African Party Research Articles

Measuring Political Change: The Quantity and Effectiveness of Electoral and Party Participation in the Zambian One-Party State, 1973–91

The introduction of a ‘one-party participatory democracy’ in Zambia in 1973 under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of President Kenneth Kaunda made significant changes in the nature and extent of political participation, regime structure and public policy in that country. Among a number of constitutional changes, the proscription of the opposition parties – African National Congress (ANC) and United Progressive Party (UPP) – was probably the most important. There is a relatively extensive literature describing these changes and evaluating their significance. A number of further changes which affected these political variables in varying degrees occurred during the life of the one-party system, which lasted until 1991, but much less has been written about these changes, at least in part because they have been assumed to be insignificant. This Note describes the collection of a systematic events dataset on changes in electoral and political party participation (including changes in policies towards participation and changes in party structures affecting participation), regime structure (including party–government relations, central government structure and central–local government relations), and policies affecting the economy, class structure and culture in Zambia from 1973 through 1985. It then describes the use of expert judges to scale events in the dataset and evaluate their cumulative significance for dimensions of change delineated by the investigator or themselves. Finally, it presents one substantive application of this methodology: specification of the overall directions and extent of change in electoral and party participation under the one-party system. Two contradictory directions of change not so far identified in the literature on the Zambian one-party state are uncovered. It is suggested that changes in the one-party state helped to undermine its support, even among some of those Zambians who initially believed in it.

South Africa's Party System

This discussion on the South African party system looks at the past, present and possible future of the party system in terms of a number of indicators, notably: voter participation, number of political parties, competition, ideological distance, characteristics of political parties, voter volatility, change and stability. In the past the nature of the party system was to a large extent predetermined by legislation as an external factor. The repeal of legislation that affected the party system will undoubtedly lead to changes, but it will take some time to determine the impact of all the new forces on the party system.

Black Ethnicities, Communities and Political Expression in Late Victorian Cape Town

In 1994 the National Party of Mr de Klerk defeated the African National Congress in only one of nine South African provinces, the Western Cape. The reason for this success lay in the support that the NP received from a large majority of Coloured South Africans in this region. Many were worried about the possibility of losing homes and jobs to ‘Africans’, and believed that the ANC was a specifically African party. These worries and beliefs were encouraged by Nationalist Party politicians. But the success of the latter's campaign was premised on the existence of more enduring self-identities, while simultaneously lending them new content.This article attempts to explain the emergence of different black ethnicities, and particularly the emergence of Coloured ethnicity, in the British Cape Colony, and its capital, Cape Town. Because of a low non-racial franchise and (theoretical) equality of all before the law, the Victorian Cape provided the possibility of formal black political expression – the establishment of parties, electioneering and political mobilization.The different black ethnicities that emerged were not the inevitable result of different ‘cultures’ or distant historical experiences. But nor were they simply created by élite Ethnic mobilizers in response to white racialization and discrimination, as was sometimes suggested in revisionist South African historiography of the Apartheid era. This historiography was understandably eager to challenge belief in the immutability of race and ethnicity that underpinned ‘separate development’ – a policy which itself served to reshape, perpetuate and reinforce perceptions of ethnic difference.Labels, like ‘Coloured’ or ‘Native’ may have been imposed by whites and used by black élites to challenge state policies or to demand resources. But the labels had to continue to make sense to those they wished to mobilize. The content of ethnicities could not be purely ‘imagined’ by élites.

The Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa in the 1920s

As early as the 1890s certain Transvaal farmers enjoyed an economic marriage of convenience with some of the wealthy gold mine owners despite the fact that most Transvaal burghers saw the mines as a political and economic threat.1 The changing requirements of the Randlords, however, terminated this relationship and the Jameson Raid (1896) and the South African War (1899-1902) widened the breach. Nevertheless, in the early decades of the twentieth century an alliance between farmers and mineowners was struck. This has been called the gold and maize alliance by Stanley Trapido.2 The alliance was informal. It was initially nourished by the Milner administration which realized that such an alliance was necessary in order to keep South Africa British. The alliance did not rest on institutional linkages between, for example, the Chamber of Mines and the South African Agricultural Union. Rather, it seemed to work via a network of persons in Parliament, in the land companies and in a variety of agricultural organizations. The alliance could be seen in operation when support was given for the South African Party and its policies (such as reconciliation between Afrikaner and Englishman) and when preferential contracts were entered into between mine owners and certain farmers or agricultural groupings. The alliance did not join all farmers and mineowners. Only the progressive maize farmers of the western and eastern Transvaal found it comfortable to have close ties with the mines. These ties were cemented at the

PARTY, POLITY AND BUREAUCRACY: THE ZAMBIAN EDUCATION DEBATE, 1974–77

BETWEEN 1974 AND 1977, at the instigation of the single Party the United National Independence Party (UNIP)1 and the Government, the Zambian people debated the future of their education. The debate took place at a crucial period in the political and social development of the country. On the political level, it was designed to allay fears about the recently declared One Party State,2 involve the people actively in the country's second decade of independence and revive the image of UNIP as the country's leader. On the social level, the aim was to use education to redress the imbalances and inequalities becoming manifest in the society. Education had been seen as a major factor in creating and continuing status and income inequalities both between those living in the towns and those living in the countryside and also within those two areas. It was also intended that a new educational plan would assist the economic development of the country by making education more attuned to the needs of the country. After nearly ten years of independence, President Kaunda and UNIP had declared a one party participatory democracy in December 1972. Kaunda had decided to end the multiparty system not because of the strength of UNIP but from an awareness of its potential as a divisive force. Perpetual struggles had gone on within the party between leaders striving for power positions.3 These internal dissensions had led to the formation of breakaway parties such as the United Party and the United Peoples Party. Grass roots organizers lost influence as their power to deliver patronage lessened dramatically with the fall in the price of copper in the early seventies.4 As a mobilizing force the party was weak: less than 40 per cent of the electorate turned out for the first elections of the new One-Party State in early 1973. In its heyday, both before and after independence, UNIP had rightly prided itself on its ability to mobilize people to vote. As Harries-Jones wrote, 'Overall, UNIP was far more effective [in political mobilization] than many West African political parties'.5

The 1912 Greyville By-Election: Labour's Early Breakthrough in Natal

Attention has already been drawn to the manner in which, after a slow start following its formation in 1909, the South African Labour Party increased its Natal support in the immediate post-First World War period to reach an all-time peak in the 1920 general election.' It was a spectacular augmentation of strength which, in microcosm, was presaged by the hitherto largely ignored by-election contest that tookplace in the Durban constituency of Greyville in June 191 2.

Enkele gedagtes oor die teorie en praktyk van federalisme

Abstract Some Thoughts on the Theory and Practice of Federalism: There are indications that the federal concept is gaining ground in South African party politics. This article therefore analyses different federal definitions as well as different principles on which federalism can be based. The territorial, and corporate principles are discussed as well as the principle of personalised matters as applied in Belgium. Furthermore this article sets out the constitutional characteristics of federations and concentrates on aspects such as the role of the upper house in a federation, the division of powers and functions, the role of the judiciary, the methods for amending the constitution, administrative arrangements within federations as well as the prerequisites for federalism.

The Nuclear Arming Of South Africa

devastating rebellions which recently occurred in South Africa, leaving untold numbers of blacks either dead or wounded are a painful and tragic, yet necessary reminder of the human stakes in the Southern African situation. As the tempo of the southward movement of the revolution heightens and the issues in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Azania come clearly into focus, it should be underlined once again, that both in terms of the classic dimensions of political analysis and the specific conditions of these African peoples, the southern African situation is a revolutionary situation. The fresh rebellions inside South Africa are evidence of the existence of revolutionary activity. If the level of struggle against white repression were left at this crude stage we could not understand the relationship between the rebellions and a continuing revolution. However, the existence of African political parties, and African military forces in the contested areas illustrates that the activity we witness is not based on mere reformist opposition to the practices of the regimes, but upon the fact that blacks have raised up African nationalism to combat white settler nationalism with the ultimate objective being the replacement of one for another. The resort to violent revolution as a means to achieve African self-determination is a legitimate strategy, but perhaps has been most necessary where colonialism from a European country was administered through a significant white settler community such as in Algeria, Kenya, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa. In all of these places, a repressive colonialism, combined with an intransigent and ruthless local settler community has fostered nationalism expressed by a revolutionary movement. The fact which concerns us, however, is that although on the one hand, the white settlers of Rhodesia and South Africa fear the use of revolutionary tactics by blacks, they are also bolstered in their opposition and intransigence by powerful third party states such as the United States. U.S. policy is, therefore, critical to understand as an element in the response of white settler regimes to the revolutionary situation in Southern Africa.

Konfederale assosiasie van state of federasie as staatkundige toekomsbedeling in Suid(er)‐Afrika: teoretiese perspektiewe vir die Suid‐Afrikaanse party‐politiek

Abstract Although federal forms of government have become particularly popular in the past century and a half, the federal political systems which have developed since the Second World War, particularly in the developing countries, have shown little stability and functionality. In most cases federation has been little more than a transitionary phase to a unitary structure. The constitutional guarantees upon which federal structures were based, have thus often been of only secondary importance. This article attempts to isolate a precis of the theory underlying confederal associations of states and federal forms of government; to elucidate the policy standpoints of the most important South African political parties in this respect, including opinions expressed in reports in the South African press and enunciated by Black Homeland leaders; and finally to make an evaluation of the applicability of a federal formula in the plural South African context. It is argued that federation, calculated to reconcile unit...

Fighting Two Colonialisms: The Women's Struggle in Guinea-Bissau

The sixties will be remembered as the decade of independence for most of Africa, independence won for the most part at the negotiating table. All too frequently the parties negotiating on behalf of African countries were a carefully cultivated elite who simply replaced the colonial administrators and set the stage for the growth of neocolonialism, coups, and counter coups. Unlike Britain and France, Portugal, until its 1974 revolution, refused to relinquish its colonies in Africa–Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. Guinea-Bissau, a small country on the west coast of Africa, had been a colony of Portugal for 500 years. For most of this period the relationship was one of trading. Portugal was not interested in political control so long as it had access to slaves and other goods. But with the “scramble for Africa” at the end of the nineteenth century, Portugal changed its attitude. Africa was being greedily divided up by the imperial powers and Portugal realized that unless it entrenched its presence and took political control, it might lose out altogether. With the coming to power of Salazar and a fascist dictatorship in Portugal in 1926, the control became both brutal and complete. In 1956 the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was founded by Amilcar Cabral and a few country people. At first PAIGC's goal was to organize workers in the towns, hoping that through demonstrations and strikes they would convince the Portuguese to negotiate for independence. It soon became clear that this was not going to happen. Each demonstration was met with violence, until the 1959 massacre of fifty dockworkers holding a peaceful demonstration at Pidgiguiti. This was a turning point for PAIGC: they realized that independence could not be won without an armed struggle, one that had to be based on the mass participation of the people. They turned their focus to the countryside and to mobilizing the peasants, who represented 95 percent of the population.

THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

ANGOLA'S INDEPENDENCE, marked for 11 November of this year, will end exactly 400 years of Portuguese colonialism in west-central Africa, and will simultaneously terminate a presence that lasted over half a millenium in GuineaBissau, the nearby drought-stricken Cape Verde Islands, and equatorial Sdo Tome and Principe, and nearly as long in Mogambique. At the time of writing (17 February), the politics of independence have moved smoothly in all the Lusophone nations-to-be, except in Angola; there the full array of political forces present in modern Africa converges on a transitional government and an eventual successor whose political shape has not yet become clear. Political coalitions in Lisbon, no more than relatively stable since the coup of 25 April 1974 that propelled Lusophone Africa toward independence, are spread over a wide range, extending from church, landed and financial interests to socialists and radicals of many varieties, and some of these parties have attempted to support like-minded groups present in the former colonies. Generally the identity of the leaders of the Lusophone nations is clear, as the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO in Mogambique undisputedly dominate African politics in those two territories. Some tension divided the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau from the Portuguese in the Cape Verde Islands; but several ephemeral local parties did not survive PAIGC determination to unite islands and mainland under its sway. A little known party called the Movimento de Libertagao de Sao Tome e Principe (MLSTP) has been the only identified political force in the two equatorial Atlantic islands. But in Angola at least four nominally African parties-the Movimento Popular para a Independencia de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional da Libertagao de Angola (FNLA), the Unido para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and the Frente para a Libertagao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)-have captured headlines from the richest of Portugal's African possessions. Politics in Angola and Mogambique also reflect the presence of numerous European Portuguese settlers, estimated at from 300,000 in Angola and (less reliably) at around 170,000 in Mogambique at the time of the April coup. The constellations of Portuguese and African political interests operate in a universe that includes numerous interested outside parties. Nations of the socialist bloc, notably the USSR and the People's Republic of China, have backed certain of the African parties through their development as liberation movements, and may be presumed to retain an interest in the politics of the

The Comintern, South Africa and the Black Diaspora

In late 1927 the Communist Party of South Africa learned with surprise and shock that the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow had drafted a radical new policy for its distant affiliate in southernmost Africa, the only communist party south of the Sahara. The new policy, focused upon the slogan, “an independent native South African republic, as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' government with full, equal rights for all races, black, colored, and white” seemed to a majority of the small multiracial membership of the South African party to be directly counter to the old policy which, after a difficult process of internal disagreements and tactical reorientation, was bringing its first significant wave of recruits and support among the black majority of the country. The slogan proposed from Moscow, quenching dreams of socialism, generated widespread opposition within the party, but an unhearing Comintern decreed in October, 1928, that the South Africans must accept the new line. The consequences of the imposition of the new slogan and the subsequent bolshevization of the party shook the Communist Party of South Africa to its roots.

African Party for the Independence of Guinea-portugal: Agreement Granting Independence of Portuguese Guinea

African Party for the Independence of Guinea-portugal: Agreement Granting Independence of Portuguese Guinea

Guinea Bissau – Khmer Republic – Middle East – Latin America

On 31 July an ICRC delegate and a doctor-delegate visited, on the Ilha das Galinhas, 33 members of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independance of Guinea and Cape Verde) to whom the Portuguese Government had granted prisoner-of-war status. The following day, the delegates went to see a sick prisoner being treated at the hospital in Bissau.

The Kakamega Club of Buganda

In March 1961 the Democratic Party won the national elections in Uganda largely because it captured o of the 21 seats within the Kingdom of Buganda. The Buganda Government had ordered a boycott of the elections, because neither the British administration nor the African political parties would guarantee Buganda's future position within Uganda, and all but three per cent of the electorate stayed away from the polls. The Democratic Party took office despised within Buganda because it had defied the Kabaka, and feared by his Protestant advisers because of its predominantly Catholic support.

Party System as a Comparative Analytic Concept in African Politics

The concepts of political party and political party system are extensively (and profitably) utilized in comparative political analysis. Typologies based on the number of parties in a political system, i.e., the party system, are common. Nonnumeric schemes that use such categorizations as mobilization, reconciliation, and the like as the analytic unit are equally tied to a characteristic of the political party, its ideology, prevailing in the given state. In this article the authors wish to deal only with the usefulness of party system type as a tool for comparative analysis of African politics. Certainly we do not wish to suggest that specific political parties on that continent should not be studied; our review of the literature dealing with African parties is designed solely to establish the context within which comparative schema of party systems have emerged. Our conclusion that this is not an illuminating set of boxes into which to distribute African polities may not surprise some of our fellow Africanists. On the other hand, our suggestion that we view party as a device for a totally different sort of institutionalization may do so. Handy though it may be, party or party system type is not an unambiguous concept. A recent study by William J. Crotty points out the definitional fuzziness prevailing in much of the literature.l While his focus is quite different from ours, he does usefully separate three input sets that delineate the environment of a party: socioeconomic, attitudinal,

The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania

Because the codes, rules and ideology of mass, single-party systems reach the village areas more slowly than do the tangible personalizations of party authority, a situation of potential misuse of power exists where rural party organizations operate. Peasants are aware of face-to-face confrontations by a familiar figure who has gained a party position; they are unaware of the precepts and regulations that the national party has laid down for the village level functionaries. Consequently, political victimization is most prounced at the very grass-root level that national leaders are attempting to integrate politically. Moreover, by its nature the rural party is a multi-faceted organization that is acceptable to the peasants because its leaders provide services that in more structured societies are carried out by specific agencies and contracts. Functions such as family arbitration, police investigation and criminal adjudication are mixed with the more classical party activities of representation and the dispensing of patronage.Taken together, the above two characteristics of a rural party—potential abuse, and the multi-faceted nature—significantly influence the extent and form of political participation in the areas they serve. This article attempts to analyze these characteristics in Tanzania, and thereafter to assess rural party participation, and more broadly to suggest the theoretical dimensions of political participation in a new nation.Participation, it may be argued, is the problempar excellencefor leaders of the new nations. The building of a state, both in terms of economic development and in the creation of a national consciousness, depends upon some type of participation by the citizens.

Controlling crime: A comparison of the policies of South African political parties

This article presents a comparison and evaluation of the crime control policies of seven South African political parties based on official party documents. The policies are compared in terms of the following: (i) the attention awarded to the various elements of crime: victim, offender, formal control, informal control, and the international dimension of crime, (ii) normative frameworks: abolitionism, liberalism, and law and order ideology and, (iii) strategies proposed to control crime: boot camps, deinsti-tutionalisation, situational crime prevention, rehabilitation, and social crime prevention. The discussion is contextualised with reference to philosophical theories of punishment, sociological/ criminological theories and research on crime, and social control patterns and strategies in western societies. Conclusions are drawn regarding the process of policy formulation with reference to globalisation, scientific theories and research, public opinion, and the latent functions of crime control.

The Theory and Practice of African One Partyism: The CPP Re-examined

When Kwame Nkrumah was ousted from power in February 1966, the CPP, generally regarded as the most dynamic of the African single parties, failed to rally to his defence. Many of its leading members indeed openly welcomed the coup.' While most Ghanaians understood the reasons for this seemingly unheroic behaviour, foreign observers, especially those who had made Nkrumah their ideological 'beast of burden' were aghast. How could a party which had dominated the Ghanaian and African scene for a decade and a half and which had

The War Issue and the Collapse of The South African Labour Party, 1914–15

The War Issue and the Collapse of The South African Labour Party, 1914–15