All-affected Principle Research Articles

Should We Increase Young People’s Voting Power?

AbstractThis paper argues that democratic collectives have reason to increase the voting power of their younger members. It first presents an intuitive case for weighted voting in general, before drawing support from a prominent principle of democratic inclusion – the all-affected principle. On a plausible understanding of that principle, a decision may affect people to varying degrees, and this variation should be reflected in the strength of their say. The paper then argues that exposure time to a decision’s effects is typically a good proxy for tracking such variation, such that collectives have reason to gradually reduce their members’ voting power as they grow older. This holds, for example, in the ordinary parliamentary elections in representative democracies. It is then argued that we may build a similar case for age-weighting on a plausible version of the all-affected principle’s main rival, the all-subjected principle. The paper ends by addressing various objections. It argues that none of them undermine the case for age-weighting, and that some might even support age-weighting over its non-weighted (‘one person, one vote’) alternative.

The Demos of the democratic firm

Despite growing interest in workplace democracy, the question whether nonworker stakeholders, like suppliers and local communities, warrant inclusion in the governance of democratic companies, as workers do, has been largely neglected. We inspect this question by leaning on the boundary problem in democratic theory. We first argue that the question of who warrants inclusion in democratic workplaces is best addressed by examining why workplace democracy is warranted in the first place, and offer a twofold normative benchmark—addressing objectionable corporate power and upholding efficiency—to assess the principles of democratic inclusion on offer. Against this benchmark, we next argue that the All-Affected Principle is unfit due to its over- and underinclusive extensional results, and that the All-Subjected Principle, whose variants we examine alongside their extensional results, holds more promise when coupled with independent considerations of justice or a constrained variant of the All-Affected Principle. These combinations need not entirely preclude, but speak against, nonworker stakeholder inclusion.

Institutional Proxy Representatives of Future Generations: A Comparative Analysis of Types and Design Features

Future generations will be strongly affected by political decisions made today (e.g., by the long-term consequences of climate change). According to the democratic all-affected principle, the interests of everyone affected by political decisions should be considered in the political decision-making process. Future generations cannot influence democratic decision-making, since they do not yet exist. Election-based democratic incentive systems are said to make it difficult to consider the needs of future generations today. Surprisingly, however, since the early 1990s, an increasing number of democracies have established what could be called institutional proxy representatives of future generations (proxies), i.e., public bodies with institutionalized access to government and/or parliament that introduce the construed interests of future generations into the political decision-making process. Proxies help to consider future generations’ interests alongside the interests of current constituencies. After concept building, this comparative study searches all liberal democracies and identifies 25 proxies, with heterogeneous institutional designs. By employing membership criteria, three types are distinguished: (a) expertise-driven independent guardians (type I), (b) political or administrative advisory and coordination bodies (type II), and (c) sustainability stakeholder councils or committees (type III). They vary considerably in their formal capacity to influence political decision-making (i.e., on what legal basis they were provided with what instruments to address which phases of the policy process and which branches of government). Overall, they should not be overburdened with expectations. While they are usually equipped with the tools to voice the (construed) interests of future generations, they often lack the capacity to act as watchdogs with teeth when ignored.

The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should all Votes Count the Same?

AbstractIn 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice to disenfranchise senior citizens, or at least to grant them a lower voting weight than non-senior citizens. In this paper, we investigate whether there are democratic reasons to do so. To answer this question, we turn to the boundary problem in democratic theory, i.e., the question of who should be included in democratic decision-making. Two prominent solutions, and a more recent one, are particularly relevant: the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the relational egalitarian principle. When it comes to the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle, we argue that there is reason to grant most senior citizens a lower voting weight than most non-senior citizens in most decisions. Whether that is the case on the relational egalitarian principle depends on how people relate to each other in society. Indeed, it is sometimes in accordance with the relational egalitarian view to grant senior citizens a greater voting weight than non-senior citizens.

If you polluted, you’re included: the all-affected principle and carbon tax referenda

ABSTRACT In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referenda. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot are ceteris paribus more affected than people who do not, because the former stands to pay more in carbon taxes than the latter. Consequently, people who pollute a lot receive large voting power, while people who pollute a little receive little voting power. This is a puzzling distribution of voting power for several reasons. First, it is instrumentally counterproductive if the goal is to rectify damages to the climate. Second, it introduces prudential incentives for everyone to pollute more to gain voting power. Third, the relative difference in voting power between people who pollute a lot and people who do not is puzzling from a desert-based point of view, since the former often make a serious effort to avoid polluting, while the latter do not.

The Boundary Problem in Workplace Democracy: Who Constitutes the Corporate Demos?

This article brings to bear findings from the debate on the boundary problem in democratic theory on discussions of workplace democracy to argue that workplace democrats’ focus on workers is unjustified and that more constituencies will have to be included in any prospective scheme of workplace democracy. It thereby provides a valuable and underdiscussed perspective on workplace democracy that goes beyond the debate’s usual focus on the clarification and justification of workplace democrats’ core claim. It also goes beyond approaches like stakeholder theory in law and economics that determine decision-making rights without taking into account genuinely democratic considerations. My discussion proceeds by considering three principles for inclusion from democratic theory for the specific case of the corporation. I submit that two of them, the all-coerced and the all-subjected principle, are not appropriate for this specific case, because they cannot capture the distinguishing features of the corporation. The all-affected principle however is appropriate but has a very wide range. I further argue that this is not as big of a problem as it first might seem and that this principle is still the most appropriate for defining the demos of the democratic corporation. The article closes by pointing out the consequences of this result for the workplace democracy debate and for the legitimacy of the market as a coordination mechanism.

Finding a fundamental principle of democratic inclusion: related, not affected or subjected

ABSTRACT The question of who should be included in democratic decision-making is known as the boundary problem in democratic theory. I identify two requirements that a satisfactory solution to the boundary problem must satisfy, i.e. the Considered Judgment Requirement and the Value Requirement. I argue that the two most prominent solutions to the boundary problem—the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle—fail to satisfy these requirements. Instead, I propose an equal relations principle and show that it satisfies the requirements. It turns out that relatedness, and not affectedness or subjectedness, is what fundamentally explains who should be included.

Contributivist views on democratic inclusion: on economic contribution as a condition for the right to vote

ABSTRACT Prior to the democratic breakthrough in most Western countries, the right to vote was premised on a person’s economic contribution. No country today reserves voting rights exclusively to contributors, but economic contribution matters once again. It matters for immigrants’ access to citizenship and its associated political rights, and it matters for emigrants’ attempts to keep the right to vote in their ‘home country’. Economic contribution has attracted very little attention in the literature on democratic inclusion. The few scholars who have discussed it have rejected it based on its expected implications, without going into detail about its different instantiations and normative underpinnings. This paper lays the foundation for a more thorough critique. Informed by historical practices, we distinguish between two main types of economic contributivist regulations: those that condition the right to vote on the size of the contribution, and those that condition it on compliance with legally required contributions. We suggest that contributivism can be based either on property rights or on reciprocity. We conclude the paper by contrasting contributivism with established principles of democratic inclusion (such as the all-affected principle), and by arguing that, unlike these other principles, contributivism is incompatible with the democratic ideal of self-rule.

What is the justifiable demos of a referendum on state secession?

The prevailing practice for enfranchisement in referendums on state secession only gives the inhabitants of the secessionist unit a vote, while all the inhabitants of a municipality often are enfranchised in referendums on urban secession. This paper examines the justifiably of holding on to the more exclusive practice at the state level from two principles for enfranchisement, the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle, as well as from a theory of secession, the exit approach. The argument of the paper is that none of these two principles is able to justify this practice, but that it is justifiable on the exit approach. The latter is also the approach we should take according to this argument. The fundamental problem with a statewide vote on the secession of a part of a state is that it mistakenly would give people a say on other people’s exit.

Representing non-citizens: a proposal for the inclusion of all affected interests

ABSTRACT This article defends the normative relevance of the representation of non-citizens in democracies. I argue that representation within nation-states constitutes a realistic institutionalisation of the All-Affected Principle, allowing justificatory practices towards non-citizens and establishing political institutions that can realise the ideal of inclusion of all externally affected individuals. I defend electoral, non-electoral and surrogate forms of representation of affected interests that satisfy both the cosmopolitan concern for the equal consideration of interests and the statist defence of the importance of a territorially and civically bounded demos. I assess piecemeal implementations of representation practices, namely reciprocal representation, ombudspersons, self-appointed representatives and deliberative and advocacy groups. Gradual and pluralised means of representation constitute necessary and feasible first steps to consider affected interests and offer an alternative route to an all-or-nothing defence of inclusion as national enfranchisement.

Making the All‐Affected Principle Safe for Democracy

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 50, Issue 2 p. 169-201 Original Article Making the All-Affected Principle Safe for Democracy James Lindley Wilson, Corresponding Author James Lindley Wilson jimw@uchicago.edu orcid.org/0000-0003-4519-6214 Search for more papers by this author James Lindley Wilson, Corresponding Author James Lindley Wilson jimw@uchicago.edu orcid.org/0000-0003-4519-6214 Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 February 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12209 *I am grateful for comments to audiences at Northwestern, University College London, the University of California at San Diego, and the University of California at Berkeley. I thank in particular Joshua Cohen, Chiara Cordelli, Mary Dietz, Jonathan Gould, Jeffrey Howard, Sean Ingham, Niko Kolodny, Shmuel Nili, Avia Pasternak, Emma Saunders-Hastings, David Wiens, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume50, Issue2Spring 2022Pages 169-201 RelatedInformation

The democratic deficit of the G20

ABSTRACT In the last few decades, the democratic credentials of global governance institutions have been extensively debated in the fields of international relations and political philosophy. However, despite their prominent role in the architecture of global governance, club governance institutions like the Group of Seven (G7) or the Group of Twenty (G20) have rarely been considered from the perspective of democratic theory. Focussing on the G20, this paper analyses its functions in international political practice and discusses whether, in exercising these functions, the G20 exhibits a democratic deficit. As a standard of democracy, the analysis uses the all-affected principle, according to which all those who are affected by a policy decision should be given the opportunity to participate in decision-making. This paper identifies several democratic shortcomings of the G20, for instance related to the exclusion of citizens of non-member states and a lack of parliamentary and public control. By describing realisable reforms that could to some degree alleviate these shortcomings, it is shown that more democratic institutional alternatives are feasible. Thus, the ascription of a democratic deficit to the G20 is warranted.

Why the All-Affected Principle Is Groundless

Abstract The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be included because she is affected. We identify three such reasons in the literature – to wit, interest protection, self-government and welfare – and show why they all fail. We then propose two alternative reasons, equal relations and fairness, and show why they are also deficient. Surprisingly, the all-affected principle then appears groundless, which supports withholding belief in the all-affected principle or(/and) investing future research in identifying the thus-far unidentified reason why being affected grounds a claim to inclusion.

The Problem of the Otherness in Contemporary Western Philosophy

This article reviews the problem of the otherness in contemporary Western philosophy . The peculiarities of the representation of the category of the otherness in the 21st-century anglophone continental philosophy were analyzed. A theoretical base of the research consists of the works by Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour, Richard Kearney, Nancy. Fraser, Dan Zahavi, Chad Kautzer, Eduardo Mendieta, and Slavoj Žižek. Within the frameworks of an Anglophone philosophy, we made a comparison of the 20th-century pragmatist approaches based on the exceptionalism and the exclusion of the Absolute Other from the intersubjective consensus and of the modern neopragmatist tendencies shaped on the principles of the generalized patience and extension of the framing of the subjectivity with the post-territorial regulation. The hermeneutical and phenomenological problems of the otherness typical for continental philosophy were covered with the analysis of the genealogy of the feeling leading to the victimization of the Other, its identification with Me, or its recognition with the preservation of the own identity. The author also analyzes ways to find a social consensus in the conditions of the antagonism between the emancipatory interests of different marginalized groups. Generally, the ways of adequate coexistence, which support the universal solidarity in a situation the global challenges humanity, had been demonstrated. That is why, finding out of a compromise in the analysis of the problem of the Otherness will be achieved with a realization of the following factors: all-affected principle, formed on the basis of the equal agency for all the subjects of communicative action for consensus with the help of a network activism, and a realization of the principles of a diacritical hermeneutics on the basis of the empathy to the Other and the termination of his/her marginalization. For this, it was offered to gain the equal rights for all the living forms for their own modes of existence to avoid antagonism between different social groups and to predict the impact of the obscurantist elites on the mass consciousness.Manuscript received 06.09.2020

Towards a principle of most-deeply affected

This article argues that all-affected principle needs to be reconceptualized to account for the differences in the historical and current social position of those who are or who should be making legitimacy claims. Drawing on Butler’s theory of vulnerability, this article advances a new and more robust all-affected principle that affords a stronger claim to legitimacy to those most-deeply affected by both the current decision in question and the historical process and practices shaping the choices available. In particular, this article identifies three sets of exclusions of groups and claims that drive this reformulation: first, cases of historical injustice such as indigenous peoples; second, cases of current processes of minoritization which silence or render some groups and opinions as marginal such as women, ethnic minorities or even people in lower economic classes; and third, cases of state establishment of boundaries and ‘worthy’ citizenship such as refugees making claims for relocation and asylum.

The All-Affected Principle and the Question of Asymmetry

As a solution to the boundary problem, the question of who should take part in making democratic decisions, the all-affected principle has gained widespread support. An unexplored issue in relation to the all-affected principle is whether there is an asymmetry between being affected negatively and positively. Is it the case that only being negatively affected, and not positively affected, by a decision generates a claim to inclusion under the all-affected principle? I call this the question of asymmetry. Some answer the question of asymmetry affirmatively. I believe they are wrong and argue, instead, that we must answer this question by looking at the reasons underlying the all-affected principle. I identify two main reasons that have been proposed to underlie the all-affected principle—(1) the opportunity for interest protection and (2) self-government—and show why both of them entail that answering the question of asymmetry affirmatively is unfounded. The upshot is that both being affected negatively and positively by a decision should generate a claim to inclusion on the all-affected principle. This makes a difference for democratic decision making on contemporary issues such as immigration, climate, and welfare policy.

The All-Affected Principle Reconsidered

The all-affected principle, by which all those affected by the policies of the state ought to be included in the demos governing it, is often considered prima facie attractive but, upon closer examination, implausible. The main alternative, according to which all those and only those affected by possible consequences of possible decisions ought to be included in the demos, is equally implausible. I suggest a reformulated principle: the demos includes all those affected by foreseeable consequences of decisions that the state has legal authority and capacity to take. This avoids the problems of the standard version and the main alternative.

The Case for Democratic Patients: Epistemic Democracy Goes Green

In mainstream democratic theory, non-agents are only considered indirectly: their interests matter if and only if a group of agents cares about them. In this paper, I argue that democratic patients, non-agents whose interests are affected by democratic decisions, have a place of their own in democratic theory. That is, they are entitled to the fair consideration of their interests in the democratic decision-making process. I defend the case for democratic patients by building upon the idea of epistemic democracy as proposed by David Estlund . If democratic procedures ought to be epistemically designed towards achieving right decisions, as Estlund argues, they should consider all relevant evidence fairly, like a jury does. Since democratic patients’ interests are affected by democratic decisions, I argue that they do count as relevant evidence via the All-Affected Principle, which lies at the core of democracy. Then I present some candidates for being democratic patients, which include young children, severely cognitively disabled humans, non-existent future humans, sentient animals and even non-sentient life forms. Whether they turn out to be democratic patients depends on what theories one accepts about agency, interests, and the impact of the outcomes of democracy on interests. I illustrate that point by discussing future humans as possible candidates. Finally, I briefly explore the challenge of designing real-world institutions derived from my argument, outlining what objectives they should aim for and some of the problems they might face.

The concept of affectedness in international development

The groups who experience direct impacts of development projects are generally known as ‘affected people’. This category is gaining traction in the governance of international financial institutions (IFIs) and is arguably becoming ubiquitous in contemporary development discourse. In this paper I investigate what ‘affectedness’ means, and also what it should mean in development context. The aim is to examine the grounds based on which the scope of affected people can be ascertained, and to underline the conceptual but also practical difficulties associated with this exercise. The proposed analysis is predominantly theoretical. It builds on the debate about the ‘all-affected principle’, as well as the theory of democratic inclusion by Iris Marion Young. My main argument is that currently the idea of affectedness functions as a boundary of inclusion/exclusion in the governance of development projects. I therefore suggest that leaving this category entirely open-ended also leaves it exposed to arbitrariness of decision-makers. This is problematic, because generally consultations that include affected people are seen as conveying legitimacy and proving social support to development initiatives. Without principled approach to affectedness, this process of selecting who should be consulted and who should not, enables an unjustified exclusion of the most vulnerable communities. This paper suggests that in the context of international development the most plausible ground for inclusion is vulnerability, which can be articulated by using the notion of structural social groups developed by Iris Young. These two concepts combined offer a principled enough approach for decision-makers to identify the minimal scope of affected persons.

Infant political agency: Redrawing the epistemic boundaries of democratic inclusion

Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants from political agency. One of the suggestions to bypass the epistemic requirement of political agency and to encourage the inclusion of infants in representative democracies is to resort to proxies or surrogates who share or advocate interests which may be coincidental with their interests. However, this solution is far from desirable, given that it privileges the political agency of parents, guardians and trustees over other adult citizens. This article offers an alternative to this conceptual frame of reference by making a case for the political agency of infants. Firstly, it maintains that political agency can be understood in terms of the several facets involved in political representation. Secondly, it claims that the all-affected principle can be reformulated as an ‘infant-affected-interests principle’ in light of which infants are members of the class of the represented. Thirdly, it explores the ways through which this political agency can occur without having to resort to alternative conceptions of representation. The conclusion ascertains that infant enfranchisement is highly undesirable and that there are more viable forms to promote infant political agency, such as virtual representation, infant-beneficial principles of political action and ombudspersons for infants.