A small but thriving philosophical industry is engaged in the ontology of art: the avowed aim is to specify the kind ofthing an artwork is, or the ontological category to which an artwork belongs. Here is Amie Thomasson's description of the enterprise:The central question for the ontology of art is this: sort of entities are works of art? Are they physical objects, ideal kinds, imaginary entities, or something else? How are works of art of various kinds related to the mental states of artists or viewers, to physical objects, or to abstract visual, auditory or linguistic structures? Under what conditions do works come into existence, survive, or cease to exist?1And here is Guy Rohrbaugh's description:Ontologists offer a map of reality, one divided into such broad, overlapping territories as physical and mental, concrete and abstract, universal and particular. Such a map provides the setting for further philosophical investigation. Ontologists of art seek to locate works of art in this wider terrain, to say where in our universe they fit in. Their governing question is, thus, What kind ofthing is a work of art?2Music is among the artforms frequently targeted by the enterprise. Julian Dodd, for example, says Wynton Marsalis composed In This House, On This Morning in 1992. But what is the nature of the thing he composed? Dodd undertakes the project of addressing . . the categorial question: the issue of which ontological category works of music belong to.3 In similar spirit, Jerrold Levinson asks What exactly did Beethoven compose?. . . what sort ofthing is it, this quintet which was the outcome of Beethoven's creative activity?4 And Stephen Davies, reflecting upon philosophical theories of music ontology, says Philosophers argue over whether musical works are classes, types, or kinds, over whether they are universale or particulars, over whether they are created or discovered, and over whether musical works, as well as their performances, consist of sounds . . ..5Such questions appear reasonable: we wish to know what sorts of entities are in the world, and - should artworks find place in the inventory - what sorts of things they are. But given puzzles and complexities involving essence, individuation, metaphysical explanation, and the relation between objects and practices, it is not clear what constitutes successful answers to such questions; nor is it clear whether the ontologist of art provides anything not already provided by critics, historians, and consumers of art. The situation is no clearer within that subindustry concerned specifically with the ontology of music. One upshot of these concerns is that artworld ontologists might be engaged in a dubious enterprise.Others have voiced skepticism about the value of ontological inquiry in the arts;6 but the skepticism I advocate here is more global, grounded in general methodological concerns about the explanatory and/or justificatory power of ontological theories.The structure of the discussion is as follows: Sections I and II address the kind of explanation - if any - that artworld ontologies might plausibly be construed as providing. Part III muddies the waters by acknowledging that artworld ontology might not, after all, be in the business of explanation, and offers alternative pictures of the ontologist's goals. Parts IV-VI broach the disturbing possibility that art-ontological theories provide nothing over and above information already provided by the art historian and sociologist of art; and traditional concerns about modality and essence motivate the idea that ontologies of art and music are nothing more than reifications of theorists' commitments to the relative importance of certain artwork properties.7 Later sections explore several efforts to salvage and legitimize the practice of artworld ontology but conclude that prospects for such salvation are dim.IArt is not science. Granted, there is artistry in science: physics requires creativity and imagination; and there is science in art: painting and musical composition require problem solving and effective use of resources. …
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