysis of discrete events than in global pronouncements, a teacher and critic rather than a militant. Alain Finkielkraut is difficult to place in any group. Some consider him a liberal thinker in the newly minted French sense of the term: antitotalitarian, anti-Marxist, devoted to the search for universal values in a nation grappling with ethnic diversity (the apparent points of convergence between this new French liberalism and American neoconservatism are not well understood). Heideggerian in his metaphysics yet opposed to German romanticism, a secular disciple of Emmanuel Levinas, as well as a Jewish intellectual

“The Rope That Connects Me Directly with You”: John Wain and the Movement Writers' Orwell

No British writer has had a greater impact on the Anglo-American generation which came of age in the decade following World War II than George Orwell. His influence has been, and continues to be, deeply felt by intellectuals of all political stripes, including the Marxist Left (Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson), the anarchist Left (George Woodcock, Nicolas Walter), the American liberal-Left (Irving Howe), American neoconservatives (Norman Podhoretz), and the Anglo-American Catholic Right (Christopher Hollis, Russell Kirk).Perhaps Orwell's broadest imprint, however, was stamped upon the only literary group which has ever regarded him as a model: the Movement writers of the 1950s. Unlike the above-mentioned groups, which have consisted almost entirely of political intellectuals rather than writers—and whose members have responded to him as a political critic first and a writer second—some of the Movement writers saw Orwell not just as a political intellectual but also as the man of letters and/or literary stylist whom they aspired to be.The Movement writers were primarily an alliance of poet-critics. The “official” members numbered nine poets and novelists; a few other writers and critics loomed on the periphery. Their acknowledged genius, if not leading publicist, was Philip Larkin, who later became Britain's poet laureate. Orwell's plain voice influenced the tone and attitude of Larkin's poetry and that of several other Movement poets, especially Robert Conquest and D. J. Enright. But Orwell shone as an even brighter presence among the poet-novelists, particularly John Wain and Kingsley Amis, whose early fictional anti-heroes were direct descendants of Gordon Comstock in Keep the Aspidistra Flying (1936) and George Bowling in Coming Up for Air (1939).

"Don't Look Back, Something Might Be Gaining on You": The Dilemmas of Constitutional Neoconservatives

"Don't Look Back, Something Might Be Gaining on You": The Dilemmas of Constitutional Neoconservatives

“Don't Look Back, Something Might Be Gaining on You”: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Neoconservatives

“Don't Look Back, Something Might Be Gaining on You”: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Neoconservatives