The policy of preemption and its consequences: Iraq and beyond.

Abstract

In this article we apply research in the field of judgment and decision making to the policy of preemption. We use Brunswik's lens model to frame the policy of preemption as the integration of multiple fallible indicators under conditions of uncertainty. We use the Taylor-Russell diagram to demonstrate how the policy of preemption increases judgment uncertainty and error. The continuation of a policy of preemption will inevitably lead to an increase in false positives (mistaken military engagements), an increase in tension and dispute among U.S. allies (and foes) over these engagements, and a growing world perception that the United States is an aggressor nation. Post-9/11 policymakers and the public are explicitly focused on reducing false negatives at the implicit cost of increasing false positives. Greater appreciation of the inverse relationship between false positives and false negatives is needed to understand the consequences of the policy of preemption.