American Antitrust Research Articles

Potential Competition and the American Antitrust Legislation of 1914

The concepts of actual and potential competition as natural checks on trusts are examined through the literature which accompanied the framing and passage of the Chyton and Federal Trade Commission acts. The contributions of professional economists to these discussions are especially significant in the evolution of the public policies ultimately adopted.

The Controversy Regarding the so-called Extraterritorial Effect of the American Antitrust Laws

1. As is evident from the way in which the question of the so-called extraterritorial effect of antitrust legislation is dealt with in the literature, in doctrinal discussions and in judicial decisions, it can be approached from various angles: from the standpoint of private international law, of international administrative law, of international criminal law, and of public international law.

International Aspects of American and Netherlands Antitrust Legislation*

In recent years, the problem of determining correctly the extraterritorial effect of the Sherman Act has gained considerable importance. Since the end of World War II, the United States Justice Department has been active and successful in its endeavors to have American and foreign businessmen operating abroad exposed to the impact of the American antitrust laws. Recent judicial pronouncements have left the feelings of the persons concerned as well as the law in a state of turmoil. If anything in the antitrust field is certain, the businessman's position in foreign commerce is definitely uncertain.

Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy

A distinction may be drawn between two kinds of antitrust law, the preventive and the corrective. The preventive seeks to outlaw those forms of behavior which, if pursued far enough, reduce or eliminate competition. The corrective seeks to eliminate monopolistic power already in existence, or at least to curb certain exercises of this power. Undoubtedly, there are policies that fall on the borderline between these categories, but in general, the distinction can be made with tolerable certainty. Almost all of the American antitrust law is corrective. This need not be argued for the Sherman Act, and I think that it is almost as true of the Clayton Act. The latter's prohibitions upon price discrimination and tying-clauses apparently were adopted in part to prevent the appearance or spread of monopoly, but it is evident that both types of policies can arise only when monopoly power is already possessed. No competitive seller will continually accept a lower price from some buyers than he can get by diverting his goods to other buyers; 1 and no buyer with adequate alternative supply sources will accept the limitations imposed by tie-in sales or total requirements contracts without an offsetting reduction in price. Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 the antimerger section, is the only important instance of preventive antitrust legislationY I shall discuss this section after briefly discussing the general problem of preventive antitrust policy.

Conflict of Laws. Judgments. British Corporation Not Subject to American Antitrust Decree Impairing Its Contractual Rights to British Patents Obtains British Order Restraining Obedience to Decree

Conflict of Laws. Judgments. British Corporation Not Subject to American Antitrust Decree Impairing Its Contractual Rights to British Patents Obtains British Order Restraining Obedience to Decree

Trusts and the Tariff

Previous articleNext article FreeNotesTrusts and the TariffFrank L. McVeyFrank L. McVey Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 7, Number 3Jun., 1899 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/250596 Views: 114Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1899 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Benjamin J. Klebaner Potential Competition and the American Antitrust Legislation of 1914, Business History Review 38, no.22 (Jul 2012): 163–185.https://doi.org/10.2307/3112071