Towards a principle of most-deeply affected

Afsoun Afsahi

doi:10.1177/0191453720972740

Abstract

This article argues that all-affected principle needs to be reconceptualized to account for the differences in the historical and current social position of those who are or who should be making legitimacy claims. Drawing on Butler’s theory of vulnerability, this article advances a new and more robust all-affected principle that affords a stronger claim to legitimacy to those most-deeply affected by both the current decision in question and the historical process and practices shaping the choices available. In particular, this article identifies three sets of exclusions of groups and claims that drive this reformulation: first, cases of historical injustice such as indigenous peoples; second, cases of current processes of minoritization which silence or render some groups and opinions as marginal such as women, ethnic minorities or even people in lower economic classes; and third, cases of state establishment of boundaries and ‘worthy’ citizenship such as refugees making claims for relocation and asylum.

Highlights

Who has the legitimacy to affect decisions? Who should have a hand in making the laws and policies that can affect others? This article argues that all-affected principle needs to be reconceptualized to account for the differences in the historical and current social position of those who are or who should be making legitimacy claims
Drawing on the work done on the importance of vulnerability, this article posits that when background conditions are unjust and people are in unequal positions from the start, the principle of all-affected, whether conceived as a threshold principle or a decision rule, will fall short of ensuring participation parity and legitimacy
Three sets of common exclusions highlight the insufficiency of the all-affected principle to respond to instances where different facets of oppression create particular vulnerabilities and drive this reformulation: first, cases of historical injustice such as indigenous peoples; second, cases of current processes of minoritization which silence or render some groups and opinions as marginal such as women, ethnic minorities or people in lower economic classes; and third, cases of state establishment of boundaries and ‘worthy’ citizenship such as refugees making claims for relocation and asylum

Summary

Introduction

This article argues that all-affected principle needs to be reconceptualized to account for the differences in the historical and current social position of those who are or who should be making legitimacy claims. Three sets of common exclusions highlight the insufficiency of the all-affected principle to respond to instances where different facets of oppression create particular vulnerabilities and drive this reformulation: first, cases of historical injustice such as indigenous peoples; second, cases of current processes of minoritization which silence or render some groups and opinions as marginal such as women, ethnic minorities or people in lower economic classes; and third, cases of state establishment of boundaries and ‘worthy’ citizenship such as refugees making claims for relocation and asylum.13 I should note, while cases of minoritization are subject to rapid changes – which may minoritize new groups and individuals, the same is not necessarily true for cases of historical injustice and state establishment of boundaries and ‘worthy’ citizenship.

Results

Conclusion