Kosovo Albanians Research Articles

Positive and Negative Identity Satisfiers in the Kosovo Cont1ict

In this article, the author examines the importance of identity as a sustaining factor in the continuing Kosovo confIict. Basic aspects of identity-based conflicts are reviewed, followed by a discussion about positive and negative identity satisfiers. A matrix comparing the identity needs of the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is presented, together with the current negative identity satisfiers that are sustaining the conflict, and a set of potential positive identity satisfiers that could help to resolve the conflict in the long-term. This review of the manifestations of unfulfilled identity needs reveals that the disputants share many similar concerns. This commonality is rarely mentioned in the literature on Kosovo, yet could serve as an important starting point for strategies of reconciliation. A regional peacebuilding plan that appreciates the importance of identity issues as conflict sources, possibly modelled after The Pact on Stability in Europe and other multinational stability-building efforts, is proposed, as are a set of potential regional efforts that are necessary if conflict resolution in Kosovo is to succeed.

Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo?

Working during the third week of NATO's bombing campaign against Serbia (in April 1999), the authors analyzed events data from the Kosovo conflict for January 1998 through January 1999. The authors expected the Serbian government's actions toward Kosovo to show an inverse-triangular response to Western actions toward Serbia—a response pattern found earlier for Serb forces in Bosnia and for Iraq from 1979 to 1997. The authors found, however, using time-series statistics, that Serbian actions toward Kosovo were not affected by international actions toward Serbia, despite bilateral reciprocity in the international-Serbian dyad. If this past pattern continues, it is predicted that NATO bombing will not affect Serbian actions toward Kosovo either by inducing Serbian compliance or by provoking greater Serbian hostility toward Kosovo Albanians.

Refugees and Intemally Displaced: Some Lessons fromi the Kosovo Crisis

This paper argues that NATO failed to protect the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and offers four lessons: military and humanitarian action should be better coordinated; internally displaced persons should be protected as well as refugees; humanitarian corridors and safe havens should not be dismissed out of hand; and civilian lives must be valued as much as those in uniforms.

What's the difference between a Kurd and a Kosovar?

Turkey's Kurds ask why they have not benefited from the same international humanitarian concern as the Kosovo Albanians

The Kosovo Liberation Army

The political struggle between the various Kosovo Albanian factions has intensified since NATO's air war against Yugoslavia began in March. The prize is rule over Kosovo after it has been liberated from Belgrade, and the split is creating increasing dilemmas for Western policy-makers. On one side are the main leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which for the past year has been waging an armed rebellion against Yugoslavia, but which is deeply distrusted by European NATO governments. On the other are Ibrahim Rugova and other leaders, who for a decade carried out a campaign of civil disobedience against Serbian rule. However, this group too is divided, leading to a complicated and potentially highly unstable Kosovar political landscape.

Why Were We Bombing Yugoslavia?

Why were we bombing civilians, women and children, hospitals, bridges, roads, schools and factories in Yugoslavia? The popular conception repeated endlessly by American and British politicians, NATO representatives and by the western media is that it was a humanitarian measure to protect Albanian Kosovars from ethnic cleansing and civil rights abuses at the hands of Serbs in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia. It may seem somewhat strange that bombing and killing innocent people can be considered a humane solution to the dispute between the minority ethnic Serbs and the majority ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in the first place, particularly when no serious attempt was made to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the dispute between the two parties before the bombs began to fall. But what makes it even more difficult to accept is that there was no program of ethnic cleansing or genocide in Kosovo until after NATO began its bombing of the whole of Yugoslavia.

The Kosovo Quagmire

BEFORE LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH 1998, most Canadians could probably not have located Kosovo (Kosova in Albanian) on a map with any confidence. (It is in the southwest corner of Serbia, also bordering Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro.) Since then, it has been prominent in the news because of the civil war that has developed between Serbian government forces and a Kosovo Albanian (Kosovar) insurgent group loosely identified as the Kosovo Liberation Army. The international community has become involved; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is poised for action; six Canadian aircraft are to take part in pressure by the international community to force the Serbian/Yugoslav authorities to end their repression and the insurgents to join them in negotiations.Although many people speak of another Bosnia, the two situations are quite different. The war in Bosnia was a by-product of Yugoslavia's collapse; conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo dates back at least to 1912.The insurgents in Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians make up more than 90 per cent of the population, seek independence, which would probably be followed by union with Albania - a traditional goal about which most Kosovars are now reticent but which many certainly espouse. The Yugoslav and Serbian governments wish to maintain the status quo of Serbian domination over Kosovo, but have offered some form of 'cultural' autonomy. They say that they are ready to negotiate; it is the Kosovars who walked away from the table.The international community has consistently stated its opposition to Kosovo independence on the grounds that it would be destabilizing for the region - particularly for neighbouring Macedonia with its own restive Albanian minority. Publicly, at any rate, even the Albanian government does not support independence for Kosovo, much less its union with Albania, although the issue of policy towards the Kosovo crisis has been contentious in Albanian domestic politics. What Albania professes to favour, and the international community is pushing for, is the broadest possible autonomy for Kosovo, either within Serbia or as a separate constituent republic of Yugoslavia. So far, this is acceptable to neither the Serbs nor the Kosovars.As usual in the Balkans, there is a lot of history tied up in the dispute. Kosovo is both the Serbian Camelot, and, for the last eighty-six years, a burr under Serbia's saddle. For the Albanians, it is part of their historic territory and the place where, in the late 19th century, aspirations for an independent Albanian state began to take shape.ANCIENT HISTORY(both Serbs and Albanians care about this)The Serbs believe that Kosovo was basically empty before the Slav migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries. The Albanians assert that they have always lived there - at least since Roman times, when it was populated by the Illyrians, from whom Albanians claim to be directly descended. Much academic ink, on both sides, has been spilt in defence of these positions.MEDIEVAL HISTORY(Serbs particularly care about this)Kosovo was the geographical and ecclesiastical centre of the mediaeval Serbian empire. It reached its height under Tsar Stefan Dusan (1331-55), who made Prizren (in Kosovo) one of his major capitals and was buried there. His realm included most of what is now Albania, and there were probably as many Albanians as Serbs in his victorious armies.What made Kosovo the central point of heroic Serbian mythology, however, was the glorious defeat of Tsar Lazar's army at Kosovo Polje (the Field of Blackbirds) on 28 June 1389 (St Vitus Day, or, in Serbian, Vidovdan) by the invading Ottoman Turks. The Serbs see their role as having valiantly, if unsuccessfully, defended Christendom against the infidel. In fact, there were Serbs on both sides of this battle, and Tsar Lazar's forces included Albanians and a contingent from Bosnia - at the time perhaps the strongest Slav state in the region. …

The growing power of Serbia's nationalist right

The rise of Vojislav Seselj's ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party has led to two extremely dangerous possibilities for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). If the present coalition between Seselj and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic does not collapse, the Serbian regime may introduce increasingly brutal policies towards the Albanians in Kosovo and other ethnic minorities. On the other hand, if the coalition disintegrates, Serbia itself could slide towards civil War.

Muslim Identity and the Balkan State

While the text is firmly rooted in the historical context, the authors concentrate on the contemporary situation of Balkan Muslim communities, their relationship with the states in which they reside, and the relationship between their ethnic and religious identities. As well as detailing the position of the large Muslim communities like the Kosovo Albanians and the Turks of Bulgaria, the book also details the current situation of less-known Muslim communities like the Pomaks who have rarely been studied. In addition, special attention is given to the role of the Turkish-speaking and other Muslims in the Balkans. As many of the latter are or perceive themselves to be Turks, the book also looks (by way of comparison) at the relation between Islam and ethnicity among Turkish Muslims in Western Europe - especially in Germany and the Netherlands. From a variety of angles, the book thus offers a rare study of the current situation of different Muslim communities living in the volatile Balkans.

The crisis in Albania

There are few signs that Albania’s fourth presidential election since the fall of communism in 1991, to be held before the end of June, will bring political stability to the country. Indeed, it could complicate the work of the Italian-led intervention force. Despite the near fall from power of President Sali Berisha and his Democratic Party (PDS) following street protests in February 1997, the PDS has been trying to claw its way back to power. However, even given the sizeable diaspora, Albania’s internal turmoil seems to have had little effect on the Albanians in Kosovo or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question

Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question David L. Phillips (bio) I. Introduction Recent incidents in Kosovo suggest that the simmering situation there could further escalate into violent conflict. This would result in a humanitarian disaster with dimensions as serious as those seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and with serious security implications throughout the Balkans. Regional destabilization might also disrupt implementation of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (Dayton Agreement) 1 which, after many years of bloody conflict, holds forth some prospect for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2 While Dayton establishes a framework intending to resolve the Bosnian conflict, the Agreement omits reference to Kosovo. In the post-Dayton period, there are new opportunities for a comprehensive settlement of issues in the former Yugoslavia, including the Kosovo question. The United States and its allies should be building on Dayton’s momentum by becoming more fully engaged in achieving a comprehensive [End Page 821] peace in the Balkans. With the success of US diplomacy in Dayton, everyone is looking to the United States for decisive action. There is, however, a responsibility which accompanies status as the world’s sole superpower. Today, there are heightened expectations about the role of US leadership in solving regional conflicts such as Kosovo. 3 II. The Kosovo Context A. The Heart of Serbia When queried about the origin of their problems with Albanians, many Serbs speak with romantic reminiscence about the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The defeat of Christendom’s defenders against the invading Ottoman Turks is still commemorated by Serbs. The Battle of Kosovo has become a defining moment in their cultural history and self-perception as a long suffering people. Slobodan Milosevic proclaimed Kosovo “the heart of Serbia.” For every Serb, “Kosovo is a holy [land] . . . . There were 200,000 Serbs living in Kosovo much before Albanians ever came from the rocky mountains.” 4 However, today’s reality is different. There are approximately two million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, which is 90 percent of the total population. Since their autonomous status was revoked in 1988, Kosovars complain about a campaign of “quiet ethnic cleansing” which is making life increasingly miserable. 5 Serbian nationalism has its roots in the fallow plains of Kosovo; Milosevic’s political base was built on a platform of Serbian hegemony over the Kosovars. With surprising familiarity, the term “ethnic cleansing” has permeated the lexicon of international relations. “Quiet ethnic cleansing” is also now becoming common parlance. Practiced out of the glare of international attention, quiet cleansing is an insidious policy which seeks to make life so unbearable that whole communities are displaced or relocate voluntarily. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia represents a dramatic instance where the dislocation of populations is the cause of war—not merely the result. [End Page 822] B. Human Rights and Self-Determination Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, likens the conditions in Kosovo to apartheid in South Africa. In response to the absence of political rights, stagnant economic opportunity, and a grossly degraded physical environment, Kosovars express their deep frustration living as a “captive nation” within Serbia. 6 Milosevic claims, “[w]e don’t have any kind of conflict with the Albanians.” 7 Despite Milosevic’s assurances, UN findings describe systematic discrimination of ethnic Albanians for which there is an ample body of evidence. Resolutions and reports of the UN General Assembly, 8 the UN Human Rights Commission, 9 the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 10 and the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 11 have voluminously documented the deteriorating human rights situation in Kosovo. Human rights violations include random acts of violence by Serbian authorities, routine harassment and intimidation of the local population, and arbitrary arrests. There is evidence of police brutality, arbitrary searches, seizures, detentions, forced evictions, torture, and ill-treatment of detainees. 12 The administration of justice is discriminatory. In addition, local self government and civil society institutions have been suspended. Ethnic Albanian civil servants from the police and judiciary have been dismissed. There is discrimination against Albanian pupils and teachers; Albanian language elementary and...

Albanians in Kosovo: Prospects for the Future

Journal Article Albanians in Kosovo: Prospects for the Future Get access Owen Bennen-Jones Owen Bennen-Jones Field Consultant WRITENET Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 4, Winter 1994, Pages 9–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/13.4.9 Published: 01 December 1994

Greater Serbia: A New Reality in the Balkans

“We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need.”Vojislav Maksimovic, MemberBosnian Serb Parliament“I don't see what's wrong with Greater Serbia. There's nothing wrong with a greater Germany, or with Great Britain.”Bosnian Serb LeaderRadovan KaradžićThe break-up of Yugoslavia has come about as a result of national, economic and political conflicts which by the end of 1987 had taken on unprecedented dimensions. At that point, latent political conflicts between various republics came into the open. More specifically, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had turned into a low-intensity war. Under Slobodan Miloševićs leadership in Serbia, the Serbo-Slovenian conflict over Kosovo deepened, forcing other republics and provinces to take sides. The Slovenian leadership opposed a military solution to the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. By 1990 the Serbo-Slovenian conflict had spilled over into Croatia, completely polarizing the Yugoslav political elite into two distinct camps; one encompassed Slovenia and Croatia, the other Serbia and Montenegro, with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina playing the role of unsuccessful mediators.

La décomposition de la Yougoslavie : la Serbie et le « front Sud »

The Disintegration of Yugoslavia — Serbia and the « Southern Front », by Michel Roux Although the Southern part of ex-Yugoslavia has so far been spared from civil war, it also risks joining in the general disintegration of a country which Serbia would have wished to preserve. Macedonia has seceded peacefully and though it satisfies the conditions of the Badinter Commission for international recognition, this is blocked by Greece. A poor, enclave region, it also has to face the problem of autonomist demands from its Albanian minority. Montenegro on the other hand is preparing to join with Serbia in forming a « third Yugoslavia » for which it would provide the maritime outlet. However this new State would be faced with separatist demands from the Muslims in Sandjak and more especially from the Albanians of Kosovo. In this latter région, political and interethnic conflict, which has been going on since 1981, contributed to the destabilisation of Yugoslavia and may finally resuit in attempted secession. The Albanian question is one of potential danger for the stability of the Balkans and of Europe.

A note on Kosovo and the future of Yugoslav‐Albanian relations: A Balkan perspective

AT the XII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia-held in Belgrade in June 1982-high on most speakers' agendas, besides the country's economic and financial predicament, was the Kosovo question. The speakers' frequent references to the causes of the 1981 riots and to the panacea for the troubled province highlighted a threefold problem: first, an internal issue for Serbia-which is in the unique position of 'guardian' of two autonomous provinces; second, a national concern for the Yugoslav federation-involving other nations and nationalities; and finally, an international issue-affecting Yugoslavia's external relations, especially vis-a-vis neighbouring Albania and Bulgaria. The historical perspective throws some light on the significance of Kosovo in the wider framework of Yugoslav-Albanian relations; throughout the post-war period, the internal situation in Kosovo has usually been a sound indicator of Yugoslavia's relations with Albania. Up to 1948 the ideological bond uniting the two countries left Yugoslavia's 1945 re-annexation of Kosovo out of their respective agendas. Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform that year provided Tirana with a platform from which to reactivate the 'unsettled annexation of Kosovo' issue; with Stalin's backing, the Albanian media gave extensive coverage to the 'persecution' of Albanians in Yugoslavia, and some high-ranking party members openly incited the Kosovo Albanians to rebel against Tito. The departure of Rankovic in 1966 paved the way for the resumption of the dialogue between Belgrade and Tirana, whose common perception of the threat posed by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought about reciprocal offers of assistance in the event of external military aggression. Over the next decade, Yugoslav-Albanian relations witnessed a gradual rapprochement, which was paralleled by Belgrade's devolution of powers to Kosovo. Although the demonstrations which swept across the Kosovo towns in November 1968 failed to secure the campaigners' demands for republican status, they played no small part in alerting the federal authorities to the seriousness of the situation. The government responded by increasing economic assistance to the province and by bringing about a degree of equalisation of the Albanian and Serbo-Croat languages. Rusinow2 has pointed out the symbolic but psychologically important renaming of Kosmet as Kosovo-thus dropping the Serbian term for the Western part of the province-and the significance of Kosovo's adoption of the Albanian flag. Furthermore, the 1969 constitutional amendments ushered in a new relationship between Republic and Autonomous Province:3 Amendment 18 was indicative of this change in two