Intervention*

The chapter explores the challenges and possibilities of greater cooperation between the Security Council and the regional arrangements. Without prejudice to the Security Council’s primary responsibility for international peace and security, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter foresees a robust role for regional arrangements both in the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as through collective measures including the use of force. “Regional frameworks and organizations are critical building blocks for the networked multilateralism” envisaged in the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace. In matters concerning international peace and security, from preventive diplomacy, to early peacekeeping deployments, to enforcement actions under Chapter VIII, the Security Council, has cooperated with regional arrangements as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The chapter explores how the Security Council can do more to strengthen regional cooperation to maintain international peace and security and to fulfill the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has delved into a variety of environmental issues as they relate to international peace and security, including climate change, preventive diplomacy and trans-boundary waters, the impact on the environment of the exploitation of natural resources in armed conflict, and the protection of the environment in armed conflict. Such issues have been addressed in the context of a broadening understanding of the organ’s mandate to maintain international peace and security, although the Council’s engagement on them remains controversial among some of its members. In spite of these political difficulties, there has been significant activity in the Council in recent years on these matters, especially the relationship between climate change and security. The Security Council’s role is not to protect the environment or to settle environmental disputes as a court or tribunal may. But the UN Charter and the Security Council’s practice provide a framework that allows the Council to play a role—and, possibly, to play an even bigger role in the future—in addressing environmental disputes and in engaging more generally in environmental challenges, when it perceives that they are pertinent to the maintenance of international peace and security.KeywordsSecurity CouncilClimate changeSea level riseInternational peace and securityPeaceful settlement of disputesConflict preventionCollective security

The use of force� /no matter how benevolent, enlightened, or impartial in intent� /has dramatic consequences. It shapes the struggle for power and helps to determine the outcome of political contests, which is why it is inherently controversial. It is why international debates about Libya� /the first road test of the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) coercive element (also known as Pillar Three)� /were understandably contentious. Pillar Three is defined as ‘‘the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide ... / protection.’’ 1 While peaceful means of response are primarily preferred, should that prove inadequate to ensure protection, the international community should use more robust action: ‘‘no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.’’ 2

Since the end of the Cold War, substantive reform of the United Nations has emerged as a major issue on the political agenda, and one of the most innovative proposals is Canadian. This proposal, submitted to the General Assembly in September 1995, calls for a United Nations rapid reaction force or capability that will enable the United Nations to respond more quickly and effectively to crises and conflicts. Ostensibly, the belief which underlies this proposal is that the post-Cold War international environment facilitates cooperative action in international security, provides an opportunity to reinforce international norms supporting peacekeeping, and creates greater political demands for the international management of violent conflict. The only dominant obstacles to the attainment of this benign vision, according to the Canadian proposal, are economic and fiscal. However, there are much deeper obstacles, masked by a Charter discourse that reflects a multilateralist and collectivist ideology, that have to do with sovereign rights and national interests. Although the Canadian proposal is designed to be both pragmatic and realistic in the short term, its long-term goal is to create a United Nations standing emergency force largely independent of national authority. This outcome will result over time from the implementation of the incremental structural reforms necessary to create a functional short-term rapid reaction capability. However, the proposal's very pragmatism and realism ensure that instead of increasing the ability of the collective to respond independent of national concerns, the implementation of reform as proposed by Canada will reinforce the national principle. In failing to confront the core issue of political will, a United Nations rapid reaction capability simply provides another means for states, specifically the great powers, to exploit and advance their national interest. If its proposal is adopted, Canada's ability to make choices about international commitments will likely be reduced. Those commitments will be made by others, namely the Security Council and its five permanent members. Driven by long-standing support for internationalism and peacekeeping that has become part of its defining myth, Canada will have no choice but to commit military resources to a United Nations capability and respond positively to Security Council decisions regarding its deployment. Thus, Canada is likely to find itself increasingly subservient to the wishes and desires of others, primarily the great powers led by the United States. Paradoxically, a proposal designed to increase Canadian influence on ideological and functional grounds will have the opposite result. To understand this paradox, our analysis looks at the Canadian proposal within the context of the differing views of the secretary-general and the Security Council on the ability of the United Nations to respond to threats to international peace and security. Canada's proposal supports the position of the secretary-general, even though the Security Council will remain the central decision-making body for rapid reaction development and deployment. Subsequently, an assessment of the key requirements for an effective United Nations rapid reaction capability indicates that simple structural developments are insufficient to overcome national dictates. Finally, the proposal is examined in the context of the defining myth of Canadian internationalism to demonstrate that Canada has 'trapped' itself in precisely the situation the proposal is designed to offset -- subservience to the great powers. THE UNITED NATIONS CONTEXT OF THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL Political conditions, practical experience, and current demand, as well as recent peacekeeping failures, set the broad context for several proposals calling for the development of a United Nations rapid reaction capability.(f.1) Their specific referent is Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace(f.2) -- which is also the source of the difficulties and paradoxes that they entail. …

With the end of the civil war and fading of military and ideological competitions of the superpowers and drastic changes in the international system, maintaining peace and security has been closely associated with the political, social economic and cultural structures of states and their behavior in observing the criteria of human rights. The Security Council as an organ, established for keeping Peace and Security has experienced great opposition to the sovereignty of states by using human rights rules as an alibi, and even has paved the way for military intervention. Normally, material breach of the human rights criteria and fundamental liberties can endanger the international peace and security. In this type of situations, the issue can be discussed in the Security Council with the request of the general assembly and the general secretary. IF the Security Council confirms a threat consequent to the material violation of human rights rules, it can enforce the required actions, regarding its obligations and authorities. The intervention of the Security Council as a representative of the international community with regard to taking decisions for humanitarian intervention in the context of the responsibility to protect and denying the absolute sovereignty of states on one hand and encouraging the states to guarantee the observance of civil rights of people and enabling them in the field of public welfare and even military intervention and protecting nations against tragedies such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, on the other hand are significant challenges. Although the responsibility to protect is practiced in the direction of legitimate intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign nation – states with the objective of protecting humanitarian rules, actually after 2001, the chances for humanitarian measures have been decreased. In this article, we will examine this issue that from the beginning of the third millennium what effects, the concept of responsibility to protect has had by limiting the sovereignty of states and redefining it, aligned with the humanitarian intervention by the Security Council?

Protecting international peace and security is the primary goal of establishing the United Nations. To achieve this goal, the organization has established, since its founding, the International Security Council. The International Security Council is one of the most important main bodies of the United Nations and is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. The Council also With the tasks entrusted to it under Article (24) of the Charter, after the members of the organization, pursuant to this article, entrusted the Council to carry out on behalf of the countries of the organization the task of maintaining international peace and security, which is represented by major and important duties, and because achieving this goal is entrusted to the Security Council, the Charter of Nations granted it the United Nations has many powers and powers that the General Assembly does not have. We find the basis of these powers in Chapters (6-7-8-12). The Council’s decisions also have binding force, as member states are committed to implementing its decisions, based on what is stated in Article (25) of the United Nations Charter, all of this comes in order to protect international peace and security. Article 23 of the United Nations Charter came as the basis for the establishment of this important body, after Chapter Five of the United Nations Charter regulated the work of the Security Council, including the functions and powers, formation and management of the Council’s meetings, and the work of its affiliated bodies. The composition of this Security Council has a characteristic that differs from the rest of the United Nations bodies, as the five major member states enjoy an advantage that the rest of the Council’s member states do not enjoy, and this advantage is evident in the right to permanent membership and the right to veto any decision issued by the Council. Finally, we conclude that the UN Security Council is the real institution that it dominates not only the United Nations, but the entire world. In view of the fundamental goal of the United Nations, which is to protect international peace and security.

World armies: Second Edition. Edited by John Keegan Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company, 1983, xlvi + 688 pages, $80.00. ISBN 8103-1515-7. LC 83-8964.

Foreword / Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas G. Weiss Foreword / Leon Gordenker Preface and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Secretaries-General on Preventative DiplomacyIntroduction1. Preventive Diplomacy in the Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences, the League of Nations, and the United Nations Charter 2. United Nations Policies and Doctrines of Preventive Diplomacy 3. The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by the Security Council 4. The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by the Secretaries-General 5. Preventive Diplomacy During the Cuban Missile Crisis 6. The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by Representatives of the Secretary-General and UN Sub-Regional Offices 7. The Preventive Role of UN Peacekeepers and Observers 8. Preventive Diplomacy in the Economic, Social, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Fields 9. Preventive Diplomacy in an Age of Genocide, Terrorism, and Non-Traditional Threats to Security 10. Cooperative Preventive Diplomacy with Regional and Sub-Regional OrganizationsConclusion: Some Thoughts for the FutureNotes Index About the Author About the United Nations Intellectual History Project

What is optimal relationship between global bodies and regional agencies in international security? This question has been intensively discussed at various junctures during last century, including at establishment of United Nations in 1940s. Indeed, regional approach was loser at this juncture, when the Charter made provision for a dimly conceived and vaguely apprehended regionalism. (1) Today debate between UN and regional organizations has resurfaced--among policymakers as well as research community--as one of most issues in global security architecture, including reform of UN Security Council. The long-standing prevailing view of global-regional relationship in security matters has posited that a dominant UN would delegate tasks to subordinate regional institutions. In this conception, region is simply an intermediate actor that undertakes tasks determined at multilateral level. The main purpose of regional agencies, according to this perspective, is to contribute to a multilateral system controlled by UN Security Council. Even if it is to improve relationship between UN and regional organizations, dominant approach neglects degree to which UN-led approach and regional security governance tend to follow different logics and as a result are potentially competing structures. The UN model is based on a Westphalian nation-state logic, whereas regional approach, at least in longer term, is more consistent with a post-Westphalian world order. With rise of so-called new regionalism in recent decades, regional organizations have become actors in their own right. A number of them--including European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Southern African Development Community (SADC)--have acquired some kind of institutionalized mechanism for conflict management. Regions, through their regional agencies, have transformed from objects into subjects, making their relationship to UN much more complex than current policy and academic debates tend to recognize. This complexity is not likely to decrease in future. The greater actor-ness of regional bodies needs to be recognized. It is more realistic to think of relationship between multilateralism and regionalism in more horizontal and reciprocal terms, compared to orthodox approach where regional agencies are subordinated to UN Security Council. Orthodoxy: The UN Delegating Mandates The UN Charter was made compatible with so-called regional arrangements or agencies. What organizations fall into this category is not precisely defined. As a result, a variety of transnational associations (e.g., Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries), continental bodies (e.g., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), and subregional institutions (e.g., Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS]) have been regarded as classifiable under Chapter VIII of charter. Not surprisingly, idea of regional contributions to UN security operations has resurfaced in recent times with emergence of a new post-Cold War security environment and multiplication of failed states. In 1992, UN secretary-general's Agenda for Peace called for involvement of regional organizations in such activities as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and postconflict reconstruction. Over next thirteen years UN head convened six high-level meetings with regional organizations from all continents involved in security matters. In 2005, secretary-general's In Larger Freedom stated that the United Nations and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing challenges to peace and security. (2) Likewise, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by secretary-general to reflect on UN reform, acknowledged in its 2004 report that regional groupings have made important contributions to stability and prosperity of their members. …

INTRODUCTION After WWII, states were determined to prevent similar horrors in the future. In order to realize this, the prevention of interstate conflict, as well as the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, became important goals of the United Nations. Tension, however, emerged between the promotion of human rights through the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which later led to the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for instance, and a strict respect for state sovereignty that meant to ensure international peace and security. State sovereignty, as the foundation for the modern system of states, came to mean they were ‘legally equal to each other, not subject to the imposition of supranational authority, and, above all, not intervening in each other's internal affairs’ (Evans, 2008, p. 16). The manner in which countries have used sovereignty as an excuse not to intervene when horrendous crimes have been perpetrated or to hide behind it when they have perpetrated the crimes, has increasingly come to be seen as problematic (Cronin, 2007, p. 298). Although Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizes the UN Security Council to intervene in order to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’, for a long time this was defined restrictively and the Security Council was hesitant to interfere with state sovereignty. This frequently severely limited the possibilities to protect populations from human rights violations (Askin, 2005, p. 1723; Grunfeld, 1998). Furthermore, during the Cold War, the Security Council was largely deadlocked. The United States and the Soviet Union vetoed an astounding 279 resolutions, and dictators were largely able to act as they pleased within the confines of their own borders for years, often even while being backed by one of the two superpowers (Ayittey, 2011, pp. 107- 108; Boutros-Ghali, 1992). While the Security Council became much more proactive after the end of the Cold War, and increasingly came to see human rights violations as a genuine concern, there was a continuous failure to prevent genocides from happening (Grunfeld, 1998; Osterdahl, 2005). The genocides that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in particular, where UN peacekeepers were present but failed to intervene in an effective manner, caused international outcry (LeBor, 2006).

While statements by the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary-General demonstrate that environmental degradation is accepted as a possible non-military threat to international peace and security, none of the relevant documentation proceeds to consider how the Security Council might respond to such new threats and sources of instability and conflict. This article examines and evaluates a number of options available to the Security Council should its members choose to address this agenda in more detail. It argues that the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and operational precedent provide an environmental mandate for the Security Council. Any authorization of force, however, is most likely to be confined to environmental war crimes. A more important environmental role for the Security Council lies in preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction.

The next American president's foreign policy will be conducted in the face of two main challenges. One is the legacy of George W. Bush: Iraq in particular, and a substantially weakened US strategic...

The Human Rights Dimensions of International Peace and Security and Humanitarian Intervention after 9/11

Problem setting. The specifics of the development of countries in the modern world are the strengthening of integration processes, the destruction of interstate and interregional barriers, coordination and joint efforts in solving global problems, creating a system of collective security, which caused significant changes in the concept of international security, interaction between countries, their cooperation. Such transformations have also affected the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations, which require it to step up its initiative, find new mechanisms and forms of conflict prevention that would correspond to current trends in the development of states and the specifics of conflict. Analysis of recent researches and publications. Mechanisms of preventive diplomacy are considered by many scientists, both domestic and foreign. Among domestic scientists, special attention is paid to this problem by I. Blyshchenko, M. Matsyakh, O. Gogosha, V. Makarov, I. Komirenko, D. Gorovtsov, A. Melkin, and S. Melnik. Regarding foreign scientists, we should pay attention to the works of such researchers as: G. Nicholson, M. Jensa, W. Latifi, J. Opio, W. Zartman, F. Mancini, A. Williams. It is worth paying attention to the publications of the UN Secretaries General: K. Annan, B. Boutros-Ghali. They detail the key functions of the United Nations, which is a key player in preventive diplomacy. Target of research. The purpose of the article is to define the concept of preventive diplomacy, the range of its subjects, the role in ensuring international and national security. Much attention is paid to the analysis of the activities of preventive diplomacy, which should actively cooperate with each other to effectively prevent conflicts. The authors try to summarize the experience of preventive diplomacy in the field of international and national security, and the obstacles that arise in the modern world in the implementation of its means. Article’s main body. The phrase “preventive diplomacy” came into use by the United Nations during the Cold War. In the late 1950s, UN Secretary-General Dаg Hammarskjöld used the phrase not as a method of preventing potential conflicts, but as a means of preventing conflicts. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace states that diplomatic measures are best used to reduce tensions before they escalate into conflict and, if they do erupt, to contain the conflict quickly and resolving the controversies that caused it. Preventive diplomacy refers to actions aimed at preventing disputes between the parties, escalating existing disputes into conflicts and limiting the spread of the latter in the event of their occurrence. This definition provides an understanding of the objectives of preventive diplomacy, which the UN has associated with a range of actions, such as facilitation, mediation, conciliation, litigation and arbitration. The main areas of preventive diplomacy are: confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and the creation of demilitarized zones. Subjective diplomacy actors such as the UN, the UN Secretary-General as its direct representative, regional bodies, national initiatives, humanitarian organizations and development agencies are widely considered. Conclusions and prospects for the development. The article summarizes the definition of the main problems of modern preventive diplomacy, which negatively affect the implementation of basic means of conflict prevention, confirms the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy in comparison with other instruments for maintaining peace and security in the world.

Key facts Headquarters: New York Members: 192 countries Mandate: to end international war, and promote social and economic development. Key structure: the Security Council has fifteen members, five of which are listed in Article 23 as permanent members, and the remaining ten are elected for two-year terms; decisions are passed when nine members support a resolution including the five permanent members. Key obligations: member states must give up the use of force except for self-defense, must carry out Security Council decisions, and must provide military resources to the Council for its enforcement actions. Enforcement: the Security Council can take any action it deems necessary, including the use of force, to respond to threats to international peace and security. Key legal clauses of the UN Charter: Article 24(1) “… the United Nations … confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Article 25 “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” Article 39 “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall … decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 41 “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.”