Actual Vote Research Articles

Rating the ratings: How good are commercial governance ratings?

Proxy advisory and corporate governance rating firms (such as RiskMetrics/Institutional Shareholder Services, GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate Library) play an increasingly important role in U.S. public markets. They rank the quality of firm corporate governance, advise shareholders how to vote, and sometimes press for governance changes. We examine whether commercially available corporate governance rankings provide useful information for shareholders. Our results suggest that they do not. Commercial ratings do not predict governance-related outcomes with the precision or strength necessary to support the bold claims made by most of these firms. Moreover, we find little or no relation between the governance ratings provided by RiskMetrics with either their voting recommendations or the actual votes by shareholders on proxy proposals.

Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll‐Call Voting

Do citizens hold their representatives accountable for policy decisions, as commonly assumed in theories of legislative politics? Previous research has failed to yield clear evidence on this question for two reasons: measurement error arising from noncomparable indicators of legislators’ and constituents’ preferences and potential simultaneity between constituents’ beliefs about and approval of their representatives. Two new national surveys address the measurement problem directly by asking respondents how they would vote and how they think their representatives voted on key roll‐call votes. Using the actual votes, we can, in turn, construct instrumental variables that correct for simultaneity. We find that the American electorate responds strongly to substantive representation. (1) Nearly all respondents have preferences over important bills before Congress. (2) Most constituents hold beliefs about their legislators’ roll‐call votes that reflect both the legislators’ actual behavior and the parties’ policy reputations. (3) Constituents use those beliefs to hold their legislators accountable.

Vamos passear na floresta! O conforto térmico em fragmentos florestais urbanos

Esta pesquisa investigou o papel dos fragmentos florestais urbanos no conforto térmico. Para tanto, foram monitoradas cinco localidades na cidade de Campinas (Brasil) durante o verão, outono e inverno de 2009. Os dados microclimáticos foram obtidos com o uso de uma estação meteorológica portátil, que mediu temperatura e umidade do ar, radiação, velocidade do vento e temperatura de globo. Além disso, aplicou-se questionários estruturados e fez-se observações de campo para a avaliação das condições de conforto térmico e da percepção ambiental dos usuários. Os índices PMV e PET foram calculados com o software RayMan 1.2 e comparados com os votos dados nas entrevistas. Os resultados indicam que os fragmentos florestais urbanos contribuem para o conforto térmico. A porcentagem de indivíduos sob condição de neutralidade térmica varia entre os índices: 72,4% consideravam-se confortáveis; 63,3% encontravam-se na faixa de temperatura PET entre 18 °C e 23 º C; e 39,8% estavam na faixa de conforto do PMV entre -0,5 a +0,5. Os usuários percebem os bosques como locais confortáveis, o que é atribuído à presença da natureza. No entanto, notam problemas relacionados à conservação e à ocupação das áreas. O microclima específico da floresta, o ar fresco e a percepção de ar puro foram citados pela população e podem ser relacionados ao conforto ambiental.

Sustaining the “Societal and Scriptural Fence”: Cultural, Social, and Political Topographies of Same-Sex Marriage in Alabama

In June 2006, voters in Alabama overwhelmingly approved a statewide referendum that added a prohibition against same-sex marriage to the state's constitution. This research examines the Alabama vote by “placing” the politics of sexuality within the state's multifaceted web of cultural and social space. We fuse a traditional electoral geography approach with an overall postpositivist cultural and social perspective, beginning with an assessment of the politics of place by situating Alabama as a place with a long history of battles over the so-called culture wars. The cultural politics of the legislative debate and the geographic distribution of the actual vote are also examined within a socio-demographic context, drawing some comparisons from a similar vote in Georgia in 2004, another state in the American Deep South. Those opposed to same-sex marriage in Alabama made effective use of various social constructions that are deeply embedded within a “moral” geography, situating the state as a fenced-off bastion of “religious traditional values,” a common theme throughout the American South. In this vein, social boundaries and territory were demarcated as a powerful political act in Alabama, a strategy that situated the state as hetero-normatively “in place,” while deeming sexual minorities as “out of place.”

Presidential Election Forecasts

This paper contrasts election forecasting models that include macro-economic and financial market variables with forecasts by Fair and the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), as well estimates made by widely recognized pollsters. The Financial Market Model proposed here incorporates the impact of election year stock market changes, including information about the recent financial crisis. However, the Financial Market Model grossly overestimates the challenger's vote share. The IEM forecast of 53.0 percent, the Fair forecast of 51.9 percent, and the Macro-Economic Market model forecast of 51.5 percent were close to the actual vote share of 53.2 percent for the Democratic nominee, but the Financial Market forecast of 59.4 in this paper would have made the president-elect extremely happy.

Micro Evidence on Inter-Party Vote Movements in Turkey: Who Voted for AKP in 2002?

Using data drawn from a survey conducted shortly after the 2002 elections, we investigate the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) election victory from the perspective of inter-party vote movements. Our aim is not only to identify the parties from which the AKP votes originated, but also the segments of these parties' voter bases the party appealed to in particular. Descriptive statistics suggest that almost all of the voters who had voted for the pro-Islamist party in 1999, about half of those who supported the center-right and the ultra-nationalist parties, and one-fifth to two fifth of the supporters of the center-left parties were captured by the AKP. Given that the actual vote share of the party was 34.3 percent, we interpret these figures as evidence of further voter realignment after the election. Our econometric work reveals that confidence in the economic performance of the party was a leading factor in the election outcome. For the voters attracted from the left-of-center parties, ideological factors also played an important role, whereas in the case of voters transferred from the far-right pro-Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties, it was the demographic factors. For the voters coming from the center-right, both sets of variables were important.

(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

We study strategic voting in a laboratory experiment using a Borda mechanism. We find that manipulation rates are surprisingly low, even for individuals who know that they possess superior information about the other agents’ preferences. Exploring possible explanations, we find that manipulation rates rise significantly if individuals are not only informed about the other agents’ preferences but also about their actual votes. This suggests that uncertainty plays a key role in understanding strategic behavior in elections. By contrast, distributional concerns, e.g., in the form of inequality aversion, are found to play a negligible role in our context.

Structural cleavages, electoral competition and partisan divide: A Bayesian multinomial probit analysis of Chile's 2005 election

The transformations in Chile's party structure since 1989 have led several authors to examine the main cleavages shaping partisan divisions and the impact of different factors on citizens' party preferences. Previous studies, however, failed to analyze the effect of these variables on actual vote choice and neglected the influence of election-specific factors. In order to address these issues, we implement a Bayesian multinomial probit model to analyze Chile's 2005 election. We show that, while both socio-demographic variables and attitudes towards democracy affected voter behavior, the latter were the main determinants of the choice between Chile's two main political coalitions. In addition, we find that the presence of a second conservative candidate, together with voters' strategic considerations, significantly affected candidate choice. These results cannot be accounted for by analyses focused on citizens' party identification or by methodologies that ignore the effect of substitution patterns between candidates on voters' electoral behavior.

Corporate PACs and the Stock Market

The 2004 U.S. presidential election was very close. Rumors from exit polls on Election Day showed that John Kerry would likely win, but the actual vote counts revealed on Tuesday night and early Wednesday morning showed that George Bush had been re-elected. This sets up a natural experiment for studying the shareholder-wealth impact of rumor and eventual outcome of election on firms which made an investment in public policy through PAC donations. The authors find that the stock of companies whose PAC contributions favored Democrats performed better on Tuesday and those that favored Republicans performed better on Wednesday. In general, most S&amp;P 500 companies appear to have favored the Republican victory with both their PAC donations and by the reaction of their stock price to election results. <b>TOPIC:</b>Security analysis and valuation

Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?

Proxy advisory and corporate governance rating firms play an increasingly important role in U.S. public markets. Proxy advisory firms provide voting recommendations to shareholders on proxy proposals and sometimes take an active role persuading management to change governance arrangements. Corporate governance rating firms provide indices to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm's governance and claim to be able to predict future performance, risk, and undesirable outcomes such as accounting restatements and shareholder litigation. We examine these claims for the commercial corporate governance ratings produced for 2005 by Audit Integrity, RiskMetrics (previously Institutional Shareholder Services), GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate Library. Our results indicate that the level of predictive validity for these ratings are well below the threshold necessary to support the bold claims made for them by these commercial firms. Moreover, we find no relation between the governance ratings provided by RiskMetrics with either their voting recommendations or the actual votes by shareholders on proxy proposals.

Contingent valuation: A new perspective

After several decades of academic research on the contingent valuation (CV) method a consistent behavioral explanation of ‘hypothetical bias’ is still lacking. Based on evidence from economics, economic psychology and the political sciences, I propose an explanation that is based on two simple working hypotheses about respondent behavior in contingent valuation surveys. The first hypothesis is that survey respondents are unable to form consistent preferences about unfamiliar goods unless the choice context offers reliable, informative cues which can be rationally exploited in simplified heuristics. The second hypothesis is that the probability and impact of strategic responses in dichotomous-choice questions about public goods depends on the extent to which the presented hypothetical costs differ from the actual costs. The literature on hypothetical bias is revisited in the light of these behavioral hypotheses. I find that the hypotheses are generally supported by the empirical data. Moreover, the hypotheses are able to explain several important empirical phenomena that previous research has not been able to explain. In particular, they solve the puzzle that pre-election polls, but not CV surveys, are able to predict actual referendum outcomes, and they explain why income effects on willingness to pay are lower in CV responses than in actual votes. If confirmed by further studies, the hypotheses will have important implications for future research and practice. First, the hypothetical costs presented in the dichotomous-choice question should to be close enough to the actual costs to be credible to all respondents. This can be achieved by specifying the costs as a percentage (rather than absolute) change in taxes. Second, the respondents should be given the option to answer based on information about the positions of large parties and interest groups with known political orientation rather than based on the raw policy information. Theory and evidence suggest that this new survey paradigm largely eliminates the fundamental problems of the conventional stated preference methods.

Cameron's ‘Mandate’: Democracy, Legitimacy and Conservative Leadership

In December 2005, the British Conservative Party elected a new leader for the fourth time since its landslide defeat in 1997. Most Conservatives appear to accept that the Party has to change if it is to stand any chance of returning to office, but equally the arguments about what needs to change, by how much and why have not yet been resolved. In this context, the legitimacy of David Cameron’s position, and of the changes he proposes to make to Party policy, will be of critical importance. Accordingly, the nature and extent of his victory in the 2005 leadership election is likely to be one of his chief arguments. In this article, we seek to evaluate that argument. We contend that, in common with his predecessors, especially since 1965, Cameron’s ‘mandate’ at the outset of his leadership is of limited extent and significance; that his legitimacy is ultimately conditional on his subsequent performance as leader; and that, again in common with his predecessors, it will be for Conservative MPs (or Cameron himself) to decide when that legitimacy is no longer sufficient to sustain him in office. The main reason for this is that, despite the apparent ‘democratisation’ of Conservative leadership selection over time, the reality is that the Party’s MPs remain the ultimate source of legitimacy for an incumbent leader, because they—and they alone—decide when that legitimacy should be withdrawn. In this context, it is interesting, and perhaps significant, that Cameron signally failed to secure the support—expressed in actual votes—of a majority of Conservative MPs before becoming leader

On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout

This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information significantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. We show that the heterogeneous effect of information on the participation of subjects in different teams is driven by the subjects' (incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their inflated probability assessment. Empirical evidence on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with our main experimental result. Namely, we observe that the difference in the actual vote tally between the party leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls only in closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioral model that explains the main findings of our experimental and empirical analyses.

Negative News and the Sleeper Effect of Distrust

The role of the media in the creation of distrust is much debated in political communication. Will negative news, for example, relentless attacks on political authorities, result in political cynicism or in a stimulation effect? By and large the media may stimulate political participation,but it is less clear when negative news will nullify this effect. Negative news may not only have short-term behavioral effects but also effects on underlying attitudes such as trust in politicians, which may produce their “sleeper effect” on political behavior only in the long run. This article addresses two related research questions.Will negative news discourage trust in political leaders? Will trust have a sleeper effect for future party choice and future turnout within the months to come? The 2002 Dutch election campaign,being an unprecedented negative campaign as compared to other Dutch campaigns, provides a good case to investigate these questions. On the basis of a biweekly seven-wave panel survey study and a daily content analysis of television news and newspapers,negative news was found to have a significant effect on trust in party leaders in addition to prior vote preference and education.The distrust in party leaders also had a significant sleeper effect in the long run on turnout and on the actual vote in addition to previous intentions.In general,these findings support the malaise theory. They are helpful to explain why the Christian Democrats could win the elections in defiance of the polls.

Development of a social will for tobacco control index.

To design a valid and reliable questionnaire to assess community support for controlling tobacco. Four samples were obtained to test the psychometric properties of the Social Will for Tobacco Control Instrument. Principal components analysis found 2 factors accounted for 42.8% (personal support) and 9.7% (agency support) of the variance, respectively. Sensitivity was 93.7%, specificity was 90.6%, and validity was 92.3%. The instrument predicted, within 1%, the actual vote regarding a local clean indoor air ordinance. Stability reliability was .84 and .77 respectively for the 2 factors. The SWTCI can help policy makers predict whether communities are supportive of clean indoor air ordinances.

Voter heuristics and political cognition in Italy: An empirical typology

Within a framework of reasoning voters who use various cognitive shortcuts — heuristics — to arrive at decision, we classify Italian voters on the basis of the information they possess, how information and judgment are organized and whether preferences match actual vote. By using only two sets of variables present in nearly all election surveys, we distinguish four types of voters: Utilius, a sort of Downsian voter that uses the left–right dimension in order to reduce the complexity of politics to a unidimensional space; Amicus, who conceives politics as an arena in which two main coalitions fight; Aliens, a detached voter that is strongly disinterested in — or even disappointed by — politics and its protagonists; and Medians, who belongs to a residual category. By distinguishing voters according to their actual knowledge and style of political reasoning, we provide a classification that is both able to grasp actual differences in the level of political cognition and sophistication, and suggestive with respect to the kind of information that are pertinent for the task at hand. We demonstrate that people follow multiple strategies and rely selectively on different kind of available information. It follows that parties, leaders, coalitions and media affect voter behavior, but they have different leverage on different types of voters. We conclude that a proper account of voter behavior needs to move from the search of the determinants of vote to the search of multiple mechanisms through which voters perceive, represent and evaluate the political landscape.

Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland

This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997, when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However, implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main cause of the variation the ‘democratic deficit’ created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoretical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit comparison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a ‘democratic deficit’) appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two referendums.

Election Timing

Election Timing. By Alastair Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 286p. $75.00.Alistair Smith has written, no doubt, the definitive book on the timing of elections in the United Kingdom. This, together with two party swings, is a subject that greatly concerns politicians and commentators in Britain. The conventional wisdom is that the choice of election date is a crucial decision for the incumbent prime minister, and that this choice gives the incumbent a considerable advantage. This follows from the ability of the incumbent to engage in “political surfing” (holding election when the government's popularity is at its highest) or to actively manage the political business cycle to achieve favorable economic conditions at the time of the election. Smith argues, however, that this advantage is overstated. The very act of calling an early election sends a signal to voters that the government has information about future performance that it wishes to hide from the voters. As a result, when governments call early elections, their actual vote share tends to be considerably less than the opinion polls before the announcement would suggest. For example, when Margaret Thatcher called early elections in 1982, she got 42% of the vote, as opposed to preannouncement polls of 48%.

The 2001 British Election Study Internet Poll

ABSTRACT This paper reports on the findings of the Internet component of the 2001 BES and compares them with those of the other BES pre-election surveys. Part 1 outlines the rationale that underpins the introduction of Internet polling as a supplement to more traditional methods of assessing mass public opinion. Part 2 describes the marginal distributions on the key dependent variable-the projected vote shares of the main political parties-of the three pre-election polls that were conducted using BES questionnaires. Intriguingly, the (unweighted) Internet-based poll provided a better guess of the actual vote shares in the subsequent election than either of the two conventional polls. Part 3 provides a more detailed comparison of the profiles of the face-to-face and Internet-based polls. It shows how the Internet poll, compared with the face-to-face poll, was skewed demographically towards the professional classes and politically towards the Conservative Party. Part 4 explores the extent to which the use of the Internet poll might result in spurious causal inferences being drawn about the sources of voting preferences in the 2001 UK election. A simple, direct-effects causal model is estimated using both the face-to-face probability sample data and the Internet survey data. The results suggest that, although the raw probability and Internet samples differ significantly, the relationships among the key variables do not differ significantly across the two samples. We conclude that Internet polling has an important part to play in gauging and analysing public opinion in future UK elections.

Introduction to the Symposium

Two years ago, a research team comprising two political scientists, Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, and two legal academics, Pauline Kim and Theodore Ruger, set out to forecast the votes cast and outcome reached in each case argued before the U.S. Supreme Court during its 2002–3 term. To generate the predictions, the researchers turned to approaches to decision making dominant in their respective fields. The political scientists devised a statistical model, which assumes, in line with the vast disciplinary literature on the subject, that judicial decisions are largely a function of politics and case facts. The legal academics went in a different direction. To tap a common belief in their field—that Court decisions reflect law and jurisprudential principles—they asked appellate lawyers and legal scholars (“experts” in particular areas of the law) to predict the outcome of each of the term's decisions. The researchers then posted all the forecasts on the Project's Web site (http://wusct.wustl.edu), along with the actual votes and outcomes as the Court handed down its decisions. As it turned out, the statistical model produced far more accurate predictions of case outcomes than the experts (75 percent versus 59.1 percent), while the experts did marginally better at forecasting the votes of individual justices (67.9 percent versus 66.7 percent).Lee Epstein thanks Jennifer L. Hochschild, Nancy Staudt, and the journal's reviewers for their comments on her essay, as well as for their help in shaping the symposium.