Actual Entities Research Articles

God and Time in Whitehead

While it is generally agreed that conceives of in Process and Reality as a single nontemporal actual entity, several interpreters have suggested that there difficulties in that conception should be remedied by thinking of as a society of personally ordered actual occasions. This article focuses upon John Cobb's argument for societal view and suggests that that argument, as well as alternative proposal offered by William Christian, is based upon a confusion of Whitehead's two kinds of process (the process of becoming, or concrescence, and process of transition) and their relationship to time. The author seeks to demonstrate that Whitehead's system in Process and Reality not only allows a conception of as a single nontemporal everlasting actual entity but, in fact, demands it. Bowman L. Clarke is Professor of Philosophy and head of Department of Philosophy and Religion at University of Georgia. He is author of and Whitehead's Conception of Speculative Philosophy, Language and Natural Theology, and other publications. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:44:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 564 Bowman L. Clarke Most interpreters of agree that in Process and Reality is conceived by as a single nontemporal actual entity. A number of interpreters, however, have argued that this view involves difficulties can be remedied if we reconstruct along lines of a personally ordered society of actual occasions, or a nexus. Let us refer to this first view as entitative view and to second as societal view./l/ In this paper I want to examine these apparent difficulties posed by entitative view, seem to suggest that a societal view is more coherent, or consistent, with Whiteheadian metaphysics -primarily those difficulties posed by John Cobb in his A Christian Natural Theology. There may be reasons external to Whiteheadian metaphysics, such as religious, philosophical, or scientific reasons, to prefer a societal view,/2/ but I want to focus solely on those apparent problems internal to writings of seem to suggest that a societal view is preferable. And I shall use problems raised by Cobb as an occasion for investigating anew problem of relation of to in Process and Reality. Cobb's argument that a societal view is preferable to entitative view can conveniently be summarized in eight steps and a conclusion as follows: 1. From point of view of physical actual occasions temporally (185). This assertion is understood to mean that perish as soon as they have (187). This is taken to mean, Cobb writes, that the temporal extension happens at as an unit (186). Or again, Cobb writes, the occasion must be said to become at once (186), and this is taken to mean that occasions are into earlier and later portions (185-86). The second step concerns sequential ordering of physical time: 2. [P]hysical [is] derived from transition from one occasion to (185). is in this way, Cobb tells us, that Whitehead's reference to Locke's time is a perpetual perishing is to be understood. He writes, for example, For 'time' is physical time, and it is 'perpetual perishing' (187). Time, then, is a series, each member of is to be conceived as becoming all at once of a temporally atomic actual occasion is indivisible into earlier and later portions and which perishes as soon as it has become, and is then succeeded by another such atomic actual occasion, and so on. 3. Whitehead recognizes process in consequent nature of God (188). This, of course, is a rather important premise since it is taken by most interpreters of to be what distinguishes his view of from classical views. And it is generally taken to be his major contribution to theology. Cobb summarizes Whitehead's view this way: It is quite clear that description of as non-temporal does not This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:44:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

3. Differential Diagnosis

It is most important to know the etiology of fistula ani (for example, colitis ulcerosa, Crohn's disease, etc.) and to understand the pathogenesis. Once this is accomplished, it is easy to differentiate fistula ani from other diseases.The actual entity of fistula is distinguished by the presence of the primary opening, the sinus tract, and the secondary opening. The circumferential lesions have been organized into 5 groups such as perianal, anal canal, ischiorectal, intratectal, and presacral region. In the presacral region, there are three important factors that should be given careful clinical attention. The first is the presence of postanal sinus, or dimple, and abscess. The repeated anorectal surgery as a result of misdiagnosis may induce an anorectal functional insufficiency.The second factor is the 60-80% frequency of congenital lesions occuring in this region. Approximately one third of these lesions may be maliganant.The third, and final factor is the low incidence of such lesions. It has been reported for only one out of 40, 000 hospitalized patients and one out of 7, 000 cases examined rectosig-moidoscopially.Therefore, it can be seen from these point that the presacral region is most important to differentiate fistula ani. Generally, anorectal diagnosis can be made in over 90% of the cases on the digital examination, using careful and skillful techniques. Many other exami-nations (blood, x-ray, endoscopy, biopsy, angiography, etc) may also be performed, but, deter-mined diagnosis should be performed histopathologically.However, we propopsed the necessity of recto-, and anorectal digital examination.

Whitehead and Personal Identity

WHITEHEAD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY T!E QUESTION whether Whitehead's speculative phiosophy can be adequately applied to the fact of personal identity has long been a thorn in the sides of Whiteheadians. Personal identity seems to be a fundamental aspect of experience to which any comprehensive and systematic philosophy simply must do justice. Yet the distinctive features of Whitehead's thought, particularly its atomism, appear to militate against, if not indeed preclude, any such adequacy. In his A Christian Natural Theology, John Cobb considered this problem and attempted to provide a solution.1 The purpose of this article is to examine that solution, to raise some questions about it, and to present some alternative suggestions. Although it has been several years since Cobb's book was published, it seems appropriate to review his contribution because of the fundamental importance of the issue. For the success of Whitehead's speculative philosophy can be viewed as resting upon the cogency of its claim to be a " one-substance cosmology." 2 The one categoreal scheme is to provide one conceptuality applicable to God, man, and the natural world alike. The cogency of this claim is reduced, however, if the scheme is really inapplicable to man's experience of personal identity. In this context Cobb's proposal becomes fairly important . If it cannot bear the weight he places upon it-and 1 John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 47-91. Subsequent references to this work are abbreviated as CNT and incorporated within the text. 2 Process and Reality (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 1'!9, see p. 168. Sub~equent references to this work are abbreviated as PR and incorporated within text. 510 WHITEHEAD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 511 he admits to some dissatisfaction with his own solution-an alternative must be sought.3 I Cobb locates the problem of personal identity as resting with Whitehead's account of the soul, that center of consciousness and experience which we otherwise, and more usually, identify as the self. In more technical terms, the soul is that living person which is the series of dominant occasions within a body. Cobb does not think that questions about the role of the body in personal identity are really to the point, for in the last analysis "it is the soul that is truly personal, the true subject." (CNT 66) 4 The body is rather the environment for personal existence and is itself " ontologically distinct " from the soul. (CNT 66) Thus it is apparent that by personal identity Cobb has in mind the identity of the person construed as a centered self or soul rather than a mind-body unity of which the soul is only a part. Now it is quite clear that Whitehead's categories repudiate any notion of a numerical or absolute self-identity through time. Such self-identity belongs only to individual actual entities. The fact of personal identity through time cannot then be construed in Whitehead's system in any absolute sense. The question is whether it can be clearly construed in terms of the soul. Cobb argues that Whitehead presents two categoreal or systematic resources for this task. Both pertain to the relationship between successive actual entities in a personally ordered society. The first resource which might explicate 3 Cobb himself points out the seriousness of the issue (CNT 74, 76). • I think Cobb is incorrect in this position, but I am unable to argue the point here. Whitehead does observe that if " human occasions of experience e«sentially inherit in one-dimensional personal order, there is a gap between human occasions and the physical occasions of nature," Adventures of Ideas (New Yol'k: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 243. (Subsequently references to this work are abbreviated as AI and incorporated within the text.) The whole thrust of Whitehead's endeavor is directed against such a gap. Cobb's position only widens it. 512 JOHN B. BENNETT personal identity is the inheritance of a common pattern or character. The second is some special mode in which the past is inherited. Cobb's solution involves the complete rejection of the first resource and a development of the...

Is Whitehead’s ’Actual Entity’ A Contradiction in Terms?

Research Article| July 01 1972 Is Whitehead’s ’Actual Entity’ A Contradiction in Terms? Robison B. James Robison B. James Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Process Studies (1972) 2 (2): 112–125. https://doi.org/10.2307/44797363 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Robison B. James; Is Whitehead’s ’Actual Entity’ A Contradiction in Terms?. Process Studies 1 January 1972; 2 (2): 112–125. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/44797363 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveUniversity of Illinois PressProcess Studies Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. © Copyright 1972 Process Studies1972 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Whitehead's 'Actual Entity' and the Buddha's Anatman

Whitehead's 'Actual Entity' and the Buddha's Anatman

Theistic Realism and Monistic Idealism

THEISTIC REALISM AND MONISTIC IDEAI.ISM IT HAS BECOME a common methodological device for Thomistic philosophers to emphatically distinguish their own evidentiary and logical foundations from those of modern idealism. In this way they hope to show that the antimetaphysical criticisms inspired by opposition to idealism are quite provincial and fail to deter a metaphysical effort conceived in an alternate fashion. Whether this device is fully successful or not, there do seem to be emphatic differences between the two outlooks. I wish to clarify the often misunderstood contrast betwen these two metaphysical positions, while pointing out certain similarities that are often overlooked.1 Although it is quite true that neither Thomas Aquinas nor F. H. Bradley are quite the philosophical fashion these days, they do provide excellent specimens of their respective metaphysical types. Few other theistic realists have attained the stature of Aquinas in Western philosophy, and due to the special interest he has held for subsequent Catholic scholars, no other philosopher's doctrines have been more closely examined and refined. Hence, a comparison of any other type of philosophy with that of Thomism would not suffer from any deficiency of delineation on the part of theistic realism. Bradley, furthermore, is an appropriate specimen of monistic idealism. Not only was he the leading British idealist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and as such the 1 That there are similarities is illustrated by the effort of A. E. Taylor to identify his Bradleian inspired metaphysics with that of Thomism. His effort to interpret the Absolute as the Thomistic God and the appearances as the Thomistic participations is not entirely successful, since he is unwilling to make the radical re-interpretation of evidentiary foundations that this would require. Nevertheless, it does bring to the forefront certain analogies between the systems that are often overlooked. See Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics, London: Methuen and Co. (University Paperbacks), (1903, 1909) 1961, both prefaces and dedication. 661 662 GARY L. BEDELL prototypical philosophical villain for Anglo-American empiricists , pragmatists, and analytical philosophers, but he is also more critical and skeptical than his great German mentor, Hegel. Bradley learned much from Hegel, but he always resented being called an hegelian or neo-hegelian, since the ultimate dialectical rationality of the Absolute, so dear and essential to Hegel, was what Bradley could not accept. Hence, it is possible to reject certain fundamental doctrines of Hegel's dialectical monistic idealism and yet maintain a monistic idealism akin to Bradley's. A comparison of theistic realism with Bradley's version would be, therefore, much more direct and elucidating than with Hegel's more specialized version of monistic idealism. The clarification of metaphysical types is much better served in this fashion. I. ExPERIENCE AND EXISTENCE 1. Although on the question of what it is that makes something real a realist and an idealist must part company, there is a common commitment for St. Thomas and Bradley that is easily overlooked. Both subscribe to what Whitehead was later to call the ontological principle, that is, that all real explanations must be in terms of actual entities. In Thomism this takes the form of the basic dictim that absolutely considered act is prior to potency. This means that, while in a changing being potency has a certain temporal priority to act, real causal efficacy and absolute priority resides in actuality. The world of potency and possibility exists only in abject dependency on act. Ultimately, to be is to be actual. The so-called world of possibles is neither real in itself nor some intermediate realm between actual being and nothingness. Much less is it a broader, more extensive realm conveying the primary meaning of being. Rather the possibles are defined in reference to the actual; they are possible precisely as conceivable participations THEISTIC REALISM AND MONISTIC IDEALISM 663 in the actuality of God. Hence, in one sense the primacy of existence in Thomism means the primacy of actuality. With this Bradley would quite concur. Indeed the worst philosophical sin for Bradley was to commit the fallacy of vicious abstraction. Vicious abstraction is the process of confusing the products of our own abstraction with concrete actuality. Metaphysics is the intellectual...

Whitehead's Metaphysics: A Critical Examination (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 99 Whitehead's Metaphysics: A Critical Examination. By Edward Pols. (Carbondale: Southern 111. Univ. Press, 1967. Pp. v-ix+195. $6.50) Edward Pols's book is a worthy addition to Whitehead scholarship despite my disagreement with his interpretation of crucial parts of Process and Reality. It was a delight to me to dip into his book and find myself carried beyond Whitehead into a penetrating analysis of the concept of freedom ingredient in Process and Reality. In this respect, the title of the book is a little misleading, since Pols's critical examination concerns Whitehead's concept of freedom . He ferrets this out of the text with great care, which leads him into some of the crucial doctrines of Process and Reality. He reads Whitehead with sympathy and understanding , and students will benefit from his analysis. The basic question of the analysis is to what degree Whitehead's metaphysics allows a genuine place to freedom. Clearly Whitehead intended to do so. Some of the crucial passages bearing on this question are: Categorical Obligation IX, which asserts, "the concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free" (PR 41); "whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence" (PR 41); and "however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence.., beyond the deterruination of these components, there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe" (PR 75). Pols quite properly, in dealing with this question, gives a wider sense to freedom, what he calls the "factor of freedom," including: "a) indetermination; b) as a correlate of indetermination, novelty, which, reflecting perhaps an optimistic bias, is sometimes identified with creative advance; c) self-causation (or self-creation) in the sense of an aim at a certain 'subjective intensity' of feeling" (p. 21). It is important, I think, at the outset to remind ourselves that creativity, novelty indetermination, origination, and chance need not be the same as freedom. It is a common error to slip from one to the other, and some metaphysical systems depend on moving from one to the other. I believe that Whitehead's Category of Creativity includes freedom in his special sense, but we could have novel creative origination without freedom. Freedom is almost too vague or ambiguous to be of much use to a metaphysician, and Whitehead wisely avoids its frequent use. Pols argues that Whitehead cannot give a proper place to freedom in his system. First, the internal constitution of an actual entity is not free because it is determined by the subjective aim of that actual entity and the subjective aim is derived from a hybrid physical feeling of God's primordial nature, a feeling that occurs in the initial phase of concrescence. Second, the phases of concrescence of an actual entity generate an incompatibility between the hybrid physical feeling of God, providing the subjective aim in the initial phase and the subjective aim as a feeling of a proposition, which could only occur in a late phase of concrescence. Third, also stemming from the phases of concrescence, the internal selfcausation of an actual entity, which brings about modification of the subjective aim, is the result of determinate components or of creativity. But creativity contributes no active power, according to Pols, and the internal constitution of an actual entity is completely governed by a network of internal relations among eternal objects playing various roles, leaving no room for the decision of subject-superject in its final creative reaction which closes concrescence. Fifth, eternal objects are the ultimate ontological elements in Whitehead's system despite Whitehead's repeated claim that actual entities are fundamental (pp. 98-99, 141-142, 157-158, 193-195). Weaving in and out of the entire fabric of Process and Reality, Pols carefully collects his passages to give the evidence for these criticisms. The marshalling of evidence is carried out with due caution, always allowing for subtle differences of meaning, indicating a close reading of the text. This analysis makes the book worth reading regardiess of whether one agrees with...

Whitehead and Private-Interest Theories

ALTHOUGH Whitehead did not write a systematic ethics, I nonetheless believe that a philosophically tenable ethics can be derived from certain of his metaphysical and religious doctrines. There has been relatively little scholarly attention given to such a project-affirmative or otherwise. Of the few relevant articles that have appeared, several suggest that ethics derived from Whitehead's doctrines would be a private-interest theory.1 Although value categories are recognized as central to Whitehead's metaphysics, the critics note, and rightly so, that the categories are aesthetic and contain no specifically ethical values. Concluding further that in Whitehead's philosophy ethical categories would therefore be reduced to categories of aesthetics, the critics judge that the imputation of a private-interest theory to Whitehead is legitimate. I will first argue that this imputation is a mistake and attempt to uncover its possible origins; finally I will construct the foundation of a more plausible Whiteheadian ethics, a task deserving of serious and detailed attention. Although this estimation of importance cannot be fully defended here, it is this conviction rather than the demands of the merely preliminary polemic that has motivated the present study. As a first contention I briefly note that it is not argument in favor of the position of the alleged private-interest theory proponents to indicate that Whitehead did not specify any values peculiar to ethics or, indeed, write ethical theory. Ethical values would be a special case of generic values. And Whitehead, as is well known, was philosophically interested in the analysis of generic principles that apply to all actualities.2 Consequently he would not find it of initial importance to discuss specifically ethical values, for clearly this would require a separate categoreal analysis of human conduct. It would be sophistical, however, for the critics to argue that not having intention implies that the intention could not be fulfilled. Fortunately or unfortunately, intentions and abilities are linked with no exhaustive reciprocity in human activities. The major part of the dispute must confront the opposing interpretations on the substantive rather than the methodological level by considering the alleged basis of their position in Whitehead's metaphysical principles. These critics take the theory of feelings, meant by Whitehead to apply to, and be generically descriptive of, all actuality, to be of central relevance. The suspect doctrine is Whitehead's claim that all feelings are rooted in aesthetic experience: an actual fact is a -fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity (PR, p. 427). A feeling is a component in the concrescence of every actual entity, productive of the process toward completed unity, the 'satisfaction' in Whitehead's particular meaning of that term. In short, feelings aiming at satisfaction contribute to the generic and fundamental activity of every actual entity. The primary characteristic of the generic valuation is its determination by what individual takes to be important in actualizing its subjective aim. Valuation is dependent upon the individual's interest. In describing this generic experience, Whitehead uses various value concepts, for

Moral freedom and metaphysics

IT IS A safe bet that a substantial number of Professor Reinelt's readers at least found themselves clenching their fists in exasperation, if not quitting in utter despair, before they had read more than a dozen pages of his essay. The simple truth is that most of us, for better or for worse, do not think of ourselves as living in a world of pure possibilities, realized possibilities, or actual entities. Our world is rather a world of trees and stones, of brick and mortar, of men and books and cars and trucks and all the other familiar objects of our everyday experience. It is only by the most unusual effort that we can wrench our minds from the familiar categories of our workaday world, and force it to seek, as Reinelt says, some general account of the character of that which (we) encounter. And many there are who are far from convinced that the project is really worth the effort—whence it follows that few men become philosophers, and fewer yet metaphysicians. Kierkegaard once said of the attempt to prove the existence of God that generally speaking, it is a difficult matter to prove that anything exists; and what is still worse for the intrepid souls who undertake the venture, the difficulty is such that fame scarcely awaits those who concern themselves with it. * Something similar must surely be said of those hardy souls who venture into the perpetually

Whitehead's Theory of Human Agency

An adequate theory of the self must provide for the fact of human agency. I would like to show that (1) we can put together a theory of human agency from Whitehead's later writings, but that (2) this theory is not satisfactory. This discussion will be, first, expository and then critical of Whitehead's position. An elaboration of Whitehead's theory has two moments. For Whitehead, all factors of the universe are finally derivative from the ultimately actual things, which he calls actual entities. The fact of agency is no exception. The establishment of such agency is the job of what I shall call Whitehead's microscopic theory. We are interested here, however, in the human being as agent. A person, according to Whitehead, is not an actual entity, but a society of actual entities. Whitehead's theory of human agency may be called the macroscopic theory. After an examination of these theories, I shall conclude by briefly criticizing them in two ways. First, for Whitehead there are no acts but only processes. Second, an adequate theory requires a doctrine of the persistence of the agent which Whitehead is unable to provide.

The self-concept, identity, and alienation from self

T HE BEGINNINGS Of neurotic development are generally at t r ibuted to disturbances of childhood growth, disturbances which affect the formation and organization of the self. T h e various psychoanalytic theories differ in their emphasis on the factors involved in the child, in its environment, or in the relationship between the two. T h e thesis presented in this paper is that ~haracteristic developmental changes of the self occur during the maturat ive growth of the young child, along with and parallel to neurot ic developmen~ I believe that these two processes intertwine and mutual ly modify each other in certain definable ways. While a holistic theory of neurosis may satisfactorily explain the driving forces, the motivational processes, and the form of the neurotic personality, the explanation of many part icular aspects can best be found in modifying influences of this early self-development. I have previously tried to point out that different conceptions of the self among the various analytic schools derive from functional principles. 1 Now it has become evident that consideration of the growing self must also take into account certain differences with the adult. In the adult the self we deal with at any specific moment represents the confluence of two dimensions of experience. First is the historical or longitudinal, with the newborn infant and the mature adult at the two extremes. Second is the dimension of immediate experience in the here-and-now, the horizontal, with the internal and the external world as the two limits. T h e infant has Iess of an experienced past to the extent that he is young; this gradually changes as he grows chronologically with more lived experience to influence him. T h e infant's inner world first predominates in importance over the outer one. This changes as his awareness of the external world grows through the maturat ion of sensory and intellectual capacities, and as his communicative and symbolizing abilities develop. Because these formative processes are more active in the child, it is possible to distinguish more easily the various aspects of the self. As Piaget, Gesell, and others have shown, the infant begins to become aware of himself as a bounded entity, an experiencing "I," very early. As we consider this early awareness of self, several components may be differentiated. I do not conceive of these as actual organic entities, bu t ra ther as more or less organized aspects or functions of the total unitary organism in process. I t is simply convenient to make these distinctions in order to bet ter clarify

SOME CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF “KIHANSEN” (STEAM-AND-SAIL BOAT) TRAFFIC IN THE SETO INLAND SEA

Even today when land traffic has attained remarkable progress, marine traffic in the Seto Inland Sea is still of high economic value. In fact, “Kihansen” takes up more than half of the total volume of goods transported and is playing an important role in the economic development of that area. It is rather difficult, however, to grasp the actual entity of this business, because over 90% of the shipowners are working on so small a scale that we might say ‘one ship one owner’. And yet in view of its being an important and complicated business, there are many interesting problems to be surveyed in regard to the forms of traffic and management. In this draft, the economic value of the “Kihansen” traffic has been closely studied, by analysing quantitatively the real conditions of fright transport, and through the subsequent regional differences in the degrees of dependence on “Kihansen”, the establishment of the area of operations of traffic, the ways of connection of these area of operations, and through their graphic representation. The following is the gist of the investigation. (1) The “Kihansen” service enjoys some strong points over that of steamships such as adaptability to the traffic conditions of the Inland Sea, reduction of the expenses of loading and unloading, comparative cheapness of short distance freightage, handling chiefly of small cargoes, lack of modernized harbour facilities for steamship, and all this gives the “Kihansen” service the principal position in the Inland Sea traffic. Thus it makes itself one of the fundamental factors in the establishment of the industrial area along the Inland Sea coast. (2) The transported goods being mainly rough and raw materials, the traffic takes the form of one way transport on the whole, while the kinds of goods make a difference in carrying distances, and such goods as coal, metals, fertilizers belong to the long distance transport. (3) While the “Kihansen” traffic in the Seto Inland Sea constitutes a big traffic area of operations centering on the Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe) area, the whole sea may be re-divided into five big traffic areas of operations by regional variations in traffic volume arising from the extent of local industrialization and sectional differences in the kinds and quantities of resources. (4) Namely, they are divided by three north-south lines, Katakami-Naruto line, Fukuyama-Tomo line, Iwakuni-Nagahama line and by two east-west lines, one passing south of Nakashima, Osaki-shimo-jima, Omi-shima, Ikuguchi-shima, Inno-shima, and Kitaki-shima, the other passing north of Nao-shima, and Shodo-shima (Fig.8). (5) As for traffic volume, that within the area of operations is relatively larger. The volume is sweepingly great in the Hanshin (eastern) area, the western area coming next. Aki and Bittyu (northern two) areas are reversely prominent in out-of-the-area-of-operations traffic, but the volume is rather small. The Shikoku (southern) area keeps the balance. The out-of-the-area-of-operations traffic is carried out between the Hanshin area and the western and the Shikoku areas. (6) The main routes of the traffic take this form: raw materials and fuel goods from Northern Kyushu and Shikoku flow into the Hanshin area, and the primary or finished products worked and manufactured there are again distributed among the different parts of the same area of operations. (7) The traffic form can be divided into two big types; one is the external traffic whose object is chiefly to transport rough and raw materials, fuel, and consumer products; the other is the internal traffic shipping various productive and manufactured goods, either primary or finished, to shorter distances, and the principal lies in the latter.

The essence of universals

Since it is evident that discourse cannot be formed by means of a vocab ulary of proper-names only, the theory of the other constituents of language which includes the theory of universals, is connected with the classification of any vocabulary and with the description of different classes of words as to their significations. Many words are modifications of nouns and verbs, but they occur in a changed form as nouns and verbs too. Most words denote features of actual entities but not actual entities as do proper-names. Further we need for the completion of dis course the so-called logical vocabulary of any language which contains connectives or 'basic articles such as 'is', 'not', 'and', 'or', 'unless', 'if, 'than', 'neither', 'nor', 'some', 'all' '!). Plato in his Theory of Ideas postulated for the meaning of some con stituents of language reality the only kind of reality in the universe and if we begin with the doctrines of Greek Thinkers we may write History of Philosophy in terms of the discussion of the meaning of those constituents of language, which do not suffice, if used as single words, to denote actual entities. The discussion is not finished until to-day, and modern Philosophers think sometimes to conclude it by the remark that all differences of opinion may be reducible to differences in the definition of the concept 'universal' which is arbitrary in principle 2). Against Plato's opinion it may be pointed out that he has not seen that the universe which is the object of his theory is a universe of discourse only. His ideas are in fact transitory phenomena because human discourse is a transitory phenomenon created by man and a function of his mind. The so-called ideas are terms of human discourse and abstract in so far as they were undefined as to position in time and space, but not 'eternal objects', as Platonists maintain. If we speak on Universals, it must be noted, that the word 'universal' is

Electron microscope studies of dentine: The true nature of the dentinal canals

1. 1. Electron microscope studies of decalcified sections and surface replicas of young dentine are reported. 2. 2. The appearance of the odontoblastic processes varies with different fixatives and different decalcifying fluids used. 3. 3. The odontoblastic process is composed of a protoplasmic extension of the odontoblast cell which appears in fixed sections as a fine fibrous network or as a tube, depending on the fixative used. We interpret this varying appearance as being due to the different precipitating actions of fixatives in altering the colloidal nature of the protoplasm. 4. 4. The dentinal tubule, as presently accepted from examination of decalcified sections, is not the true picture of the structure existing during life. It is a canal with walls composed of highly inorganic material, much harder than the surrounding matrix and enclosing in its center the odontoblastic process. The diameter of the actual canals, therefore, is only that of the odontobastic process, approximately 1 to 1.5 μ. There is no appreciable space for the diffusion of tissue fluid around this process. 5. 5. The erroneous appearance of a patent canal surrounding the odontoblast fiber in decalcified sections is due to acid solution of this highly calcified wall. 6. 6. In these experiments the internal diameter of the calcified wall is of the order of 1.2 μ and corresponds to the accepted diameter of an odontoblastic process. The external diameter of the wall of this canal is of the order of 3 μ and corresponds to the accepted diameter of what previously was considered to be the dentinal tubule. 7. 7. In some preparations there is a suggestion of a further sheath of organic material, which surrounds the calcified wall described and separates this from the surrounding matrix. This organic structure, if an actual entity, may be what has been described as Neumann's sheath.

Morphological and Functional Aspects of Living Matter and Whitehead's Category of Actual Entity

It may seem trivial to state that one of the major trends in biological investigation consists in an attempt to explain the structural and functional aspects of living matter in chemical terms, in an effort to obtain insight into the equivalent of macroscopic phenomena on the molecular level. I am sure you are aware of, and this meeting of the Association has brought ample additional evidence, in how many fields this tendency has become apparent. It can be recognized in genetics with the molecular analysis of chromosomes and the enzymatic or metabolic interpretation of hereditary properties like the eyecolor of Drosophila. In a purely morphological branch like histology we do not ask merely for a differentiation of stained cell structure but we ask for the nature of the staining reaction; in nerve physiology we try to interpret conduction as alterations of protein lipoid layers; or in pathology where the age old syndrome of inflammation is explored with biochemical methods. I should mention molecular models of membranes and cell surfaces, the molecular interpretation of secretion and of the macroscopic phenomena of metabolism. Yet insofar as this yield of data could be designated as a trend, it would rather seem to be the natural outcome to be expected from the application of the analytic method of science. In one instance, however, this approach has been carried farther than in all the other fields, and it would seem to be worthwhile to pause for one moment to ask whether this case is important merely because of its technical implications or whether it is meaningful in a wider sense.

Eternal Objects and the Philosophy of Organism

In what follows our purpose is to make clear the reasons which lie back of Whitehead's appeal to eternal objects in his explanation of the emergence of actual entities and to show that so long as one operates within his scheme of ideas no other consistent explanation is available. A thoroughgoing reconstruction of the scheme is necessary if this presupposition is to be eliminated. If the project is successful, it will be demonstrated that the theory of actual entities provides no basis for the explanation of the emergence of novel things, which is one of the major tenets of the organic philosophy. The argument will develop by way of an analysis of the theory of “physical relatedness.”

Whitehead's Philosophy: The Higher Phases of Experience

In my last article I described fully the important type of entity in Whitehead's philosophy called “propositions,” and explained the part they played in conscious experience. We learnt that “consciousness” was a certain kind of emergent quality associated with the late phase of concrescence of some high-grade actual entities. It was pointed out that whenever consciousness was present in experience, this proved to be the subjective form of an integral synthetic feeling composed of (1) a physical feeling and (2) a pro-positional feeling. This integral feeling was said to be a feeling of contrast between “actuality” and “ideality,” between a fact and a possibility. That is to say consciousness is the subjective form of the feeling of a contrast between what actuality is, and might not be, or what actuality is not, and yet might be. We can now proceed to deal with a number of higher phases of experience such as “belief,” “conscious perception,” “judgment,” together with experiences termed by Whitehead “physical purposes.”

Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence and Criticism

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.

Whitehead's Philosophy: Propositions and Consciousness

In earlier articles I explained the fundamental entities in the Organic Philosophy, namely: actual entities or actual occasions, and eternal objects. But there is also a third type of entity called “propositions,” very important for the introduction of novelty into our world, and indispensable for “consciousness” and the higher phases of experience. Before discussing Consciousness and these higher phases, it is necessary, therefore, to give an account of propositions.

Whitehead's Philosophy: Space, Time and Things

In earlier articles an account has been given of some of the chief notions in the Organic Philosophy, namely Creativity, Actual Entities, Eternal Objects, God. In the present article the writer will endeavour to present Whitehead's doctrine concerning the space-time continuum and the nature of enduring objects implicated therein.