Abstract
Wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) have aroused widespread attention in recent years with the development of Internet of Things (IoT) technology. WMSNs offer many new opportunities for healthcare professionals to monitor patients and patient self-monitoring. To overcome the resource (such as memory and power) limitations of sensors and attain data security of patients’ private medical information, researchers have designed plenty of work for securing WMSNs. For years, certificate-based aggregate signature (CBAS) schemes have been put forward for WMSNs to prevent patients’ sensitive medical data from being tampered with and damaged. In this work, we analyze the security flaws of a very recent CBAS scheme proposed by Verma <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> (2021) by presenting two types of security attacks. We later propose a CBAS scheme with user anonymity protection for WMSNs and prove its security based on the standard cryptographic assumption. The performance comparison results from theory and experiment illustrate the practicality of our design.
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