Levels Of Agents Research Articles

플레이 수준 조절이 가능한 강화학습 기반 카드형 대전 게임 에이전트

Game agents which are behavioral agent for game playing are a crucial component of game satisfaction. However it takes a lot of time and effort to create game agents for various game levels, environments, and players. In addition, when the game environment changes such as adding contents or updating characters, new game agents need to be developed and the development difficulty gradually increases. And it is important to have a game agent that can be customized for different levels of players. This is because a game agent that can play games of various levels is more useful and can increase the satisfaction of more players than a high-level game agent. In this paper, we propose a method for learning and controlling the level of play of game agents that can be rapidly developed and fine-tuned for various game environments and changes. At this time, reinforcement learning applies a policy-based distributed reinforcement learning method IMPALA for flexible processing and fast learning of various behavioral structures. Once reinforcement learning is complete, we choose actions by sampling based on Softmax-Temperature method. From this result, we show that the game agent's play level decreases as the Temperature value increases. This shows that it is possible to easily control the play level.

Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning

A rational principal delegates learning to an overconfident agent who overestimates the precision of the information he collects. The principal chooses between two contracts: commitment, in which the agent commits to the duration of learning in advance, and flexible, in which the agent decides when to stop learning in real time. When the agent is sufficiently overconfident, the principal optimally ties the agent's hands by offering him the commitment contract. When the principal can choose both the contract and the agent's level of overconfidence, selecting the rational agent is suboptimal when the cost of learning is sufficiently high.

Asymmetric taxation, limited liability, and agency conflicts

Current income tax systems are characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. This implies that the (effective) tax rate on profits exceeds that on losses. We study the contractural relationship between two parties (the principal and the agent). For example, such a relationship occurs if a franchisee (agent) contracts with a franchiser (principal) or when a new partner (agent) enters a partnership (principal). We focus on the effect of the agent's asymmetric taxation on the principal's optimal contract and show that the principal's expected profit is a non-monotonous function of the agent's loss tax rate. In particular, we show that the principal can be strictly better off if the agent is taxed more heavily. This result stands in contrast to the existing literature, which has only shown that lower taxation at the agent's level increases the principal's expected profit.

A model of weighted network formation

This paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either “reciprocal” or “nonreciprocal.” In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link between them. In a nonreciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into “concentrated” and “diversified” agents, and a concentrated agent is only linked to diversified agents and vice versa. For every link, the concentrated agent invests more in the link than the diversified agent. The unweighted relationship graph of an equilibrium, in which two agents are linked if they both invest positively in each other, uniquely predicts the equilibrium values of each agent's network investment and utility level, as well as the ratio of any two agents' investments in each other. We show that equilibria are not pairwise stable and are not efficient due to the positive externalities of investing in a link.

A multi-sensory code for emotional arousal.

People express emotion using their voice, face and movement, as well as through abstract forms as in art, architecture and music. The structure of these expressions often seems intuitively linked to its meaning: romantic poetry is written in flowery curlicues, while the logos of death metal bands use spiky script. Here, we show that these associations are universally understood because they are signalled using a multi-sensory code for emotional arousal. Specifically, variation in the central tendency of the frequency spectrum of a stimulus-its spectral centroid-is used by signal senders to express emotional arousal, and by signal receivers to make emotional arousal judgements. We show that this code is used across sounds, shapes, speech and human body movements, providing a strong multi-sensory signal that can be used to efficiently estimate an agent's level of emotional arousal.

Consensus reaching in social network DeGroot Model: The roles of the Self-confidence and node degree

In this paper, we investigate how the agent's self-confidence level and the node degree influence the consensus opinion formation and the consensus convergence speed in the social network DeGroot model. We find that (1) the higher self-confidence will increase the agent's importance degree to determine the consensus opinion, but will also slow down the convergence speed for all agents to be able to obtain consensus, and (2) it is conducive to accelerating the convergence speed to be able to reach a consensus where all agents can manage to balance self-confidence levels and node degrees in the social network.

Influenced Preferences: Consumption Under Uncertainty

This work studies the impact of uncertainty on an agent's decision-making process in an interdependent preference context. Mainly, it analyses the influence of society on the agent's consumption level when the agent is uncertain about the consumption level of the society. This issue is modeled in a hypothetical economy with two consumers and one good, where one of the consumers is the decision maker (DM), and the other is a peer. The principal outcome of this research confirms that when there is uncertainty about the peer's consumption level, then the inequity averse DM increases her consumption level.

When Patience Leads to Destruction: The Curious Case of Individual Time Preferences and the Adoption of Destructive Fishing Gears

The use of destructive fishing methods is a serious problem, especially for tropical and developing countries. Due to inter temporal nature of fisheries extraction activities, standard economic theory suggests that an individual's time preference can play a major role in determining the gear choice decision. Based on earlier theoretical work we identify two ways in which individual time preferences can impact the adoption of destructive extraction methods; (i) the conservation effect which posits that patient individuals (as indicated by relatively high discount factor) are less likely to use destructive extraction methods since they are more likely to account for the loss of future income that is accompanied by using these methods, (ii) the disinvestment effect which argues that patient individuals are more likely to use destructive extraction methods since they have greater investment capability.Using an agent-based model we clarify the conditions under which one of these effects is more dominant than the other one. Our model suggests that the nature of destructive gear along with the level of social dilemma determines whether patient or impatient individuals (relatively lower discount factor) are more likely to adopt such a gear. Additionally agent's beliefs regarding future resource condition and other agent's extraction level can have a major influence in some cases.

Análisis sectorial de la función de emparejamiento en Colombia: eficiencia del Servicio Público de Empleo

The objective of this research is to analyze the Colombian labor market and to identify some frictions that affect the aggregate, departmental and agent's levels, through the estimation of a matching function, using monthly data from the Public Employment Service (SPE), from February to November 2014. This research is the first approach to estimating the matching fucntion of the Colombian labor market. Comparison between models concludes that: (i)frictions are higher for firms than for the unemployed; (ii)there is a bias in the estimation of the matching function; (iii)there is evidence of constant returns to scale; (iv)interactions between supply and demand for labor occur first in the regions and are less relevant because of the characteristics of the agents; (v)the stock-flow model does not adjust to several estimates, and (vi)the more robust model corresponds to the dynamic linear model.

Change and continuity in post-Katrina New Orleans

In post-Katrina New Orleans the City Charter endorses the designation of the City Planning Commission (CPC) as the lead agency for both urban and recovery planning. The municipal level of government and the theory and practice of planning thus achieve positions of dominance in the recovery process. The paper notes a number of correspondences between the New Orleans model and Habraken's hierarchy of control of urban change, in which control over the top level, the city, confers dominance over the actions of agents operating at all lower levels. The post-Katrina planning literature records, however, that despite its mandate the CPC becomes just one agency operating within a competitive context in which the cataclysmic destruction of the physical environment is not reflected in the associated social structure of the city's agents of change. A considerable continuity of tenure within the membership of the city level's agents emerges from the literature, and the control of the recovery planning process becomes a common objective. The paper concludes with an assessment of the degree to which they succeed in exerting a controlling influence on the content and implementation of the recovery plans.

Participation and demand levels for a joint project

We examine a voluntary participation game in public good provision in which each agent has a demand level for the public good. The agent's demand level is the minimum level of the public good from which she can receive a positive benefit. In this game, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at which the (Pareto) efficient allocation is achieved. The voluntary participation game may also have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with underprovision of the public good. However, some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the efficient allocation satisfies strong perfection, introduced by Rubinstein (1980), and strong perfection is satisfied only by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the efficient allocation. Furthermore, all payoffs at strong perfect equilibria belong to the core of the enterprise game. By these results, we conclude that in our case, the voluntary participation problem is not as serious as the earlier studies report. We also discuss the extensibility of these results.

Participation and Demand Levels for a Joint Project

We examine a voluntary participation game in public good provision in which each agent has a demand level for the public good. The agent's demand level is the minimum level of the public good from which she can receive a positive benefit. In this game, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at which the (Pareto) efficient allocation is achieved. The voluntary participation game may also have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with underprovision of the public good. However, some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the efficient allocation satisfies strong perfection, introduced by Rubinstein (1980), and strong perfection is satisfied only by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the efficient allocation. Furthermore, all payoffs at strong perfect equilibria belong to the core of the enterprise game. By these results, we conclude that in our case, the voluntary participation problem is not as serious as the earlier studies report. We also discuss the extensibility of these results.

Agency Models in Law and Economics

This lecture is an introduction to the use of agency models in law and economics. It is designed for first year law students with no background in economics. A simple example is used to illustrate the basic tradeoff between incentives and insurance when a principal is unable to observe an agent's level of effort. The example is then generalized, and several complications (multitasking, multiple agents, teams, etc.) are discussed. The agency model is then used to analyze contract remedies, and (very briefly) issues in torts, corporations, civil procedure, administrative procedure, and other important areas of the law.

Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence-free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that the optimal contract (and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not) depends on the magnitude of the productivity-based influence costs. We show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low.

Transformation of State-owned Enterprises in China: A Strategic Action Model

AbstractTransformation is a vital challenge for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their top managers. To explore this increasingly important topic, we first summarize the institutional context of SOE transformation and the conflicting interests and interdependent relationships of six major actors as inside/outside stakeholders. Based on the strategic action view of institutional analysis, we emphasize the role of the change agent's level of aspiration and political skills in transforming an SOE. Then, through inductive case studies on the transformation of three SOEs, we address how top managers, acting as change agents, can initiate and engage in institutional change through strategic actions such as negotiation, manipulation, and coercion; we also illustrate how they adopt different actions to influence different actors. Based on the inductive results, we develop a theoretical model, which we refer to as the ‘strategic action model’ that shows how the aspiration level, political skills, strategic actions, and change outcomes interrelate and offer insights into the strategic action of top managers as change agents. Our most important contribution is revealing the interplay between the proactive role of inside actors as change agents and the enabling condition of institutional context.

Design Mechanism on Dynamic Incentive Machnism Considering Special Talents of the Manager

Suppose the firm's output is influenced by the agent’s effort level observable and the ability unobservable, researching the optimal level of incentives under the two levels of incentives associated. Study found that corporate client based on the first period of corporate performance, the agents ability to judge the case, risk aversion, the variance of the degree of capacity, the degree of attention of the principal agents the ability have an impact on the agents first and second of the optimal incentive level. In addition, of the optimal incentive level in first period is correlated with the contribution of the efforts with the manager of the firm's output, the agent's incentive level in the second period as well as the effort cost associated of the first period; while the second period of the optimal the incentive level is a decreasing function of the current cost of effort.

Transformation of State-owned Enterprises in China: A Strategic Action Model. 中国国有企业改制：一个战略行动模型

abstract Transformation is a vital challenge for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their top managers. To explore this increasingly important topic, we first summarize the institutional context of SOE transformation and the conflicting interests and interdependent relationships of six major actors as inside/outside stakeholders. Based on the strategic action view of institutional analysis, we emphasize the role of the change agent's level of aspiration and political skills in transforming an SOE. Then, through inductive case studies on the transformation of three SOEs, we address how top managers, acting as change agents, can initiate and engage in institutional change through strategic actions such as negotiation, manipulation, and coercion; we also illustrate how they adopt different actions to influence different actors. Based on the inductive results, we develop a theoretical model, which we refer to as the ‘strategic action model’ that shows how the aspiration level, political skills, strategic actions, and change outcomes interrelate and offer insights into the strategic action of top managers as change agents. Our most important contribution is revealing the interplay between the proactive role of inside actors as change agents and the enabling condition of institutional context. 摘要 改制是中国国有企业及其高层管理者面临的重要挑战。为了探究这个愈来愈重要的问题，我们首先总结了国有企业改制的制度情境，以及六个主要内外部利益相关者之间的冲突利益和相互依赖关系。基于战略行动视角的制度分析，我们强调变革推动者的抱负水平和政治技能在国企改制中的作用。然后，通过对三个国企改制的归纳性案例研究，我们指出高层管理者作为变革推动者，如何通过谈判、操纵和强制等战略行动，发起和深化制度变革；我们也分析了他们如何采用不同策略来影响不同行动者。基于这些归纳结果，我们开发了一个理论模型，即所谓的“战略行动模型”，用以表征抱负水平、政治技能、战略行动和变革结果之间的相互关系，进而指明高层管理者作为变革推动者的战略行动。我们最重要的贡献在于，揭示内部行动者作为变革推动者所扮演的主动性角色和制度情境所具有的诱发性条件之间的相互作用。

Irreversible investment, uncertainty, and ambiguity: The case of bioenergy sector

We analyze production and investment decisions of an agent in industrial activities that are characterized by two forms of uncertainty: demand uncertainty (in terms of number of buyers) and competitive effect uncertainty (in terms of other energy resource). We apply our model on the bioenergy industries. We compare the case of an ambiguity neutral agent with that of an ambiguity averse agent. We show that the investment decision of an agent depends on the effects of both the capital investment and the level of production on the cost and the uncertainty the agent is confronted with. Moreover, we find that ambiguity aversion tends to decrease the agent's optimal levels of production and investment. Our numerical analysis of the French case illustrates the different effects associated with demand uncertainty and competitive effect uncertainty.

Dead and Gone

I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives us a way to acknowledge both the intuition that we cannot be harmed after we die and, in a sense, the intuition that things that happen after we die are relevant to our lives.

Fraud Deterrence in Dynamic Mirrleesian Economies

Social and private insurance schemes rely on legal action to deter fraud and tax evasion. This observation guides the authors to introduce a random state verification technology in a dynamic economy with private information. With some probability, an agent's skill level becomes known to the planner, who prescribes a punishment if the agent is caught misreporting. The authors show how deferring consumption can ease the provision of incentives. As a result, the marginal benefit may be below the marginal cost of investment in the constrained-efficient allocation, suggesting a subsidy on savings. They characterize conditions such that the intertemporal wedge is negative in finite horizon economies. In an infinite horizon economy, the authors find that the constrained-efficient allocation converges to a high level of consumption, full insurance, and no labor distortions for any probability of state verification.