AbstractThere is a sharp contradiction between the economic performance of the Hungarian government of Victor Orbán and the institutional framework (toolkit) by which the seemingly stellar performance of the Hungarian economy has been achieved. It looks like as if the economic playground of the government (disciplined fiscal policy, unorthodox monetary policy and contradictory institutional system) and political-institutional order built by the same government during the last ten years, represent two different worlds. This paper provides a possible explanation to resolve this contradiction by identifying reversed relationship between tools and goals of economic policies. The genuine, hidden but most important goal of the present Hungarian government is to make Orbán and his political family wealthy and make their enrichment legitimate. In disguise of a public policy to achieve this (private, personal) goal, this government needs absolute and uncontrolled power certified by the scenery of the parliamentarian democracy. This private effort should be falsified, which could be achieved if his government pretends that it wants to pursue a disciplined economic policy.