Abstract To ensure privacy and security of healthcare wireless medical sensor networks (HWMSNs), several concrete constructions of efficient certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme without bilinear pairing were proposed in the last few years. However, many previous constructions of CLAS scheme were found to be impractical, which either fail to meet the claimed security or contain design flaws. For example, in some of the previous proposals, any adversary can forge a valid signature on any new message. In this paper, we first demonstrate some security issues and design flaws in the previous proposals of CLAS scheme. As follows, to further address the above deficiencies, a new construction of CLAS scheme with improved security is presented, and the formal security proof is given using Forking Lemma in the random oracle model, assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Compared with the previous CLAS schemes, our construction has similar computational costs, and it provides better security guarantees. Therefore, compared with the existing solutions, our proposal with strong security and high computational efficiency is more suitable for use in HWMSNs.
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