First, I would like to thank John McCumber and Joshua Ramey for taking the time to read through my book, and to come up with such insightful comments throughout. In writing the book, I tried to be as balanced as possible, particularly in my reading of Hegel. I'm very pleased that both with John on the nature of difference, and Joshua on the question of implications, we are beginning from a recognition that both Deleuze and Hegel are worthy of genuinely philosophical discussion, even if one or both of them may lose out on the slaughter-bench of the history of philosophy.In response to their papers, I want to go through John and Joshua's comments in the following order. First, I want to address John McCumber's diagnosis that it is the interpretation of the dialectic that is the problem with Deleuze's critique of Hegel. Second, I want to look at the claim that is diversity. I will then turn to the question of multiplicity in Deleuze before concluding with some comments on chance, evolution, and ethics, to address Joshua Ramey's comments.Differences in Interpretation of the DialecticTo begin, then, John McCumber, in his analysis of my critique of Hegel, holds that a different understanding of the dialectic could allow Hegel to sidestep the difficulties I present. On his reading of the dialectic, diversity does not immanently develop into contradiction, leaving the category free to operate as a Hegelian equivalent of Deleuze's concept of difference. I do not think, however, that our disagreement about the relationship between diversity and Deleuze's concept of can be put down to a in how we view the operation of dialectics. As McCumber notes, I consider the dialectic as a process of immanent development of categories, where the inherent limitations of a dialectical category lead to the emergence of new categories. On my reading, when we look at the determinations of reflection, we have a process whereby immanently develops into contradiction. As Hegel puts it, difference as such is already implicitly contradiction; for it is the unity of sides which are, only in so far as they are not one-and it is the separation of sides which are, only as separated in the same relation.1 Similarly, when Hegel talks about the concept of diversity, he notes that the indifference between beings in diversity is ultimately unsupportable:The usual tenderness for things, whose only care is that they do not contradict themselves, forgets here as elsewhere that in this way the contradiction is not resolved but merely shifted elsewhere, into subjective or external reflection generally.2Ultimately, I do not think that differences in our reading of the dialectic are pertinent here, however. While Deleuze (and I) might argue that diversity immanently develops into contradiction for Hegel, this does not mean that diversity isn't a category that can be used to describe the world. It simply means that for Hegel, understanding the world in terms of diversity gives us a partial account of the nature of the world. In the Philosophy of Nature, the categories of physical magnitude are shown to be inadequate, and are eventually sublated into the more adequate categories of animal life. This doesn't prevent us from using the categories of physical magnitude to claim, for instance, that a giraffe is 18 feet tall. This is a partial description of the animal. If we took the statement, 'a giraffe is 18 feet tall' to be an adequate definition of what a giraffe is, however, we would fall into error. Similarly, Deleuze would have to accept that if his concept of were Hegelian diversity, then Hegel would have an affirmative concept of difference. More than this, Hegel would have shown, provided the dialectic was rigorous, that affirmative was just a moment within a broader system of determinations. In fact, however, Hegel's concept of diversity is not what Deleuze means by difference. …