DURING THIS CENTURY WE have made great progress in extending human rights to children and young people. Large-scale, exploitive sweatshops are a phenomenon of the past; many state statutes contain provisions against corporal punishment in schools; and the public is now intervening when there is evidence of child abuse or neglect. Many constitutional rights and privileges, previously granted to adults over 18, have been extended to children and adolescents. High school dress codes and freedom of speech restrictions have been relaxed; the right to defense in juvenile court is now mandatory; and employers are to pay children the national hourly minimum wage for part-time work. These are healthy trends. Moreover, these legal trends are consistent with social trends and social policy generally. Over the last two decades, educational systems have been modified so that young people can play an increasing role in deciding what they want to learn. As a result of career education and other reform movements, young people are helped to make informed choices on training for their future careers (Heyneman, in press). In fiscal year 1976, eight Federal agencies 23 research and development projects that included a youth participation component (Heyneman, Mintz, and Mann 1977); these projects were designed to give young people an increasingly active voice in the guidance of their own affairs and over the affairs of others. This, too, is healthy. Nevertheless, social policy on adolescence can be divided into two categories; the above examples represent only one. They represent a category in which an adolescent's participation is sponsored; that is, an adult privilege or an adult activity is extended to adolescents, which they can choose to exercise without having to relinquish their non-adult financial or legal status. The second category of social policy is one that something of adolescents. This differs from the first in that in exchange for health, protection, and education, a non -adult is asked to participate in an activity over which s/he has little or no choice (Heyneman and Thomas, 1977). Thus the first category of policy represents sponsored experience; the second category represents required experience. I contend that public policy on adolescence has concentrated on the first and has ignored the second. Briefly I will summarize how each can be defined both for private (family) and public policy, including education, and then suggest how social policy which requires something can be advanced without it being unjust.