If you polluted, you’re included: the all-affected principle and carbon tax referenda

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referenda. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot are ceteris paribus more affected than people who do not, because the former stands to pay more in carbon taxes than the latter. Consequently, people who pollute a lot receive large voting power, while people who pollute a little receive little voting power. This is a puzzling distribution of voting power for several reasons. First, it is instrumentally counterproductive if the goal is to rectify damages to the climate. Second, it introduces prudential incentives for everyone to pollute more to gain voting power. Third, the relative difference in voting power between people who pollute a lot and people who do not is puzzling from a desert-based point of view, since the former often make a serious effort to avoid polluting, while the latter do not.