Aggressor Nations Research Articles

When Firms Continue Doing Business in Aggressor Nations: A Refined Moral Decoupling Perspective on Consumer Response

Russia's invasion of Ukraine prompted many Western companies to pull out of the aggressor country. This study examines why and when consumers purchase from companies that choose to sustain operations in Russia. This study advances a refined moral decoupling model where effects of transgression relevance on purchase intention are channeled not only through judgments of performance and morality, but additionally through judgment of social responsibility. Results of an empirical study with four German companies and a sample of German consumers indicate that the relevance of a company's transgression influences consumer purchase intention through judgments of social responsibility and morality. This remains stable regardless of individual differences in moral decoupling. However, judgments of performance mediate a transgression's effects on purchase intention only with individuals who are less prone to decoupling. Effects of a company's perceived social responsibility on purchase intention are weaker with the politically more liberal than with the more conservative, whereas effects of morality are enhanced by a more liberal political orientation and the strength of a person's moral identity. These findings aid researchers and practitioners by advancing a refined moral decoupling framework that has greater relevance in the context of political conflict and war.

Strategic Investment in Open Hardware for National Security

Free and open-source hardware (FOSH) development has been shown to increase innovation and reduce economic costs. This article reviews the opportunity to use FOSH as a sanction to undercut imports and exports from a target criminal country. A formal methodology is presented for selecting strategic national investments in FOSH development to improve both national security and global safety. In this methodology, first the target country that is threatening national security or safety is identified. Next, the top imports from the target country as well as potentially other importing countries (allies) are quantified. Hardware is identified that could undercut imports/exports from the target country. Finally, methods to support the FOSH development are enumerated to support production in a commons-based peer production strategy. To demonstrate how this theoretical method works in practice, it is applied as a case study to a current criminal military aggressor nation, who is also a fossil-fuel exporter. The results show that there are numerous existing FOSH and opportunities to develop new FOSH for energy conservation and renewable energy to reduce fossil-fuel-energy demand. Widespread deployment would reduce the concomitant pollution, human health impacts, and environmental desecration as well as cut financing of military operations.

전쟁 동원의 만화 [노라쿠로(のらくろ)] 재고 - 일본 미디어 리터러시의 방법론으로 -

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the Japan media literacy by analyzing how Anime was utilized in some ways in the early stages of its establishment and consequently working as media mix of war mobilization for Japanese Imperialism. Today, the features of nationalism on Anime is still in progress. Therefore, this paper starts from the past in order to read the modern Japan as well and focuses on Norakuro of Tagawa Suihō(1899󰠏1989) as a starting point. In Norakuro, the war could be glorified by strategically using traditions of Japan and featuring animal characters which soften harsh situations at those times. Besides, the nationalism of the distorted reality unfolded against the backdrop of Manchuria and was used as propaganda for the purpose of arousing will to fight. Since then, for the injustice of the aggressor nation, today it has flown into space and changed its context to SF dealing with a future society. But it still repeats its repertoire. Although we looked at Norakuro produced during the war, the consciousness of pseudo󰠏family community, which is based on the experience of comrades in arms, is still working after the war. Norakuro is also a consistent demonstration of how the uncritically modern Japanese consciousness has been formed. It is now clear that it was much easier to form the consciousness by using ordinary animal characters such as “Norakuro the stray dog,” rather than fantasy developments led by “Momotaro”, represented as a hero, the main character of the old story used for Japanese Imperialism.

Peace and the Barrel of the Gun in the Internationalist Women’s Movement, 1945–49

Abstract In 1949, at a conference instigated by the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) held in Beijing, China, the Asian Women’s Conference solidified an anticolonial, antifascist, and antiracist theory for organizing women transnationally. This transnational feminist praxis drew its movement demands and strategies from the masses of women in anticolonial movements, both rural and urban poor women. It also framed a two-fold theory of women’s organizing: it delineated one platform for women fighting imperialism within colonized countries, and another platform for women fighting imperialism within aggressor nations. This transnational feminism supported an explicitly pro-socialist vision for the future.

A National Pragmatic Safety Limit for Nuclear Weapon Quantities

This study determines the nuclear pragmatic limit where the direct physical negative consequences of nuclear weapons use are counter to national interests, by assuming all unknowns are conservatively optimistic. The only effect considered is nuclear winter (“nuclear autumn” in the low weapons limits) and the resultant effects on the aggressor nation. First, the ability of low nuclear weapon limits is probed for maintaining deterrence in the worst-case scenario of attacking the most-populous nation. Second, the ability of aggressor nations to feed themselves is assessed without trade and industry resultant from a nuclear attack causing “nuclear autumn” (10% global agricultural shortfall). Third, the best-case wealthy aggressor nation with abundant arable land is analyzed for starvation and economic impacts given 7000, 1000, and 100 nuclear weapons scenarios. The results found that 100 nuclear warheads is adequate for nuclear deterrence in the worst case scenario, while using more than 100 nuclear weapons by any aggressor nation (including the best positioned strategically to handle the unintended consequences) even with optimistic assumptions (including no retaliation) would cause unacceptable damage to their own society. Thus, 100 nuclear warheads is the pragmatic limit and use of government funds to maintain more than 100 nuclear weapons does not appear to be rational.

Analysis of Introduced Species as a Form of Biological Weapon: Part 1-Theory and Approaches

The hypothesis of this paper is that introduced species (aka non-indigenous species) could be used as a form of biological weapon (BW). The first step of this paper is a brief review of biological weapon concepts, and a review ofthe definition of an introduced species, as well as a brief survey of historical examples of introduced species. Previous evidence of the use of invasive species as a form of biological weapon is also discussed.The methods to predict a successful invasive species candidate is discussed, and examples of various theories and computer software models to analyze introduced species invasions are reviewed. The use of GARP (Genetic Algorithm for Rule-set Prediction) has found promise in predicting the range and effective invasiveness of an organism, prior to the actual invasion. This research discusses the approaches of invasive species by hostile actors (aggressor nation, crime syndicate,bioterrorists, or lone individual), as well as the various BW targets (public health, ecosystems, agricultural commodities,biofuel feed stocks). The vulnerability of nations to invasive species introduction, as well as the risk factors favoring invasive species BW would also be examined. Some of these risk factors favoring a BW attack using invasive speciesinclude poor communication between local population and government scientists and decision makers; monocultureof agricultural fields; disturbed or damaged ecosystems, and presence of favored niches in the targeted areas. Thestrategies to introduce BW invasive species are discussed, and range from human smuggling and delivery by vectors to biocruise-the technique of using cruise missile technology (aka unmanned aerial vehicles), to deliver and disperse BW agents (e.g. virus, fungal spores, bacteria, even insects), at precise targeted sites. Two models are presented to describe the process of invasive species BW by hostile actors-one, using a single invasive species and one leading to invasion meltdown of the targeted area. Four examples of potential BW using introduced species are discussed, with supportive evidence for their effectiveness and invasive potential on targets (Nipah virus, Striga plant parasite, Heartwater-Ehrlichia ruminantium, and Wheat Stem Rust-Puccinia graminis f. st.tritici). Finally, the data supports the hypothesis that introduced species could be used as a form of biological weapon.

Roots and risks of total nuclear disarmament

I disagree with my friend Sid Drell about the implications of a world ostensibly without nuclear weapons. In such a world, the only countries with nuclear weapons would be Iran, North Korea, and the like. A treaty renouncing nuclear weapons would be a modern-day repeat of the folly of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War.Such symbolic gestures are not harmless. The signatories of Kellogg-Briand included all the aggressors of the 1930s. Democracies are slow to recognize aggressor nations because their motives are incomprehensible to us. Our enemies arm before we realize their intent, and our defensive measures follow only after long delay. We listen to our Winston Churchills very late. As a wise Roman said: “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.’Disarmed, we would face the threat of even a single nuclear weapon without the ability to deter it. In the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile, not even the oceans offer strategic depth.An American renunciation of nuclear weapons would be followed by a rush to proliferation as a dozen or more regional powers, no longer protected by an implicit or explicit American guarantee, build their own nuclear forces. Such a world, in which a multitude of rivalries and enmities become nuclear confrontations, would certainly be more dangerous than the present one.© 2010 American Institute of Physics.

Military power and international order

In offering some tentative remarks on this subject I shall consider briefly the nature both of war and of the international order within which it arises. I shall not, in dealing with the first, adopt the view that war is a disease of the body politic, a pathological condition which can be traced to abnormalities in the social or economic structure, or to the racial characteristics of particular peoples. One could list many such explanations of the causes of war, from ‘aggressor nations’ or the machinations of armament-manufacturers to particular kinds of ruling class — whether monarcho-feudal, as the Gobdenites believed a hundred years ago, or bourgeois-capitalist, as the socialists believed fifty years later. All take as their starting point the assumption that peace is the natural condition of mankind, as health is of the human body. Such a view is understandable enough. It is a commendable reaction, not simply against the evils of war in themselves, but against the doctrines which were so widespread in Europe during the nineteenth and the earlier part of this century, that War is necessary to the health of the Race, that it is an intrinsic part of the dialectical mechanism of Progress or the biological mechanism of the Survival of the Fittest, a test of manhood to be strenuously prepared for and welcomed when it comes. The generation of Rupert Brooke had still to learn the lesson, on which Sir Frederick Maurice was to insist in 1927, that ‘war is a great evil’.

The policy of preemption and its consequences: Iraq and beyond.

In this article we apply research in the field of judgment and decision making to the policy of preemption. We use Brunswik's lens model to frame the policy of preemption as the integration of multiple fallible indicators under conditions of uncertainty. We use the Taylor-Russell diagram to demonstrate how the policy of preemption increases judgment uncertainty and error. The continuation of a policy of preemption will inevitably lead to an increase in false positives (mistaken military engagements), an increase in tension and dispute among U.S. allies (and foes) over these engagements, and a growing world perception that the United States is an aggressor nation. Post-9/11 policymakers and the public are explicitly focused on reducing false negatives at the implicit cost of increasing false positives. Greater appreciation of the inverse relationship between false positives and false negatives is needed to understand the consequences of the policy of preemption.

Mitigating but Not Rethinking: George W. Norris, Tommy Douglas, and the Great Plains

The careers of George W. Norris of Nebraska and Tommy Douglas of Saskatchewan, two extraordinary Prairie progressives, cover nearly a century of political activism, and tell us something about both what was possible and what was never even considered in Great Plains (1). That their seemingly different heritages, one a dyed-in-the-wool Republican from Ohio and one a Scots Labourite, should result in similar solutions to the problems of European-style agriculture on the Great Plains illustrates the significance of geography, independent of ideology, in determining the lifestyles that will work for a region. Richard Lowitt, Norris's biographer, describes him as a nineteenth-century liberal, but one who became a Progressive and then a New Dealer, developing his ideas to fit the exigencies of the twentieth century but maintaining his basic beliefs in the fundamental goodness of human beings, the value of honesty and hard work, and the role of government in helping people who were in trouble through no fault of their own. Although Norris carefully researched all the legislation he proposed and supported during his long career in the United States House (1902-1912) and Senate (1912-1942), he charted his economic and political course on experience rather than readings in history or theory. Like many highly successful individuals, he had a few ideas and he stuck to them, winning most of his greatest battles. He believed that government should be efficient, economical, and accountable to the voters. His institutional reforms included curbing the power of the Speaker and the caucus in the U.S. House and in instituting a Unicameral legislature in Nebraska. Norris started his career as a Republican but eventually became an Independent and one of the most intelligent backers of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. Deeply moved by an international peace conference he attended in Belgium in 1905, he consistently supported a world body for arbitrating disputes, the disarmament of aggressor nations, and the restriction of munitions and armaments on the part of democratic nations. Norris, though originally not sympathetic to organized labor, came to see farmers and laborers as a necessary coalition. He believed that big business tended to exploit them both and that the role of government was to protect the people from monopolies by ensuring fair competition, bargaining right for workers, and mortgage relief for farmers beset by bad weather or low markets. He also believed that electric power was a basic but transformative necessity that could serve people best if it were generated and distributed publically, supporting both municipal and federal power (Norris, Lowitt, passim). Tommy Douglas has so far attracted more adulation, more vituperation, but less painstaking scholarly analysis than Norris. There is no work that compares to Lowitt's magisterial three-volume study of Norris. Nonetheless, the outlines of Douglas's career and beliefs are also clear. His intellectual tradition was that of British Labour of the Scots variety, deeply affected by the twentieth century Social Gospel of Salem Bland and J.S. Woodsworth. Like Norris, his program was based on experience rather than theory--he quickly dropped the repugnant eugenics theory that had formed his master's thesis, and it never influenced any part of his public policy (Stewart, 2003, 80-81). While Norris had had his pragmatic training as a lawyer and judge in southwestern Nebraska during the 1890s, Douglas's lessons in the world came from his own recurring bouts of osteomyelitis, his witnessing of the police riots against strikers in Winnipeg in 1919 and in Estevan in 1931, and his experience as a pastor and graduate student among the unemployed and desperate in the early 1930s. Unlike Norris, Douglas was satisfied with the parliamentary systems he worked in as both a Member of Parliament (1935-44, 1962-1979) and as Premier of Saskatchewan (1944-1962). He successfully advanced his beliefs, whether he was in the opposition or the majority. …

The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull's Search for Peace 1936-1938

BY the middle of the 1930s, policymakers in the United States had become deeply concerned about the possibility of war in Europe and Asia. President Franklin D. Roosevelt eagerly began to seek ways to prevent a major conflict or, at least, to insulate the Western Hemisphere against its direct effects. In 1936, he called the Buenos Aires Conference in an attempt to create a system of collective neutrality. In 1937, he toyed with the idea of quarantining aggressor nations and, until 1938, mulled over the suggestion that he sponsor an international conference. While Roosevelt fitfully explored these avenues without notable success, Secretary of State Cordell Hull also sought a foreign policy initiative that would help to pull the world back from the Niagara of Hull had long insisted as a general proposition that economic rivalry was a basic cause of war and that gradual international adherence to the principles of liberalized trade embodied in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program of 1934 would ultimately produce prosperity and peace.' By 1936, however, Hull began to suspect that long-range remedies were inadequate; and he launched a vigorous effort to forge an Anglo-American commercial alliance that would accelerate the movement toward freer trade and thus slow the drift toward war. This endeavor culminated in the Anglo-American trade agreement of 1938, and for Hull it seemed to provide a workable plan by which the United States could effectively exert a pacific influence on the course of world events. Hull conceived of the Anglo-American agreement as the beginning of a worldwide campaign to restore political stability. Mutual adoption of liber-

The ‘labor daily's’ Volte face on the Abyssinian crisis, 1935

THE DRASTIC CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE of the Labor Daily towards the Abyssinian crisis has long aroused the interest of historians and students of politics. In the chapter on the crisis in Press, Radio and World Affairs the authors assert that the Labor Daily supported sanctions till Lang's speech on 4th September 1935, while at the A.I.P.S. summer school in 1938 several speakers discussed Lang's motives. They agreed that a primary one was the influence of the Catholic Church. The purpose of this article is therefore to discuss in what way the Labor Daily changed its policy, when the change occurred, and why. The' opening of the Abyssinian crisis found the Labor Daily staunchly supporting the League and Collective Security. Indeed, it criticised Sir Samuel Hoare for being too conciliatory; a strong stand in favour of the League, and against aggression, would be a better way of preserving peace in Europe. The Labor Daily even felt that 'every civilised nation should . . . accept full responsibility for maintaining peace by giving reality to the sanctions contained in Articles 10 and 16', and 'Great Britain under this article would have no other recourse but to close the Suez canal'. Moreover it went on to say 'Article 16 contains the economic and military [sic] sanctions that all members of the League agree to employ against an aggressor nation, and represents the very basis of the security system'. It therefore wanted a convention of major powers 'to present an ultimatum to Mussolini based on Article 16'. All this is very strong. If the Labor Daily did not actually advocate closure of the Suez canal and the application of military sanctions, it implied sympathy with both. It did demand economic and financial sanctions. The blame for the crisis was placed squarely on Italy; Abyssinia was defended as not uncivilised, and earlier League failures were used as a reason for action in this crisis. It even urged Litvinov to realise that his slogan, 'Peace is Indivisible' was at stake, and criticised him for not acting more strongly. (Indecision was apparent on 6th July, when the threat of conscription and Australia being involved in European adventures was mentioned; and on two occasions the Labor Daily wondered if the Imperialist powers were planning a partition of Abyssinia. The suspicion was used however to urge more effective League action.) It is clear that the Labor Daily was supporting a strong line in favour of the League and collective security, until 22nd August, 1935, the latter date seeing in several ways the strongest editorial of all.

Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech

On october 5, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt aroused the democratic world by calling for a quarantine of the aggressor nations. Since that morning in Chicago there has always been uncertainty as to how the President meant to implement his speech. A review of the available documents concerning the aftermath of the quarantine speech provides four additional notes which help clear up this uncertainty. The first demonstrates that Roosevelt instead of backing down before seemingly overwhelming opposition from the American public, believed he could persuade not only his fellow countrymen but “90 percent of the population of the world” to quarantine the aggressor nations. The second shows that the President looked upon the Nine Power Conference which met in Brussels during November, 1937, as an opportunity to initiate positive action in the Far East. The third, by an analysis of the activities of Norman Davis, the American delegate to that conference, indicates the extent to which the President was willing to go in imposing a quarantine against Japan. The last note attempts to explain briefly why by mid November Roosevelt finally “pulled in his horns” and permitted the Nine Power Conference to disintegrate. From these notes comes further support for the conclusions that the man who met defeat at Brussels was President Roosevelt and the policy which failed to be adopted was that of a quarantine, of containment, of the aggressor nations.

Postwar Treatment of Japan

O UR policies toward Germany and Japan at the conclusion of World War II differ markedly from our policy toward Germany in 1918. This time we know that we must find satisfactory solutions for the political and economic problems of the peace if our success in the military phases of the conflict is not to be another hollow victory. This time, our country, in concert with our Allies, proposes to adopt a policy that will not only restore some part of the losses suffered by the victims of the aggressor nations, but will also effect basic readjustments in the national economies of Germany and Japan and their neighboring countries. By means of these readjustments, which we may call disarmament, we propose to reduce drastically the power of Germany and Japan to wage war, and to strengthen very greatly the ability of their former victims to withstand attack in the future. This we shall do by removing as reparations from Germany and Japan the industrial capital equipment not needed to sustain a standard of living specified by the Potsdam formula. Once installed and in operation in the countries of the reparations claimants, such equipment will contribute positively to the industrial development of areas whose economic significance formerly lay in the supply of raw materials to processing nations, and in the furnishing of markets for cheap manufactured products. As these areas become developed industrially, they will be able to defend themselves against attack and, even more important to us, they will be able to participate much more actively in the economic give-and-take of world trade. AN ENGINEER'S POINT OF VIEW

The Naval Station at Alameda 1916-1940: A Case Study in the Aptitude of Democracy for Defense

THE NAVAL AIR STATION at Alameda, California, came into commission before the veil of secrecy was dropped over the activities of rearmament and operation which, since December, 1941, have altered much of the landscape of the United States. Within its wired enclosure and its patrols, designed to keep military secrets where they ought to be, events are happening with which civilians have deep concern, but of which they have no right as yet to be informed. The story of the station as tool for victory may one day be told. But time is not yet ripe for this. It is, however, neither untimely nor improper, in study of the capacity of the United States for war, to examine the behavior of the United States at peace; to make case study of defense project during the quarter of century between the dream of navy base at the Golden Gate, and the fulfillment of the dream when, November 1, 1940, Captain Frank R. McCrary, one-time chief of the Bureau of Naval Aeronautics, raised his flag within the enclosure of the station, and took command.' Democracy, turned now into self-examination as aggressor nations both deny its validity and attempt its annihilation, is a vehicle so lumbering that part of the world has come to doubt whether it is dependable carrier for national interest.2 It suffers from the very defects of its convincing virtues. The procedure which makes it safe for its neighbors and for itself, in moments of peaceful and deliberate balancing of conflicting aims and interests, leaves it uncovered when danger threatens. Its inherent inability to see danger while danger lies below the horizon of imagination, or to devote to policy abroad the efforts and resources which are all too insufficient to satisfy the needs at home, perhaps makes democrats menace to any world but world of similar democrats. In the years since the Alameda Naval Air Station went into com-

The Anthropological Approach to the Problem of Modifying Race Attitudes

Today the entire world is preoccupied with race attitudes. An aggressor nation is using racism as a rationalization for precipitating the most destructive war of all time. Yet the use of race as a determining factor in human affairs is a relatively recent development. Indeed, it is but the latest chapter in the age-old story of the sheep and the goats. Today, it is the color of the skin and the texture of the hair which distinguish the sheep from the goats. In discussing scientific work on race it is difficult to separate arbitrarily the roles of anthropology, biology, psychology and sociology. The findings of each have been the starting place for the others, and the work of all is interrelated. We shall emphasize the work of anthropology in this paper, but must of necessity bring in other scientific contributions which have a direct bearing on the anthropological work. Biology, and more specifically, the science of genetics, contributed much to the scientific work on race. Until the end of the nineteenth century it was taken for granted by everyone, scientist and layman alike, that acquired characteristics were inherited. If the members of one generation developed their brains and muscles, their children were supposed to inherit this development. But by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century geneticists in different countries, experimenting simultaneously on this problem, reached conclusions which thoroughly discredited the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. All the geneticists finally agreed that any evolutionary changes which did take place came through mutations, that is, spontaneous changes in the chromosomes. Professor Thomas Hunt Morgan summed it up very well when he said that, "the belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics is not based on scientific evidence, but on the very human desire to pass on one's acquisitions to one's children".' With the scientific acceptance of the fact that acquired characteristics were not inherited, it could then be assumed, at least by the scientist, that whether a man became a cannibal or not, whether he was polygamous or monogamous, whether fishing or agriculture was his main occupation, or whether he worshipped ancestors or believed in God, was culturally determined and had nothing to do with biological inheritance. Neither African culture, nor French culture, nor American culture, nor any part of culture could be biologically inherited. The physical anthropologist starting from this base, asked himself a different question: What did the biological characteristics which he knew were inherited, mean? Did the color of the skin, the texture of the hair, the shape

Science and Government

THE second annual luncheon of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, held on February 11, was attended by several members of both Houses of Parliament, including three Cabinet ministers, and by representatives of the associated scientific bodies. In an address on the organization of scientific effort in Great Britain, Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, who has now become responsible for the Government's scientific services, recalled that Sir Stafford Cripps had already outlined the existing arrangements for scientific research and development in his address on January 30 before the conference on “Planning of Science : in War and in Peace” (see NATURE, February 6, p. 152). Sir John devoted himself therefore to the general principles which he believes should govern such arrangements. He believes that four main conditions must be satisfied : the organization must be an integral part of the Government machine ; it should maintain contact with outside scientific bodies ; it must not cut across normal ministerial responsibilities ; and it must be linked up with a minister who is in a position to see that extra-departmental considerations are not neglected. The present organization of scientific effort, with the scientific advisers to the Ministry of Supply, the Scientific and Engineering Advisory Committees and so on, is, in Sir John Anderson's opinion, meeting these requirements tolerably well, and will provide a good basis on which to build up the type of organization required for the post-war world. Sir Robert Robinson spoke on the importance of the international control of explosives. As all the explosives in use by armed forces depend on the supply of nitrates, he urged the control of synthetic nitrate and similar plants as a measure for ensuring that aggressor nations shall not resort to war.

Water Supply Facilities and National Defense

HAS been a little more than two years since hostilities which were destined to have world-wide ramifications flared up across the seas. As nation after nation fell under the heel of aggressor nations, America watched, heeded, and plotted her course. From the beginning that course has been one of preparedness for any eventuality. Less than one week after that indelible date of September 1, 1939, the President of the United States issued a directive designating the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the co-ordinating agency in all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, and other related national defense matters. At the request of the Army and Navy, the FBI immediately undertook an extensive program of surveying industrial plants having contracts to supply the armed forces with vital defense materials. Trained Special Agents of the FBI have thoroughly surveyed approximately 2,000 of these manufacturing establishments for the purpose of recommending suitable protective measures to the plant officials. In addition, over 24,000 copies of a confidential booklet, entitled Suggestions for Protection of Industrial Facilities, have been distributed to officials of industrial plants, public utilities, and transportation facilities, to whom this book is available upon request. At the present time, with the official approval of the Director of Civilian Defense, the FBI is engaged in conducting courses of training

The Neutrality Fight in Congress: 1939

When Congress convened in January, 1939, the neutrality legislation of 1935, 1936, and 1937 had been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Ethiopia, Spain, and China had proved unsatisfactory testing grounds, and the President, in his annual message to Congress, hinted that certain changes would be designed (1) to enable the United States to act less favorably vis-à-vis aggressor nations, (2) by means of giving the executive more discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs under the neutrality laws.