Future Of Africa Research Articles

The End of the African Renaissance

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Elaine Ganley, “Mandela Asks African Renaissance, and Good Government,” Associated Press, June 13, 1994. 2. See World Bank, “Africa Development Indicators,” Web site, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/africa-development-indicators. 3. See International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa: Back to High Growth?” April 2010, Table SA3, p. 68, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/afr/eng/sreo0410.pdf. 4. See World Bank, “Global Monitoring Report 2009,” 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALMONITOR/EXTGLOMONREP2009/0,,menuPK:5924413~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:5924405,00.html. 5. See Statistics South Africa, “Quarterly Labour Force Survey,” Statistical Release P0211, May 4, 2010, http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2010.pdf and “South Africa's Official Unemployment Rate 32.6 percent,” Reuters, March 31, 1995. 6. See Avril V. Adams, “Skills Development in the Informal Sector of Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Bank, June 10, 2008, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21812910~menuPK:2098867~pagePK:64002643~piPK:64002619~theSitePK:258644,00.html. 7. See IMF, “International Financial Statistics,” Web site, http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/; UN Development Programme, “Human Development Reports,” Web site, http://hdr.undp.org/en/; UN World Food Programme, “Annual Report,” Web site, http://www.wfp.org/policy-resources/corporate?type=37&tid_2=All&tid_4=All. 8. Makau Wa Mutua, “African Renaissance,” New York Times, May 11, 1991, p. 23. 9. See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” Web site, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15. 10. Kenneth Good, “The Illusion of Democracy in Botswana,” in Larry Diamond, Larry Jay, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 293. 11. See “A Runaway Army,” Africa Confidential 50, no. 9 (April 30, 2010), pp. 10–11, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3511/A-runaway-army and Adam Nossiter, “Former Exile Holds Power in West African Nation,” New York Times, May 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/world/africa/26bissau.html. 12. See Afrobarometer, “Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: The Evolution of African Political Regimes, 1999–2008,” Briefing Paper no.67, p. 2, http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo67_19may09_final.pdf. 13. Jason Mclure, “Why Democracy Isn't Working,” Newsweek, July 5, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/18/why-democracy-isn-t-working.html. 14. “South Africa: Mbeki Laments Africa's Slip to the Sidelines,” Africannewslive.com, May 28, 2010, http://africannewslive.com/?p=5062. 15. Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index,” Web site, 2010, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140. 16. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Trafficking in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” July 7, 2009, http://img.modernghana.com/images/content/report_content/westafricareport2009.pdf. 17. See “Piracy Could Spread to Other Parts of Africa: Radebe,” South African Press Association, May 25, 2010, http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/article469446.ece/Piracy-could-spread-to-other-parts-of-Africa-Radebe. 18. Werner Menges, “Heroes’ Monument Losing Battle,” The Nambian, May 6, 2005, http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=17897&no_cache=1. 19. See Commission for Africa, “2005 Report,” http://www.commissionforafrica.info/2005-report. 20. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Development Statistics, Web site, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm. 21. Yunus Abdulhamid, “Group Wants Action On Climate Change By Africa Leaders,” AllAfrica.com, June 8, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201006080660.html. 22. Elaine Ganley, “Mandela Asks African Renaissance, and Good Government,” Associated Press, June 13, 1994. 23. See George B.N. Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 24. See Edwin Musoni, “Citizens Know What is Best for Them – Kagame,” AllAfrica.com, July 31, 2010. 25. Elias Biryabarema, “Museveni Succession—What Next After Museveni?,” All Africa News Service, January 31, 2008. 26. See Goran Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 27. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 257. 28. Zibani Maundeni, “Why the African Renaissance Is Likely to Fail: The Case of Zimbabwe,” Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no. 2 (2004):195. 29. Se Mark Gevisser, A Legacy of Liberation: Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African Dream (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 30. See World Bank, “Toward the Competitive Frontier: Strategies for Improving Ethiopia's Investment Climate,” Report No. 48472-ET, June 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Data%20and%20Reference/22432643/Et-ICA-10-June-09.pdf and World Bank, “Capturing the Demographic Bonus in Ethiopia: Gender, Development, and Demographic Actions,” Report No. 36434-ET, June 2007. 31. Leonard Barnes, African Renaissance (London: Gollancz, 1969), p. 10. 32. Johnnie Carson, “U.S. Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Washington, D.C., March 24, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/139002.htm. 33. Susan D. Page, “U.S.–South Africa Strategic Dialogue,” African Affairs Special Briefings, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2010/140260.htm. 34. See Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty,” International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 85–120. 35. “FACTBOX: African leaders’ French Assets Under Scrutiny,” Reuters, October 29, 2009, http://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFLS66793620091029. 36. IMF, “IMF and World Bank Announce Debt Relief to the Republic of Congo,” press release no. 10/20, January 28, 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr1020.htm. 37. See Kathleen M. Fallon, Democracy and the Rise of Women's Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 38. See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, L'Afrique A-t-Elle Besoin d'un Programme d'Ajustement Culturel? [Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?] (Ivry-sur-Seine, France: Editions Nouvelles du Sud, 1990). Additional informationNotes on contributorsBruce GilleyBruce Gilley is assistant professor of political science in the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University and is the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (Columbia University Press, 2009)

THE NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AFRICA

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to promote the revival of African economic history. Poverty, the most pressing issue confronting the continent, has received world-wide publicity in recent years. Yet historians have continued to neglect the history of economic development, which is central to the study of poverty, in favour of themes that have their origins in the Western world rather than in Africa. However, there is now an exceptional opportunity to correct the balance. Unknown to most historians, economists have produced a new economic history of Africa in the course of the past decade. This article introduces and evaluates two of the most important contributions to the new literature: the thesis that Africa has suffered a ‘reversal of fortune’ during the last 500 years, and the proposition that ethnic fragmentation, which has deep historical roots, is a distinctive cause of Africa's economic backwardness. These arguments are criticized on both methodological and empirical grounds. But they are also welcomed for their boldness, their freshness and their potential for re-engaging historians in the study of Africa's economic past – not least because it is relevant to Africa's economic future.

Preface

Preface

Africa's Futures: from North – South to East – South?

This article contests dominant projections of Africa's future, most notably the Afro-pessimism that permeates almost all Northern analyses. While long-term data do confirm the continent's developmental impasse, they also dispute the dominant argument that Africa has been isolated and disengaged from the world economy. Indeed, Africa has been increasingly engaged with—and impoverished by—its relationships with Europe and North America. African scholars, recognising this dilemma, call for a return of the ‘developmental state’. This recommendation, however, like Afro-pessimist projections, fails to take into account fundamental transformations in Africa's geostrategic and world-economic relationships. The implications of two key, global transitions are traced for Africa and particularly South Africa: first, the disruptive power of global social movements; second, the rise of Asia and the demise of US and European hegemony over Africa.

EU Trade Policy & the Future of Africa's Trade Relationship with the EU

Despite the announcement of a ‘new trade strategy’, EU agricultural trade policy has exhibited considerable consistency over several decades, always conditional on the CAP regime and the course of its reform. A 25-year, heavily subsidised transition, will shortly see European farmers (thanks to income support of up to 50% of their total income), able to enter the world market without export subsidies. Meanwhile the EC expects ‘partner’ countries in Africa (and the Caribbean and the Pacific) with still underdeveloped infrastructures, and provided with relatively trivial subsidies, to complete a similar process in a decade or so. The economic partnership agreement (EPA) negotiations are based on a shift from the Lomé Convention's non-reciprocity commitment to a basic regime of free trade between the EU and EPA regions, involving liberalisation of trade in goods, trade-related areas and services. Whereas Europe has already effectively integrated, few African regions have yet got very far in regional integration, but the EC is forcing the pace in negotiations so that there is a risk that integration will be with the EU rather than within a country's own region, and on the EU's terms. A ‘development dimension’ adds an element of window-dressing (or sugaring of the pill). This article considers the development programmes that the EU is promising in order to address infrastructural constraints in the partner countries, and the costs of adjustment to free trade, in particular the loss of state revenues generated from tariffs. The article concludes with an attempt to foresee the likely outcomes and implications of the negotiations, including the undermining of government revenues and the consequent increase in reliance on the private sector for many services, accelerated deindustrialisation, and the inhibiting of first-stage processing of agricultural commodities, the undermining of regional integration, the economic ‘recolonisation’ of Africa and the harming of efforts to promote national exploitation of economic resources.

The Future of Africa's Trade with Europe: ‘New’ EU Trade Policy

Trade with Europe is currently more important for the African continent, and nearly every single country in it, than any other international economic links. Africa's future trade relationship with the European Union (EU) is now being decided in negotiations which are provoking intense debate, and to understand what is at issue it is necessary to locate these negotiations in the context of the EU's wider trade policy. This policy was recently reiterated in a more coherent and focused form in the European Commission's (EC’s) October 2006 proposal for a new trade strategy. This paper seeks to review the main elements of this ‘new’ strategy before looking at how it impacts on the EU's approach to the negotiations for ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’ (EPAs) with four groupings of African countries.1 It closes by reviewing what this will probably mean for the Africa-EU trade relationship in the future in the context of the major trends in the current processes of negotiations.

Cultural identity and the future of Africa

The major challenge facing the development of the African culture today cannot be easily deciphered without unearthing the problems encountered by the exposure of traditional cultures to the beliefs and practices of other forms of life. Colonialism, capitalism and of recent, globalization are international trends that have called into question the views, ideas and thoughts of the traditional African culture. The result of this encounter with these international trends has forced us to reflect on the African project and thus embark on the quest for a paradigm that would best account for the needs and interests of Africans in a more satisfactory manner.

Cultural identity and the future of Africa

The major challenge facing the development of the African culture today cannot be easily deciphered without unearthing the problems encountered by the exposure of traditional cultures to the beliefs and practices of other forms of life. Colonialism, capitalism and of recent, globalization are international trends that have called into question the views, ideas and thoughts of the traditional African culture. The result of this encounter with these international trends has forced us to reflect on the African project and thus embark on the quest for a paradigm that would best account for the needs and interests of Africans in a more satisfactory manner.

Past drought hints at Africa's future

Past drought hints at Africa's future

Sub-Saharan Africa's Future: A US National Intelligence Council Conference Report

Sub-Saharan Africa's Future: A US National Intelligence Council Conference Report

On the Edge of Reason: Planning and Urban Futures in Africa

The shift in planning theory from technical-instrumental to relational conceptions of rationality is helpful in relating to urban environments in Africa that are characterised by the intersection of multiple rationalities and also by spatially extensive and shifting networks of economic and social transaction. However, the relevance of contemporary planning theory is limited by its origins within the intellectual traditions and experiences of the West. If we are to engage effectively with the multiple rationalities that are shaping the cities of the world-cities that are increasingly centred in the global South-then we must bring Western intellectual tradition into a critical relationship with the epistemologies, rationalities and value-based traditions of the non-Occidental world. This paper argues that post-colonial literature and theory may provide some of the intellectual resources needed to sustain such an engagement, as post-colonial thought directs attention to the hybrid intellectual formations and practices that emerge in the on-going interaction between colonised and coloniser. By using Johannesburg as the prism through which to look at cities and at planning, this paper provides some thoughts on how to construct an 'other way' of thinking that is situated both within and outside dominant representations.

African Integration and Civil Society: The Case of the African Union

African integration and civil society:the case of the African Union Mammo Muchie (bio), Adam Habib (bio), and Vishnu Padayachee (bio) The future of Africa, the modernisation of Africa that has a place in the 21st century is linked up with its decolonisation and detribalisation. Tribal atavism would be giving up any hope for Africa. And of all the sins that Africa can commit, the sin of despair would be the most unforgivable … My generation led Africa to political freedom. The current generation of leaders and the peoples of Africa must pick up the flickering torch of freedom, refuel it with their enthusiasm and determination and carry it forward. (Julius Nyerere, New African, January, 2000) Introduction For nearly forty years African integration was the exclusive domain of the political elites that occupied high office in Africa's post-colonial states. To the extent that it occurred, these elites tried to pursue policies of regional co-operation as a means of integration ostensibly to achieve the double aim of social and economic development and a reduction of dependency on the metropolitan countries. 'When Pan-Africanists signed the charter of the [Organisation for African Unity] in Addis Ababa, what they had in mind was the liberation of the continent from colonialism and apartheid —so far the only elements of consensus' (Pondi 2001:1). The rhetorical commitment at the annual and rather ritualistic meetings of the OAU to end all vestiges of colonialism, to promote African unity, and oppose South Africa's apartheid state, continued over a period which saw many heads of states and governments forcibly removed from office, often superceded by those even less committed to national development, reducing dependency and deepening democracy within their nations. Claude Ake has observed in this context that 'most African regimes have been so alienated and so violently repressive that their citizens see the state [End Page 3] and its development agents as enemies to be evaded, cheated and defeated if possible, but never as partners' (Ake 1991:13). Beyond an effort to express a collective voice in support of the broader African struggle to be freed from racialism and colonialism, the OAU cannot be said to have reached a threshold of integration that can meaningfully co-ordinate external and internal political, economic and social policies to promote credible and sustainable institutions for democracy and national development. At a meeting of African Heads of States in Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2002, the OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU). Rather than continuing the dominant state-centered process of integration, the AU has written into its Constitutive Act a commitment to transform itself into a people-centered organ. The vehicle of this transformation is envisaged to be the active participation of civil society. The move from a state-centered to a people-centered or civil society-activated integration process raises critical issues such as how state-society relations can be reconceptualised and reconfigured. In one sense, the formation of the AU has opened a Pandora's box that had been tightly closed under the OAU. While the AU has opened the space for civil society to participate in shaping what is yet to be forged as a people-centered AU, it leaves many questions about the nature of the partnership and power relations unanswered: what exactly is the nature of the participation by civil society? Is this merely an invitation to civil society to inform decision makers and raise issues for the agenda without full participation in the shaping of AU institutions and the making of a tangible contribution? How substantive is the envisaged participation? What kind of civil society participation do state officials and the civil society actors envisage? Will the AU foster a new civil society and state relationship? Our central thesis here is that Africa's integration agenda should be cast on rather different foundations to those of other cases. We argue that civic participation should be an integral component of Africa's integration agenda and, encouragingly, the AU has distinguished itself from its predecessor by explicitly committing itself to a people-centred and participative programme. It has institutionalised this through the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council...

Africa in the global knowledge economy: strategic options

The future of Africa now depends largely on the nature and outlook of its economic vision and the realignment of national institutions to reflect major trends in global and regional economic affairs. Ongoing political reforms in Africa have coincided with the growing realisation that economic growth is mainly a result of the transformation of knowledge (expressed in the form of education, science and technology and the associated institutions) into goods and services. This paper provides elements of a strategic policy outlook for Africa's economic renewal and growth, emphasising the role of science, technology and innovation.

Centre for African renaissance studies, the academy, the state and civil society: Methodological implications of transdisciplinarity and the African perspective

The Centre for African Renaissance Studies (CARS) at the University of South Africa was born in a political and social environment in which there is a new groundswell for a rebirth, where there are calls for ownership, accountability, excellence, responsiveness and substantive democracy on new terms. Surrounding the centre are the state, the academy and civil society, each with its limitations as well as possibilities for an institution that is established to foster, nourish and effect change in the context of the African Renaissance. The challenge before CARS is therefore one that involves the creation of new knowledge, analyses and interpretations of social reality on an ongoing basis. In working out its linkages and its strategies for dialogue, engagement and co‐determination around the past, present and future of Africa, with players such as the state, the academy and civil society in general, therefore, the centre needs of necessity to clarify its position, role and vision in the field of knowledge production. It is here that transdisciplinarity signifies a distinct methodology in knowledge generation, development and utilisation. This article argues that the nature of the crisis we face today is definitely no longer that of ‘economics’, ‘politics’ or ‘culture’ per se; neither is it, for that matter, a crisis of the humanities versus the natural sciences; but rather it is one in which there is a peculiar convergence of all these factors and which, together, form an entirety exceeding the sum of its parts.

Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future

Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future

Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future

Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future

Africa unchained: the blueprint for Africa's future

Africa unchained: the blueprint for Africa's future

Endgame in the Western Sahara: what future for Africa's last colony?

* Acknowledgments * Chronology * 1. Introduction * 2. International context: The Maghreb from 'Cold War' to 'War Against Terror' * US ambitions for the Maghreb * Jealous France and post-colonial Spain * 3. Cain and Abel: The Western Sahara and the Struggle for Regional Supremacy * Changing interests in a changing world * The supporting players * 4. Morocco: Unstable and Counting the Cost of the Green March * Economic costs versus political benefits * 5. The Alchemist's Dream: The Quest for Gold from the Desert Sand * Oil * Phosphates * Fisheries * Iron and other minerals * 6. Sahrawi Society under Occupation * The demographic fog * Economic development: grand plans, grim reality * 7. The 'Years of Lead' * 8. An Identity Forged by Resistance * 9. 1999: Civil Society and Breaking Down the 'Wall of Fear' * 10. Zero sum game: The Western Sahara and the UN Process * The settlement plan: From ceasefire to deadlock * Sidelining the Sahrawis * Baker tries again * 11. Polisario and the SADR: Guerrillas, Refugees and their State-in-Waiting * Political evolution within the movement * The structure of Polisario's state * 12. War: The Unbroken Chain * 13. Endgame

Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Impacts of Biomass and Petroleum Energy Futures in Africa

We analyzed the mortality impacts and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions produced by household energy use in Africa. Under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, household indoor air pollution will cause an estimated 9.8 million premature deaths by the year 2030. Gradual and rapid transitions to charcoal would delay 1.0 million and 2.8 million deaths, respectively; similar transitions to petroleum fuels would delay 1.3 million and 3.7 million deaths. Cumulative BAU GHG emissions will be 6.7 billion tons of carbon by 2050, which is 5.6% of Africa's total emissions. Large shifts to the use of fossil fuels would reduce GHG emissions by 1 to 10%. Charcoal-intensive future scenarios using current practices increase emissions by 140 to 190%; the increase can be reduced to 5 to 36% using currently available technologies for sustainable production or potentially reduced even more with investment in technological innovation.

NEPAD AND THE CAPITAL FLOWS INITIATIVE: CAN AFRICA WALK THE WALK?

In the 1960s and early 1970s the future of Africa looked bright and promising. Economic growth and development on the continent was considerably higher than in other developing regions. However, during the middle 1970s political instability increased and economic development started to deteriorate, both contributing to the marginalization of the continent. The continued marginalization constitutes a serious threat to the participation of Africa in the global economy. Nepad calls for a reversal of this process through a new partnership between Africa and the international community (Nepad, 2001: 1 and 2).