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Abstract
This study determines the nuclear pragmatic limit where the direct physical negative consequences of nuclear weapons use are counter to national interests, by assuming all unknowns are conservatively optimistic. The only effect considered is nuclear winter (“nuclear autumn” in the low weapons limits) and the resultant effects on the aggressor nation. First, the ability of low nuclear weapon limits is probed for maintaining deterrence in the worst-case scenario of attacking the most-populous nation. Second, the ability of aggressor nations to feed themselves is assessed without trade and industry resultant from a nuclear attack causing “nuclear autumn” (10% global agricultural shortfall). Third, the best-case wealthy aggressor nation with abundant arable land is analyzed for starvation and economic impacts given 7000, 1000, and 100 nuclear weapons scenarios. The results found that 100 nuclear warheads is adequate for nuclear deterrence in the worst case scenario, while using more than 100 nuclear weapons by any aggressor nation (including the best positioned strategically to handle the unintended consequences) even with optimistic assumptions (including no retaliation) would cause unacceptable damage to their own society. Thus, 100 nuclear warheads is the pragmatic limit and use of government funds to maintain more than 100 nuclear weapons does not appear to be rational.
Highlights
In the past, the size of the nuclear weapons arsenal for a given nation was determined through a military and policy analysis of deterrence and the ability to fund the stockpile [1,2,3,4]
This represents a significant underestimate, as the impacts of the bombs on trade and the climate are not considered and the attack would kill a significant number of additional people. To demonstrate that such a death toll from a relatively small number of nuclear weapons would act as a deterrent for rational decision makers, the demographic shock is put into historic context
World War I caused about 18 million deaths, so the 100 nuclear weapon case would kill more than 3 times more civilians than were lost in WWI
Summary
The size of the nuclear weapons arsenal for a given nation was determined through a military and policy analysis of deterrence and the ability to fund the stockpile [1,2,3,4]. Despite strong arguments for limiting nuclear weapons inventories because of the risks of accidents, full-scale nuclear war or threats of retaliation for first strikes [18,19,20,21,22], there is a fundamental upper limit for the number of nuclear weapons needed by any country. Stated : no country should have more nuclear weapons than the number necessary for unacceptable levels of environmental blow-back on the nuclear power’s own country if they were used. Such a pragmatic limit may appear self-evident to rational readers, and is supported by the psychology literature, which points out that suicide is closely associated with mental disorders [23,24,25]
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